P L D 1967 Lahore 459 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD AKRAM, J.‑This order will dispose of Writ Petition No. 1166 of 1964 by Mr. A. R. Niazi and 10 others and Writ Petition No. 1276 of 1964 by Sh. Abdul Majid and others.

2. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1166 of 1964 are the practising Advocates of this Court. They are occupying portions of Bungalows Nos. 17, 17‑A, 17‑B, 19‑A and 19‑B Fane Road, Lahore. They have filed this writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan for a declaration to the effect that the sale of the properties in their possession belonging to the Dayal Singh College Trust Society to the State Bank of Pakistan was unauthorised, illegal and ultra vires and the orders of the Chief Settlement Commis?sioner separately served on them to vacate the premises in their occupation and to deliver its possession to the State Bank of Pakistan were of no legal effect. The petitioners have further prayed for a direction against respondents Nos. 1 to 3 for the transfer of these properties to them. The petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 11 are claimants displaced persons from India. The rest of the petitioners are locals beloning to the territories now forming part of Pakistan. All the petitioners have their offices in separate portions of the property in dispute. The petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 are also residing there. It is admitted that petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 are in possession of the portions in their occupation as tenants under the Dayal Singh College Trust Society since Independence, while the remaining petitioners occupied the premises afterwards as tenants or licensees under the Trust. All of them excepting petitioners Nos. 7, 9 and 10 were in undisputed‑ occupation of the portions in their possession before the 20th of December 1958. The property in dispute admittedly belonged to the Dyal. Singh College Trust Society established for running a first class College at Lahore. The College thus founded has continued to function even after the partition. In the writ petition the property in dispute is regarded as evacuee property attached to the charitable, religious and educational trust. It is averred in this petition that under section 4 (2 i of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the evacuee properties attached to charitable, religious and educational trusts were expressly excluded from the compensation pool constituted under the Act. To them special provisions have been applied. By virtue of section 16‑A of the Act, the Chief Settlement Commissioner was authorised to prepare one or more schemes for the management and disposal of such properties. These could be disposed of in one of the modes expressly stipulated in the section and not otherwise. In the year 1960, the Chief Settlement Commissioner with the approval of the Central Government framed a Scheme for the management and disposal of the properties attached to charitable, religious and educational trusts or institutions. Under clause (7) of the Scheme the Evacuee Trust Property Board was set up which has since assumed the control over the property in question. Acting under clause 29 (ii) of the Scheme, respondents Nos. 1 to 3 are alleged to have sold the property in the possession of the petitioners to the State Bank of Pakistan. It is alleged that the petitioners learnt about this on receipt of the letter dated the 1st of June 1964 from the Chief Settlement Commissioner asking them to vacate the premises in their possession and to deliver its possession to the Bank. The petitioners represented against this demand to the Central Government and the Chief Settlement Commissioner pointing out that the transfer of the trust property to the State Bank was unwarranted and illegal. In any case the petitioners could not be asked to vacate the premises in their possession; at least without providing them with suitable alterna?tive accommodation. But those representations were turned down. The petitioners subsequently received another letter dated the 19th of August 1964, from the Chief Settlement Commissioner in which he persisted in his demand for the possession of the premises. It is reiterated in this petition that the evacuee trust property in dispute attached to the charitable, religious and educational trust could be sold to a "suitable institution" only within the meaning of section 16‑A (i) (b) of the Act and not to the State Bank of Pakistan. The intention of the Legislature was to apply such properties, primarily for the benefit of the Trust to which they were dedicated or to another "suitable institution" having similar aims and objects. Under the will of the founder, Dayal Singh College Trust properties were dedicated for the purposes of maintaining a first class college at Lahore. It is alleged that properties belonging to the Trust could not be validly diverted for extraneous purposes. The State Bank of Pakistan was not in any sense a suitable institution and the property in dispute could not be legally transferred to it. This would by no stretch of imagination fulfil the requirement of the Trust and the wishes of the testator. It is further averred by the petitioners that for more than 100 years the properties situated on Fane Road, Lahore, have been exclusively used to provide accommodation for lawyers: that it would be against public interest to dislocate them from the premises in their possession in which they are practicing as Advocates of the High Court and to install a building for the State Bank at the site. At any rate the petitioners cannot be deprived of the property in their possession without providing them with suitable alternative accommodation. It is further alleged that they are in undisputed occupation of the premises since before the 20th of December 1958 and as such they are entitled to the transfer of the property in preference to everybody else; particularly as some of them are claimants and displaced persons from the Indian territories.

3. This Writ Petition No. 1166 of 1964 was filed in this Court on the 27th .of August 1964. It came up for hearing in motion on the 1st of September 1964, when the petitioners put in an application under section 151 Code of Civil Procedure for elucidation of certain facts stated by them in their writ petition. In this application they have alleged that although the communications dated 1st of June 1964. and the 19th of August 1964 received by them from the Chief Settlement Commissioner were styled as demi‑official letters, in substance they were tantamount to orders passed by him for the ejectment of the petitioners from the premises in their occupation. It is stated in the application that some of the representatives of the State Bank actually came to the spot armed with axes etc., to forcibly pull down the building in their occupation but they were prevailed upon to desist from demolishing the building. It is further alleged by the petitioners that even if the sale of the property to the State Bank of Pakistan was regarded as legal, the petitioners were protected in their possession for at least 6 years under section 30 of the Act and they were not liable to be evicted in the meantime. In an endeavour to improve upon their stand, the' petitioners have further alleged in this application that they were the regular allottees in possession of the premises or they were holding it under the authority of the Dayal Singh College Trust Society who was competent to lease it out to them and their occupation was not liable to be disturbed. The main concern of the petitioners was against the Chief Settlement Commissioner who was going to illegally eject them.

4. The writ petition was admitted to a regular hearing on the 1st of September 1964 by a Division Bench of this Court on the three main contentions advanced by the petitioners. Firstly, because under section 16‑A of the Act evacuee property attached to charitable, religious and educational trusts or institutions could be transferred only to institutions with similar objects and not to the State Bank of Pakistan. Secondly, even if it be assumed that the sale could be legally made to the State Bank of Pakistan, the Chief Settlement Commissioner had no power under section 29 of the Act to interfere with‑ the possession of the petitioners after the completion of the sale. Lastly, at any rate the possession of the property in dispute by the petitioners was protected under section 30 of the Act for a period of at least six years from the date of the transfer and the respondents cannot be allowed to interefere with it in the meantime.

5. The second Writ Petition No. ‑1276 of 1964 is by Sh. Abdul Majid Advocate and some of his other family members who are living with him in a portion of ‑the premises in dispute. It is alleged in this petition that late Sh. Chiragh Din, Advocate, the predecessor of the petitioners was a claimant and , allottee in possession of a portion of the property in dispute bearing , No: S 63‑R‑7, commonly known as 19‑A, Fane Road, Lahore. It was allotted to the deceased in the year 1947 by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore. Sh. Chiragh Din, Advocate, died on the 20th of December 1963 and the petitioners are his heirs. The other portion of this property bearing No. 19‑B is occupied by Ch. Nasrullah Khan, a non‑claimant. It is alleged that in the year 1951, the Custodian of Evacuee Property, because of the fact that the trustees of Dayal Singh College Trust had migrated to India, treated the property attached to the Trust as evacuee property for a limited purpose. In course of time new trustees were appointed by the Court and ultimately Sh. Chiragh Din, Advocate attorned to the Dayal Singh College Trust Society in view of the order passed by the learned Custodian. But afterwards on the 15th of December 1960, in Appeal No. 699 of 1960, Dayal Singh College Trust Society v. Sh. Khurshid Ali etc., Mr. Justice Masud Ahmad, the then Custodian of Evacuee Property, Lahore, held that with the appointment of the new trustees of Dayal Singh College Trust Society by the Civil Court the nature of the property belonging to the Society did not change and it did not cease to be evacuee property even after the appointment of the new trustees. The petitioners in this writ petition have averred that on the 15th of June 1895, Sardar Dayal Singh Majithia had under his will created the trust for educational, charitable and religious purposes in order to run a first class college at Lahore: After the partition of the Indo‑Pakistan sub‑continent the Dayal Singh College Trust continued to be managed, as before, by a committee of trustees which was later on replaced by another committee of trustees appointed under the orders of the High Court in the suit brought by the Advocate‑General. Subsequently the Evacuee Property Trust Board assumed the management and control to administer the trust for the purposes of running a first class college at Lahore in accordance with the will of the testator. According to the petitioners, they have attorned to the Board and are regularly paying the rent of the premises to it in accordance with the terms and conditions of the rent deed executed by their father in his life time. As such they are not liable to be evicted from the premises in their possession under section 29 of the Act. For identical reasons noticed in the first writ petition, it is averred in this case as well that the transfer of the property in dispute to the State Bank of Pakistan was illegal and contrary to the objects of the Trust. Petitioner No. 1 has received the letter dated the 1st of June 1964, from the Chief Settlement Commissioner asking him to vacate the premises in dispute and to deliver its possession to the Bank. He represented against it to the Central Government as well as the Chief Settlement Commissioner objecting to the validity of the sale to the State Bank of Pakistan. But this was turned down. He then received another letter dated the 19th of August 1964, from the Chief Settlement Commissioner insisting on him to vacate the premises. This was followed by a notice dated the 31st of August 1964, from Mr. A. A Wasti,‑ Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore, to petitioner No. 1 asking him to show‑ cause why he should not be ejected from the house in dispute bearing No. 19‑B. Fane Road, Lahore, in exercise of the powers vesting in him under section 29 of the Act. The petitioners have, therefore, challenged the validity of the sale of the property in dispute to the State Bank of Pakistan and also of the orders directing them to vacate the premises in their possession. It is further alleged in this writ petition that the properties on Fane Road, Lahore, are in use by the lawyers for over 100 years by now and it would be against public interest to dislocate petitioner No. 1, who is practicing lawyer of this High Court from the premises in his possession in order to make room for the State Bank of Pakistan. The petitioners have also averred that property bearing No. 19‑B, in their possession and the Unit bearing No. 19‑A, Fane Road, Lahore in the occupation of Ch. Nasrullah khan were comprised of a single indivisible house liable to be transferred to them as a whole. Their father late Sh. Chiragh Din Advocate, had during his lifetime paid in cash about Rs. 35,C00 as rent of the premises Similarly after his death, petitioner No. 1 has been paying the rent in cash. But the amount paid by them in cash was liable to be refunded to the petitioners and in respect of the rent payable to the respondent for the premises in dispute suitable adjustment could be made against the verified amount in Schedule All ‑ No. VI of the compensation book of their‑father. The petitioners have relied on the order dated the 15th of December 1960 passed by Mr. Justice Masud Ahmad, Custodian of Evacuee Property, West Pakistan, Lahore, to assert that the property belonging to the Dayal Singh College Trust Society being evacuee property was lawfully acquired by virtue of the notification under section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, issued on the 28th of August 1959. Therefore, it is alleged that the property in dispute was available for transfer to the petitioners as the heirs of Sh. Chiragh Din, Advocate, the claimant allottee in authorised possession of a portion of the premises. They have a vested right to the transfer of the property to them. It is further alleged by the petitioners that on the 11th of June 1963, the Minister for Rehabilitation and Settlement made a statement in, the National Assembly of Pakistan to the effect that the evacuee trust properties would also be transferred to those eligible for them. Evidently, the Government was intending to treat them at par with all other evacuee property. The petitioners have further alleged that the provisions of the Act, in particular section 4 (2) and ‑ section I6‑A standing in the way of the transfer of the property in dispute to the petitioners on evaluation basis, were repugnant to and inconsistent with the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the fundamental rights of the petitioner. Similarly the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, XII of 1957 and more particularly its sections 2 and 7 are in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners by the Constitution. It is further alleged that the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957 have made an unwarranted discrimination against ‑evacuee properties ‑attached to trusts. The petitioners have also criticised the sale of the land measuring over 32 Kanals to the State Bank of Pakistan for a wholly inadequate price much below its market value. The property was to all intents and purposes evacuee property in which the petitioners have a vested interest. On these averments the petitioners have prayed that the sale or the agreement to sell the property in question including the property in the possession of the petitioners by the concerned respondents to the State Bank of Pakistan be declared to be void, illegal, without lawful authority and of no legal effect and be ordered to be rescinded, cancelled, withdrawn and set aside. They have further prayed that the impugned orders passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and the Additional Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, under section 29 of the Act for the ejectment of the petitioners be declared to be without lawful authority and of no‑ legal effect and the respondents be directed to refrain from interfering in their possession. It is also prayed that property No. S‑53‑R‑7 (19‑A and 19‑B, Fane Road, Lahore) in ‑ the possession of the petitioners and Mr. Nasrullah Khan be transferred to the petitioners as the legal heirs of Sh. Chiragh Din, deceased, who was a claimant, allottee in the authorised possession and respondents be directed to issue the requisite Provisional Transfer Order and Permanent Transfer Deed to the petitioners for this property. It is lastly prayed by the petitioners that the respondents may be directed to refund the sum of over Rs. 35,000.00 paid‑to them in cash on account of rent after making suitable adjustments for it. against the verified amount under Schedule VI in the Compensation Book issued to late Sh. Chiragh Din.

6. The respondents have contested the two writ petitions. The main written statement in the two cases was put in on behalf of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. In a nutshell he has denied all the material allegations of the petitioners. It is not denied that the property in dispute belonged to Dayal Singh College Trust Society established under the will of the testator. In the year 1957, acting under section 6 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance (XV of 1949), the High Court appointed a committee of, new trustees for the control and management of the Dayal Singh College Trust Properties on the suit brought by the Advocate‑General of the Province. After the property was acquired under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, the trustees appointed by the High Court claimed exclusive authority over the property of the Trust. The matter was at first decided by the Custodian against them and their writ petition against that order was also dismissed. It was held that under the Scheme the management and control of the Trust property vested in the Evacuee Property. Trust Board and the Dayal Singh College Trust Society was divested of its management. It is alleged that? section 16‑A of the Act generally provides for the making of a scheme or schemes for the "disposal" of evacuee trust properties with the approval of the Central Government. The Scheme framed under this section has made ample provisions for the disposal and sale of such properties. The extensive and valuable property in dispute was yielding no or little income and was uneconomic. Under the circumstances its disposal by sale appeared to be the best course to be adopted by the Board so that its sale proceeds could be applied for the purposes of the Dayal Singh College. The bargain was struck with the State Bank of Pakistan after careful negotiations. Under the agreement between them the price has to be paid by the Bank after the delivery of vacant possession of the premises to it. The agreement was made by the Board with the approval of the Central Government. In view of these commitments, the Chief Settlement Commis?sioner at first thought it proper not to initiate regular ejectment proceedings against the petitioners who are respectable Advocates of the High Court. He, therefore, wrote demi‑officially to them requesting them to vacate the premises in their occupation in the larger national interest. Thereafter, some of the petitioner met, the (Minister concerned, and also the Chief Settlement Commissioner. They also filed their written representations against their ejectment. In the end the Chief Settlement Commissioner informed them that after careful consideration the Government was unable to accede to their request. The Board then moved the Chief Settlement Commissioner to arrange for the ejectment of the petitioners and other occupants of? the premises, in. the exercise of the powers vested in him under section 29 of the Act. This power had been delegated by the Chief Settlement Commissioner to the Settlement Commissioner, Additional Settlement Commissioner and the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The request of the Board was, therefore, forwarded to the Additional Settlement Commissioner to proceed in accordance with law and issue show‑cause notices to all the occupants of those properties giving specific reasons for their ejectment from the premises in each individual case. But the Writ Petition No. 1166 of 1964 was filed in this Court without waiting for these notices and without any ejectment order having been passed against them in accordance with law. The proper course open to them was to have waited and moved he competent authorities, against the notices for their ejectment, in accordance with law, after they had. been served on them. This writ petition was, therefore, premature. It is clarified by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in his reply that the petitioners were labouring under a misunderstanding about the true nature of the deal with the State Bank of Pakistan. The correct position was that the vacant portion of the land measuring about 17 Kanals in area towards the Mall has been sold to the Bank. As regards the remaining portion measuring about 15 Kanals in the possession of the petitioners in the two cases, an agreement to sell has been concluded with the Bank and the sale is to be completed only after the delivery of its vacant possession to the Bank against payment of the proportionate price to the Board. It is averred Settlement Commissioner that the petitioners cannot stand of their ejectment from the premises in accordance with law and were not entitled to any protection against it. It is further alleged that the property in dispute was duly acquired by the Central Government under section 3 of the Act. But by virtue of the operation of subsection (2) of section 4 of the Act, it did not form part of the compensation pool and was not liable to be transferred under the provisions of the Schedule to the Act. Section 10 was applicable to the properties forming part of the compensation pool and not to the evacuee trust properties not included in it. Therefore, none of he petitioners have any vested right to the transfer of the property in dispute on the grounds that he is a claimant, non‑claimant or a local in possession thereof. A separate scheme for the disposal of such properties is provided under section 16‑A of the Act. 7, At this stage .it would be helpful to narrate a brief history of Dayal Singh College Trust Society and ?the impact of the changing evacuee laws on its properties. Dayal Singh College Trust viral founded in the year 1895 under the will of Sardar Dayal Singh Majithia and the committee of the trustees appointed under the will was vested with the trust properties "for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a first class arts College at Lahore." In pursuance of the will Dayal Singh College, Lahore, was established. With the Partition of the sub‑continent in 1947 all the trustees appointed under the will migrated to India and the management of the Trust was assumed by some of the de facto trustees nominated by the trustees who had evacuated. As early as February 1948, questions arose as to whether the Dayal Sing Trust Society was evacuee and its property evacuee property or not, neither Dayal Singh College Trust. Society nor Dayal Singh College, Lahore, ceased to function wholly or partially on account Lathe disturbances of 1947 and the learned Custodian Evacuee property passed the following order on the 14th of February 1948:-- "The Dayal Singh Trust Society, not having wholly or partially ceased to function, is not an evacuee and its property will not be treated as evacuee property within the meaning of will ordinance VII of 1947.? This question was again raised in some suits filed by the Society and the matter was referred to the Custodian of Evacuee Property in accordance with law. By that time the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance XV of 1949 had answered the reference made to it as under:- ?"The position in this case is that the Dayal Singh College Trust is a localized trust created for the benefit of Lahore Citizens by the late Sardar Dayal Singh Majithia. A college is being run with the income of the College Trust Property which is of a considerable value. The property is partly situated in Pakistan and partly in Indian territory. The original trustees all migrated at the time of the partition. Mr. Anand Kumar, who was Secretary of the Trust sent a power of attorney in favour of Mr. Abdul Haq, Deputy Legal Remem?brances and Professor Abid Ali, who is now principal of the College, authorising them to function on his behalf during his absence. In these circumstances, I, as Custodian, had declared that the property of this Trust should not be treated as evacuee property. I did not in so many words say that the authority of these two gentlemen to act on behalf of the Secretary of the Trust was recognised but in effect it amounted to a direction in these terms. Under the present law the position is that if the trustees of a particular trust have all migrated to India the Trust could be described as an evacuee but only for a limited purpose. That purpose is that the function of the trust should be carried on under the Custodian's care till such time as a competent Court appoints new trustees. The same object has been achieved by allowing the two attornies appointed by Mr. Anand Kumar to function on behalf of the Trust with the approval of the Custodian. If there was any defect in their authority to do so, by the absence of any formal order on my part, I hereby regularize the position by passing an order expressly, recognizing their authority to act on behalf of the Trust. It is noteworthy that in a resolution of the trustees, passed on the 4th of August 1949, the Trustees unanimously resolved that S. Abdul Haq be appointed a Trustee, of the Dayal Singh College Trust. By another resolution dated the 11th of April 1950, the Trustee further resolved to appoint S. Abdul Haq as Honorary Secretary of the Trust Society for Pakistan ???.?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????He was further authorised to manage the trust property and the Dayal Singh College at Lahore. Now that I have passed the above formal order the position should be regarded as beyond doubt. The answer to the reference should, therefore, be that although technically the trust property could have been described as evacuee property if no authorisation of the Custodian had been forthcoming, but as the attornies appointed by the Secretary of the Trust were allowed to function on behalf of the trust and their authority to do so has been now placed beyond dispute by a formal order, the trust cannot be regarded as an evacuee and ipso facto its property cannot be described as evacuee property." In the year 1957, the Advocate‑General of the Province, instituted a suit in the Civil Courts at Lahore against the then existing trustees of the Dayal Singh College Trust Society under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for their removal and for appointment of new trustees and to frame a scheme to Bbd manage and administer the Trust. This suit was later on? transferred to the High Court for its disposal in the exercise of its extraordinary original jurisdiction. The suit was ultimately decreed by B. Z. Kaikaus, J. on the 21st of September 1957. In his judgment reported as The Advocate‑General Punjab v. Sheikh Abdul Haque and others (P L D 1957 Lah. 321) his Lordship examined the effect of the above order dated the 1st of September 1951, passed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property. On behalf of the contesting respondents in that suit it was argued that by that order the learned Custodian had in fact declared the trust to be non‑evacuee and the property of the Trust was not evacuee property. But this contention was repelled by the learned Judge. He remarked that it was not the correct interpretation to be placed on the order of the learned Custodian who had declared the property of the Trust to be evacuee property to the extent that it would remain vested in the Custodian till the new trustees were lawfully appointed by the Court. The learned Judge further added that "although on reading the order itself there can be little doubt in one's mind as to what is the true Pr ort of the order I have also consulted my Lord, the Chief Justice, who passed this order as Custodian, and he has told me that his intention in passing the order was to hold that it was evacuee property to the limited extent mentioned in the order, that is, it vested in him under section 6 (2) of Ordinance XV of 1949". On a reference to the definition of the terms "evacuee" and "evacuee property" contained in section 2 of the Ordinance, the learned Judge remarked that even the interest held by a person as a trustee would become evacuee interest if the trustee were to leave the country on account of the disturbances and such interest would then vest in the Custodian though for a limited purpose. In these circumstances, the suit of the Advocate‑General was decreed and the new trustees were appointed by the Civil Court under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with section 6 (2) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance XV of 1949 to manage the affairs of the Trust. In passing it may be mentioned that this interpretation placed on the order of the learned Custodian of Evacuee property, was not even challenged before us by the parties. The new Trustees appointed by the Court were managing the affairs of the Trust when the disputes arose about the title to certain plots of land situated on Nishat Road Lahore and the Society applied to the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, Lahore under section 22 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, against Sh. Khurshid Ali, Khan Muhammad Khan and Mr. Durrani alleging that they belonged to the Trust and were not evacuee property. The Deputy Custodian after enquiry held that the disputed plots belonged to the Trust. The Society went up in appeal against that order. The appeal was heard and disposed of by Mr. Masud Ahmad, Custodian of Evacuee Property, West Pakistan, Lahore, by his order dated the 15th of December 1960. He had no hesitation in holding that the plots in dispute belonged to the Dayal Singh College Trust Society. On the question as to whether the property in dispute before him was or was not evacuee property, the learned Custodian was of the opinion that the only effect of the appointment of the new trustees by the Court under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure was that the Custodian was divested of the property of the Trust, as soon as the appointment was made, and to that extent sub? section (1) of section 6 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance XV of 1949, according to which all evacuee property vested in the Custodian, became inoperative. Till the appointment of new trustees, the Custodian of Evacuee Property was duty bound to apply the Trust property and its income for the purposes of the Trust as far as possible. With the appoint?ment of new trustees by the Court, this duty came to an end. But according to the learned Custodian, notwithstanding the appointment of the new Trustees, the nature of the property continued to be evacuee property as before. By the mere appointment of the new Trustees the property did not cease to be evacuee property. In the opinion of the learned Custodian if the intention of the Legislature had been that on the appointment of the new trustees, the nature of the property would also change, they could have employed suitable language to express their intention more explicitly and no such intention could be inferred from the language of subsection (2) of section 6 of the Ordinance, nor from any other provision of that enactment. The provisions of subsection (2) of section 4 and section 16‑A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and subsection (2) of section 14 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 which were promulgated afterwards, lead to the conclusion that the properties belonging to religious and charitable trusts have all along been regarded as evacuee properties. The learned Custodian, therefore, held that despite the appointment of the new trustees of the Dayal Singh College Trust Society, the nature of the property owned and possessed by the Society did not change. It did not cease to be evacuee property and continued to remain evacuee property as before. The validity of this order made by the learned Custodian on the 15th of December 1960, was challenged by the Dayal Singh College Trust Society in Writ Petition No. 61 of 1961 in this Court, and it was contended on behalf of the petitioners in that case that property attached to the Trust has altogether ceased to be evacuee property. But a Division Bench of this Court dismissed the writ petition and its decision is reported in Dayal Singh College Trust Society v. The Custodian of Evacuee Property, West Pakistan, Lahore (P L D 1962 Lah. 352). This Court had repelled the contention of the Society to the effect that the property of the Dayal Singh College Trust which was evacuee property lost its character as such on the appointment of the new trustees under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was observed by the Court that the decision of the question whether or not any property was evacuee property, was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Custodian Evacuee Property and it was not liable to be challenged by a writ petition in this Court. If the law were !hat only that property could tie evacuee property which vested in the Custodian, the contention of the counsel for we society would have prevailed. Sub?section (2) of section 6 of the Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1956, said that evacuee trust property will remain vested in the Custodian till such time as the new Trustees were appointed tinder the law; the law vested all evacuee property in the Custodian but it did not say that only that property shall be deemed to be evacuee property which was declared to have vested in the Custodian; therefore in the opinion of the High Court the provisions of law on which the Society had relied were of no help to it.

8. In the background of these facts the various contentions raised by the petitioners before us must be noticed now. On behalf of petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1166 of 1964, their learned counsel strenuously argued that with the appointment of the new trustees for the Dayal Singh College Trust Society on 21st of February 1957, by this Court under section 6 (2) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance XV of 1949, the property belonging to the Trust altogether ceased to be "evacuee property"; it completely went out of the pale of the evacuee laws and consequently that of the Settlement laws. As such the Trust property in dispute could not be acquired by the Central Government under section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and the Settlement authorities and the Evacuee Property Trust Board had no jurisdiction to intermeddle with its affairs. In raising these contentions the learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1166 of 1964 has made a complete departure from the very allegations in the petition. He has attempted to built up an altogether new and inconsistent case for the first time in the course of his argument addressed to us. The writ petition solely proceeds on the basis that the property in dispute was evacuee property, it was lawfully acquired by the Central Government in exercise of the powers vested in it under section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958; could not be transferred to the State Bank of Pakistan under the Provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and that their possession of the property in dispute was protected under section 30 of the Act applicable to them. Even in their application dated the 1st of September 1964, under section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, for the elucidation of the facts stated in the writ petition made at the time of its admission in Motion, the petitioners have adhered to their earlier stand. Towards the close of his arguments, their learned counsel submitted an application dated the 22nd of December 1965, for amendment of the writ petition to permit him to raise these additional pleas urged before us. The respondents have vehemently opposed this application. 1t cannot be denied that very wide powers are vested in us to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. But the discretion in this respect has to be exercised according to judicial principles and not arbitrarily. Ordinarily no amendment can be allowed to introduce an altogether new and inconsistent case and to change or alter its fundamental character. In the present case made as already discussed the petitioner has set up a wholly new and inconsistent case by way of amendment. This has the effect of displacing the whole case of the petitioners in Writ Petition, No. 1166 of 1964 and it cannot be allowed at this late stage.

9. Even otherwise we find that these new pleas raised before us by the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1166 of 1964 are devoid of any force. On a careful consideration, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that the property belonging to the Dayal Singh College Trust Society ceased to be evacuee property at all from the 21st of February 1957, with the c appointment of the new trustees by the Civil Court. At the relevant time the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance XV of 1949 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) was in force and in it the terms "evacuee" and "evacuee property" were defined as under:‑ "2 (2) evacuee means any person‑ (a) who on account of the setting up of the dominions of Pakistan and India, or on account of the civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances on or after the 1st day of March 1947, leaves or has left any place in the territories now comprising Pakistan for any place outside those territories; or (b) ???????????????????????????.. (c) ???????????????????????????.. 2 (3) ?evacuee property' means any property in which an evacuee has any right or interest (whether personally or as trustees or a beneficiary or in any other capacity), and includes? ???????????????????????????.. ???????????????????????????..? Therefore, in a case like the present, if the trustees had migrated to India on account of the setting up of the dominions of Pakistan and Indian or on account of the civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances, on or after the 1st day of March 1947, the property of the Trust would be regarded as "evacuee property" within the meaning of the definition under the Ordinance and it shall continue to bear that character. However, the petitioners have relied on the provisions of section 6 of the Ordinance to contend that the trust property ceased to be evacuee property with the appointment of new trustees by the Court. This section is as under:‑ "

6. Vesting of evacuee property in Custodian. (1) All evacuee property shall vest and shall be deemed always to have been vested in the Custodian with effect from the 1st day of March 1947. (2) Where any evacuee property is held in trust for religious or charitable purposes, the property shall remain vested in the Custodian only till such time as fresh trustees are appointed in the manner provided bylaw, and pending the appointment of fresh trustees the trust property and the income thereof shall be applied by the Custodian for fulfilling, as far as possible, the purposes of the trust. (3) Where any evacuee property in Pakistan belonging to a joint stock company, has vested in or been taken possession of by any person exercising the powers of a Custodian under any law in force immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance, nothing contained in clause (3) of section 3 shall affect the operation of subsection (1), but the Central Government may by notification in the official Gazette, direct that the Custodian shall be divested or dispossessed of any such property in such manner and after such period as may be specified in the notification." By the operation of subsection (1) of section 6, all evacuee property vested in the Custodian with effect from 1st of March 1947. But in subsection (2), as reproduced above, there is a qualified exception to this general rule. It lays down that evacuee property belonging to a trust for religious or charitable purposes, shall remain vested in the Custodian for a limited time for a specified purpose only. The Custodian was bound to apply the income of the trust property for fulfilling the purposes of the trust. With the appointment of the new trustees for the trust in accordance with law, the Custodian is divested of the evacuee properties belonging to the trust, notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1). This exemption from the operation of subsection (1) is limited in its scope and has no greater implications or repercussions than those expressly postulated by it. It is true that with the appointment of new trustees under the law, the Custodian is divested of the evacuee trust property and its management and control devolves on the new trustees for the purposes of the trust. But it does not necessarily follow that, thereby, the trust property has altogether ceased to be evacuee property. Subsection (2) does not say so. All evacuee property vests in the Custodian but the converse of it is not necessarily true. The two things do not always go together. Subsection (3) of section 6 provides an apt illustration; although under section 2 (3) the property belonging to a joint stock company whose registered office was situated in India before 15th of August 1947, was not evacuee property, yet it continued to vest in the Custodian as before. The definition of the term "evacuee property" contained in section 2 (3) of the Ordinance is in no way controlled by the provisions of sub?section (2) of section 6 in this respect. The question as to whether the property in dispute is evacuee property or not must be resolved with reference to the definition of the term and that too by the Custodian of Evacuee Property who has the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter. The language of the definition used G by the Legislature is binding upon the Courts and this will be so even though the definition does not coincide with the ordinary meanings of the words used. Mr. Masud Ahmad, the Custodian of Evacuee Property by his order dated 15th of December 1960, has already found that the properties belonging to the Dayal Singh College Trust Society did not cease to be evacuee properties on the appointment of the new trustees by the Court.? This order was not shown to be without jurisdiction before us. In Dayal Singh College Trust Society v. The Custodian of Evacuee Property, West Pakistan, Lahore in interpretting the Provision of subsection (2) of section 6 of the Ordinance, a Division Bench of this Court repelled the argument advanced before us and observed that "as the law vested all evacuee properties in the Custodian and did not say that only that property shall be deemed to be evacuee property which was declared to have vested in the Custodian, the provision of law relied upon by Sheikh Mahboob Elahi is not of that assistance to the petitioner as the learned counsel insisted that it was." Subsection (2) of section 6 simply connotes that the duties of the Custodian to manage and account for the income of?? the evacuee trust property came to an end with the appointment of the new trustees under the law. In Punjab Co‑operative Bank Limited v. The Republic of Pakistan (PLD1964SC616) the case of the appellant was covered by subsection (3) of section 7 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act XII of 1957 which corresponds with the similar provisions contained in sub? section (3) of section 6 of Ordinance XV of 1949. The High Court took the view that once the property of the Punjab Co‑operative Bank Limited became evacuee property under the previous laws, it must continue to remain evacuee property if the definition given in the Ordinance XV of 1949 was read together with the provisions of section 6 thereof. But the Supreme Court reversed that finding and agreed with the contention of the learned counsel for the Bank to the effect that the provisions of subsection (3) of section 7 of Act XII of 1957 did not control the definition "evacuee property" given in subsection (3) of section 2 of the Act. We are, therefore, clear in our mind that the provisions of subsection (2) of section 6 of Ordinance XV of 1949 (which corresponds with subsection (2) of section 7 of Act X11 of 1957) do not control the definition of "evacuee) property" given in subsection (3) of section??? 2 of the Ordinance (corresponding to subsection (3) of section 2 in the Act). The hall‑mark of "evacuee property" on the property in dispute was indelible and did not change with the appointment of new trustees in place of the evacuee trustees under the law in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of section 6 of Ordinance XV of 1949.??????????? With the advent of Settlement operations the Legislature has made separate provision for the management and disposal of the evacuee properties attached to charitable and religious trusts in sections 4(2) and 16‑A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958) Act (XLVII of 1958). This further fortifies us in the belief that the Legislature did not intend to release such properties altogether from the ambit of the Evacuee and Settlement Laws.

10. In this connection the case of Madhavji Dharasibhai and others v. The Karachi Panjrapore Association (2) cited before us on behalf of the petitioners is distinguishable. In that case the Supreme Court has observed that "according to subsection (PLD1957SC (Pak.) 83) of section 6; the custody of the Custodian over such property is only a temporary one". Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have nowhere gone any further to hold that after the Custodian is relieved of his duty with the appointment of the new trustees under the law, the property belonging to the trust altogether ceases to be evacuee property. Similarly Mian Ahmad All v. The Rehabilitation Authority (P L D 1964 S C 229) cited on behalf of the petitioners, does not help them. It was held in that case that a gaddi nashin has no interest in the properties attached to a religious institution. He is only a manager of those properties. In case he becomes evacuee, the property attached to the institution do not become evacuee property. But the position of gaddi nashin of a religious institution in this respect is vitally different from that of the trustee under a trust. Strictly speaking a trustee is the legal owner of the trust property and according to section 2(3) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance XV of 1949 the property attached to the trust becomes "evacuee property" with the migration of the trustee to India in the circumstances mentioned therein. In the same connection the petitioners have brought to our notice that the property belonging to Dayal Singh College Trust Society was treated as non‑evacuee property in the past for a long time. In S. A. Waheed v. The Dayal Singh College Trust Society (P L D 1955 Lah. 57Q) arising out of a civil suit brought by the Society, relying on the above‑mentioned order of the Custodian of Evacuee Property, dated 1st of September 1951, the property of the Trust was considered to be non‑evacuee property. But since then the position has changed altogether under the circumstances explained in para. 7 above.

11. The next plea raised on behalf of the petitioners is common to both the Writ Petitions. It is averred that at any rate the sale of the property in dispute belonging to Dayal Singh College Trust Society was ultra vires of the provisions of section 16‑A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. This argument proceeds on the basis that the property in dispute was lawfully acquired by the Government by virtue of section 3 of the Act. To elaborate their contention it is stressed that under section 16‑A of the Act, the Chief Settlement Commissioner is empowered to prepare one or more schemes for the disposal of evacuee property attached to charitable, religious or educational trusts. Under this section, before it was amended, such a scheme may provide;‑. (a) for the appointment of new trustees on fresh terms and conditions, if necessary; or (b) for the transfer of such property to any suitable institu?tion; or (c) for the transfer to Government or to any local authority of such property for any charitable, religious or educational purpose. It is, therefore, maintained by the petitioners in the two case that, if at all, the disposal of evacuee property attached to any charitable, religious or educational trust could be made in one of the manners specified above and not otherwise. So, it is contended that the law does not countenance the sale of such property to the State Bank of Pakistan. Elaborating this argument further it is asserted that under section 16‑A (1) (b) of the Act the evacuee trust property could be transferred to any "suitable institution"; that the intention of the Legislature was clearly to preserve the property attached to a charitable, religious and educational trust primarily for the benefit of the trust to which it was attached and failing that to apply it for the purposes of some institution having object akin to the original trust always keeping in view the wishes of the founder. In this particular case under the will of the founder, Dayal Singh College Trust properties have to be applied wholly and solely for maintaining a first class college at Lahore and the transfer of the corpus of this property to the State Bank of Pakistan by no stretch of imagination can be regarded as a step in aid towards the fulfillment of the aims and objects of the Trust and the wishes of the testator. So, it is contended that the State Bank of Pakistan was not a "suitable institution" to whom this property could be sold.

12. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is not well founded. By virtue of the operation of section 3 of the Act and the notification issued under it, all evacuee property other than agricultural land situated within the Province of West Pakistan was acquired by the Government. Thereby the right, title and interest of the evacuee in evacuee property was extinguished and the property vested wholly and absolutely in the Central Government free of all encumbrances. This is true also in respect of the evacuee property attached to charitable, religious and educational trusts which equally vested in the Central Government for the purposes of the Act. However, by virtue of the special provisions contained in sub?section (2) of section 4 of the Act such property did not form a part of the compensation pool constituted under subsection (l). It is treated differently under the Act and separate provisions are made for its management and disposal. In this connection subsection (1) of section 16‑A of the Act, prior to its amendment, was as follows:‑ "Subject to the provisions of this Act, and the rules made thereunder, the Chief Settlement Commissioner shall prepare one or more schemes for the disposal of evacuee property attached to charitable, religious or educational trusts or institutions referred to in subsection (2) of section 4, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force, or in any instrument of trust or other document, such schemes may provide: (a) for the appointment of new trustees on fresh terms and conditions, if necessary; or (b) for the transfer of such property to any suitable institution; or (c) for the transfer to Government or to any local authority of such property for any charitable, religious or educational purpose." The powers conferred by this subsection on the Chief Settlement Commissioner are very wide and over‑riding. In framing the scheme for the disposal of such property he can act notwith?standing anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, or in any instrument of trust or other document. In this respect he is not necessarily tied down by the stipulation contained in any deed of trust. Of course in framing the Scheme the Chief Settlement Commissioner must conform to the provisions of the Act and the rule made thereunder to which he is subject. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the subsection reproduced above are in reality illustrative in their scope and intent. These do not have the effect of restricting the wider import of the powers conferred on the Chief Settlement Commissioner in framing the scheme. They do not tend to impose any limitation on him in this respect in the disposal of evacuee trust property attached to charitable, religious or educa?tional trusts or institutions. The latter part of this subsection is discretionary only. In particular, this subsection has placed no such fetters on the powers of the Chief Settlement Commis?sioner that in framing his scheme he must provide for the G disposal of such properties in the manners laid down in clauses (b) and (c) only. These two clauses in the subsection were inserted by way of elucidation rather than to restrict the, power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner in this respect. A scheme prepared by the Chief Settlement Commissioner may in addition to all other matters provide (a) for the appointment of new trustees on fresh terms and conditions, if necessary; (b) for the transfer of such property to any suitable institutions and (c) for the transfer to Government or to any local authority of such property for any charitable, religious or educational purposes. The key to the interpretation of this subsection is contained in the opening words that subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the Chief Settlement Commissioner shall prepare one or more scheme for the disposal of such properties. With the promulgation of the Displaced Persons (Laws Amendment) Ordinance X111 of 1964 on the; 24th of December 1964, the old section 16‑A in the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 was. substituted by a new provision. This amendment was introduced with retrospective effect. The new section 16‑A is as under: "(1) subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the Chief Settlement Commissioner shall prepare one or more schemes for the administration, main?tenance, management and disposal of property included in the trust pool. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, such scheme may provide‑ (a) ??????????????????????????? (b) ??????????????????????????? (c) for the appointment of new trustees on such terms and conditions as may be deemed appropriate; or (d) for the grouping of the trusts or institutions wherever necessary; or (e) for extinguishing a trust or winding up an institution the original object of which has wholly or partly ceased to exist; or (f) for the transfer to Government, any local authority or suitable institution of any property in the trust pool for any charitable, religious or educational purpose; or (g) for the sale of the property where disposal by sale appears to be the best course under the circumstances." This newly introduced section has further elaborated that the Scheme prepared by the Chief Settlement Commissioner may provide for the amalgamation of the trusts and grouping them together wherever necessary and for extinguishing a trust or winding up an institution in case its original objects have wholly or partially ceased to exist. The scheme may also provide for the transfer to Government, any local authority or suitable institution of any property in the trust pool for any M charitable, religious or educational purpose and under clause (g) for the sale of such property in case the disposal by sale appears to be the best course under the circumstances. Here again the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to frame the scheme are very wide and extensive. Needless to emphasize that this new provision was introduced with retrospective effect.

13. Actually in the year 1960 the Chief Settlement Commis?sioner prepared the Scheme under section 16‑A (1) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and section 14 (2) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. It was promulgated with the previous approval of the Central Government in whom all evacuee property has vested. It is known as "The Scheme for the management or disposal of property, attached to charitable, religious or educational trusts or institutions". Under this Scheme the Evacuee Property Board has been constituted by the Central Government to manage and dispose of such properties in accordance with the Scheme. Under clause 18 of the Scheme the general supervision of such property vests in the Board which is empowered to "do all things considered by it to be necessary, proper and expedient for the efficient maintenance, control, administration and disposal" of such property and for the application of the funds that may accrue therefrom to purposes provided in the scheme. Without prejudice to the generality of these provisions, under clause 19 (j ), the Board is charged with the‑ duty "to sell with the previous approval of the Central Government uneconomic immovable or any other such property in respect of which disposal by sale appears to be the best course under the circumstances." Similarly clause 29 lays down that the Board shall pool all such property and ;may,, subject to the provisions of the Scheme, "transfer or make endowment of any property attached to any particular trust for a public purpose or for any purpose as may be specified by the Central Government under such terms and conditions not inconsistent with the provisions of this Scheme, as it may consider suitable. These provisions in the Scheme do not appear to us to be ultra vires of section 16‑A of the Act either before or after its Amendment.

14. On behalf of the Chief Settlement Commissioner it has been explained in his written statement that there used to be a dilapidated building on a portion of the site in dispute. This was pulled down by the Dayal Singh College Trust Society before the property was acquired under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Society was contemplating to construct a multi?-storeyed building at the site but sufficient funds were not available for undertaking this costly project. Whatever income accrued to the Society from the properties attached to the Dayal Singh College Trust, was spent in running the College. The Evacuee Property Trust Board after the control was taken over by it, also felt that it was notable to allocate sufficient funds for the construction of the building which was likely to cost about two crores of rupees. The greater part of the premises was lying vacant after its demolition and was yielding no income. The back portion of the premises presently occupied by the petitioners in the two writ petitions consisted of dilapidated bungalows which did not yield any appreciable income to the Trust. Under the circumstances this extensive N and valuable trust property was yielding no or little income and its disposal by sale was considered to be the best course for the Board to adopt so that the sale proceeds of the property could be usefully applied for the benefit of the Dayal Singh College. The site in question was selected by the State Bank for constructing a stately building thereon and after careful bargaining it was agreed to sell the whole of this property to the State Bank of Pakistan. To enable the State Bank to start the construction without any loss of time, one of the conditions of the agreement to sell is that the Board would deliver the vacant possession of the property to the Bank. On the recommendation of the Board this agreement to sell the property for Rs. 32 lacs to the Bank was approved by the Central Government. In these circumstances the Board and the Government considered the property in question to be uneconomic trust property and decided to sell it away. This was neither in contravention of the provisions of section 16‑A of the Act nor the Scheme framed thereunder.

15. It remains to be examined some of the other contentions of the petitioners common to both the Writ Petitions. They have averred that they are in lawful possession of the premises in their occupation and the respondents cannot be permitted to take the law into their own hands to interfere with their possession. It appears that after the respondents had decided to sell the properties in dispute to the State Bank of Pakistan, Mr. B. A. Qureshi, the then Chief Settlement Commissioner (Pakistan), Lahore, on the 1st of June 1963, addressed a demi‑official Letter No. 2270‑P‑S‑Sc&C/CS to the different occupants of the property informing them that the land in dispute situated on the junction of Fane Road and the Mall, Lahore, belonging to the Dayal Singh Trust was sold by the Government to the State Bank of Pakistan and the sale proceeds have to be placed at the disposal of the Dayal Singh College; that the College was badly in need of funds and the State Bank was anxious to start the construction of their multi‑storeyed building at the site ; that the Bank has to pay the price of the land against the delivery of the physical possession of the property to it and that immediate transfer of the vacant possession of the land to the State Bank was necessary. The Chief Settlement Commissioner therefore, wrote this letter to "appeal" to the different occupants to co‑operate with him and vacate the portions in their possession and requested them to make the sacrifice in the public interest. He also mentioned in his Letter that the Evacuee Trust Board has a Scheme to construct first class offices on an adjoining plot which would meet a long standing need and provide suitable accommodation for the legal practitioners. The various occupants of the property made their representations against this letter and even saw the Minister concerned as well as the Chief Settlement Commissioner in that connection. But, according to the demi‑official Letter No. 4619‑IX‑PS/64, dated the 19th of August 1964, from Mr. B. A. Qureshi, the Chief Settlement Commissioner (Pakistan), Lahore, to them, the Government declined to accede to the request of the occupants, and the Chief Settlement Commissioner once again requested them to co‑operate with him and to vacate the portion in their possession immediately. These two letters were essentially in the nature of an appeal and a request to those in possession of the premises to vacate them in the public interest. They did not embody any orders in them under the law to vacate the premises occupied by them. Before us Major Ishaque Muhammad Khan, Settlement Commissioner (Legal), who appeared on behalf of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, even expressed his readiness to withdraw them. As such the two communications in question did not give rise to any valid cause of action to the petitioners to rush to this Court. 'Writ Petition No. 1166 of 1964 was filed in this Court on the 27th of August 1964 before any regular ejectment notices were served on the petitioners. They have, however, averred that these communications though termed as demi‑official letters and couched in a polite language, were in substance the orders issued by the Chief Settlement Commis?sioner for their ejectment and, as if to execute these orders, representatives of the State Bank actually appeared on the scene armed with axes etc., to forcibly pull down the building in their occupation and it was with difficulty that the petitioners were able to prevail upon them and manage to dissuade them from illegally trespassing into their premises. The respondents have denied these allegations and convinced us that they have no intention to take the law into their own hands. After the two demi‑official letters did not have their desired effect on the petitioners the Evacuee Trust Property Board requested the Chief Settlement Commissioner to initiate suitable ejectment proceedings against them as required by section 29 of the Act The Chief Settlement Commissioner passed on this request of the Board to the Additional Settlement Commissioner for disposal in accordance with law. Thereupon, the Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore, served regular notices on the individual occupants of the property in dispute, including the petitioners, to appear before him on the dates specified by him and show cause as to why they should not be evicted from the premises in their occupation under section 29 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. These notices also contain the grounds on which the various occupants were being asked to quit the premises. One of the main ground in most of these notices is that they were defaulters and had failed to pay the arrears of rent due from them. The other grounds are that they have sublet portions of the property in their possession without the permission or consent of the Board of the Society, that they have committed breaches of the terms and conditions under which the property was held by them; that they have willfully caused damage to the property in their possession and that they were not authorised to continue in possession of the premises under the provisions of the Act. Mr. Abdul Majid, petitioner No. 1, in Writ Petition No. 1276 of 1964 admits to have received this show‑cause notice, thereafter he filed the writ petition in this Court on the 19th of September 1964. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1166 of 1964 were served with these show‑cause notices sometime after the writ petition had been filed by them. It appears that the Additional Settlement Commissioner has postponed any further action on these notices to await the result of these two writ petitions. Therefore, as the position now stands, the proceedings initiated for the ejectment of the petitioners in the two cases, are still pending before the Settlement authorities and no final order has so far been passed thereon; and we are sure that they shall have ample opportunity to defend themselves in response to the notices sent to them. As such we have no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. We are clear in our mind that in the exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction vested in us under Article 98 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, we should do nothing which is likely to cause any prejudice to the parties in the proceedings pending before the Additional Settlement Commissioner in pursuance to the show‑cause notices issued by him.

16. There is another objection raised before us on behalf of the petitioners. It was argued for them that after the sale of the property in dispute to the State Bank of Pakistan, it is not lawful for the transferee to eject any person in possession or occupation of the property for a period of at least six years as laid down in proviso (b) to subsection (1) of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and the notices of ejectment sent to them by the Additional Settlement Commissioner were against law and without lawful authority. There is no basis for this argument. The respondents have explained that so far, out of the total area of about 32 Kanals of the land, the vacant plot measuring 17 Kanals 4 Marlas being Khasra Nos. 3064, 3065 Min and 2274 Min situated on the junction of the Mall and Fane Roads has been transferred to the State Bank of Pakistan under the registered deed of sale, dated the 20th of June 1964. This does not include the property in dispute occupied by the petitioners and no deed of conveyance in respect of the portion in dispute has so far been executed in favour of the State Bank of Pakistan. So far, the Chairman, Evacuee Property Trust Board, Government of Pakistan, Lahore, has entered into an agreement to sell it to the State Bank after he is in a position to deliver its vacant possession to the Bank. In the demi‑official letter No. 2270‑P‑S‑SC&S/CS, dated the 1st of June 1964, from Mr. B. A. Qureshi, the Chief Settlement Commissioner (Pakistan), Lahore, to the petitioners it was too broadly stated that the Dayal Singh Trust land situated on the junction of Fane Road and the Mall, Lahore, had been sold by the Government to the State Bank of Pakistan. He did not make any such distinction between the two pieces of the land. This letter was of in informal nature. There is nothing to show that actually the portion of the property in the possession of the petitioners has been transferred to the State Bank of Pakistan by any deed of conveyance. In the absence of any such deed of conveyance, the very basis of the argument of the petitioners under section 30 of the Act fizzles out altogether. The petitioners have no locus stand to object to the transfer of the other portion of the property not occupied by them.

17. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1166 of 1964 have alleged that they are in undisputed occupation of the different portions of the premises in their possession at least since before the 20th December 1958. Similarly, according to the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1276 of 1964 a portion of the property in dispute was lawfully allotted to their father, late Sh. Chiragh Din, Advocate in 1947 and he continued to be in its authorised possession ever since until his death on the 20th of December 1963. He was a claimant displaced person. After his death his legal heirs have stepped into his shoes to occupy the premises. It is alleged by the petitioners in the two writ petitions that as such they are eligible for the transfer of the properties occupied by them under the provisions of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. This argument is wholly misconceived. The property in dispute is evacuee property attached to religious, charitable and educational trust and under the specific provisions of subsection (2) of section 4 of the Act, it was expressly excluded from the compensation pool. Under section 10 of the Act the provisions of the Schedule to the Act are not applicable to such properties. This property forms part of the "Trust Pool" constituted under section 4‑A of the Act to be administered separately in accor?dance with the provisions of section 16‑A and the Scheme prepared by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Therefore, the petitioners have no vested right to the transfer of the property in question. Apart from every other consideration none of the petitioners have so far applied to the competent authorities for the transfer of this property to them and they cannot ask for it from the High Court in the course of these proceedings.

18. The petitioners, in the two writ petitions, have also averred that the properties on Fane Road, Lahore, including those in dispute, were devoted for use by the practising lawyers of this Court in the past for about 100 years and it would be against public interest to dislocate them now. There is no doubt that the properties in, this locality are predominently occupied by the lawyers who find it very convenient to practise in the vicinity of the High Court. However, on this account alone the petitioners have acquired no vested right in the property held by them under any law that we are aware of. At least no such law was brought to our notice by the petitioners. During the course of the argument they have repeatedly brought to our notice their difficulties in case they are dislodged from the premises in question. A number of them are claimants, displaced persons from India. They represent an important cross section of the Society and most of them are engaged in the legal profession so indispensible in the administration of justice. But in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution we cannot go into these considerations to afford any relief to them. It is for the authorities concerned to look into these matters and we are sure they will examine the cases of the deserving petitioners in this connection. We find that the Chief Settlement Commissioner is already aware of the difficulties of the lawyers in this respect and has admitted in his demi?-official letter No. 2275‑P‑SCS/64, dated the 1st of June 1964, to the petitioners that the Evacuee Property Trust Board has got a scheme to construct first class offices on an adjoining plot which would meet the long standing need and provide suitable accommodation for the legal practitioners. But we cannot say as to how far this scheme has materialized and may be of any help to the petitioners.

19. This will dispose of Writ Petition No. 1166 of 1964. But there are some further pleas raised in the other Writ Petition No. 1276 of 1964. In that case it is also averred that on 11th of June 1963, the Minister for Rehabilitation and Settlement had made a statement in the National Assembly of Pakistan to the effect that the evacuee trust properties shall be transferred to the displaced persons in possession like all other evacuee property. It is further alleged that section 4 (2) and section 16‑A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 are ultra vires and repugnant to the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the fundamental rights guaranteed under it; similarly subsection (2) of section 7 and the other relevant provisions of Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act XII of 1957 are inconsistent with the fundamental rights secured by the Constitution and there was no justification in the authorities in treating the property in dispute as evacuee property for a limited purpose only. The discrimination made in this respect was void and ultra vires. It is further contended that the price at which the property in question was sold to the State Bank of Pakistan is wholly inadequate and far below its true market value. In this petition, in addition to the other prayers, the petitioners have claimed that the sum of over Rs. 35,000 already paid in cash by them and their father on account of the rent of the property in their possession, was liable to be refunded to them. At the bar Mr. Abdul Majid Advocate, petitioner No. 1, has also challenged the competence of the Central Legislature to inter alia enact the provisions of section 4'(2) and section 16‑A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 in respect of the properties attached to charitable, religious and educational trusts.

20. But after hearing the learned counsel at length, we find that none of these additional contentions raised before us has any force. On a reference to the news item (Annexure G) appearing in the Pakistan Times, dated 13th of June 1963, it no doubt appears that the then Minister for Rehabilitation extended an assurance that the evacuee trust properties in possession of refugees claimants would be transferred to them and that executive instructions would be issued immediately in this respect. But so far there has been no change in the relevant law and the Scheme in that direction and this Court cannot take notices of the assurances, given on the floor of the house, which are contrary to law.

21. The learned counsel has relied on Article 106 and the relevant entries in item 8, Part II, of the Concurrent List in the Constitution of Pakistan, 1956. The Central Legislature had the concurrent power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in item No. 8 of the list relating to "relief and rehabilitation of refugees, custody, managements and disposal of evacuee property." But the learned counsel maintains that in relation to charitable, religious and educational trusts and endowment in particular the Central Legislature had no power to make laws and in this respect the exclusive power vested in the Provincial Legislature. To that extent, it is contended, that the provisions of section 4 (2) and section 16‑A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and of Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act (XII of 1957) dealing with the properties attached to charitable, religious an educational trusts were ultra vires of the Central Legislature. There is no force in this contention of the learned counsel. The two sections deal with the matters concerning the adminis?tration, management and disposal of evacuee properties attached to charitable, religious and educational trusts covered by item No. 8, Part lI, of the Concurrent List. As such both the Legislatures had concurrent powers to make laws about them. For the same reasons the contention of the learned counsel to the effect that the Displaced Persons (Laws Amendment) Ordinance (XIII of 1964) by which section 4‑A was added to and section 16‑A was substituted in the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, was ultra vires of the powers of the Central Legislature, is untenable. Under Article 131 of the present Constitution, the Central Legislature has exclusive power to make laws with respect to the matters enumerated in the corresponding entry No. 42 of s the Third Schedule about the "Relief and rehabilitation of refugees; evacuee property."

22. It is further asserted on behalf of the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1276 of 1964 that sections 4 (2) and 16‑A of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and section 7 (2) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, in so far as they have made separate provisions relating to the evacuee properties attached to charitable, religious and educational trusts and institutions, are discriminatory and violative of the Fundamental Right No. 15 of the present Constitution which guarantees that "all citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law." On the face of it this objection hardly deserves any serious consideration. Evacuee trust property stands as a class by itself and in the very nature of things special provisions had to be made for them. Accordingly these laws making separate provisions for the disposal, management and control of such property cannot be considered to be discriminatory. The distinction between privately owned properties and those T attached to trust is natural and well recognized and it has always been found necessary to make separate provisions for the administration of trust properties. In Jibendra Kishore etc. v. Province of East Pakistan (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 9) it was held that the term "equal protection of law" only means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of law which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances, in their lives liberty and property and pursuit of happiness. Similarly the guarantee of "equal protection of laws" requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed in the application of these principles, however, it has always been recognised that classifications of persons or things is in no way repugnant to the equality doctrine provided the classification is not arbitrary or caprisious, is natural and reasonable and bears a fair and substantial relation to the object of the Legislation.

23. The petitioners have further relied on Fundamental Right No. 8 ensuring "freedom of trade, business and profession" and Fundamental Right No. 14 which lays down that no person shall he deprived of his property save in accordance with law and no property shall be compulsorily acquired or taken possession of save for a public purpose and save by the authority of law which provides for compensation therefore. In this connection it was argued that the ejectment of the petitioners from the premises in dispute is bound to interfere adversely with the freedom of Mr. Abdul Majid, petitioner No. 1, to practise as an Advocate of this Court, secured to him under Fundamental Right No.

8. Similarly the tenancy rights vesting in the petitioners are valuable rights in property which are safeguarded by Fundamental Right No. 14 of the Constitution. The stand taken by the petitioners is wholly misconceived, Petitioner No. 1 is already enjoying the right to enter upon any lawful profession he chooses and there is no question of any interference with that right by respondents in this case. This right has nothing to do with the property which does not belong to him. Similarly Fundamental Right No. 14 has in no way been infringed in this case. This merely provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law. Assuming that the tenancy right possessed by the petitioners is "property" within the meaning of this provision, the respondents mean to eject them from the premises in accordance with law and not otherwise. Already the Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner has issued notices to some of the petitioners for their ejectment in accordance with section 29 of the Act and we are sure that the respondents shall proceed in accordance with law and will do nothing which is not warranted by law. No question of compulsory acquisition of the tenancy rights of the petitioners in the property is involved in this case. These contentions raised by the petitioners in writ petition No. 1276 of 1964 do not deserve any serious consideration and no question for the enforcement Fundamental Rights by the Court arises. Otherwise in view of the Proclamation of Emergency by the President and the Order issued by him under Article 30 of the Constitution, these proceedings in this Court were liable to remain suspended for the period of the emergency.

24. The petitioners have also averred that the property in dispute has been sold very cheaply to the State Bank of Pakistan. We have no cogent evidence before us to assess the true market value of this property. At any rate the petitioners have no locus standi to object to the sale and the price for which it was sold.

25. The prayer by these petitioners for the refund of the amount paid by them in cash towards the monthly rent of the premises in their possession, is to say the least unusual and no law was cited before us under which this request could be entertained. For the reasons discussed above both these petitions are bound to fail and are, therefore, dismissed with costs. K. M. A.????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? Petition dismissed.