P L D 1994 Supreme Court 621 (PLP)

SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.‑‑‑ The appellant has called in question, in the above appeal, the judgment of Federal Shariat Court, dated 13‑1‑1991, whereby six Shariat petitions. in which some of the provisions of Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as `the Ordinance' only) were challenged as opposed to Injunctions of Islam, were dismissed on the ground that the Federal Shariat Court has no jurisdiction to examine the validity of the Ordinance in view of the definition of the word `law' given in Article 203‑B of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred as `the Constitution' only). The learned Judges of the Federal Shariat Court in reaching the above conclusion relied on the. dictum laid by this Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Mst. Farishta (PLD 1981 SC 120) we have heard the appellant, who is appearing in person in the case, and Mr. Hafiz SA. Rehman, Advocate for the Federation. The relevant provisions of the Constitution conferring jurisdiction on the Federal Shariat Court to examine whether any law or provision of the law is or is not opposed to the Injunctions of Islam is contained in Article 203‑D, which reads as follows:‑‑ "203‑D.‑‑(1) The Court may (either of its own motion or) on the petition of a citizen of Pakistan or the Federal Government or a Provincial Government,. examine and decide the question whether or not any, law or provision of law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, as laid down 'in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) hereinafter referred to as the Injunctions of Islam. [(1A) Where the Court takes up the examination of any law or provision of law under clause (1) and such law or' provision of law appears to it to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, the Court shall cause to be given to the Federal Government in the case of a law with respect to a matter in the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List, or to the Provincial Government in the case of a law with respect to a matter not enumerated in the either of those Lists, a notice specifying the‑ particular provisions that appear to it to be so repugnant, and afford to such Government adequate opportunity to have its point of view placed before the Court.] (2) If the Court decides that any law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, it shall set out in its decision‑‑ (a) the reasons for its holding that opinion; and (b) the extent to which such law or provision is so repugnant; and specify the day on which the decision shall take effect (:) [Provided that no such decision shall be deemed to take effect before the expiration of the period within which an appeal therefrom may be preferred to the Supreme Court or, where an appeal has been so preferred, before the disposal of such appeal.] (3) If any law or provision of law is held by the Court to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam,‑‑ (a) the President in the case of a law with respect to a matter in the Federal Legislative List or Governor in the case of a law with respect to a matter not enumerated in either of those lists, shall take steps to amend the law so as to bring such law or provision into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam; and (b) such law or provision shall, to the extent to which it is held to he so repugnant, cease to have effect on the day on which the decision of the Court takes effect..." The word `law' used in the above Article is defined in the Constitution, in Article 203‑B, as follows:‑‑ "203‑B. In this Chapter, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,‑' (c) `Law' includes any custom or usage having the force of law but does not include the Constitution, Muslim Personal Law, any law relating to the procedure of any Court or Tribunal or, until the expiration of (ten) years from the commencement of this Chapter, any fiscal law or any law relating to the levy and collection of taxes and fees or banking or insurance practice and procedure; and..." From the above‑quoted definition of the word `law' it is quite clear that the provisions of the Constitution, Muslim Personal Law and laws relating to, the procedure of any Court or Tribunal cannot be examined by the Federal Shariat Court under Article 203‑D of the Constitution to determine whether or not they are opposed to the Injunctions of Islam. Similar restrictions were also placed on the powers of Federal Shariat Court for a period of ten years commencing from 26‑5‑1980 in respect of all fiscal laws, laws relating to the levy and collection of taxes and fees or banking or insurance practices and procedure. The expression "Muslim Personal Laud" used in Article 203‑B(c) on the Constitution while defining the term "law" is not defined in the Constitution. However, this expression was interpreted by this Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Mst. Farishta (supra), as follows:‑‑ "After hearing the learned Advocates we are of the view that the preliminary objection raised has force and phrase 'Muslim Personal Law' may have two meanings depending on the context in which it is used. In one generally and commonly understood sense, it may mean, such religious or Divine law of Muslims by which they believe to be governed as a matter of their religious faith. It is a law which a Muslim carries with him wherever he goes, and this is because, according to him, Islam is not merely a religious but Din imparting the sense of obedience to Allah's commandments)‑‑‑and embraces a man's life from cradle to the grave. It is a whole way of life, and from that point of view, Islam, as such, is a pure personal law of every Muslim. In the second sense it may mean all such special statutory laws which apply only to the religious community known as Muslims of Pakistan, as distinct from general laws of this country which apply to all classes and types of people in general. In other words by the, term 'Muslim Personal Law' is meant that portion of the Civil Law of Pakistan which is exclusively applied or which authorises application of certain specified law to Muslim residents of this country as a special and personal law for them." After interpreting the expression "Muslim Personal Law" in the above manner, this Court in the ultimate analysis reached the conclusion that the legislature while defining "law" in Article 203‑B of the Constitution used the expression "Muslim Personal Law" in the latter sense. The reasoning given by this Court in support of the above conclusion in Mst. Farishta's case (supra) was as follows:‑‑ "In our opinion it is in the latter sense that this phrase has been used in Explanation of Article 203‑B of the Constitution and the view of the High Court as abovementioned is not correct. Our reasons in support of our view follows hereafter. .

5. It is to point out that Islamic. Law derives its authority and sanction from the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and from that point of view it is a Divine Law. All Laws which the Muslims acknowledge to "be binding on them, as such, are their religious laws in the sense of being attributed to a Divine origin. These laws are from that concept personal laws of the Muslims? and are in certain relevant context sometimes called 'Muslim Personal Law or Laws'. In the process of Islamization of Laws, it is with reference to these Divine Laws, that an exercise was to be done by the Shariat Benches of the High Courts‑‑‑(now by their successor Federal Shariat Court)‑‑‑to find out whether any existing law , conflicts therewith or not. In other words and from that perspective, it means that 'Muslim Personal Law'‑‑‑(in the sense of Divine Law)‑‑‑is the touchstone with which the other laws are to be tested. When, therefore, explanation to Article 203‑B states that you are not to examine the validity of 'Muslim Personal Law' then it if refers to the Divine Law of the Muslim persons, in the very nature of things it makes no sense, because, in the context hereinbefore stated, as it had already been made a touchstone for testing other laws it could not be made the subject of being tested itself and to pose a question, with reference to which touch‑stone? This shows that the meanings which are being given to the words 'Muslim Personal Law' by the High Court do not fit in the context above explained and cannot be accepted." The appellant, while making his submissions in the present case, prayed for review of the decision of this Court in Mst. Farishta's case (supra) on the ground that the Constitutional protection given to "Muslim Personal Laval" from being scrutinized by the Federal Shariat Court under Article 203‑D of the Constitution could not extend to the laws made by legislature, although such laws may be exclusively applicable to Muslims and for that reason they may reasonably be classified as the Personal Law of Muslims. Mr. Hafiz SA. Rehman, the learned counsel for the Federation on the other hand supported the view expressed by this Court in Mst. Farishta's case (supra) and further contended that the question of validity of the Ordinance or any of its provision, otherwise could not be brought under challenge under Article 203‑D of the Constitution in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Khalid Abdul Rauf v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1987 SC 228). We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced in the above case we will first of all deal with the contention of Mr. SA. Rehman that the validity of the Ordinance or any of its provision are not open for examination now, under Article 203‑D of the Constitution, in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Khalid Abdul Rauf v. Federation of Pakistan (supra). The decision in the case of Khalid Abdul Rauf v. Federation of Pakistan (supra) was given by this Court in Shariat Appeals Nos. 19 and 20 of 1981 which were filed by the appellants in that case against the judgment of Federal Shariat Court dismissing the Shariat Petitions in which the whole of the Ordinance as well as section 1(3) added by Zakat and Ushr (Amendment) Ordinance of 1980, were challenged as opposed to the Injunctions of Islam. The Federal Shariat Court dismissed the petitions on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to decide the controversy under Article 203‑D of the Constitution. In appeal against the decision of Federal Shariat Court, this Court held that the Ordinance fell within the classification of a Fiscal Law, therefore, it could not be taken up for examination under Article 203‑D of the Constitution by the Federal Shariat Court or by the Federal Shariat Appellate Bench. The contention of the appellants in that case to exclude the Ordinance from the purview of the expression `Muslim Personal Law' as defined in Article 203‑B(a) of the Constitution and to review the decision of this Court in Mst. Farishta's case was repelled as follows:‑‑ From the above‑quoted passage it is quite clear that the prayer of the appellants in Khalid Abdul Rauf s case (supra) to review the judgment of this Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Mst. Farishta (supra) was not rejected on merits but this Court was of the view that it was not a fit case for 'undertaking this exercise. We, therefore, do not agree with the contention of Mr. S.A. Rehman, the learned counsel for the Federation that the question of review of the decision of this Court in Mst.Farishta's case stood foreclosed by the judgment of this Court in Khalid Abdul Rauf s case. We now proceed to examine whether the view expressed by this Court in the case Federation of Pakistan v. Mst. Farishta (supra) needs any reconsideration or review by us. The respondent in that case had challenged the validity of the rule of succession contained in section 4 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 before the Shariat Bench of Peshawar High Court. The learned Judges of Peshawar High Court declared section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, opposed to the Injunctions of Islam. This decision of the Peshawar High Court is reported as Mst. Farishta v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1980 Peshawar 47). On appeal this Court set aside the above judgment of Peshawar High Court after reaching the conclusion that section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, applied exclusively to Muslims in Pakistan and as such it 'fell within the category of Muslim Personal Law arid therefore, its examination by the Shariat Bench of the High Court, in exercise 'of its powers under the then Article 203‑B of the Constitution was not permissible. The precise observations of this Court in this behalf were a. follows:‑‑ "Examined in the light of the above discussion it is clear and we hold that section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961) is a special statutory provision which is intended to be applied only to Muslims of Pakistan as a class by itself, and from that point of view, constitutes a personal law for the Muslims, i.e. Muslim Personal Law in the sense above explained, with the result, that its scrutiny was outside the jurisdiction of the High Court and the judgment and order of that Court, holding to the contrary, is not correct and is liable to be set aside. In this view of the matter we are also not in a position to deal with the merits of the validity or invalidity of the impugned provision, as our jurisdiction is equally limited to the extent authorised by Article 203‑B of the Constitution which lays down that such types of laws are not to be scrutinized thereunder. Holding accordingly, we accept this appeal and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case or the law challenged herein, set aside the order of the High Court as being without jurisdiction, leaving the parties to bear their own costs." In course of discussion of the above point in Mst. Farishta's case this Court further observed as follows:‑‑ `Muslim Personal Law' in this special context, therefore, means such codified or legislated law which is being applied to Muslim residents of Pakistan as or with the denomination `Muslim' which governs their persons as such and as distinct from generally law of the land which applies to everybody." The above‑quoted observations in Mst. Farishta's case (supra) has been consistently interpreted as having the effect of completely ousting the jurisdiction of Federal Shariat Court to examine under Article 203‑D of the Constitution, any codified or statute law which exclusively applied to the Muslim population of this country to determine whether or not it is opposed to the Injunctions of Islam. In our humble view, this aspect of the case needs reconsideration and to that extent the view expressed in Mst. Farishta's case requires to be reviewed by' us. After carefully considering the various provisions of the Constitution in the light of the submissions at the bar, we are of the view that the expression "Muslim Personal Law" used in Article 203‑B(c) of the Constitution while defining `law' did not mean all codified and statute law or provision of a law which exclusively applied to Muslim population of the country as a class. The reasons for our above conclusion are as follows. The jurisdiction to examine whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam was first conferred on the Shariat Benches of the High Courts of the country by President s Order 22 of 1978 promulgated on 4th December 1978. The word `law' as defined in Article 2(a) of P.O. 22 of 1978, included any custom or usage having the force of law but did not include the Constitution, any fiscal law, Muslim Personal Law, any law relating to the procedure of any Court or Tribunal or any law relating to the levy and collection of taxes fee for banking or. insurance practice and procedure. It is, therefor, quite clear that the Shariat Benches of the High Court were conferred the jurisdiction under Article 6 of P.O. 22 of 1978 to examine whether any law, usage or custom having the force of law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam but this jurisdiction could not be exercised by them in respect of Constitution, any fiscal law, Muslim Personal Law, any law relating to the procedure of any Court or Tribunal or any law relating to the levy and collection of taxes and fee or banking or insurance practice and procedure. On 7th February 1979, by President's Order No. 3 of 1979, a new Chapter 3‑A was inserted after Chapter, 3, in Part VII of the Constitution and P.O. 22 of 1978 was repealed. Article 203‑B in the newly‑added Chapter 3‑A conferred jurisdiction on the High Courts to examine and decide the question whether or not any law or provision of the law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, on the petition of a citizen' of Pakistan, the Federal Government or the Provincial Government, as the case may be. The explanation of Article 203‑B, however, limited the jurisdiction of the High Courts to examine the validity of laws, under Article 203‑B, in the same‑ manner as was done under Article 6 of P.O., 22 of 1978, with the exception that after expiry of a period of 3 years from the date of insertion of Chapter 3‑A in the Constitution, the High Courts could also examine, under Article 203‑B, whether or not any fiscal law or law relating to collection of taxes and fees or banking or insurance, practice and procedure, was repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. By President's Order No. 1 of 1980, promulgated on 27‑5‑1980, the whole of Chapter 3‑A, which was inserted in Part VII of the Constitution by P.O. 3 of 1979, was replaced by a new Chapter 3‑A, which contained Articles 203‑A to 203‑

1. Under Article 203‑C of this newly‑added Chapter 3‑A of the Constitution, for the first time a Federal Shariat Court was created which was conferred exclusive jurisdiction under Article 203‑D to examine whether or not any `Law' or provision of law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of Prophet (peace be upon him) and such decision of Federal Shariat Court was made appealable before this Court. However, by defining the word `Law' in Article 203‑B(c) of the Constitution for the purpose of Chapter 3‑`A', the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court to examine whether or not any law was repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, was taken away completely in respect of Constitution, Muslim Personal Law and any law relating to the procedure of any Court or Tribunal and for a period of 3 years from the date of commencement of Chapter 3‑A in respect of any fiscal law or any law relating to the levy and collection of taxes and fees or banking or insurance procedure. This period of 3 years mentioned in clause (c) of Article 203‑B of the Constitution was amended from time to time through successive Presidential Orders. It was first amended to 4 years by P.O. 7 of 1983 promulgated on 19‑5‑1983, then to 5 years by P.O. 2 of 1984 promulgated on 26‑4‑1984 and finally to 10 years by P.O. 14 of 1985 (commonly known as (RCO) Revival of Constitution of 1973 Ordinance, 1985) enforced on 2=3‑1985. It is pertinent at this stage to mention here that soon after substitution of present Chapter 3‑A in Part VII of the Constitution on 27‑5‑1980, an explanation was also added to Article 227 (1) of the Constitution in Part VIII, Chapter IX on 18‑9‑1980 by President's Order No. 14 of 1980, which is as follows:‑‑ "[Explanation.‑In the application of this clause to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression `Qur'an and Sunnah' shall mean the Qur'an and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect." Article 227(1) of the Constitution contains a command to bring all existing laws in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam, in the manner provided in Part IX of Chapter VIII of the Constitution. It also prohibits the legislature from . enacting any law in future which is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. Article 228 of the Constitution envisages creation of a body by the name of Council of Islamic Ideology (hereinafter to be referred as `the Council' only) whose Chairman and members are to be nominated by the President of Pakistan in accordance with the provision of that Article. The functions of the Council are given in Article 230 of the Constitution. From reading of Article 230 (supra) it is quite evident that the Council acts as an advisory body to the Executive and the legislature to recommend and advise ways and means in formulating the future legislation and in bringing the existing laws in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam. However, the advice and recommendations of the Council have no binding effect under Article 230 (supra). In contradistinction to the advisory role of the Council, the Federal Shariat Court and this Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction over the decision of Federal Shariat Court, when declares a law or a provision of law, repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam under Article 203‑D (supra) and specifies the date on which its decision shall take effect, the President in the case of such law, if it pertains to Federal Legislative List or Concurrent List and the Governor of a Province in case of law not covered by either of the above two lists, shall take steps to amend the law so as to bring such law or provision of law in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam, and in case of failure on the part of President or the Governor as the case may be, to amend the laws, such law ceases to have effect from the date specified in the decision. It will thus be seen that the Constitution foresees a greater and effective role by the Federal Shariat Court and this Court, in the process of Islamization of laws. This conclusion also finds support from the fact that when the jurisdiction was first conferred on the Shariat Benches of the High Courts, the jurisdiction to examine the validity of Fiscal Laws, laws relating to the levy of taxes and fees or banking or insurance practice and procedure were not made amenable to the jurisdiction of Shariat Benches. However, all these laws can now be examined under Article 203‑D of the Constitution by the Federal Shariat Court and this Court. We are, therefore, of the view that the provisions of the Constitution conferring jurisdiction on the Federal Shariat Court to examine whether or not any law or provision of the law is opposed to the Injunctions of Islam, are to be interpreted in a manner which would give full effect to the process of Islamization of laws. Such interpretation will be more harmonious with the spirit and letter of the Constitution. Examined in the light of the above discussion, we find it difficult to agree with the interpretation of the expression "Muslim Personal Law", by this Court in Mst. Farishta's case in the context of jurisdiction of Federal Shariat Court under Article 203 (1) of the Constitution to examine whether or not a law is opposed to the Injunctions of Islam. The interpretation by this Court, of the expression "Muslim Personal Law" in Mst. Farishta's case (supra) has clothed all codified and statute laws which exclusively apply to Muslims population of the country, with such immunity that they could not be brought under challenge before the Federal Shariat Court or this Court under Article 203‑D of the Constitution even if on their fact these laws appeared to be opposed to some of the Injunctions of Islam. The learned Judges in Mst. Farishta's case were also not oblivious of this difficulty as they made the following observation in this behalf, at page No. 125 of the report in Mst. Farishta's case:‑‑ "

9. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that if the words `Muslim Personal Law' are held to indicate all such law or laws which in this country apply to Muslims as a separate class, then tomorrow, if any such provision is introduced in a statute which is against the Injunctions of the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah, then will that be. called or covered by the term `Muslim Personal Law', and will that law in the view we have taken be immune from scrutiny by Shariat Courts? The question is not what is the `Muslim Personal Law' of the Muslims in the Divine sense of that law, but as to what is the law for the time being in force which applies and has been applied to Muslims alone as a class and as a special law. If it has been so applied, it will fall within the set of those laws which apply to the class of people known as Muslims and in the resultant sense will be `Muslim Personal Law' for them. This law will not be challengeable before the Shariat Courts and the wrong, if any, done by that law, will be remedied by the Council of Islamic Ideology. The point in this way is not of giving validity to any such law but only of examining as to through which forum, institution, agencies, or media it is to be remedied. This should not cause any stir, because, there are other laws also like laws of procedure of a Tribunal or Courts, fiscal laws, banking laws, taxation laws and insurance laws ac. which have been kept outside the jurisdiction of Shariat Courts. Merely, because jurisdiction has not been given to such Courts to examine their validity, it does not mean, that they become `Muslim Personal Laws' of Muslims in their Divine sense, and all that it means is, that to remedy them, it will be the Council of Islamic ideology which will deliver the goods in their own way, and not the Shariat Courts." With highest respect and regard to the learned Judges who decided Mst. Farishta's case, the above quoted reasons in our humble opinion did not support the interpretation of expression "Muslim Personal Law" adopted in Mst Farishta's case. The role of the Council as defined in Article 230 of the Constitution is purely of advisory nature. There is nothing in Article 230 (supra) to indicate that the President, the Governor, a House or a Provincial Assembly is bound to obtain advice of the Council before enacting a law. The Council is to advise only when a matter is referred to it in accordance with the provision of Article 229 of the Constitution. Again, pending advice of the Council on a reference, a law could be promulgated by a House, Provincial Assembly, President or the Governor, if it found to be in public interest and the advice of the Council received subsequently. that the law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, is only to be considered by the agency making the reference to Council. Therefore, to say that wrong done by promulgation of such law could be remedied through the Council would be mere illusion. The interpretation of the expression "Muslim Personal Law", therefore, in a manner which reduces the effective role of Federal Shariat Court contemplated under the Constitution, in the process of Islamization of laws, in our view, will be contrary to the necessary intendment of the Constitution. We are, therefore, E inclined to interpret the expression `Muslim Personal Law' in a manner which would enlarge the scope of scrutiny of all codified and statute laws not strictly falling within the meaning of "Muslim Personal Law". Keeping in view the preceding discussion, what then the expression "Muslim Personal Law" really means in the context of jurisdiction of Federal Shariat Court under Article 203‑D of the Constitution. The expression "Muslim Personal Law" used. in Article 203‑B (c) of the Constitution while defining "Law" is not explained I anywhere in the Constitution. Chapter 3‑A which contains Article 203‑B (supra) was introduced in the Constitution on 23‑5‑1980. Almost immediately after that on 18‑9‑1980, by P.O. 14 of 1980, the explanation to Article 227 (1) of the Constitution was added which we have already reproduced earlier in our judgment. The effect of the explanation added to Article 227 (1) (supra) was not considered in Mst. Farishta's case by this Court, perhaps for the reason 1 that Mst. Farishta's case was decided on the basis of language of Articles 203‑A and B and Article 227 of the Constitution, as they stood before substitution of present Chapter 3‑A in the Constitution and addition of explanation to Article 227 (1) (supra). The fact that this Court did not consider the effect of explanation added to Article 227 (1) (supra) in Mst. Farishta's case is evident from the comparison in juxtaposition of the then Articles 203‑A and B with Article 227 of the Constitution in the judgment at page 123/124 of the report in that case. In our view, the addition of explanation to Article 227 (1) of the Constitution immediately after insertion of present Chapter 3‑A in the Constitution was very significant. The Federal Shariat Court was established for the first time under the Constitutional mandate in pursuance of the provisions contained in Chapter 3‑A, which became part of the Constitution on 27‑5‑1980. The jurisdiction of Federal Shariat Court was speed in Article 203‑D (supra) after defining the word `Law' in Article 203‑B (c) (supra) the establishment of Federal Shariat Court in the Constitutional scheme was undoubtedly a part of the process of Islamization of laws. The addition of the explanation to Article 227 (1) (supra) immediately after establishment of Federal Shariat Court and defining its jurisdiction indicated the scope of r‑ocess of Islamization of laws. This explanation in our view also provided an insight to the real meaning of expression "Muslim Personal Laval" used in defining `Law' under Article 203‑B of the Constitution. The explanation to Article 227 (1) provides that while applying clause (1) of Article 227, which contains a command to bring all existing laws in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam and prohibits the legislature to enact any law in future repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, the personal law of any Muslipn sect, will be construed on the basis of interpretation of Qur'an and Sunnah by that sect. .It needs no elaboration here that Muslim Ummah consists of several sects and each sect interprets Holy Qur'an and Sunnah of Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) in its own way and considers it as the personal law of that sect. This personal law of each sect of Muslims has been given full protection during the process of Islamization by adding the explanation to Article 227 (1) of the Constitution. It was necessary to protect the personal law of each sect of Muslims based on the interpretation of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah of Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) by that sect as otherwise it would lead to unresolvable controversies and conflict between different sects of Muslim Ummah. To us, it appears that the Constitutional scheme of Islamization of laws intended to keep the personal law of each sect of Muslims outside the scope of scrutiny of Federal Shariat Court under Article 203‑D of the Constitution. The expression "Muslim Personal Law" used in Article 203‑B(c), therefore, in our view means the personal law of each sect of Muslims based on the interpretation of Qur'an and Sunnah by that sect. The expression "Muslim Personal Law" used in Article 203‑B (c) (supra), therefore, will be limited in its meaning only to that part of personal law of each sect of Muslims which is based on the interpretation of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah off' Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) by that sect. Therefore, a law which a particular sect of the Muslims, considers as its personal law based on its own interpretation of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah is excluded from being scrutinized by the Federal Shariat Court under Article 203‑D of the Constitution as it would fall within the meaning of "Muslim Personal Lave". All other codified or statute laws which apply to the general body of Muslims will not be immune from scrutiny by the Federal Shariat Court in exercise of its power under Article 203‑D of the Constitution. Mere fact that a codified law or a statute law applied to only Muslim Population of the country, in our view, would not place it in the category of "Muslim Personal Law" envisaged by Article 203‑B (c) of G the Constitution. In the case before us, the Federal Shariat Court refused to entertain the petitions of the petitioner on the ground that the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance being a codified law and applicable exclusively to the Muslim population of the country, fell in the category of "Muslim Personal Law" and, therefore, it was outside the jurisdiction of Federal Shariat Court, to examine this statute under Article 203‑D of the Constitution. As we have reached the conclusion of that only by reasons of being a codified or statute law and applicable exclusively to the Muslim population of the country, a law would not fall in the category of H "Muslim Personal Law" unless it is also shown to be the personal law of a particular sect of Muslims, based on the interpretation of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah by that sect. The Ordinance was not outside the scope of scrutiny of j Federal Shariat Court under Article 203‑D of the Constitution. We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the order of Federal Shariat Court and remand the case with the direction to dispose of these petitions in accordance with the law. There will be no order as to costs. M.BA./M‑2046/S Case remanded.