P L D 1952 Federal Court 29 (PLP)

ABDUL RASHID, C. J.‑This is an appeal from a decision of the Chief Court of Sind, dated the 5th February, 1951, dis missing an application in the nature of habeas corpus preferred by the appellant Sobho Gyanchandani under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant was arrested on the 17th April 1948, under the Sind Maintenance of Public Safety Act, and was ordered to be detained for a period of 6 months by the Provincial Gov ernment of Sind. On the 23rd July 1948, Karachi was separated from the Province of Sind. The detention of the appellant was extended from time to time by orders issued under the Sind Act by the Administrator of Karachi. On the 1st April, 1950, an order was passed by the Ministry of Interior, Pakistan Govern ment, under Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1949, ordering the further detention of the appellant for a period of six months. The detention was extended from time to time, and according to the information supplied to the counsel of the appellant, the last order of detention was issued in March 1951. The Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance was promulgated by the Governor‑General under section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935, on the 8th of October, 1949. Subsection (3) of section 1 of this Ordinance is in the following terms:‑ "It shall come into force at once and remain in force for the period of one year : Provided that the Central Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that it shall remain in force for such further period as may be speci fied in the notification". On the 16th of September, 1950, a notification was issued extending the Ordinance for a further period of one year i. e. from the 8th of October, 1950, to the 8th of October, 1951. Again, on the 1st of October, 1951, another notification was issued by the Central Government extending the Ordinance from the 8th of October 1951, for a period of one year. Under section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor‑General may, in cases of emergency, make and pro mulgate Ordinances for the peace and good Government of Pakistan, and any Ordinance so made shall have the force of an Act passed by the Federal Legislature. The power of making Ordinances under section 42, however, is subject to the same restrictions as the power of the Federal Legislature to make laws, and any Ordinance made under section 42 may be controlled or superseded by any Act of the Legislature. Section 42, therefore, confers very wide powers of legislation on the Governor‑General. When exercising these powers, the Gov ernor‑General acts as the Federal Legislature. Section 3 of the Ordinance states in unambiguous terms that the Ordinance shall be in force ‑for a period of one year. The proviso, however, lays down that the Central Government may, from time to time, direct that it shall remain in force for such further period as may be specified in a notification in the Official Gazette: The sole question for determination in the present case is whether the Governor‑General, acting in his legislative capacity, could give the power of extending the life of the Ordinance to any external authority, that is, the Central Government of Pakistan. On behalf of the appellant, it has been vehemently contended that the power to extend the duration of an enactment and to keep it alive is a legislative power, and that it is not open to the Legislature to delegate this power to an external authority. The Governor‑General, while acting as a Legislature, could not empower the Central Govern ment to keep this Ordinance alive for an indefinite period. The Central Government, by means of the proviso, has been autho rised to convert temporary legislation into a permanent enact ment. On behalf of the Crown, it was urged that the proviso did not in fact delegate any legislative functions to the Central Government, that the power conferred on the Central Govern ment by the proviso constituted an administrative or executive function, and that such a function could validly be deligated by the Legislature to the Central Government. It was further contended that even if the power to extend the life of an Act was a legislative function, it was open to the Legislature to entrust such a function, to the Central Government. Legislative functions can be delegated by the Legislature to an external authority so long as the Legislature does not efface itself or abdicate its functions completely. The question involved in this case being one of considerable importance, it is necessary to deal with it in some detail. The following quotation from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations Eighth Edition, p. 224 deals with the delegation of legislative powers :‑ "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the Sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed . . . . .". At page 227 it is stated :‑ "It is not always essential that a legislative Act should be a completed statute which must in any event take effect as law, at the time it leaves the hands of the Legislative Department. A statue may be conditional, and its taking effect may be made to depend upon some subsequent event. Affirmative legislation may in some cases be adopted, of which the parties interested are at liberty to avail themselves or not at their option. A private act of incorporation cannot be forced upon the corporators ; they may refuse the franchise if they so choose. In these cases the legislative Act is regarded as complete when it has passed through the constitutional formalities necessary to perfected legislation, notwithstanding its actually going into operation as law may depend upon its subsequent acceptance. The maxim that power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to any other authority does not preclude the legislature from delegating any power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise . . . . .". The question whether legislative power can be delegated to an external authority has been dealt with at length in Craw‑ford's Statutory Construction. The following page 24, 1940 Edition may be reproduced with advantage :- "In as much as the legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the doctrine of the separation of powers, the general rule is that the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate such power. As a result, any attempt to do so, is unconstitutional and void. Nor can this power to make laws be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority‑delegatus non potast dele gare. A power, however, which is not legislative in character may be delegated . . . . . As a general rule, it would seem to be the nature of the power rather than the manner in which it is exercised by the administrative officer, which determines whether the delegation is lawful". As it was urged over and over again by the Advocate -General that the proviso authorizing the Central Government to extend the life of the Ordinance was conditional legislation, it is necessary to determine what constitutes conditional legisla tion. When a law is made to take effect on the happening of a certain event, the Legislature in effect declares the law but leaves it to an external agency to bring it into force, whenever it considers it expedient to do so. A law may be regarded as inexpedient in certain events, but expedient if certain events should take place. In passing conditional legislation, the Legislature completely performs the duties which are imposed by the constitution upon it. That is, it places legislation on the Statute Book, and the only function that it delegates to an external authority is to bring the legislation into force if certain events should happen and the enforcement of the legislation should be considered necessary. Even if the legislation is not brought into force it remains on the Statute Book to be utilized, when and if necessary. If, however, a temporary Act is passed by the Legislature for one year, it dies a natural death after the lapse of one year from its commencement. There after, it ceases to be a law. In these circumstances, can it be said that the external authority that gives a new lease of life to an enactment is merely bringing the legislation into force in accordance with the wishes of the Legislature ? This question was considered by the Federal Court of India in the case of Jatindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar and others, 1949‑50 F. C. R. p.

595. Section 1, subsection (3) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act laid down that the Act shall remain in force for a period of one year from the date of its commencement.' There was, however, a proviso to the effect that the Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council, direct that the Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification. It was held by three of the judges (Fazl Ali J. dissenting) that the power to extend the operation of the Act for a further period of one year with such modification, if any, as may be specified was a legislative power ; and that the proviso to section 1 (3) which delegated such power to an authority other than the Provincial Legislature was not conditional legislation. The delegation of this legislative power was ultra vires. This case was strongly relied upon on behalf of the appellant. On behalf of the Crown it was contended that the power to extend the life of the legislation in Jatindra Nath Gupta's case 1949‑50 F. C. R., p. 595, was coupled with the power to amend the legislation and that that case was therefore clearly distinguish able. A perusal of the judgments of the various Judges in that case, however, shows that three of the Judges, namely, Kania C. J., Mahajan and Mukherjee JJ., held that the power to extend the operation of the Act beyond the period men tioned in the Act was prima facie a legislative power, and that such a power could not be delegated to any external authority, even if the power were not coupled with the power to amend. Kania C. J., observed as follows :‑ "It was contended that the power to extend the life of an Act, beyond the prescribed period, was clearly legislative power, and the Provincial Legislature had no power by the proviso to delegate this power to the two Houses of the Legislature of the Province of Bihar so as to extend the life of the Act by their resolutions only." "The power to extend the operation of the Act beyond the period mentioned in the Act prima facie is a legislative power. It is for the Legislature to state how long a particular legisla tion will be in operation. That cannot be left to the discre tion of some other body". Mahajan, J., expressed the same view in the following terms :‑ "The proviso which has been assailed in this case, judged on the above test, comes within the ambit of delegated legislation and is thus an improper piece of legislation and void. To my mind, it not only amounts to abdication of legislative authority by the Provincial Legislature, it goes further and amounts to setting up a parallel Legislature for enacting a modified Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act and for enacting a provision in it that that Act has to be enacted for a further period of one year. A careful analysis of the proviso bears out the above conclusion . . . . . ." "I am further of the opinion that the power given to extend the life of the Act for another year in the context of the language of section 1 (3) also amounts to an Act of legislation and does not fall under the rule laid down in The Queen v Burah. The Act in a mandatory form stated, that it shall be in force for one year only. That being, so, the power given in the proviso to re-enact it for another year is legislative power and does not amount to conditional legisla tion. Mukherjee, J., held that :‑ " The validity of the proviso to section 1 (3) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act cannot be upheld on the ground of its being a piece of contingent legislation ; It cannot also be supported on the ground that what it delegates is a mere non‑legislative function. The duration of a statute is a matter for determination by the Legislature itself ". The majority of the judges, therefore, regarded the exten sion of the duration of an enactment as re‑enactment of the legislation and held that such a function could only be per formed by the Legislature itself and could not be delegated to any other authority. The decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Kalyanam Veerabhadrayya 1949/II M. L. J., p. 663, has a direct bearing on the question involved in the present case. This case relates to the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act 1947. The life of the Act was one year, but by section 1 (4) the Provincial Government was given the power to extend the continuance of the Act by notification for another year. This provision was held to be invalid. The distinction between delegation of power to make the law and conditional legislation was discussed at great length: The following observations may be reproduced in extension:‑ " As the legislative power of a Government is vested in the Legislature under the Constitution Act it is not open to the Legislature to surrender or abdicate that power or dele gate it to another authority whether it is the executive Government or some other body. But a Legislature is authorised to delegate a power which is non‑legislative in character. Sometimes the delegated power may be in the nature of conditional Legislation authorizing an authority such as the executive to determine the time of the com mencement of an Act and the area of its application after determining, if necessary, certain facts. It may also entrust the power of extending the Act to other matters not en umerated in the Act itself in other cases, the Legislature entrusts to the subordinate bodies the power of making bye laws and regulations so as to carry out into execution the Act in which the principles and the policy of the Legislature have been laid down with precision. In other words, the Legislature by the Act passed by it lays down general principles and the policy, leaving out details to be filled in by regulations or rules by the executive Government or some other authority ". It will be seen from the above that it is the nature of the power rather than the manner of exercising it which determines whether the delegation is proper or invalid. If the Legislature gives the power to extend the life of an enactment to the Central Government, the nature of the power which is to be exercised by such Government is Legislative power, as without the exercise of the power the legislation would have died a natural death and would no longer have remained on the Statute Book. If, on the other hand, the body on which the authority has been conferred by the Legislature has discretion as to the manner of the execution of the powers to be exercised, and in pursuance of the law the external authority is not making or unmaking the law but is performing its administra tive functions in respect of matters which have been finally determined by the Legislature itself, it is not exercising legis lative functions. In the case of a temporary Act, after the expiration of the period fixed for its operation, the Act comes to an end automatically. There is no analogy between con ditional legislation which authorizes an outside authority to determine its commencement and the power to determine the life of the Act itself. The power of extending the life of an Act is really a power to bring the Act into existence for a further period, and it is therefore identical with the power off re‑enactment. The power to extend the life of an Act cannot be regarded merely as conditional legislation. The Calcutta! High Court in the case of Badal Bose and others v. The Chief Secretary, West Bengal, 53 C W N 728 (1948‑49), and the Dacca High Court in the case of A. K. R. Ahmed and others v. The Crown P L R Dacca Series, p. 290, have also held that the power to extend the life of an Act is a legislative function and cannot be delegated to an external authority. It is un necessary to deal with these cases in detail as they proceeded on the observations made by the Federal Court of India in the case of Jatindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar and others 1949‑50 F C R p.

595. The Advocate‑General contended that the delegation of power to the Central Government to extend the life of the Ordinance from time to time must be treated on a different footing from the delegation of authority to an external power to make laws in general. According to him, if power were given to the Central Government to extend the life of the Ordinance, it would be valid, while if power to legislate is delegated in general to any external authority it would be invalid, the reason being that in the latter case the Legislature would be effecting itself and abdicating its functions. In this connection, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in: the case of Her Majesty The Queen v. Burah, 5 I A

179. This case lays down that "Act (XXII of 1869) which confers upon the Lieutenant‑Governor of Bengal the power to determine whether the Act, or any part of it, shall be applied in a certain district, is conditional legisla tion, and not delegation of legislative power. Where plenary powers of legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether in an Imperial or in a Provincial Legislature, they may be well exercised, either absolutely or conditionally ; in the latter case leaving to the discretion of some external authority the time and manner of carrying its legislation to effect, as also the area over which it is to extend". As this case was clearly distin guishable the Advocate‑General stated that the principles en unciated in this judgment were applicable to the present case. He particularly emphasized the following observations :‑ " The Indian Legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it, and it can of course, do nothing beyond the limits which circum scribe those powers. But, when acting within those limits, it is not in any sense an agent or delegate of the Imperial Parliament, but has, and was intended to have, plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same nature, as those of Parliament itself: The established Courts of Justice, when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded must of necessity determine that question ; and the only way' in which they can properly do so, is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirma tively, the legislative powers were created, and .by which, negatively, they are restricted. If what has been done is legislation, within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and it violates the express condition or restriction by which that power is limited (in which cate gory would, of course, be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it), it is not for any Court of justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions". This observation, in my opinion, does not help the case for the Crown. Their Lordships emphasised the fact that the functions that were entrusted to the Lieutenant‑Governors were not legislative functions, that the entire legislation was contained in Act XXII of 1869, and that the operation of the order of the Lieutenant‑Governor was "directly and immedia tely, under and by virtue of Act itself". The proper Legislature had exercised its judgment as to place, persons, powers, and laws, and the result of that judgment had‑been to legislate con ditionally as to all these things. When the legislation is applied to a particular district, the condition having been fulfilled the legislation becomes absolute. Had it been possible for the legislature to delegate its legislative functions to the Lieutenant -Governor, their Lordships would not have observed that no Legislative functions were to be exercised by the Lieutenant- Governor in pursuance of the provisions of Act XXII of 1869. It was pointed out that the Legislature merely gave a discre tionary power to the Lieutenant‑Governor to extend certain legislation to a particular area when he considered it expedient. It was contended by the Advocate‑General that in the present case also it was the intention of the Governor‑General, when exercising his legislative functions, to keep this Ordinance alive for a period exceeding one year, and that is why the proviso was enacted in order to give the Central Government power, if circumstances so required, to extend the operation of the Ordinance from time to time. The life of the enactment, according to the counsel, was therefore, extended in pursuance of the wishes of the Legislature. The Governor‑General did not intend the Act to be of a temporary character lasting only for a period of one year, but it was envisaged that the Act may have to be extended almost indefinitely. I cannot accept this contention. If the Public Safety Ordinance was meant to have perpetual operation it was easy to say so. It cannot be presumed that the Governor‑General intended that this Ordin ance should have perpetual operation as the power to pass legislation accrues to the Governor‑General in cases of emer gency only. The Advocate‑General relied strongly on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Russel v. Queen. 1882 App. 7 Cas.

829. This case dealt with the Canada Temperance Act 1878. The preamble of the Act states that it is very desirable to promote temperance in the Dominion, and that there should be uniform administration in all the provinces respecting the traffic in intoxicating liquors. The Act is divided into three parts. The first relates to "proceedings for bringing the second part of this Act into force" ; the second the "Prohibition of traffic in intoxicating liquors"; and the third to "Penalties and prosecution for offences against the second part." The mode of bringing the second part of the Act into force, is as follows :‑ "On a petition to the Governor in Council, signed by not less than one‑fourth in number of the electors of any country or city in the Dominion qualified to vote at the election of a member of the House of Commons, praying that the second part of the Act should be in force and tale effect in such country or city, and that the votes of all the electors be taken for or against the adoption of the petition, the Governor -General, after certain prescribed notices and evidence, may issue a proclamation, embodying such petition, with a view ' to a poll of the electors being taken for or against its adoption. When any petition has been adopted by the electors of the county or city named in it, the Governor‑General in Council may, after the expiration of sixty days from the day on which the petition was adopted, by Order in Council published in the Gazette, declare that the second part of the Act shall be in force and take effect in such county or city, and the same is then to become of force and take effect accordingly. Such Order in Council is not to be revoked for three years, and only on like petition and procedure." It was contended on behalf of the Crown that the provisions of this Act delegated to the voters the option of bringing the second part of the Act into force in any county or city in a particular manner. Not only that, but that the voters had the right to petition the Governor to revoke the Act, and on such petitions, the Governor was bound to terminate the operation of the Act. According to the Advocate‑General, this was an instance of delegation of legislative powers by the Legislature to an external authority. This contention is wholly without force and has been affectively anywered by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the following words :‑ "It was in the first place contended, though not very strongly relied on, by the appellant's counsel, that assuming the Parliament of Canada had authority to pass a law for prohibiting and regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors, it could not delegate its powers, and that it had done so by delegating the power to bring into force the prohibitory and penal provisions of the Act to a majority of the electors of counties and cities. The short answer to this objection is that the Act does not delegate any legislative powers what ever. It contains within itself the whole legislation on the matters with which it deals. The provisions that certain parts of the Act shall come into operation only on the petition of a majority of electors does not confer on these persons power to legislate. Parliament itself enacts the condition and every thing which is to follow upon the condi tion being fulfilled. Conditional legislation of this kind is in many cases convenient, and is certainly not unusual, and the power so to legislate cannot be denied to the Parliament of Canada, when the subject of legislation is within its com petency". The case of King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma and others 1945 F C R p. 161 dealt with Ordinance No. II of 1942 which was made and promulgated by the Governor‑General under section 72 of the Government of India Act and which recited in the preamble that an emergency had arisen which made it necessary to provide for the setting up of special criminal Courts. In the body of the Ordinance provision was made for setting up of such Courts when necessary, with special judges and special Magistrates, and for the respective limits of jurisdiction and procedure, together with restrictions on appeal. It was urged that by means of this legislation that Provincial Government was given the powers in any province on being satisfied of the existence of an emergency of setting up of special Courts and that this was an instance of "delegated legislation" by which the Governor‑General without legal authority sought to pass the decision whether an emergency excised to the Provincial Government instead of deciding it for himself. This objection was repelled by their Lordships in the following terms :‑ "The second objection has attracted more support but is, in their Lordship's opinion, equally unfounded. It is undoubt edly true the Governor‑General, acting under section 72 of Sch. IX, must himself discharge the duty of legislation there cast on him, and cannot transfer it to other authorities. But the Governor‑General has not .delegated his legislative power at all. His powers in this respect, in cases of emergency, are as wide as the powers of the Indian Legislature which, as already pointed out, in view of the proclamation under sec tion 102, had power to make laws for a Province even in respect of matters which would otherwise be reserved to the Provincial Legislature. Their Lordships are unable to see that there was any valid objection, in point of legality, to the Governor- General's Ordinance taking the form that the actual setting up of a special Court under the terms of the Ordinance should take place at the time and within the limits judged to be necessary by the Provincial Government specially concerned. This is not delegated legislation at all. It is merely an example of the not uncommon legislative arrangement by which the local application of the provision of a statute is determined by the judgment of a local administrative body as to its necessity". The Advocate‑General also referred to the decision of the High Court of Australia in the case of Baxter v. Ahway 8 C L R p.

626. Subsection (g) of section 52 of the Customs Act 1901, provided that all goods the importation of which shall be prohibited by proclamation shall be prohibited imports. Such prohibited imports were enumerated in section 52 of the Act, and by clause (g) of that section the Governor‑General was empowered to add to the list of prohibited goods. In exercise of this power, the Governor‑General in Council issued a proclamation prohibiting the importation of opium suitable for smoking. The objection was taken that the power to prohibit the importation of opium was a power that should be exercised by the Legislature and could not be delegated to the Governor‑General. This objection was repelled on the ground that the delegation of powers to the Governor‑General was not delegation of a legislative function, but conditional legislation. It was remarked at p. 638 that :‑ "Half the Statutes on our books are in the alternative, depending on the discretion of some person or persons to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper. occasion exists for executing them. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. So in Locks's Appeal 'To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend upon a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible ‑to fully know. The proper distinction the Court said was this :‑`The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law ; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law‑making power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside the halls of legislation". It was contended on behalf of the Crown that the case of Kishori Lal Potder v. Debi Prasad Kajriwal and another A I R (37) 1950 Pat. p. 50 was a direct authority in support of the proposition that the extension of the life of an Act or Ordin ance by the executive Government, if such a power is delegated to it, does not amount to delegated legislation, but is merely an instance of conditional legislation. Subsection (3) of section 1 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, enacts that the Act shall remain in force for such period as the Provincial Government may by notification fix, provided that the Provincial Government may, from time to time, by notification, extend such period. By a notification, dated the 15th March 1947, the Provincial Government fixed one year as the period for which the Act should remain in force. By a subsequent notification, dated 1st March, 1948, the period was extended by one year, and by a notification dated the 7th March, 1949, a further extension of one year was made. After this extension subsection (3) was repealed by means of an Ordinance, and in its place, was substituted the following :‑ "(3) It shall remain in force for five years ." It was contended on ‑behalf of the appellant that by enact ing subsection (3) of section 1 of the Act of 1947, the Provincial Legislature lead delegated legislative powers to the Provincial Government, and that the result of this was that the entire Act was ultra vires, and, accordingly, that the amend ment attempted by the Ordinance of 1949 had nothing to operate upon. The Legislature had not itself fixed the period for which the Act was to remain in operation, but had left it to the Provincial Government, and this amounted to a delegation of its legislative functions to an external authority. Agarwala, C. J., repelled the above contention in the following words :‑ "Prima facie, the contention is a surprising one. But for subsection (3) the Act would be an Act of indefinite duration which came into force on the date on which assent to it was published in the Official Gazette. Subsection (3) of section 1, conferred on the Provincial Govern ment the power to curtail the period of its duration, and the proviso to that subsection empowered the Provincial Government to extend the period of duration after having curtailed it by notification. It is a common feature of Legislative Acts in this country for it to be provided in a statute that the statute shall come into operation as from a date to be fixed by the‑Provincial Government. In such cases, if the Provincial Government should never fix a date for' the statute to come into operation, it would remain a dead letter. The mere fact that the Legislature empowers the Provincial Government to fix the date from which an Act is to come into operation has, so far as I am aware, never been urged as a ground for holding that the Legislature had delegated its functions to the Provincial Government. The present is the converse case. The Act of 1947 came into operation without any act of the Provincial Government, and, if the Provincial Government had not, by notification, fixed the period during which it was to remain in force, it would have remained in operation indefinitely." The learned judge, after making the above‑mentioned observations, dealt with various cases, and came to the follow ing conclusion :‑ "Applying these observations to the Act of 1947, what is it that the Legislature entrusted to the Provincial Government by subsection (3) of section

1. To read that subsection is to answer the question. What was entrusted to the Provincial Government was merely a limited discretion to decide how long the provisions of the Act, which were obviously designed to deal with an unusual state of affairs, would be necessary. The entire legislation for controlling the lease, rent and eviction from buildings in Bihar is contained in the Act itself. No power has been conferred on the Provincial Government to alter the provisions of the Act in any way with regard to these matters. All that the Provincial Government has been empowered to do is to decide when the unusual provisions of this Act shall no longer operate because the changed circum stances no longer require their enforcement." In conclusion, the learned judge answered the question referred to him in the following words :‑ " What this question is intended to mean is whether the power conferred on the Provincial Government by sec tion 1 (3) is ultra vires the Provincial Legislature. For the reason stated above, I would answer this question in the negative. If I had felt constrained to take the contrary view, I would also have held that section 1 (3) is separable from the rest of the Act and, consequently, in the absence of any valid power to curtail its operation, it would remain in force indefinitely.". It is obvious that Agarwala, C. J., regarded the Act as a permanent statute, as the Act was to continue indefinitely if the Local Government did not curtail its operation. He was of the opinion that the curtailment of the life did not amount to an exercise of legislative functions by the Provincial Government. I am not impressed by this argument. The curtailment of the life of an Act is tantamount to its repeal. The Provincial Government originally brought the Act into operation for a period of one year. Thereafter, it gave a new lease of life for a further period of one year. The exercise of these powers by the Provincial Government, in my view, constituted the exercise of legislative powers by an authority other than the Legis lature. In any case, this decision is not of any great assistance as the Act was treated as permanent and not' as a temporary measure. Meredith, J., differed from Agarwala, C. J., and held that decision of the Federal Court of India' in Jatindar Nath Gupta's case 1949‑50 F. C. R., p. 595, was applicable. Ramaswami J., agreed with Agarwala, C. J. On behalf of the Crown a great deal of emphasis was laid on the observations of Fazal Ali, J. In re : Art. 143, Constitu tion of India A I R (38) 1951 Supreme Court p.

332. These observations are as follows :‑ " (1) The Legislature must normally discharge its primary legislative function itself and not through others. (2) Once it is established that it has sovereign powers within a certain sphere, it must follow as a corollary that it is free to legislate within that sphere in any way which appears to it to be best way to give effect to its intention and policy in making a particular law, and may utilize any outside agency to any extent it finds necessary for doing things which it is unable to do itself or finds it inconvenient to do. In other words, it can do everything which is ancillary to and necessary for the full and effective exercise of its power of legislation. (3) It cannot abdicate its legislative functions, and therefore while entrusting power to an outside agency, it must see that such agency acts as a subordinate authority and does not become a parallel Legislature. (4) The doctrine of separation of powers and the judicial interpretation it has received in America ever since the American Constitution was framed, enables the American Courts to check undue and successive delegation but the Courts of this country are not committed to that doctrine and cannot apply it in the same way as it has been applied in America. Therefore, there are only two main checks in this country on the power of the Legislature to delegate, these being its good sense and the principle that it should not cross the line beyond which delegation amounts to abdication and self‑effacement." With all respect, I do not agree with the proposition that the delegation of legislative powers by a Legislature to an external authority is invalid or ultra vires only if it amounts to "self‑effacement and abdication." The following passage from the judgment of Kania, C. J., has an important bearing on the observations made by Fazal Ali, J. :‑ "It was contended by the learned Attorney‑General that under the power of delegation the legislative body cannot abdicate or efface itself. That was its limit .." " To say that the true test of effacement is that the authority which confers powers on the subordinate body should not be able to withdraw the power appears to be meaningless. In my opinion, therefore, the question whether there is `abdication' and `effacement' or not has to be decided on the meaning of the words used in the instrument by which the power is conferred on the authority " " Abdication by a legislative body need not necessarily amount to a complete effacement of it. Abdication may be partial or complete. When in respect of a subject in the Legislative List the Legislature says that it shall not legislate on that subject, but would leave it to somebody else to legislate on it, why does it not amount to abdication or efface ment ? If full powers to do anything and everything which the Legislature can do are conferred on the subordinate authority, although the Legislature has power to control the action of the subordinate authority, by recalling such power or repealing the Act's passed by the. subordinate authority, the power conferred by the instruments in my opinion, amounts to an abdication or effacement of the Legislature conferring such power." The opinion of the majority of the judges was that it was not open to a Legislature to delegate its essential legislative powers to an external authority. With this conclusion, I am in complete agreement. To sum up, I am of the view that a legislature cannot delegate its powers of making, modifying, or repealing any law to an external authority. If it does so, it would be creating a parallel legislature. The power of extending the duration of an enactment which would have terminated, but for the inter ference of the external authority, is the exercise of legislative powers by an external authority and is invalid. Extension of the life of an Act is tantamount to re‑enactment. It is open to the legislature to delegate powers relating to the enforce ment of the Act, or its application to particular areas if certain conditions prevail therein, as that merely amounts to con ditional legislation. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has taken pains to explain in a large number of decisions that the powers delegated by the Legislature to various administrative and executive bodies did not amount to "delegated legislation" and fell within the category of con ditional legislation. It is obvious, therefore, that the Privy Council was of the view that if any Legislature delegated legislative functions to an external authority such delegation would be invalid. In the present case, the Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1949, was to remain in force for a period of one year from the date of its promulgation, i.e., the 8th of October, 1949. By means of the proviso, the Central Government was given power, from time to time, by notification, in the Official Gazette to direct that it shall remain in force for such further period as may be specified in the notification. This proviso must be held to be invalid and ultra vires as it confers legislative powers on an external authority, i.e., the Central Government. The Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, in my opinion, died a natural death on the 8th October, 1950. It was stated at the Bar that the appellant was now being detained by virtue of an order issued by the Ministry of the Interior in March, 1951. As the Public Safety Ordinance had expired on the 8th October, 1950, it was not open to any authority to issue any order of detention under this Ordinance subsequent to that date. For the reasons given above, I would hold that the appellant is being illegally detained. I would, therefore, allow this appeal, and order that the appellant be released forthwith. AKRAM, J.‑This is an appeal by one Sobho Gyanchandani, a detenu, whose application for release under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code was dismissed by the Chief Court of Sind on 5th February, 1951, The learned judge save a certificate to the effect that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Government of India Act, 1935 (as adapted to Pakistan) and hence the present appeal. It appears that the appellant was at first detained for a period of six months on the 17th of April, 1948, under the Sind Maintenance of Public Safety Act, on the ground of "fomenting trouble among the labour in general, and the Government employees in particular." Before the period expired Karachi was separated from the Province of Sind on the 23rd of July, 1948, but the detention of the appellant was continued under the same Act, by the Administrator of Karachi ; on the 1st of April, 1950, in pursuance of the Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance (XIV of 1949) promulgated on the 8th of October, 1949 (to last for a period of one year) the Ministry of Interior, Pakistan Government, directed a further detention of the appellant for a period of six months ; this detention was again extended to 30th March, 1951, by order, dated 19th August, 1950. The main contention raised before us (as before the Chief Court of Sind) by counsel for the appellant was that the extension by the Central Government of the period of deten tion by virtue of the proviso to clause 3 of section 1 of the Ordinance (XIV of 1949) was illegal and ultra vices, and the appellant was, therefore, entitled to be released and set at liberty. Clause 3 of section 1 of the Ordinance reads as follows :‑ " (3) It shall come into force at once and remain in force for the period of one year ; Provided that the Central Government may from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that it shall remain in force for such further period as may be specified in the notification." It was urged that when the Ordinance (XIV of 1949) itself expired in accordance with its own term, on the 8th of October, 1950, any further extension of it by virtue of the proviso to clause 3 of section 1 by the Central Government was invalid and of no legal effect, even though the Central Government was empowered to do so by the proviso ; that it was of no consequence that the first notification to prolong the life of the Ordinance issued prior to the expiration of one year fixed by the Ordinance, or that the second notification issued within the period extended by the first notification; that the Ordinance should have remained in force only under the sanction of the Governor‑General in his legislative capacity and not under the direction of any one else before its provisions could be availed of ; that the Ordinance having expired on the 8th of October, 1950, the continuance or the revival of it by the Central Government was tantamount to legislation in contravention of the Government of India Act, 1935, and contrary to the principles expounded in the cases of Queen v. Burah 5 Indian Appeals, 178 (P C) : I' L R 4 Cal. 172 ; Emperor v. Benoari Lai Sharma 72 Indian Appeals, 57 ;that the decisions in the case of In re Kalyanam Veerabhadrayya A I R (37) 1950 Mad. 243 ; Badal Bose and others v. The Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal 53 C W N, p. 728 and A. K. R. Ahmad and others y. The Crown, (1951) Pakistan Law Reports, Dacca Series, Vol 1, 290 ; are directly in point and go in favour of the contention that even a conditional legislation, upon the fulfilment of the condition prescribed, delegation of powers could not be made beyond subsidiary matters, such as, fixing time, persons, place etc., necessary to meet future contingencies and facilitate adjustments. In reply, counsel for the respondent (the learned Advo cate‑General of Pakistan) argued that in section 1 of the Ordinance, clause 3 and its proviso were to be read together as a whole, and when so read, it amounted to conditional legisla tion and was not, therefore, ultra vires the Governor‑General ; that the real intention should be gathered by reading clause 3 and its proviso conjunctively and not disjunctively ; and if that was done, it would become quite apparent that the intention was to keep the Ordinance alive not for a temporary period but permanently ; that if this view was correct, then the only question left to the Central Government, in the present case, was merely as to the application of the Ordinance, that is, determination of the duration for its remaining in force ; that such a thing could be done, and was permissible, finds ample support from the principles in the cases of Queen v. Burah 5 Indian appeals. 178 (P. C.) : I. L. R. 4 Cal. 172 and Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma 72 Indian Appeals, 57 ; that even if the clause and its proviso were to be read disjunctively so that the Ordinance could be regarded as a temporary measure, still the power conferred on the Central Government would be intra vires as held in the case of Kishori Lal v. Debi Parshad F. B. (1950) A I R Pat.

50. Reliance was further placed upon the cases of Russel v. Queen (1882) 7 A. C. 829 ; Powell v. Appollo. Candle Co. (1885) 9 A. C. 282 ; Hogde v. Queen (1884) 8 A. C. 117 and Baxter v. Ahway (1908) 8 Commonwealth Law Reports, 626, referred to and discussed in the judgment of the above case of Kishori Lal v. Debi Parshad. The real question, to my mind, seems to be whether the power delegated under the proviso to clause 3 of section 1 of Ordinance (XIV of 1949) created a rival legislative authority contrary to section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The following observation in the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Benoari Lai Sharma (1945) F. C. R. Vol : 7, p. 161, at 117, deserves special attention :‑ "With the greatest respect to these eminent judges, their Lordships feel bound to point out that the question whether the Ordinance is intra vices or ultra vices does not depend on considerations of jurisprudence or of policy. It depends simp ly on examining the language of the Government of India Act and comparing the legislative authority conferred on the Governor-General with the provisions of the Ordinance by which he is purporting to exercise that authority .There is nothing of which their Lordships are aware in the Indian constitution to render invalid a statute, whether passed by the Central Legislature or under the Governor‑General's emergency powers, which does not accord with this principle: I think it cannot be denied that a substantial delegation of powers becomes necessary in the overgrowing complexities of a modern state. but the question arises what should be the limits of such a delegation. In my opinion, matters of a fundamental nature or of general policy or of great importance, cannot be delegated, though powers may be assigned within reasonable limits and scope, such as the determination of time, place persons, dutiable commodities, etc., so that rules, regulations schemes and bye‑laws may be made by anyone empowered to do so, within the frame‑work of the main legislation ; the main legislation itself, however, cannot be dictated or its contents revived under the delegated powers ; to say otherwise would virtually amount to permitting an abdication or a surrender of the legislative authority itself reposed in the person delegating it. I have referred to bye‑laws here not without a purpose, it is to draw attention to the fact that delegation may lawfully be made of powers involving the exercise of functions, more or less, of a legislative character, provided it is within recognised limits. As instances of such delegated powers, the Civil P. C. (V of 1908), section 122 ; and the Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1945), section 38, may be mentioned ;these are not regarded as delegation of legislative .authority to make laws, but merely delegation of ancillary or incidental powers to carry out the purpose of the main enactment by and in virtue. of that enactment. In the case of Hodge v. Queen (1883) 9 A. C. 117, where the power of a local Legislature to confer on a Board of Com missioners, authority to enact regulations, to give effect to an Act (Liquor License Act) was in question, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that the Legislature had that power, and in the course of their judgment observed as follows :‑ "When the British North America Act enacted that there should be a Legislature for Ontario and that‑its Legislative Assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for the province and for provincial purposes in relation to the matters enumerated in section 92, it conferred power not in any sense to be exercised by delegation from or as agent of the imperial Parliament, but authority as plenary and as ample, within the limits prescribed by section 92 as the Imperial Parliament, in the plenitude of its powers possessed or could bestow. Within these limits of subjects and area the local Legislature is supreme and had the same authority as the imperial Parliament or the Parliament of the Dominion would have had under like circumstances to confide to a municipal institution or body of its own creation authority to make bye‑laws, or 'resolutions as to subjects specified in the enactment, and with the object of carrying the enactment into operation and effect. It is obvious that such an authority is ancillary to legislation, and without it an attempt to provide for varying details, and machinery to carry them out might become oppressive or absolutely fail. The very full and very elaborate judgment of the Court of Appeal contains abundance of precedents for this legislation, entrusting a limited discretionary authority to others and has many illustrations of its necessity and convenience." As to the cases relied upon by the learned Advocate -General‑In the case of Queen v. Burah 5 Indian Appeals 178, (P. C.) the Legislature itself had decided that it was fit and proper that the Khasi and Jantia Hills should also be removed from the jurisdiction of the existing Courts and the operation of the laws passed by regular legislation (as was done in the case of the Garo Hills) and all that was entrusted to the Lieutenant‑Governor of Bengal was to determine the time when the repeal was to come into‑effect, the jurisdiction of new Courts and officers extended and the operation of new laves introduced (see Act (XXII) of 1869 sections 3 and 9) ; it was merely a question of the application of the enactment passed by the Legislature which was left to the discretion of the Lieutenant‑Governor. In the case of Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma (72 Indian Appeals, 57), apart from the ordinary criminal Courts already in existence, provision was made by the Governor‑General by Ordinance (II of 1942) for the setting up of certain special criminal Courts, if and when considered necessary, by the Provincial Government. It was held that the Ordinance was intra .vires the Governor‑General as it merely left the application of the Ordinance with respect to time and place, in the discretion of‑ the local administrative body ; that the condition itself, and if it was fulfilled, every thing to follow, was laid down by the Ordinance. In the case of Kishori Lal v. Debi Parshad A I R 1950 Pat. p. 50, strongly relied upon for the respondent the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent, Eviction) Control Ordinance (II of 1946) was passed on the 1st of October, 1946, and it was followed on March, 1947, by the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent, Eviction) Control Act (III of 1947) ; subsection 3 of section 1 of the Act declared that the Act shall remain in force for such period as the Provincial Government may by notification fix ; Provided that, the Pro vincial Government may from time to time by notification, extend such period. On, the 15th of March, 1947, the Provincial Government initially fixed one year as the period for which the Act was to remain in force, but by subsequent notifications, extended the period from time to time. It was contended that under subsection 3 and its proviso, the Provincial Legislature had delegated legislation to the Provincial Government, and that, therefore, the entire Act was ultra vires ; that subsection 3 had conferred on the Provincial Government power to curtail the duration of the Act, and its proviso to extend the same. The majority of the Full Bench (Merridith, J., dissenting) held that subsection 3 with its proviso was not illegal or ultra vires on the ground of improper delegation or legislative powers. In this case apparently the power to keep or not to ‑keep the Act in force was bestowed upon the Provincial Government, but as a matter of fact the Act was kept in force till March, 1950. As the Act has not been placed before us, 'it is difficult to say whether the Act was or was not of a more or less permanent nature, but if the majority decision favours the respondent's contention and implied that even where the Act is of a short and temporary duration, its life can .be extended by an outside authority purporting to exercise power under‑the expired Act, with great respect to the learned Judges, I must say that I am unable to agree. The legislation itself must be in force under the Legislature's own sanction before its pro visions can be availed of. Regarding the other cases relied upon by the learned Advocate‑General, which, as already noticed have been discussed and considered in the case of Kishori Lal, I do not think it will serve any useful purpose to deal with them in the present case, they being clearly distinguishable on their facts ; in none of those cases attempt was made by any extraneous body, under authority conferred by an enactment, to prolong its life or to revive it, where according to its terms it was to exist after a certain specified period. With regard to the argument that clause 3 and its proviso under section 1 of the Ordinance (XIV of 1949) should be read together to find out the real intention of the Legislature, it cannot be denied that the enacting part, clause 3 is to be read with reference to its proviso ; but while construing an enact ment, section or clause, if the language happens to be clear and unambiguous, only the words used are to be considered in their plain meaning and it is not necessary to find out the intention of the Legislature. Under clause 3, the Ordinance is to remain in force for a period of one year only, but under its proviso, power is bestowed upon the Central Government to extend the period from time to time. The words used are quite clear and unmistakable, there is no ambiguity about them, and the only question is whether the proviso itself is valid and of legal force and effect. That first, the enacting part and the proviso should be considered together, so that the Ordinance may be regarded as a legislation of a permanent character ; and after that, the proviso should be read by itself, singly, so that it may be regarded as a condition for the application of the Ordinance, is a suggestion, which I am unable to appreciate or to approve. I am unwilling, therefore, to adopt it as a legiti mate method of construing or interpreting an enactment. The cases of (1) In re Kalvannam heerabhadrayya ; (2) A. R. K. Ahmad and others v. the Crown and (3) Badal Bose and others v. The Chief Secretary Government of West Bengal, cited by learned counsel for the appellant directly cover the question now raised before us and support his contention. I fully agree with the view and the observations contained in the judgments of the learned judges who decided those cases. Considering everything, I hold that the proviso to clause 3 of section 1 of the Ordinance (XIV of 1949) is ultra vires and the detention made thereunder illegal and unauthorised. I accordingly allow the appeal, and direct that the appellant be released forthwith and set at liberty. CORNELIUS, J.‑The following statement of facts will be sufficient for the purposes of this judgment. The appellant Sobho Gyanchandani is at present undergoing detention by reason of an order made in that behalf under section 3 of the Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance XIV of 1949. He was originally detained by an order of the Provincial Government of Sind made under the Sind Maintenance of Public Safety Act on or about the 17th April 1948 on which date he was arrested at Karachi. Karachi was later separated from the Sind Province and by virtue of the relevant instrument, the Sind Act above cited continued in force in Karachi. Orders extending the detention are stated to have been made from time to time by the Administrator of Karachi under the aforesaid Sind Act, until on the 1st April 1950 the first order of detention under the Ordinance of 1949 was made by the Pakistan Government which is stated to have been extended without interruption since that time by the Administrator of Karachi. It was not contended that there is any defect in any of these orders of‑detention or extension, affecting the validity of the detention. A number of intermediate attempts are said to have been made to challenge the validity of detention on other grounds before the application under section 491, Crimi nal P. C. was instituted in the Sind Chief Court, from the dismissal of which by a Division Bench of that Court, Sobho Gyanchandani has now appealed to this Court. Before the Chief Court, the validity of the detention was challenged on two principal grounds, The first ground went to the validity of the Ordinance itself. It was contended that a provision contained in subsection (3) of section 1 of the Ordi nance whereby its life which was fixed by the legislating authority, (viz., the Governor‑General under section 42, Government of India Act, 1935) at one year from the date of its promulgation, was rendered capable of extension by the Central Government, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, was ultra vices. The argument briefly was that the fixing of the duration of a statute is a legislative function, and is not susceptible of delegation by an authority legislating under powers derived from a written constitution. The Central Government as the principal executive authority under the Ordinance is an entity distinct from the Governor‑General, who promulgated the Ordinance under the Legislative power con ferred by section 42 of the Government of India Act, 1935. By conferring upon the Central Government a power which was in its essence a legislative power, the Governor‑General had in fact created a new legislative authority of a kind which was not contemplated by and, therefore, could not be tolerated under the Constitution Act. The Central Government by notification dated the 16th September 1950 and the 1st October 1951 had successively extended the life of the Ordinance for a period of two years. It was contended that these extensions were wholly ineffective to preserve the Ordinance in force, but by virtue of the express provision in the Ordinance directing that "it shall come into force at once and remain in force for the period of one year", the Ordinance had expired on the 7th October 1950. Consequently, the detention of the appellant could not have been extended on any date after the 7th October 1950. The second principal argument raised on behalf of Sobho Gyanchandani in the Sind Chief Court was that in view of the fact that he had been in detention continuously from the 17th April 1948 it was not possible for the detaining authority to be satisfied by reason of any recent acts performed by him that his detention was necessary "with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of public order". The Division Bench of the Sind Chief Court refused to hold, on this ground alone, that the final order of detention of Sobho Gyanchandani was not made bona fide, observing that there was "no difficulty in conceiv ing of circumstances in which it will be highly dangerous to allow a particular type of persons to be at liberty even though they may have been under detention for long period". There are indications on the record concerning the potentialities of Sobho Gyanchandani which had influenced the authorities to detain him under the Ordinance. In the first order of arrest and detention, it was said that he was given to fomenting trouble among labour in general and Government employees in particular. In the succeeding order of extension the reason given for his. detention was his "importance and potentialities for stirring up trouble". Evidently the need for preventive action in this case did not arise by reason of recent conduct on his part but of deep‑seated and inherent capacity and tendency to perform acts of a nature prejudicial to public safety and the maintenance of public order. I am in agreement with the view of the Sind Chief Court on this point. The Division Bench of the Sind Chief Court also rejected the argument challenging the validity of the Ordinance in the period front the 8th October 1950 onwards. In order to appre ciate the grounds upon which this decision has been based, it is necessary to set out the provision iii the Ordinance which purports to determine its life This is contained in sub section (3) of section 1 and is in the following terms :‑ (3) "It shall come into force at once and remain in force for the period of one year provided that the Central Govern ment may from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that it shall remain in force for such further period as may be specified in the notification". The argument placed before the Sind Chief Court, on behalf of the detenu, appears from the judgment of the Division Bench to have been briefly to the effect that the power of extension of the Ordinance given to the Central Government was a legislative power and could not be described as "conditional legislation" in the sense in which the latter expression has been employed by the Judicial Committee in the leading case Queen v. Burah (L. R. 5 I. A. 178) No legislative authority under the written constitution of Pakistan could delegate its legislative authority further and therefore by virtue of the disputed pro viso, no power of any kind was conferred upon the Central Government. In support learned counsel relied upon the opinions of three Judges of the Federal Court of India, namely Kania C. J., Mahajan J., and Mukherjea J., in the case of Jatindra Nath Gupta (1949 F. C. R. 595) as well as on a Division Bench decision of the High Court published as In re. Veerabhadrayya (I. L. R. 1950 Mad. 243). These cases have again been relied upon in the argument before this Court, and it will be convenient to set out, at this point, the facts and the conclusions, so far as they are relevant for the purposes of the present appeal. In the case before the Indian Federal Court the Act to be considered was one passed by the Legislature of the Bihar Province. It provided that the Act‑ "Shall remain in force for one year ; provided that the Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed by the Bihar‑Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifica tion if any as may be specified in the notification". The Bench of the Indian Federal Court in Jatindra Nath Gupta's case consisted of five judges. Kania C. J. held in clear terms that the giving of power of extension of the statute by a novel procedure and through an agency which was not a duly constituted legislative authority, under the Constitution. Act, amounted to delegation of the legislative function in contraven tion of the written constitution. Mahajan J. expressed the following view :‑ "I am further of the view that the power given to extend the life of the Act for another year in the context of the language of section 1 (3) also amounts to an act of legisla tion and does not fall under the rule laid down in Queen v. Burah. The Act in a mandatory form stated that it shall be in force for one year only. That being so, the power given in the proviso to re‑enact it for another year is legislative power and does not amount to conditional legislation, Mukherjee J. expressed the opinion that the duration of a statute is a matter for determination by the legislature itself, but went on to observe that though the validity of the exten sion might have been saved, by the argument that the intention of the legislature was that the Act should remain in force for one year absolutely and for one further year, conditionally upon passing of the resolution by the two houses of the Bihar Legislature and the making of a notification by the Provincial Government, had there been do power of modification con ferred by the same words, yet it was impossible to separate the two powers of extension and modification and consequently the provision for extension was invalid, Patanjali Sastri J. pre ferred to found his conclusion on the point which arose in the case on another ground. The fifth judge Fazal Ali J. held that the intention of the Legislature was to legislate for one year absolutely and for the second year conditionally, the condition being as already stated, and this being satisfied, there was no re‑enactment but a mere continuance of the Act. In the Madras case the provision for determining the life of the Act, namely, the Madras Public Order Act 1947 was that it should remain in force for one year, but the Provincial Govern ment was empowered from time to time by notification to extend the continuance of the Act for a further period or periods not extending one year in the aggregate, if in their opinion it was expedient to do so. The learned judges of the Division Bench held that the power of extending the life of an Act was really a power to bring the Act itself into existence for a further period. They did not consider that such a power was in the nature of "conditional legislation'4 but held that it was clearly legislative power, and that its delegation to the Provincial Government was unconstitutional. They based this conclusion upon a lengthy examination of authorities from the Privy Council the English Supreme Court, and the High Court of Australia, as well as a number of American cases, and they also drew upon the discussion of the subject by learned American authors. Finally, they relied upon datindra Nath Gupta's case (cited above) and referred also to a case from West Bengal Badal Bose v. The Chief Secretary West Bengal (53 C W N 728), where a provision in a West Bengal Security Act for extension of the life of the Act very similar to that contained in the Bihar Act in Jatindra Nath Gupta's case was held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court to be invalid, following the decision in that case. The learned judges of the Sind Chief Court have disposed of the closely reasoned argument in the Madras case on the short ground that the statement made in the judgment "that in Jatindra Nath Gupta's case a majority of the Judges are clearly of opinion that even a bare power to extend the life of an Act with or without modification is a legislative power which could not be delegated", is inaccurate to the extent that it "can hardly bear examination". With respect, this view is itself not strictly correct, as will appear from the statement of the finding of the five judges of the Indian Federal Court given above. Of the judges who opined directly on the question, a majority were certainly of the view that mere extension of the life of a statute was a legislative Act, not succeptible of delegation. The limi tation on the total life of the Bihar Act, which formed the basis of the view of one judge that the provision for extension within such period was "conditional legislation", a view which was tentatively shared by another judge, is not found in the Ordinance here in question. As regards the case of Jatindra Nath Gupta, the learned judges of the Sind Chief Court declined to accept the view of the majority of the judges of‑the Indian Federal Court, on two grounds. Firstly, they disagreed wholly with the view that in the Bihar Statute,. power to extend the statute had been given by form of words which linked that power inextricably with the power of modifying the statute. In the case before the Sine Chief Court, the statute conferred only a single power, namely, that of extension of the life of the statute, and consequently the question of separability was without relevancy, The second ground stated by the Sind Chief Court is that the views of the judges in India "are clearly contrary to what the Privy Council have repeatedly and in the clearest manner decided when dealing with substantially the same question". In support of this emphatic assertion, reference has been made to three judgments of tile Judicial Committee which are reported as Queen v. Burah (I L R 5 I A 178) ; Russel v. Queer. (1882 7 A C 829) and King‑Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma, It falls to be observed that in none of these cases was there before the Judicial Committee, for examination, a statute which in essential respects can be‑ said to bear any resemblance to the provision in subsection (3) of section 1 of the Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance 1949. In Burah's case the Act under exami nation was an Act by the Governor‑General in Council in 1869. It was in no respect a temporary statute, i.e., it contained no indication that the legislating authority intended that it should not remain on the Statute Book indefinitely. The object of the statute was to make provision for selective application of the laws then in force in the Province of Bengal to a specified portion of the territory included in that Province namely, the Garo, Khasi Jaintia and Naga Hills. At the time when the Act was passed the laws prevailing in the Bengal Province, were also, ex hypothesi, in force in these tracts. By the Act power was given to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal to issue a notification in prescribed terms, which would have the effect of terminating forthwith the operation of all the laws in force in the Bengal Province, but only in respect of the area described as the Garo Hills. The Act also empowered the Lieutenant‑Governor thereafter to extend to the Garo Hills tracts, any law in force in the rest of the Bengal Province, and to specify authorities who should, in relation to the Garo Hills tract, exercise powers under each Act so extended. By a further provision the Lieutenant. Governor was empowered by notification to extend to the Khasi Jaintia and Naga Hills tract, all or any of the provisions of the Act of 1869. The Legislature, by making this provision, impliedly declared its opinion that the Act (of 1866) should apply to the Khasi Jaintia and Naga Hills tract as well but they left to the Lieutenant‑Governor the duty of investigating and deciding when it would be appropriate to apply the Act to all or any of these tracts, and in addition, to select which provision of the Act should be so applied. In relation to the Garo Hills the Lieutenant Governor was given power only to decide the date on which the provisions of the Act relating to that tract should come into force. For the purposes of drawing a parallel between Burah's case and the present, it is necessary to compare the powers, con ferred upon the Lt.‑Governor by the Act of 1869 and the particular power conferred by the Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance 1949 upon the Central Government. By the Act of 1869, wide powers were conferred upon the Lt.‑Governor, firstly in regard to the bringing into operation of that Act in the Garo Hills area, secondly in regard to the application of selected provision of that Act to the remaining hills, thirdly in regard to selection of statutes for application in the respective areas, and fourthly in regard to modification of such selected Acts, but only for their proper implementation on the administrative side. These powers could be exercised without limit of time. The provisions of the Act could be applied piecemeal to the Khasi, Jaintia and Naga Hills and similarly, the application of statutes to the area in question could be effected piecemeal over an indefinite period of time. There is no provision to be found in that Act which would enable the Lt.‑Governor, by any act on his part, to terminate the life of the Act itself. In other words, the existence and continuance of the Act of 1869 as a part of the network or complex of laws in force in India, in other words upon the Indian Statute Book, could not be affected by any act which the Lt.‑Governor was capable of performing by virtue of any powers conferred upon him by the Act itself. Before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee the con tention was raised that the powers conferred upon the Lt. Governor by this Act included legislative powers such as the Governor‑General‑in‑Council was not competent to delegate. The argument was repelled by the Judicial Committee on the ground that the Act did not provide for any exercise of Legis lative authority by the Lt.‑Governor, but only provided for acts to be done by him under the legislative authority of the Governor‑General‑in‑Council. They described the Act as "conditional legislation" and observed that the conditions having been fulfilled the legislation was absolute. It will be of advantage to cite the following brief quotation from the judg ment :‑ "Legislation, conditional on the use of particular powers or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the legislature to persons in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon thing ; and, in many circumstances, it may be highly convenient". In that case, the condition was one which lay between the Act of 1869 on the one side and firstly its operation in the Garo Hills, and secondly its application to the remaining Hills; the condition was that the Lt.‑Governor should issue a notification in the prescribed form. This condition was specified in the Act itself and was neither intended to be, nor capable of being, used in any way so as to curtail or affect the life of the Act itself. In the present case, there is a condition, namely, that the Central Government should issue a notification, but it relates to the continuance of the Act itself so that unless the condition is satisfied, after a certain date, namely, the 7th October, 1950, the Act itself would be no more. It is not necessary to add any further words to make it plain that 4o question of any power even remotely resembling this power came under the obser vation or examination of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Burah's case. In the two remaining cases, the Judicial Committee were dealing with statutes of other types, but again, in each case, the question was merely one of application of the statute in a local area. In Russel's case, which was from Canada, the provision in a Temperance Act whereunder the operation of certain provisions of the Act in specified areas, namely, countries and cities, was determined, came under examination. Such pro visions were to be applied by the Governor‑General by Order- in‑Council to a country or a city, if the majority of the elections in such country or city decided in favour of such application. After the lapse of a specified time, the application of such provisions could be terminated in like manner. Here again the question was not as to the existence of the Act itself upon the Statute Book of Canada, but merely of its operation in any particular area this was rendered subject to a specified condition. The vires of the provision having been challenged, the Judicial Committee observed as follows :‑ "Conditional legislation of this kind is in many cases con venient, and is certainly not unusual, and the power so to legislate cannot be denied to the Parliament of Canada, when the subject of legislation is within its competency". There can be no doubt, and I say so with the greatest respect, that the description "conditional legislation" applied to the Canadian Act which was under examination in that case, but the provision here in question is of an entirely different nature, nothing arising out of the argument of their Lordships of the Privy Council in relation to the Canadian Act is directly avail able in a similar sense in relation to the Pakistan Ordinance for reaching a similar conclusion. The third case from the Privy Council, that of Benoari Lal Sharma related again to a provision in a statute of the Central Legislature of India whereby power was given to a Provincial Government in specified circumstances to apply the Act in the Province, and subsequently, to terminate the application of the Act, in each case by means of notifications. To the argument that a legislative power had been delegated to the Provincial Government, the judgment of the Judicial Committee furnishes the following reply :‑ "This is not a delegated legislation at all, It is merely an example of the not uncommon legislative arrangement by which the local application of the provisions of a statute is determined by the judgment of a local administrative body as to its necessity . No question arose in that case concerning .any provision in the Act under examination enabling any executive authority. whether Central or Provincial, to perform any act having an effect upon the continued existence of the Central Act upon the Statute Book. Therefore the fact that the description "con ditional legislation" could be correctly applied to that Act is plainly no ground for applying the same description to that disputed provision in the Pakistan Safety Ordinance 1949. Such being the limited effect of these three decisions of the Privy Council, it would appear difficult to include the present case within the principle of "conditional legislation" without an appreciable extension of that principle. The learned Judges of the Sind Chief Court appear however to have been of the view that the case fell directly within that principle, and as the Learned Advocate‑General appearing on behalf of the Crown has also argued in a similar strain, it is desirable to deal with the conclusions reached in the judgment under appeal at some length. With reference to the argument raised on behalf of Sobho Gyanchandani that a power to extend the life of a statute was a legislative power, and not merely conditional legislation, the learned judges observed that to argue thus was :‑ " to miss the whole point of, the Privy Council decision in Queen v. Burah and to fall into the same error which the Privy Council were at such pains to emphasise and explain in that case." In another place, they observed that the argument "wholly ignores what was so clearly decided in Queen v. Burah that when an external authority exercised a discretion conferred upon it by enactment to determine the time when the enactment was to be in force as a law, the exercise of the discretion by the external authority did not amount to a legislative Act." In the light of the distinction which has already been pointed out above between the power of application of the provisions statute at a particular time, or in a particular place or to parti cular persons or things on the one side, and the power to de cide whether or not the Act itself shall continue on the Statute Book or shall be deleted therefrom, the opinion thus uncom promisingly expressed would appear difficult to appreciate on any basis other than that the learned judges had failed to see this plain difference between Burah's case and the present case. The learned Advocate‑General was unable to improve on the argument beyond suggesting that where the conferment of power upon an executive authority to determine the applica tion or operation of a law in point of place, person and thing, was recognised in practice, there should be no difficulty in allowing that power could also be conferred by a legislature to an outside authority to decide as to the existence of the law over a period in the future to be fixed at the discretion of such authority. The suggestion has no merit except plausibility and is impossible to accept. Particularly in matters affecting the constitution and powers of legislation it is dangerous to the public interest to seek enlargement of power on the basis of analogy or inference. In the present case, however, they seems no analogy nor can any foundation be discovered for ex tension of the principle "conditional legislation" by inference to cover such a case as the present. Prima facie the placing and keeping of a law on the Statute Book, and the removing of a' law from the Statute Book are legislative functions. There is nothing in the judgments of the Judicial Committee in three cases cited above which in any way detracts from the cogency of this rule. The three cases relate exclusively to the application and operation of provisions of statute, by virtue of the exer cise of powers conferred by those statutes. No question arose, nor was anything said by their Lordships of the Judicial Com mittee, regarding the power of either placing or keeping any of the Acts there in question upon the Statute Book or of the removal of any such Act from the Statute Book, In the pre sent case the power relates to the keeping of the Ordinance on the Statute Book and its removal from the Statute Book, both to be determined entirely at the discretion of the Central Government. The learned Advocate‑General was unable to cite any authority on the question of the nature of a power to keep a Statute on the Statute Book, but sought to support an inference that it is not legisla tive power on the view expressed by the learned judges of the Sind Chief Court that a power to determine the life of a statute is not a legislative power as well as the similar opinion of two judges of the Patna High Court in a recent case cited as Kishori Lal v. Debi Parshad (A I R 1950 Pat. 50). There the statute in question was the Bihar Building (Lease. Rent and Eviction) Control Act 1947, and the provision determining its life was to the effect that it "shall remain in force for such period as the Provincial Government may by notification fix provided that the Provincial Government may from time to time by notification extend such period." It appears from the judgments of the three learned judges who heard the case that the Act came into force not on any date fixed by the Act itself but by virtue of the provisions of the General Clauses Act 1897, on the date on which it received the Governor‑General's assent. The power conferred upon the Provincial Govern ment by the provisions cited above was therefore a power to fix the terminal date of the Act and to extend such date from time to time, The validity of this power having been challeng ed as unconstitutional delegation, two of the learned Judges held that the power to curtail the period or duration of an Act was not a legislative power ; the third judge preferred to follow the decision in Jatindra Nath Gupa's case (cited above) and held the provision was ultra vires. The conclusion of the two Judges who held that the provision was intra vires is not supported by any reasoning. They were content to say that in their opinion curtailment of the life of an Act is not a legisla tive Act. With respect, the question is too important to be determined in this manner. The true criterion is whether by an act of an outside authority a change is brought about in the network of laws which have validity in the country and are on the Statute Book. It is axiomatic that these laws interact on each other and the provisions of any one of these laws in some respect are operative in addition to parallel provisions n other laws and in some respects in derogation of such provisions. The complete removal of a particu lar law from the Statute Book creates an effect which goes beyond the mere termination of the particular provisions of such law. There is also an effect upon other laws as well, whose own provisions thereby are either restored to full force or deprived of supplementary force as a result of the disappearance of the repealed law. A repeal has, therefore, a wider effect upon the legislative structure of the country than the mere disappearance of the particular law might appear to produce. It cannot be denied that to act so that such a result is produced is to act legislatively in the fullest sense. There is no difficulty in perceiving the distinction between pro ducing an effect of such a fundamental kind on the one hand and on the other either, bringing into operation a statute which is already on the Statute Book or applying the provisions of a law which is on the Statute Book in particular places or to particular persons or things. The learned judges of the Sind Chief Court went on to observe that in a true delegation, it is necessary that the Legis lature should abdicate its duty and attempt to leave such duty to be performed by an external authority. This argument was also adopted by the learned Advocate‑General, who attempted to reinforce it by reference to the views expressed by two of the seven judges of the Indian Supreme Court who heard the recent case In re : Article 143 Constitution of India (A I R 1951 section C‑332). These Judges, namely, Fazal Ali, J. and Das J. expressed the view that a Legislature under a written constitution may exercise a power of delegation its legislative functions subject only to the condition that it should not abdi cate or efface itself. On the other hand three judges, namely, Kania C. J., Mahajan J. and Bose J. wholly refused to accept this view and thought the limits should be much more narrowly laid. Patanjali Sastri J. recorded no clear opinion on the point while the seventh judge Mukherjee. J. held in terms markedly different from the contention now advanced, that the delega tion was only permissible "as ancillary to, or in aid of, the exercise of law‑making power by the proper Legislature " and should not be used to relieve the Legislature of its own respon sibility or essential duty. It is true that this Court is not concerned with the fact of a majority being on one side or the other, but only with the merit of the arguments by which the conclusions of the individual Judges are sustained. To set out these arguments will not, in my opinion, serve any useful pur pose, and I content myself, therefore, with saying that; on this point, I am in respectful agreement with the majority view in this case. The learned Advocate‑General attempted to derive such a power from a passage in the judgment in Queen v. Burah, reading as follows :‑ "The Indian Legislature has powers expressly limited by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it * * *But when acting within those limits, it * * * has * * plenary powers of legislation, as large and of the same nature, as those of Parliament itself. The established Courts of Justice when a question arises whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must of necessity determine that question, and the only way in which they can properly do so, is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are restricted. If what has been done is legislation within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power, and if it violates no express condition or restric tion by which that power is limited it is not for any Court of justice to enquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions." The simple argument put forward by the learned Advocate -General was that there being no "express condition or restric tion" in section 42, Government of India Act, 1935, forbidding the delegation by the Governor‑General of the power of legislation thereby conferred upon him, the conferment of the disputed power on the Central Government must be held to be intra vires. The argument rests on the assumption that the judicial Committee, in passage cited above, was laying down exhaus tively the limits of a legislative power derived from a written instrument. That this cannot have been the case will be evident from the fact that even in the case of a sovereign legislature, whose powers are unwritten and prima facie unconfined, there are limitations, e.g., that no legislature can pass an irrepealable law. Moreover, their Lordships of the Privy Council have frequently expressed the caution that their pronouncements are not to be interpreted as having general application, but must be confined to the facts and circumstances of the case in which they are made. In Burah's case, as already seen, the questions were of the operation and application of the pro visions of an Act, not as to the keeping of that Act itself on the Statute Book. This contention is, therefore, clearly untenable. It is undeniable that of the functions which are conferred by a written constitution, the legislative function is by far the most important. I cannot conceive that the constitution mak ing authority when providing for the establishment of a Legis lature and conferring powers on that Legislature, should have intended otherwise then that the powers so conferred should be exercised exclusively by that legislature. The difficulty which, under the increasing complexity of modern conditions, is felt by all legislatures in making provision for every case which may arise within the contemplation of a statute, render it necessary for some measure of ancillary power to be dele gated to executive authorities to make statutory rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the statute in matters of detail. Delegation to this extent has been uni versal practice for a great many years, and such provision will be found in a great number of statutes. A leading authority on this point is Hodge v. Queen (1884 9 A C 117). Similarly on the basis of established practice, limited discretion and particular powers may be given to executive authorities to determine the application or operation of statutes in point of time or in rela tion to places, persons and things. Statutes empowering the Executive Government to determine when they shall come into force are to be found in large number in the Statute Book of every civilised country. Instances of statutes empowering application of their provisions to particular places and persons are the three statutes considered by the Privy Council in the cases considered in detail above namely those of Burah, Russell and Benarsi Lal Sharma. Instances of statutes empowering application of their provisions to particular things will be found in Powell v. Appollo Candle Company (1885) 10 A C 282 and Baxter v. Ahway (1909) 8 Com. I R

626. I am fully persua ded that it is not necessary, in order to meet any conditions or situations that may arise, for any duly constituted legis lative authority to go beyond the limits indicated by the forms of practice outlined above, to discharge its duty adequately. In my opinion no argument of necessity can avail to create any such power of legislating as is contended for by the learned Advocate‑General. The learned judges of the Sind Chief Court 'further observed that the question whether there had been any delega tion of legislative authority should be determined by the con sideration whether "the efficacy of the acts of the external authority was to be due to the legislation carried out by the proper Legis lature, or to the legislative authority of some other newly created legislative power armed with general legislative authority." They pointed out that the extension of the Ordinance or its termination by the Central Government would be effected by acts performed under the authority of the Ordinance itself and they considered that the efficacy of such acts would be due exclusively to the legislation, and not to the authority of the Central Government. This argument was also adopted by the learned Advocate‑General, but it seems to me that if it be borne in mind that the central question is whether the legislat ing authority, namely, the Governor‑General was himself em powered to confer such a power upon the Central Government, no useful purpose is served by searching for the words or the formulae under which the Central Government purported to Act. There is no doubt that these words are found in the Ordi nance itself, but the question is‑are those words, which purport to convey a power, properly included in the Ordinance and have they any effect whatsoever ? I have already answered these questions in the negative and I need only to add at this stage that there is no escape from the conclusion that after the 7th October, 1950, the Ordinance remained on the Statute Book as a result of an exercise of the will, not of the legislating authority but of the Central Government. What is more when the first period of extension had been fixed, the power of further extension was derived not from the original Ordinance, but from the Ordi nance as extended, and therefore any further extension would be doubly attributable to the exercise of the Central Govern ment's will. To this extent, at any rate, there was abdication by the legislating authority of its function of keeping the law on the Statute Book. It is also plain that the Central Govern ment's power of bringing the Ordinance to an end and thus removing it from the Statute Book by voluntarily refraining from extending it further, was not subject to control by the legislating authority. Supposing the Ordinance were thus brought to an end, contrary to the wishes of the legislating authority, there would be no power left in the legislating authority, by virtue of the Ordinance itself, to rectify the position but in order to carry out its will, the legislating authority would have to re‑enact the legislation afresh. There fore in my opinion it is erroneous to regard the acts of the Central Government extending the Ordinance as deriving their efficacy from the will of the Legislature. It may help to elucidate the distinction which I make between, on the one hand, making and keeping a law on the Statute Book, and on the other hand, putting a statute into operation, or applying its provisions to particular places, persons or things, if a parallel be drawn between the networkor complex of laws, which is the Statute Book regarded as a storehouse of statutory potential, and an electric grid or net work of power installations. No addition to or subtraction from the network of laws overlying the Municipal territory is possible without the express direction of the Legislature, with one minor exception, and that is that, in any particular law, conceived as a net, the interstices may be filled, if the law ex pressly allows it, by means of subordinate legal provisions, des cribed as statutory rules, to be made by an authority specified in the law itself. A condition of the existence of such subordi nate legislation in the network of statutory potential is that it should be framed so as to carry out the provisions of the law under which it is made, and also should be consistent with all the provisions of that law. As to the application of this statutory potential to the territory, each individual law may specify the particular places or persons or things to which it is to apply, from what time and up to what time. Or, alternatively, the law may provide that an outside authority may bring it into force by a specified act over the whole territory, in the way that electric current may be laid on for distribution over a whole town, or in different parts of the territory at different times, in the way that different sections of a town may receive electric supply at different times, through the acts of authorised engineers. Similarly selective application to particular persons and particular things may be authorised, so as to furnish a close parallel to the laying on of electric current from the main grid, at the discretion of the engineers. There may, in certain areas, be difficulty in applying the laws as passed owing to variant conditions. Such difficulty is frequently experienced by reason of the administrative machinery in certain areas being different from that to which a law is adapted. To apply the law in such an area, some slight measure of transformation or modification may be necessary, similar to the transformation which is carried out in converting alternating electric current into direct current to suit the conditions in a particular area. Burah's case affords an instance where such modification was empowered, and the simile may serve to show that the power so given was not one affecting the main storehouse of statutory potential, but was necessary merely for the local application of the particular law. Such a simile is at best only an aid to understanding, and must not be pressed too far or be relied upon exclusively to found a conclusion, particularly in a case involving such grave issues as the present. The parallel is, however, in my opinion, helpful in appreciating who it is not sufficient to point to a condition, viz., the issue of a notification by the Central Government, for claiming that the disputed provision here is merely " conditional legislation." It is necessary to look to the effect of the performance of that condition, and when that test is applied, it is plain enough that it is in no way similar to those in the cases where disputed provisions have been passed as valid in the ground of being " conditional legislation." Here the effect goes directly to the structure of the Statute Book. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to deal, except in the briefest possible manner, with the final argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant, that the delegation of power to extend the life of the Ordinance, which could, in terms of the statute, be exercised irrespective of the existence of an emergency, was in excess of the power of the delegating authority, who could in terms of section 42, Government of India Act, 1935, only legislate by Ordinance in an emergency. Had the legislating authority set a maximum term within which the statute could be extended by direction of the external authority, it might have been possible to urge for this limited purpose that any such‑extensions were not to be regarded as re‑enactments, but merely as continuance of the same statute, and as, at the time when the Ordinance in question was promulgated, the Governor‑General could legislate in this mode without limit of time, the absence of requirement of emergency in relation to subsequent extensions might have been represented as without effect on their validity. But there is no maximum term fixed for the Ordinance, and with effect from the 1st January, 1950, all Ordinances made under section 42 aforesaid have been placed under a strict limitation as to their duration. Therefore, the contention is not without force, but it is unnecessary to resolve the question definitively in view of the findings already reached. The last order extending the detention of Sobho Gyanchandani was made in March 1951, at a time when the Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance 1949 under which it purported to be made was in existence only by reason of an extension order made by the Central Government on the 16th September 1950. This order directed the detention of the appellant "till further orders". I am satisfied that the order is void and of no effect by reason of the fact that the Ordinance itself was not validly in force on that date, the power of extension of its life conferred upon the Central Government by section 1 (3) thereof being ultra vices of the Governor -General under section 42 of Government of India Act 1935. I would, therefore, allow this appeal and make an order directing that the appellant be released forthwith. A. H. Appeal allowed.