1983 PLP 1064 (SCMR)

MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑Judgment, dated 30‑11‑1982 of the Lahore High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, in an alleged urban tenancy .are, has been brought under challenge, through this petition and it has been converted into an appeal. The respondent stated to be real nephew of the appellant, sought the eviction of the appellant from a shop in his occupation on ground of default in payment of rent. As result of a remand order passed in respondent's appeal after the dismissal of his eviction application by a learned Rent Controller in the first round of litigation, the respective pleas of the parties on the main issues of title to the property, were retried by another learned Controller in the form of the following issues "(1) Whether relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties ? (2) Whether Muhammad Ramzan has any locus standi to file application on the basis of the power‑of‑attorney?" Additional issues framed by the appellate Court. "(2‑A) Whether the respondent validly executed the sale‑deed, dated 1‑5‑1967 and the rent note of even date in favour of the appellant? (2‑B) Whether the aforesaid deeds in fact related to issuance of a passport for Muhammad Sarwar, the son of the respondent? (2‑C) Whether the deeds in question were based on fraud and mis representation if so, with what effect?" The learned Rent Controller recorded the evidence of the parties and same to the conclusion that the sale‑deed as well as the rent note could not be proved so as to determine the ownership of the respondent in respect of the disputed property and the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was not established: He, therefore, dismissed the application. The landlord/respondent went in appeal and the learned Additional District Judge vide order, dated 19‑10‑1982 allowed the appeal and directed the Peti tioner to deliver the vacant possession of the shop within two months from the date of order. He also made an observation to the effect that the appellant if so advised might file civil suit for the cancellation of the documents, namely, sale‑deed and rent note. Then the petitioner moved the High Court in its writ jurisdiction but without success‑‑He has now sought leave to appeal to this Court. Appellant's plea about the sale‑deed and the rent note (both of 1‑5‑1967) relied upon by the respondent, was that they are fictitious and forged. product of fraud, practised upon him by his nephew in the following circumstances "The respondent has been living in England. The petitioner asked the respondent to send his son to England and made him believe that, he could arrange his passage to England. In this reference the respondent brought the petitioner to Sahiwal and got signed certain papers in connection with the passport of his son and certain bond deeds for security of the liabilities of his son intending to go to England. It was only in this context that the petitioner if at all, signed any docu ments of any nature. He never meant to sign sale deed or rent deed regarding shop in dispute in favour of the respondent. It is further contended that the petitioner could rot have sold the shop in dispute for Rs. 2,500 while its market value was not less than Rs. 30,

000. Therefore, such an unconscionable act on the part of the petitioner cannot reasonably be conceived." The learned Rent Controller after due consideration of the evidence came to the following conclusion on the main issue: "It is interesting to note that none of the petitioner's (respondent herein) witnesses have stated that shop in dispute was rented out in his presence. Whole of the petitioner's claim is based upon the execution of rent deed Exh. A‑2 which has not been proved. In rebuttal to this week and discrepant evidence, all of respondent's (appellant herein) witnesses unanimously corroborated the contention of the respondent. I do not find any reasons to disbelieve the cogent evidence of respondent which is also confirmed by the deposition of A. W.

1. In these circumstances petitioner has miserably failed to prove execution of both the docu ments, Exh. A‑1, Exh. A‑2 and the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. As a result issues under discussion are decided against the petitioner (respondent herein)." Earlier the learned Controller took note of the fact that respondent's own witness No. 1 Fazal Muhammad who is a marginal witness of the alleged sale‑deed and the rent note (Exh. A‑1 and Exh. A‑2), had corroborated appellant's version to the extent that the said documentation in fact was a part of security for the arrangements which the respondent was to make for the son of appellant for his travel to and stay in England. The sentence Exh. A‑2 Exh. A. was particularly noticed. It may be added that this witness had also admitted that the appellant had not received any "sale price" for the shop and that it was worth much more than Rs.2,500 he gave the estimated price as 30/40 thousand rupees. The learned Rent Controller had further observed that the respondent failed to produce other witnesses of the execution of the documents, despite opportunity, presumably because they, like Fazal Muhammad, would not have supported him. The learned District Judge in appeal did not disturb the afore discussed findings. On the other hand he also felt that there was strength in the plea of the appellant and observed that "there is some grain of truth in the allegations of fraud and forgery alleged by the respondent (appellant herein) in this case. He, however, in my view, if advised, should have filed a civil suit for the cancellation of sale‑deed Exh. A‑1 and rent deed Exh. A‑

2. He can still do so if be so likes, of course subject to the period of limitation." The appellant then moved the Lahore High Court in its writ jurisdiction with the prayer that the judgment and order passed by the appellate Court; whereby he was ordered to be evicted, be declared without lawful authority, A learned Single Judge without disputing the fact that the plea raised from the appellant's side (which had been accepted by the learned Rent Controller and that finding had not been disturbed by the first appellate Court), was genuine and worth acting upon; nevertheless, on the assumption regarding execution of the disputed documents, held that the relationship of the landlord and tenant had been established. However, at the same time not only affirmed the observation of the appellate Court regarding cancellation of the sale‑deed and rent note through a civil Court but also advised the petitioner to file a civil suit "for determination of his claim". The writ petition having thus been dismissed, leave to appeal has now been sought by the appellant. A very serious question arises indeed whether in the cases like the present one, the Rent Controller or for that matter the appellate Court in that hierarchy, can evict the so‑called tenant, leaving it for him to seek redress from civil Court on the question of title and/or fraud committed on him by the so‑called landlord. The answer to the aforenoted controversy can be considered in two separate aspects thereof. One, whether when acting under the Rent Restric tion Law a Controller or a Court in appeal can decide issue of relationship of the landlord and tenant in favour of the landlord even when there is a doubt about the strength of his case or to put it otherwise, the material brought on record by the tenant has made the landlord's claim doubtful. And two, whether in such a situation, the tenant and not the landlord should be left/advised to seek remedy in a civil Court. There are several decided cases and some of them are recent wherein questions similar to the aforenoted controversy were dealt with. But before noticing them, it is necessary to state that an amendment has been made in section 12 of the Civil Procedure Code by Ordinance X of 1980. As amended it reads as follows :‑ "Section

12. Bar to further suit.‑(1) Where a plaintiff is precluded by rules from instituting a further suit in respect of any particular cause of action, he shall not be entitled to institute a suit in respect of such cause of action in any Court to which the Code applies. (2) Where a person challenges the validity of a judgment, decree or order on the plea of fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction, he shall seek his remedy by making an application to the Court which passed the final judgment, decree or order and not by a separate suit." The first question posed in the last but one paragraph does not present any serious difficulty. Whether it is the forum of Rent Controller or a Court exercising its appellate or constitutional jurisdiction, there is no scope for the argument that even if a landlord fails to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant beyond reasonable doubt he would still be allowed the benefit of affirmative finding on this issue. There is neither any general principle nor the relevant law governing proceedings either before the Controller as a special tribunal or the appellate Court that when a party is required to establish a fact, positively. it shall be deemed to have discharged its burden only by. obtain ing a tentative opinion and not a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not necessary to go into the difference regarding appreciation of evidence in criminal proceedings as compared to those of civil nature, as the jurisprudential consideration regarding burden on an accused person is foreign to the present discussion, This finds support from the relevant law, namely, Rent Restriction Ordinance; section 13 whereof requires that if the Controller, after affording ‑reasonable opportunity to the tenant, "is satisfied" that one or the other conditions having been fulfilled he is liable to be evicted (of course on sue satisfaction) ran pass orders visualized by the said provision. This clearly shows that the finding of fact is to be reached after complete satisfaction and that too as a result of opportunity having been afforded to the parties/ concerned to satisfy the Controller one way or the other. When the Controlled is permitted and/or required to give only a tentative finding in respect of any matter the law has specified it; for exampled in subsection (6) of section

13. Sometimes in order to support the plea that the Rent Controller has only to form a tentative ,opinion regarding relationship of landlord and tenant because it is not always necessary for the landlord, under the wide and extended definition of the term "landlord" to establish "ownership" of the property concerned. Therefore, the Rent Controller need not go into the dispute questions of title. It is true that the definition of landlord, as held in man cases, in the said law is very wide and a person in various capacities, can be deemed to be a landlord even if he is not the owner of the property. But it cannot be denied that in large majority of the cases the claim of the applicant before the Controller as landlord is based on the ownership of the property, because the right to recover rent in those cases is based on the title in the property. This category of landlord is visualized in the very opening part of the definition of the landlord "any person for the time being entitled to receive rent whether on his own account or . . . . . : :" is a landlord. When the satisfaction of the Controller under section 13 is visualized in connection with the claim of a person to receive rent on his own account on the basis of his title in the property, it becomes clear that he will have‑ to be satisfied, that the claimant regarding status of the landlord before him, is the owner and is thus entitled to recover rent. As to whether the parties would be able to lead the necessary evidence before the Rent Controller, the statute law itself does not make any distinction between the trial of an issue like an issue of title by a civil Court on the one band and the Rent Controller on the other hand, except that the Evidence Act and the Civil Procedure Code do not apply to the latter. And in addition to this aspect of the special law one cannot ignore another very important and somewhat similar but overriding aspect of that law; that is, it provides speedy and summary remedy to the parties in respect of controversy dealt therein. If elaborate trial of seriously controversial issues of title is held before the Rent Controller, this main object of the law might be frustrated: The two afore discussed, somewhat conflicting demands of the same law (satisfaction of Controller but in a speedy quasi‑judicial trial) become more complex when full effect is given to a very important third demand of that law which has, by and large, not been given due attention in relation to the afore noted controversy except in a recent judgment of this Court delivered by one .of us (Mr. Justice Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah) namely, Zahoorul ,Hassan v. Mst. Ruqia Begum and others (PLD1981SC112). It is the provision which bars the jurisdiction of all other forums and Courts excepting of course the appellate and constitutional jurisdiction, in respect of matters which are included in "the order" of the "Controller" as visualized by subsection (7) of section 15 of the amended Ordinance. It reads as follows :‑ "The order of the Controller, subject to the result of appeal, if any, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court of Law, including the High Court, by suit, appeal or otherwise." Before the amendment the position was not much different. ~ Subsection (5) of section 15, before it was amended read as follows :‑ "No order passed by the Controller, the Appellate Authority or the High Court under the provisions of this Ordinance shall be called in question in any Court of law by suit or otherwise, except as provided under this Ordinance." Obviously it cannot be contended from either side that the law maker intended that this provision should not be given due effect in all its relevant respects. The pronouncement of this Court in Zahurul Hasan's case is not only instructive but also lays down the law regarding this major aspect of the present controversy. If the Rent Controller decides the question of relationship of landlord and tenant affirmatively in, favour of the landlord directly upon a finding regarding his claim to recover rent on account of his ownership in the property, it would not be possible under ordinary circumstances for a civil Court, on account of the statutory bar, to re‑open the same question. And simply because the determination of this question of fact will also determine his own jurisdiction will not render it into a jurisdictional fact simpliciter. This general consideration by itself, will not displace the overriding command of the statute law in section 15(7) (or sec tion 15(5) unamended) of the Ordinance or section 12(2) of C. P. C. wherever applicable for example when :here is a decision by an appellate Court or by a superior Court in an urban tenancy matter. As already noted there would remain some concern and anxiety for the Courts due to one of the commands and the objects of the special law regarding speedier proceedings which excludes the application of C. P. C. and Evidence Act. Cases would still come before the Controller wherein due to these constraints it would not be possible at all for him to give a firm decision on controversial question of title. Those would include the present type also wherein although the Rent Controller positively gave a firm finding that the appellant, the so‑called tenant, is himself the owner of the property; and that, the respondent tried to oust him through forgery of title documents, the finding of the appellate Court of fact is that the so‑called landlord has not been able to establish his claim regarding title to the property and consequent position as landlord, beyond doubt. It is in this context that the next question arises, whether in the proceed ings under Rent Restriction Ordinance, a party can be left to seek remedy/ declaration from the civil Curt, if so which one. One answer can be given straight 'The stage has now come to examine the case‑law. The recent case of Zahurul Haman has already been noticed. 1t was held that an order of a Rent Controller subject to result of appeal, if any, is final and cannot be questioned in any Court of law by suit, appeal or otherwise and the word "otherwise" was considered wide enough to include remedy by way of revision also under section 115, C. P. C. The cases analysed in this ruling were; Kishen Chand & Co. v. Nur Muhammad (P L D 1949 Lah.30) ; The Corporation of the City of Lahore v. Mst. Fahmida Begum (P L D 1952 Lah.258) ; Khadim Mohy‑ud‑Din and another v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra (P L D 1965 S C 459.) : Abdul Haq v. Syed Arif Ali and 6 others (P L D 1978 Lah.441) ; Motabar and others v. ,tfessrs S M. Rehman & Co. and another (P L D 1971 Quetta 47) ; Abdul Fazal Khan v. Muhammad Amjad Khan (P L D 1980 Lah. 706) ; Haq v. Saijur Rehman and others (P L D 1968 Lah. 478) ; Allah Rakha v. Col. Abdul Ghafoor (P L D 1978 Lah. 1364) and Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafl C. A.. No. 14 of 1973 (unreported). . a In another recent case 1d;mail Brothers v. Keval Ram (P L D 1981 S C 545), although the relevant question had arisen in connection with temporary injunction yet some of the points raised and observation made therein will have some bearing on the nature of controversy in this case. It was urged from one side that even judgment of the highest Court in the land can be challenged in the Court of preliminary jurisdiction on the ground of fraud. Reliance was placed on M. Moosa v. Muhammad and others (1975 S C M R 115), wherein it as observed that the remedy in case of fraud was by way of civil suit and not through a review application. It was, however, suggested by the same party that the remedy was also available under section 12 of the C. P. C. or as held in The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others (PLD1975SC331) through approach to the same forum for relief from which judgment was obtained by fraud. But a detailed inquiry, it was further suggested was only through a civil suit. The main reliance of the other party was on section 12, C. P. C. which barred the filing of a civil suit. It was also urged by that side that the detailed inquiry is destructive for purpose of the Rent Restriction Law as it relates and is confined to the relation of the landlord and tenant and does not concern itself at all with the varying shades and numerous facets of the incidence of ownership of property. As the question related only to the issue or refusal of temporary injunction, the general questions of jurisdiction raised by the parties were not finally determined except that some general observation was made with regard to the nature of controversy when the allegation of fraud is relatable to the proceedings before a tribunal or Court and not as in present case when it is alleged by one party against the other, not only out of Court but also before approaching the Court. The facts and circumstances of that case, any way, are illustrative of various types of controversy, regarding title which can be brought before the Rent Controller or before a civil Court in a matter which is pending before or disposed of by a Rent Controller. In Mushtaq Ali v. Muhammad Bakhsh alias Mian Muhammad (1982SCMR29), it was held that the term "landlord" defined in section 2 (c) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, was very wide and that it included not only an owner who is entitled to receive rent but also any other person who was competent to receive the rent on behalf of or for the benefit of the owner. The two cases of M. Moosa and Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan, noticed in the case of Ismail Brothers, dealt with the question of remedy when there is allegation of fraud regarding proceedings before a tribunal or a Court. The discussion in the latter's case on this limited controversy is elaborate. Both the possibilities for redress were visualized one, approach to the same forum which could, if otherwise was permitted by law to do so, be commenced in suo motu proceedings ; and the other, by way of a civil suit within the scope of section 9 of the C. P. C. These cases were decided prior to the amendment of section 12, C. P. C. Thereafter the position has changed. One change has been noticed in Asif Jah Siddiqi v: Government of Sind and others (PLD 1983SC46), wherein reference was also made to Abdul Majid and others v. Abdul Ghafoor Khan and others (PLD1982SC146). These two judgments also considered the effect of certain observations made in the case of Muhammad Swaleh and another v. Messrs United Grain and Fodder Agencies (P L D 1964 S C 97). The general principle of res judicata as also the qualifying clause in section 9 of C. P. C. "excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly, or impliedly barred" were also considered. In the context of what has teen held in Asif Jah Siddiqui's case (when taking due note of amended section 12 of C. P. C.) the general observation made in the case of Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan regarding scope of section 9, C. P. C., might have to be held as subject to development of law which took place subsequently. And in cases under Rent Restriction Law, what has been held, in the case of Zahurul Hasan already noticed will also have to be kept in mind. In Messrs Arakey Limited Karachi and another v. Munir Ahmad Mughal and others (P L D 1982 S C 204), the effect of newly‑added subsection (2), section 12, C. P. C., was noted as follows :‑ "Before the amendment of section 12 by the insertion of the said subsection an order passed by a Court was not liable to be challenged z 2s collaterally before the same Court on the ground of fraud, misrepre sentation or want of jurisdiction. A separate suit was maintainable for having such order declared a nullity on these grounds. However, the effect of the amended provisions is that a separate suit is not competent to seek relief on the grounds covered by subsection (2) of section

12. Clearly, therefore, the provisions have the effect of encroaching upon and curtailing the remedy before the general Courts of jurisdiction in the relevant field. It is a well‑established principle of interpretation of statutes which create new and extraordinary remedies, or remedies unknown to common law, to be strictly construed. Same rule is applied for construing statutes which have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of ordinary Courts. Applying these principles of inter pretation, it appears to us that the special remedy provided by section 12(2), C. P. C. will be available only in respect of cases where the ground of attack is based on fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction." In another recent case Mst. Safia‑ Bibi v. Mst. Aisha Bibi (1983 S C M R 494), against the effect of section 12(2) was noticed as follows :‑ "The statute law has made another important provision, namely, that in case like the present one, where a person challenges the validity of a judgment, decree or order of the High Court (The allegation of fraud was regarding the High Court proceeding) on the plea of fraud, misrepresentation or what of jurisdiction, he shall have to seek his remedy by making an application to the High Court and "not by a separate suit". In this case, the petitioner could not have filed a separate suit as it stood barred by the above‑referred law. It was, therefore, necessary for her to have made an application before the High Court if she wanted to challenge the order, dated 26‑10‑1980 on the allegation of fraud and mis-presentation as made in the applica tion, dated 2‑12‑1980. That being the position, the High Court was required to hold the enquiry and adjudicate this aspect of the matter see Muhammad Akhtar's case 1981 S C M R 878." In the case of Muhammad Akhtar which had also arisen out of a rent restriction matter, this Court noticed the effect of section 12(2) of C. P. C. and it was held that after an adjudication regarding title by the Supreme Court in a rent restriction matter, a civil suit to reagitate the same matter could not be filed and that it was an abuse of the process of law. "Moreover, in subsection (2) section 12 of the C. P. C. (1908), it is laid down that "where a person challenges the validity, of a judgment, decree or order on the plea of fraud, misrepresentation, or want of jurisdiction, he shall seek his remedy by making an application to the Court which passed the final judgment, decree or order and not by a separate suit". The interaction of res judicata objection raised by the one party and the plea of fraud in the earlier proceedings so as to meet the res judicata objection, was considered by the same learned Judge who decided the case of Muhammad Akhtar, in Shahul Hamid v. Tahir Ali (1980 S C M R 596) and the effect of section 44 of the Evidence Act, was also considered in this behalf. The question whether the Rent Controller can examine the plea regarding title was noticed in Bashir Ahmad v. Abdul Hamid and another (1983 S C M R 302) and (in the context of the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case wherein the question of title of the landlord through his predecessor‑in‑interest, as also, the plea of adverse possession by the tenant had been independently decided by the Courts of general jurisdiction, even up to the Supreme Court) it was observed that "the tenant had not entered the witness‑box or produced any other witness in support of his claim or to rebut the claim of the respondent or to stand the test of cross‑examination". This was taken to be adversely reflecting on the case set up by him. Accordingly leave to appeal was refused. In Mst. Khurshid Begum etc. v. Ghulam Kubra etc. (1982 S C M R 90), the scope of the jurisdiction of executing civil Court under the C. P. C. vis‑a‑vis the order passed by the Rent Controller, was examined with a view to discover whether the civil Court, while seized of the execution of the order could reopen and adjudicate the question which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the special Tribunal. The discussion is instructive. Subsection (2) of section 12, C. P. C., came up for interpretation also before the High Court in Pakistan. Some of the cases which can be referred in this behalf are Gahna Khan v. Mitha (P L J 1983 .Lab. 166), Alam Ali and another v. District ,fudge and others (P L D 1983 Lab. 278), Sardar Shaukat Ali and others v. Shamim Ahmad Beg and another (1982 C L C 2042), Samiullah v. Mansur Ali and others (1982 C L C 2157), Malik Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Saleem (P L D 1981 Lab. 318), Muhammad Siddique and others v. Malik Allah Ditta (P L D 1981 Lah. 353), Muhammad Ilyas v. Azhar Hafeez Sheikh and others (1982 C L C 625), Munir Ahmad Khan. etc. v. Samiullah Khan, etc. (N L R 1981 A C 125), Mir Ahmad Shah v. Pakistan and 2 others (1981 C L C 1130), Fateh Muhammad v. Khushhal Muhammad (1981 C L C 1130). Sheikh Muhammad Shafique v. Hamayun Kabir and others (1981 C L C 1248) and Wajid Ali and others v. Board of Revenue, Punjab and others (P L D 1982 Lab. 716) which dealt with the question of general res judicata. Two recent decisions by the Supreme Court of India may also be men tioned as relevant to the controversy in this case : Har Pyari Devi v. Ghansham Singh (1983 P S C 281), was a case between landlord and tenant and question of genuineness of a will was involved therein. While dismissing the appeal of the tenant the general principle of res judicata was applied as the ques tion raised by a party stood determined in earlier litigation. In another case (Smt.) Gangabai 'w/o Rambilas Gilda v. (Sort.) Chhabu. bai w/o Pukharajji Gandi (1983 P S C 302), there is an elaborate discussion on the principle of res judicata. Finding of Small Causes Court as to title to immovable property was pleaded as operating a res judicata in a regular civil suit for determination or enforcement of any right or interest in that property. It was held that the question of title as involved in the small cause suit, was inci dental to main issue and could not operate as res judicata in subsequent suit in which question of title was directly raised. It was further held that in order to operate as res judicata the finding must be one disposing of a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit and the issue should have been heard and finally decided by the Court trying such suit; and that a matter which is collaterally or incidentally in issue for the purpose of deciding the matter directly in issue in the case, cannot be made the basis of a plea of res judicata. A question of title in a small cause suit can be regarded as incidental to the substantial issue in the suit and, therefore, when a finding as to title to immovable property is rendered by a Court of Small Causes, res judicata cannot be pleaded as a bar in a subsequent regular civil suit for the determination or enforcement of any right or interest in that property. Reference in this case was made to Explanation VIII added to section 11, C. P. C., which would in the context of the present discussion, be of advant age to read. . It reads as follows "Explanation VIII.‑An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised" (added by the Code of Civil Procedure (.Amendment) Act (104 of 1976)." It is partinent to note that the amendment of section 11 in India, it seems was made in recognition of earlier Indian Supreme Court's view that the plea of res judtcata on general principle, can be successfully taken in respect of judgments of the Courts of exclusive jurisdiction like revenue Courts. Further, case‑law has developed in India on this question. In some cases it was held that there was no question of res judicata when the Court of exclusive jurisdiction had in fact no jurisdiction to try the suit. The Indian amendment did not cover the plea of fraud and misrepresenta tion in this context. By virtue of the amendment in section 12 by the addi tion of subsection (2) thereof in Pakistan, however, the plea of fraud (and want of jurisdiction) has also been brought under the general principle regard ing bar of fresh suit. It was necessary to take note of the case‑law which would furnish the background for determining true dimension of the newly‑added subsection (2) of section 12, C. P. C., in all possible fields involving repeat adjudication. Barring that, it is not the purpose of the present discussion to visualise all possible facets of this provision, which it appears is of far‑reaching conse quences in various classes of litigation‑in particular involving special laws. However, the case law in Pakistan on two such types of litigation has become somewhat clear in recent years. Where the Settlement /Rehabilitation authority having decided a matter, it was also agitated in writ jurisdiction of the High Court and in appeal from those decisions in Supreme Court, it has been firmly laid down that subject to certain conditions, the decision in the High Court and the Supreme Court would operate as bar to the filing of civil suit in respect of the same subject‑matter. Those cases have already been noticed in the earlier discussion in this judgment and need not be mentioned again. In the field of Rent Restriction also the forum of Rent Controller though held as not a Court, yet the general principle of res judicata has been applied in a large number of cases when the order passed by the Rent Controller was sought to be set at naught through civil suit. In few cases the bar contained in section (15 (7) (5) unamended of the Rent Restriction Ordinance was made specifically applicable. In others general principle of res judicata. was applied. And in other yet an category of the cases the provisions of sub section (2) of section 12, C. P. C. have been pressed in service, notwithstanding the fact that they applied to the Court and not to the tribunal like Rent Controller. It appears that in the last mentioned category, the provision could be made applicable only when the case under the Rent Restriction Law had passed through the appellate Court and/or the superior Court. There does not seen to be arty difficulty in including the appellate "Court under the Rent Restriction Ordinance within the connotation of the expres sion "the Court which passed the final judgment . . . . . . . . . ." used in section 12 (2) of the C: P. C. ; because, it is now an established law in Pakistan that the District Judge when acting as an appellate forum, under section 15 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance (only . after the relevant amend ment made therein) acts as a Court and/not as a persona designata and same would apply to the superior Courts when they deal with the matter either in appeal and/or in the constitutional jurisdiction. It is now possible to deal with the remaining controversy as visualized in the earlier part of this judgment. There is nothing in the law including the case‑law as discussed already to answer the second (earlier posed) question, in the affirmative. What a party, tenant included can, offer to do, for going to the civil Court, the Con troller can no doubt pass an order with the same result including the injurious consequences for the party concerned. It has been seen that there are three major demands of the relevant laws. They are (i) The proceedings are summary before a forum which is not in the strict sense a Court‑Evidence Act and Civil Procedure Code do not apply and the presiding officer need not have judicial experience, e.g. in cantonment rent cases in some areas. (ii) The law leaves no doubt that except where tentative and only prima facie orders are permissible, the decision regarding eviction (and it basis including when the matter involves title) cannot be without com plete satisfaction of the Controller. In cannot be so where he is in doubt'. (iii) By operation of general law of res judicata, section 9, section (12)(2), C. P. C. and section 15 (7) of Rent Restriction Ordinance together with policy of Courts to prevent multiplicity and repeat litigation, the civil Court is debarred from setting aside the orders of the Con troller. What is permissible for Courts of general jurisdiction in the field of fair play, justice and equity when there is no statutory bar, is also permissible for the Controller. He can, in a given case even when the landlord ha discharged the initial burden in a title involving case, on the tenant creating genuine and reasonable doubt about the same, refuse to eject the tenant and can leave the landlord to a remedy in a civil Court, first and then again approach to the Controller. Even when the tenant has not succeed before the Controller to create the required `reasonable" doubt but has convinced him that his plea is not frivolous and/or vexatious, but due to constraint of summary/speedy procedure, has failed to create the required satisfaction or doubt, while eject ing him, the Controller can leave scope for civil suit by observing so and where he fails to do so, higher Court can do the same. It needs to be seen whether in this case the first appellate Court was justified in directing the appellant's ejectment notwithstanding the deficiency pointed out by it regarding finding of fact. It is also to be seen as a second step whether any of the parties could in view of the afore‑discussed position regarding fresh litigation in civil Court be left to remedy through a civil suit, for determination of title. And lastly in the light of the finding of fact by the learned three Courts below, whether the appellant so‑called tenant, could in this case, be evicted and left to seek redress from the civil Court. It has already been held that when the decision of the issue regarding relationship of landlord and tenant depends solely and not only incidentally on the question of the ownership and title to the property and it will not possible for the Controller to decide the case without deciding the basic question involved regarding title, then in such like cases it would not be appropriate to evaluate the situation by observing that the decision on question of title was only tentative. It has also been observed that the requirement o the relevant law contained in the Rent Restriction Ordinance is that the Rent Controller cannot decide the question of relationship of landlord and tenant against the tenant when the landlord has not been able to establish hi position as landlord beyond reasonable doubt. In that situation the proper course for the Rent Controller would be to decide the issue against the landlord and advise him to first get his title established before seeking ejectment. The decision of main issue depends directly on the decision seeking regarding title in the present case. The Learned Rent Controller adopted the right course. But without disturbing the findings of fact rendered by him, the learned first appellate Court notwithstanding expression of doubt regarding the success of the respondent on the issue of title and relationship of landlord and tenant, allowed the eviction application. This with' respect, is not in accord with law as discussed above. The High Court also failed to notice it. The appellate and High Courts' judgments. therefore, are liable to be set aside. Before concluding this judgment, it needs to be recapitulated that the decision by the Rent Controller and the appellate Court, the High Court and the present decision shall not operate as bar to the suit to be filed by the so‑called landlord respondent in this case in order to establish the title. Section 15(7) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance will not operate as a bar. In the order of the appellate Court and the judgment of the High Court there are observations for the filing of a civil suit in a Court of general jurisdiction. Subsection (7) bars the suit only if the said order or judgment is called in question in a civil suit. That situation would not arise in this case because they themselves have left open the possibility of filing the suit and the same, therefore, is an important part thereof. It also needs to be observed that as the law has been discussed in this case it has been possible for this Court to corelate the result of the discussion to the order/judgment passed in this case via‑a‑via the bar contained in subsection (7). In other cases, however, the difficulty in this behalf can be obviated by the concerned party making prayer for and obtaining it as a part of the order from the Controller or of the judgment of the higher forum, in case a need for filing of a civil suit is genuinely and clearly visualized ; with the condition that the party concerned would in that eventuality have to take the definite position via‑a‑via the proceedings under the Rent Restriction Law before seeking the observation for raising the controversy regarding title in a civil Court. The bar contained in section 12(2), C. P. C., would also not apply in the present case notwithstanding the fact that decisions rendered under the Rent Restriction Ordinance include judgments by three "Courts", namely, the District Judge, High Court and Supreme Court. The question to be agitated in the civil suit would not be relatable to the jurisdiction of the appellate Court or the High Court or this Court‑rather it would be in pursuance of the "orders" passed by them ; nor the validity of the judgments would be brought under challenge on the ground that they were obtained by practising fraud/ misrepresentation on these Courts. The fraud and misrepresentation alleged from the appellant's side in this case is alleged to have been committed by the respondent, not in connection with the proceedings, but much before their initiation and that it is not connected with the proceedings in any manner whatsoever. , The general principle of res judicata would also not be attracted in this case as the final decision by this Court which has upheld and restored the order of the Rent Controller itself has, on account of the doubts expressed by the learned appellate Court and High Court regarding the title of the alleged landlord and thus about the issue of relationship of the landlord and‑tenant, J left the question of his title to be decided by a civil Court before he could see eviction of the appellant‑so‑called tenant. Therefore, the important condition of res judicata namely, final decision on issue of title and consequently issue of relationship of landlord and tenant, has not been fulfilled. In the light of the above discussion, this appeal is allowed with costs. The judgments of the High Court and the District Judge are set aside and the order of the Rent Controller is restored. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.‑I entirely agree with my learned brother that the appeal be allowed, the order of the Rent Controller be restored leaving the respondent herein, if so advised, to move the Civil Court to establish his title over the property occupied by the appellant and in the event of his success in the Civil Court to move the Rent Controller against for his jectment. I may, however, usefully add that any Tribunal or a statutory Authority exercising quasi‑judicial Functions when required to determine any question, which, under the law, it has the authority to determine should decide all the questions arising before it and the:'‑ spare the parties from the ordeal of rushing from one forum to another. The findings recorded by such Tribunals on the questions adjudicated by it, subject to correction or alteration by the Appellate or Constitutional forum are final and on the general principles of res judicuta are not open to be re‑agitated before a Civil Court. Thus, the findings recorded by a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction like the Rent Controller would also be final, if they are given. The merits of the plea raised before it and will operate as res judicata. However, in the event where the Rent Controller feels that a complicated question requiring a protracted inquiry would be necessary for deciding a particular question such as for instance whether a party claiming to be the owner of a property and is therefore the landlord of the person occupying it, cannot in view of the demands of the law to decide questions of the existence of the relationship of landlord an tenant expeditiously be undertaken by him, he can observe that such a question should be decided by a Court of general jurisdiction, namely, the, ordinary civil Court and this finding should be specifically recorded by him in his Order. In a case like the present when the appellate authority of the Rent Controller was of the view that the respondent herein, who was claiming to be the landlord on the basis of ownership but this claim did suffer from some doubt, the proper course for the appellate authority was to have decided the issue of the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant against him, but at the same time permitted him to get his title established in a civil Court adding that he can again move for ejectment of the occupant from the property in question if the same is found by the civil Court to belong to him. An ejectment petition as decided in these terms would entitle the alleged landlord to re‑agitate the matter before the Rent Controller again and the decision of the Rent Controller taken earlier by him would not constitute res judicata or preclude him from re‑agitating the matter before him once again. The result in practical terms accordingly may be summed up as follows, The Rent Controller who was dealing with a petition for ejectment of an occupant of a property by a party claiming to be his landlord, claim which was based on the plea of ownership, should have proceeded to decide all the issues relevant to the said question, which incidentally may also have included a decision on the question of title. This was done by the Rent L Controller. If his appellate authority considered that a deeper and a more detailed examination of the last‑mentioned question was necessary for setting this, matter and also found that the title of the alleged landlord did suffer from sc doubt, he should in these circumstances, have dismissed the ejectment petition, leaving the appellant before him, to move the Civil Court for a declaration of his title. As has been observed earlier that if such leave is not granted by the Rent Controller or by the Appellate Authority while deciding the ejectment petition, the finding of such authorities even on the question of title incidental though it may be, shall become final and will operate as res judicata, not liable to be re‑opened before a Civil Court. However, the aggrieved party can get this omission rectified, if made by the Rent Controller, by filing an appeal and if made by the appellate authority, from the High Court, in exercise of its supervisory constitutional jurisdiction. In case these forum& find that the question of title does indeed, require further examination by the Civil Court and the finding of the Rent Controller or them to authority, should not be treated as final, such a finding. Given by them would enable the aggrieved party to re‑agitate the said question before a Civil Court and in such an eventuality the bar of res judecata would not apply, For the rest I fully concur with the judgment of my learned brother and having nothing more to add. M. Z. M. Appeal allowed.