P L D 1968 Karachi 480 (PLP)

(3) British South Africa Co. v. De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd (1910) 2 Ch. 502. (4) Re : Smith (1916) 2 Ch. 206. (5) British Controlled Oilfield v. Stagg (1921) 127 L T 209. . (ii) The English Court has ordered re-conveyance of a foreign estate where a creditor, who is within the jurisdiction, has caused the estate to be sold by unfair use of the process of the Courts of the situs: Cranstown v. Johnston (1796) 2 Ves. 170. (iii) Where the mortgagor and mortgagee are within jurisdiction, English Courts have entertained proceeding, far redemption for foreign immovables and have even granted injunction restraining; the mortgagee from continuing with proceedings for foreclosure in the colonial Court; Backford v. Kemble (1822) 1 S & St.

7. A suit for foreclosure of mortgage of foreign land is maintainable in England if the mortgagor is within jurisdiction; (1) Toller v. Carteret (1705) 2 Vern. 494. (2) Paget v. Ede ( 1874) 18 Eq. 118. (v) The English Courts have exercised jurisdiction in suit for accounts between tenants‑in‑common of, foreign land, if they are within jurisdiction: Scott v. Nesbitt (1808) 14 Ves 438. (vi) An action to enforce the trusts of a creditor's deed against foreign real estate is maintainable in England if some of the trustees are within jurisdiction :‑‑‑ (1) Jenney v, Mackintosh (1886) 33 Ch. D 595. (2) Duder v. Amsterdamsch Trustees'(1902) 2 Ch. 132. (vii) The Courts in England have exercised jurisdiction in an action against a resident in England to relieve the plaintiff of a charge on his foreign land, which charge has been obtained by fraud, Duder v. Amsterdamsch Trustees Kantoor (1902) 2 Ch. 132. (viii) The English Courts have exercised jurisdiction to enforce equitable charge on land in Mexico in favour of English of debenture holders, which charge is void by Mexican law for want of registration : Mercantile Investment Co. v. River Plate Co. (1892) 2 Ch. 303. (ix) At :tion for recovery of rent of foreign land is maintain able in. English Courts : St. Pierre v. South American Stores Ltd. (19 36) 1 K B 382. (x) The English Courts have entertained action for accounts of partnership property situated in foreign jurisdiction against the executors of a deceased partner who are within jurisdiction Hendrick v. Wood (1861) 13 L J Ch. 583. (xi) The English Courts have appointed receiver of foreign land : Mercantile Investment Co. v. River Plate Co. (1892) 2 Ch. 303.

15. It has above been noted that according to Dicey (Excep tion 2 to rule 18) the Court has jurisdiction to determine questions oaf title to the foreign immovables in an action for the administra tion of an estate or a trust, if the property includes immovables situated abroad and also property within the jurisdiction. This principle has been recognized in several English decisions which have been referred to by Dicey. Thus, Nelson v. Lord Bridport ((1846) 8 Beav 557) involved a question of title to land in Sicily, granted to Lord Nelson by the King of the Two Sicilies, and which Lord Nelson devised to trustees upon trust for his brother for life with remainders over Later, a Law was passed in Sicily abolishing entails and making the person lawfully in possession of land he absolute owner thereof. The English Court assumed jurisdiction in the dispute between the daughter of Lord Nelson's brother, to whom the land in Sicily had been devised under the letter's will, and the remain‑ derman, who was in possession of the Sicilian estate. In Re: Pirecy ((1895) 2 Ch. D 83) the Court assumed jurisdiction determine as to whom was entitled to land in Sardima (Italy), w re testamentary trusts were forbidden, under a will of an English testator. In Re Stirling ((1908) 2 Ch. D 344) jurisdiction was assumed by a English Court over land situated in Scotland in a dispute between tenant‑in‑ tail in remainder under a will; and the tenant‑in‑possession, where the will also included property in gland. In Re: Peerse's Settlement ((1909) 1 Ch. 305) it was held that the Court had jurisdiction to determine whether land in Jersey, in the Unit States, should: be included in an English marriage settlement where the land was acquired subsequent to the settlement, and the law of Jersey prohibited such trusts of land. In Re: Ross ((1930) 1 Ch. 377) he English court exercised jurisdiction in a claim made by the eldest son of a testator to a moiety of his mother's estate under Italian laws, the mother being domiciled in Italy, and leaving by her English will all the residue of her property in England an elsewhere to her niece, and land in Italy by an Italian will, to her grand nephew. In Re : Duke of Wellington ((1948) Ch. D 118 (C A)) the testator made two wills, one a Spanish Will for his property In Spain, which was devised to the person who became Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the there an English Will for English property, which was devise to the person who became Duke of Willington. The question was whether the property in Spain passed to the testator's uncle, who became the 7th Duke of Wellington, or to his sister who to him, under Spanish Law to the Dukeedom of Ciudad Rolrigo, or to the testator's mother who was his heiress under Spanish Law, under which the testator could dispose of only half the land in Spain by will, The English court assumed jurisdiction and held that the whole of the testator's estate, that is, property in England as well as in Spain, passed to the person who become the seventh Duke of Wellington.

16. The explanation for the practice of English Courts of determine questions of title to foreign immovables, has been given by Lord Herschell in British South Africa Co v. Companh de Mocarnbique ((1893) A C 602, 626) as follows :‑

It is quite true that in the exercise of the undoubted jurisdiction of the Courts it may become necessary incidentally to investigate and determine the title to foreign lands; but it does not seem to me to follow that because such a question may incidentally arise and fall to be adjudicated upon, the Courts possess, or that it is expedient that they should exercise jurisdiction to try an action founded on a disputed claim title to foreign lands." But Cheshire detect, inconsistency in this statement, and referring to the Wellington Case has expressed doubt whether the title to the Spanish land therein was a mere incident in the proceed ings, and proceeds to say :‑ "there is no doubt that in the Courts of dealing with such a matter as a trust or a will subject to English law the courts have in fact not hesitated to determine the title to foreign land. The jurisdictional difficulty that arises appears to have been canvassed only once, and all that can be said is that the practice comes perilously near to destroying the supposedly universal principle that jurisdiction concerning the title to, or possession of, immovables, resides only in the forum reisitae."

17. The third exception to the rule that only forum reisitae as jurisdiction with regard to immovables, as noted above, arises where the doctrine of election is applied, by which the English Courts have continuously sought to affect the disposition of land situate outside the jurisdiction. In this connection, would refer to two cases, i e., Brodie v. Barry ((1813) 2 & B 127) and Re : Ogilvie ((1918) 1 Ch. 492). In Brodie v. Barry, a testator domiciled in England made a will devising Scotish land and movables in England to trustees in trust for division equally amongst his nephews. Under the Scotish law, the will was invalid as to the Scotish land, to which only one of the nephews was heir under the Scotish law. The nephew was put to his election either to take the Scotish immovable property against the will as heir and give up his claim as legatee, or to take the legacy in full subject to the Scotish immovable property going according to the will. In Re : Ogilvie the testatrix domiciled in England, devised land in Paraguay to a charity, and her movables in England and elsewhere to her children and grand‑children. By the law of Paraguay, she could, however, dispose of only one‑fifth of the land away from her heirs. It was held that the children, who were obligatory heirs under Paraguayan Law and were also legatees under the will, were put to their election, that is, if they chose their obligatory four‑fifths of the Paraguayan land they must compensate the testatrix to the extent of the shares which they took under the will in the movable property.

18. We may now turn to the question of the jurisdiction of the Courts in Pakistan. The law on this subject is contained in sections 16 to 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Under section 16, suits for recovery of immovable and movable proper ties, and suits for partition, foreclosure, sale, car redemption, or for the determination of any right or interest in immovable property, or for compensation for wrong thereto, have to be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate. But in a case of foreclosure, sale or redemption of immovable property, such suit may also be institut ed at the place where the cause of action, has wholly or partly arisen. Under the proviso to this section, a suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immovable property held by or on behalf of the defendant may, where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience, be instituted in the Court within the local limits of which the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain: The explanation to section 16, however, stipulates that "Property" in this section means property situated in Pakistan. Under section 17, suits relating to immovable property situate within the, jurisdiction of different courts, may be instituted in any court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate, and where there is uncertainty with regard to the location of immovable properties within the jurisdiction of two or more Courts, any of these Courts may, if satisfied as to the sufficiency of grounds for such uncertainty may proceed with such suit. Under section 19, suits for compensation for wrong to the person or to movable property may be instituted either in the court within whose jurisdiction the defendant resides or carries on business or person ally works for gain, or in the court within those jurisdiction the wrong was done. Then comes section 20, which provides that subject to the limitations contained in sections 16 to 19, a suit may be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction :‑_. (i) the defendant or each of the defendants, where there are more than one, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; or (ii) where there are more than one defendant, any of the defendants so resides carries on business or personally works for gain, provided leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside or carry on business or personally work for gain within the jurisdiction acquiesce in the institution of the suit; or (iii) the cause of action has wholly or partly arisen.

19. It will be seen that sections 16 to 19 do not in terms apply to properties situate outside Pakistan. The explanation to section 16 makes clear that by "Property" is meant "Property in Pakistan". But the Courts in this sub‑continent have followed the practice of the ' courts of equity in England to entertain certain suits respecting foreign immovable by exercising jurisdiction in personam, if the relief sought can b obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant, that is, if he either resides, or carries on business, or personallv work for gain within the jurisdiction of the Court. Suits in which the courts in Pakistan or India will exercise this jurisdiction have' been classified into the following categories :‑

(i) Suits in respect of contracts for land, including suits for specific performance, foreclosure, sale or redemption; (ii) Suits involving an element of fraud or unconscionable conduct which has affected immovable property situate in foreign jurisdiction; and (iii) Suits to enforce trusts affecting foreign immovables, or for the preservation or protection of trust funds situate edit abroad.

20. Here it will be convenient to refer to the opinions of the Courts in Pakistan and India with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in personam in respect of foreign immovables or movables. In Kashinath Govind v. Anant Sitaramboa (19001 L R 24 Bom. 407) it was held in a suit to establish a right to a share in the income received within British India from lands outside British India, that the suit was within the jurisdiction of the Court, as the jurisdiction of the Courts in India is governed and must be ascertained by the principles applied by the Courts of Equity in England, which have always operated in personam. The same High Court held in Krishnaji Pandurang Sathe v. Gajanan Balvant Kulkarni (1909 I L R 33 Bom. 373) that the courts in India have jurisdiction to try actions relating to foreign properties where the defendants are living within the jurisdiction, and that this jurisdiction is exercised upon the ground of a contract or some equity existing between the parties. The Madras High Court held in Kattick Rarnunni v. Udayamaga lath Mithal ((1912) 14 I C 279) that on the principle that movables follow the person, the Courts in India would exercise jurisdiction over such movables where they are under attachment in foreign territory at the instance of the defendant, if he is resident in British India. A Division Bench of the Bombay High, Court held in Mahayeo Govind Suktankar v. Ramchandrt Govind Suktenkar (A I R 1922 Bom. 188) that in accordance with the general principles of English law, courts, in India have jurisdiction in a suit to recover mesne profits of land situated outside British India, even though section 16 of the Civil Procedure Code may not be applicable to such cases. In Ram Kishan v. Ranshan and others (A I R 1923 Lah. 551) it was held that the British Indian courts have jurisdiction in suits for accounts of rents of immovable properties situate in foreign territory. The High Court of Nagpur held in Yadao Ghirnikar v. Krishanji Dore (A I R 1928 Nag. 56) that the Civil Procedure Code does not forbid the institution of suits for mesne profits of foreign immovables, even if the decision involves adjudication‑ of the plaintiff's title to such immovable, if the decree can effectively,, be enforced by the personal obedience of the defendant within the jurisdiction. Lastly, there is the Sind decision in Dev Samaj Council, Lahore v. Amrital Motilal and others (A I R 1934 Sind 123) in which the immovable properties were situate in Quetta, which was then considered outside British India, and a suit was brought at Shikarpur for declaration (a) that the release deed executed by the plaintiffs' father and uncle was of no effect, (b) that the plaintiffs were entitled to re‑open the partition effected by their grandfather and his sons, (c) that the plaintiff had a subsisting share in the said foreign property, (d) that trust created by their grandfather did not affect plaintiffs' interests, and (e) that the plaintiffs were entitled to mesne profits for their shares in the said property. The Court held that the British Indian Courts would have jurisdiction to entertain such suit, as the orders of the Courts could be enforced in personam against the defendants. I would here also refer to the decision of the High Court of Lower Burma in Mst. Ayesha Bee v. Gulam Hussain Suleman Aboo (A I R 1921 L Burma 82). This was an administration suit, in which some of the properties were situated outside the jurisdiction of the British Indian Courts and were in possession of a person who was also claiming a share in the estate situate within the jurisdic tion. It was held that the British Indian Court had jurisdiction to direct the person in possession of foreign property to account for the value of such property as a condition of his obtaining his share of the estate in the hands of the administrator appointed by the British Indian Court.

21. It will thus be seen that the Courts in Pakistan and India have entertained suits for reliefs with regard to properties situated in foreign territories. In general, the view has been the this jurisdiction is not exercise under the Code of Civil Procedure, but on the principles which the Courts of Equity in England have applied in exercising jurisdiction in personam. I would, however, think that the exercise of this jurisdiction can he founded on the provisions of section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code itself. Under the explanation to section 16, the "Property" referred to in this section, and also in sections 17, 18 and 19, mea "property" situated in Pakistan. If an action does not coin within the purview of any of these sections, section 20 can then be invoked, and an action can be brought in a court in Pakistan even with regard to foreign immovables, if any of the conditions enumerated in clauses. (a), (b) and (c) of this section is in existence, that is, if the defendant, or each of the defendants resides or carries on business or personally works for gain within the local limits of the court's jurisdiction or, if only one of the defendant fulfils this condition, the court gives leave to sue the other's defendants or if the latter acquiesce in the institution of the suit, o if the cause of action has wholly or partly arisen within the juris diction of the Court. Section 20, is, of course, made subject to the, limitations contained sections 16, 17, 18 and

19. One of these limitations is that the property with regard to which‑the suit is brought should be properly situated in Pakistan. This particular limitation, however, would disappear if the property is not situated within Pakistan, in which case there will be no bar to the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign immovables under section 20 of .the Code. In my opinion, this section embodies the principles which the Courts of Equity in England have applied in exercising jurisdiction in personara. I would, therefore, venture to say that under section 20, a suit with regard to properties situate outside Pakistan can be brought in a Court in Pakistan, if the Court decides to assume jurisdiction and if there exists any of th conditions enumerated in this section for the exercise of th jurisdiction. If the Court does exercise jurisdiction, its judgment or order will be enforceable through the personal obedience of th defendants by dealing with them in an appropriate manner, such' as for contempt or sequestration of their properties in Pakistan.

22. Before considering as to whether conditions exist in the present case to enable the Court to make a grant of administra tion in the present suit even with regard to foreign immovables, it would be preferable to discuss the principles which should apply .to the succession of the deceased's estate, movable and immov able, situate within foreign jurisdictions. The rule has been long established in England that in case of intestacy, movables of the deceased are to be distributed according to the domicile of the intestate at the time of his death. This principle is formulated by Dicey as follows: 'The succession to the movables of an intestate is governed by the law of his domicile at the time of his death, without any reference to the law of the country where (1) he was born; or (2) he died; or (3) he had his domicile of origin; or (4) the movables are, in fact, situate at the time of his death;" And according to Rule 110, "The Court has jurisdiction to determine the succession to the movables of any person whenever it exercises its jurisdiction to make a grant."

23. As regards immovable, Dicey's Rule 85, it has been noted, under which all rights over, or is relation to, an immov able are governed by the law of the country where the immovable is situate (lex sius). Therefore, every question with regard to the succession of immovables, in consequence of death, is governed by this law, whether the succession takes place under an intestacy or under a will.

24. The distinction in the English system of conflict of laws between immovables and movables for the purpose of succession and jurisdiction of Courts, has its roots in the feudal law, under which the feudal lords did not allow the descent of their land to be affected if wassals should acquire a foreign domicile. Accordingly, the principle of scission was developed, by which the deceased's movable property was governed by lex domicilii, while his immovable were governed by the lex situs. The rule of scission is peculiar to the countries whose legal system is based on the Anglo‑Saxon system of jurisprudence. Countries like Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden have, however, followed Roman Law rule of Universal Succession, and accordingly apply a unitary law to the whole of the deceased's property, immovable and movables. Under this system, the heir succeed per Universtitatem and, not by a series of particular acts to each item. In other words for movables and immovable alike, one system of law is applied, which in the case of some countries, that is, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, Egypt, Japan, China and Greece, is his personal law, and in countries like Switzerland, Norway, Denmark and Argentine, it is the law of the deceased's domicile; Wolf's Private International Law, Second Edn. 567 -568‑The‑advantage of the Unitary Law is that the law applied in the succession to the deceased's estate is simple, and complications are avoided which would be inevitable when several items of property included in one estate have to be distributed under different rules.

25. The inconvenient results of the application of the principle of scission between immovables and movables that is, leg sites for the immovables and lex domicilii to the movables, compromised in one estate, have long been realised by the Courts in England. Accordingly, several important exceptions have been grafted upon the rule that immovables, for the purpose of succession and jurisdiction of the Courts, are regulated by the lex situs. Some of these exceptions have already been referred to above by me, but would bear a brief repetition here. Thus, the English Courts have affected foreign immovables, and also their disposition, by exercising the equitable jurisdiction in personam, by deciding disputed questions of title to foreign lands in the course of administering an estate, comprising both property within and outside the jurisdiction, and by patting the heir of foreign immovables to election or to compensation, if a will fails with regard to immovables outside the jurisdiction but is valid as to property within the jurisdiction. A study of the English decisions on this question inevitably leads to the conclusion that the one principle on which the English Courts have generally acted, is the effectiveness of their judgments and orders with regard to immovables situate in foreign jurisdictions. Whenever the defendants' personal obedience to the judgment and decree can be obtained, either by the presence of the defendants, or of assets, within the jurisdiction, the English Courts have nit hesitated to adjudicate questions, including questions as to succession, relating to foreign immovables. I have already made a reference amongst others to the Wellington Case, in which the English Court decided the question as to 'who should succeed to the immovable estate of the testator situate in Spain. This decision, to use the words of Cheshire, has almost destroyed the principle, supposed to be universally accepted by the English Courts that immovables are regulated by lei situs and that jurisdiction in connection therewith resides only in the forum rei situe.

26. The question which is now to be considered is whether the Islamic Law, as administered in this country, recognizes the principle of scission between immovables and movables for the purpose of succession. In my opinion, no such distinction is accepted in this system. I would only refer to Amir Ali (Muhammadan Law, Vol. 2, 1965 Edition, p.134), who states that: "Mussulman Law generally is a personal law; that is, its incidents remain attached to the individual Mussalman whatever the domicile, so long as continues even outwardly faithful to the Islamic faith. 'Mussalman' says the Kifaya, is absolutely subject to the laws of Islam, whatever the domicile;" Nor do I see any valid justification to import into this system the distinction, rooted in feudal law, between immovables and movables. Thus, if a Moslem dies domiciled in' England, the Courts in this Country, will apply, not lex domicillii but his personal law that is, Islamic Law as administered in this country to succession to his movables in Pakistan. Even the will with regard to these movables, though valid in English "aw, will be recognised by the Courts of this country only so fat as it is consistent with Islamic Law.

27. The rule of scission is also disregarded in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, under which the plaintiffs have brought their claim for inheritance in the estate of the deceased Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif. By section 1 (2), it is provided that the Ordinance "extends to the whole of Pakistan, applies to all Muslim citizens of Pakistan, wherever they may be." The words `wherever they may be" are of great significance. If read with section 4 of the Ordinance, under which the children of a pre deceased son or daughter of the proposilus per stripes received a share equivalent to the share which their father or mother would have received if alive, the‑ irresistible inference would be that the domicile of the propositus is not to be taken into considera tion with regard to the succession to his estate. The rule of succession laid down in the Ordinance would apply to every propositus, irrespective of his domicile or the place of his ordinary residence. In this respect, the Ordinance makes more definite the rule of Islamic Law that succession to a Muslim is governed by his personal law. Even if such was not the rule of Islamic jurisprudence, by the use of the words "wherever they may be," the Ordinance requires that in matters of succession under section 4, the domicile of the propositus should not be taken into account, and this leads to the further inference that with regard to immovables even lei sites has to be disregarded. If a Muslim citizen of Pakistan dies domiciled in a foreign country, the law of his domicile cannot, by the force of the words used in section 1(2) and 4 of the Ordinance, be applied to his estate in Pakistan. On the same principle, if a Muslim citizen dies domiciled in Pakistan and leaves property, both immovables and movables, in foreign jurisdiction, the succession to his estate will be according to the rule or Islamic law as modified be section 4 of the Ordinance. The Courts in Pakistan, in matters of succession to the estate of Muslim citizen, can apply only his personal law, irrespective of the rules of lei domicile or sites. The only limitation on the jurisdiction of the Courts to regulate succession according to the personal law of the propositus, is the effectiveness of their judgments. Where, however, the Court has jurisdiction under section 20 of the C. P. C. and its judgment can be enforced by securing the personal obedience of the defendants, the Courts in Pakistan will not hesitate to apply this personal law.

28. Turning to the present case, the admitted position is that the propositus, Mustala Bin Abdul Latif, was national of, and domiciled, in Pakistan, at the time of his death. The defendants Nos. (1) to (10), that is, his widow and surviving sons and daughters, are also nationals of Pakistan and domiciled in Karachi. The defendant No. 11 also has his domicile in Pakistan and was the partner of the propositus in the firm of "Mustafa Abdul Latif & Co.", which carried on business in this country. Not withstanding the rules of lex situs as regards immovables situate in Bahrein, Dubai and Sharjah, the succession to the whole estate of the propositus shall be regulated by his personal law, that is, the Islamic Law as altered by the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The obedience of the defendants to the judgment of this Court can be secured by their personal presence within the jurisdiction, as also by reason of the location in Pakistan of a considerable part of the deceased's estate.

29. Even according to the rules of the English conflict of taws, this Court can exercise jurisdiction in personam against the defendants Nos' (1) to (10) and also defendant No. (11). The defendants (1) to (10) stand, both with regard to the deceased's foreign estate and estate in Pakistan, in fiduciary relationship towards the three plaintiffs. It was held in Saudagar Muhammad Abdul Rahim Baig Saheb v. Saudagar Muhammad Abdul Hakim Baig Saheb (A I R 1931 Mad. 553) that where a Muhammadan merchant dies leaving an adult son, a widow, some minor sons and daughters, and the eldest son carries on the deceased's business, he holds the assets of the deceased not as owner but because, of his fiduciary relationship and that sections 23 (F) and 88 of the Trusts Act would apply to such a case. In another decision of the Madras High Court, Kathoon Bi v. Abdul Wahab Sahib (A I R 1939 Mad. 313), which was given by Leach, C. J. and Abdul Rehman, J., it was held that where a Muhammadan merchant dies leaving his only minor daughter and three brothers, and the brothers continue the business of the deceased, they then stand in fiduciary relationship towards the deceased's minor daughter and are liable to account for her share in the profits of the deceased's business. I would also refer to the decision of the High Court of Lahore, given by Cornelius, J. (now Chief Justice of Pakistan), and Kayani, J. (as he then was) in Mahbub Alam v. Razia Begum (P L D 1949 Lah. 263). This case arose out of an administration suit brought by one Mst. Razia Begum against her brothers for administration of the estate of her father, Sh. Danishmand Suqrat, who died in 1913, and of her mother Hashmat Bibi, who died in August 1945. Cornelius, J. held that it was preferable to treat such a suit as suit for administration of quasi trust, the nature of which trust is specified in section 90 of the Trusts Act, 1882, which reads as follows: "Where a tenant for life, co‑owner, mortgagee or other qualified owner of any property, by availing himself of his position as such gains an advantage in derogation of the rights of the other persons interested in the property, or where any such owner, as representing all persons interested in such property, gains any advantage, he must hold, for the benefit of all persons so interested the advantage so gained, but subject to repayment by such persons of their due shares of the expenses properly incurred, and to an indemnity by the same persons against liabilities properly contracted in gaining such advantage." His Lordship further observed that if section 90 of the Trusts Act applied, then under section 95 of the said Act, the person holding property must, so far as may be, perform the same duties, and is subject, so far as may be, to the same liabilities and disabilities, as if he were a trustee of the property for the person for whose benefit he holds it. Thus, the defendants Nos. (1) to (10) hold the deceased's estate, both in Pakistan and abroad, for the benefit of all the co‑heirs of the deceased, including the three plaintiffs before me, towards whom, accordingly, these defendants stand is fiduciary relationship. The defendant No. (11), being the de ceased's partner in the firm of Mustafa Abdul Latif & Co.", holds the deceased share in this firm as a quasi trustee, for the benefit of the heirs. It has not seriously been contested before me that this defendant does not stand in fiduciary relationship towards the deceased's heirs, including the present plaintiffs. Thus, .according to lex fori, that is, the law which the Courts .in Pakistan will apply in the administration of an estate, there .exists between the plaintiffs and the defendants fiduciary relation ship, which would justify this Court to exercise equitable jurisdiction in personam against the defendants, and to enforce the defendants' personal obligations to give to the plaintiff their shares in the deceased's estate.

30. The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the question of the plaintiffs' title to the property in Bahrein, Dubai and Sharjah, can also be upheld under the second exception re congnised by the English Courts to the general rule of lex sites in the matter of immovables. I have, above, referred to the proposition, accepted as valid by the Courts in England that English Courts can decide questions of title to foreign property is the course of the administration of an estate, which com promises immovables abroad, and also property within the jurisdiction. In the present case, it is the admitted position that the estate of Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif includes movables and immovables, both within Pakistan and in the Persian Gulf States. ‑On the Principle recognized in the cases referred to in .paragraph 15, particularly the Wellington case, this Court should, therefore, have jurisdiction to decide as to whether or not the .plaintiffs succeed to the deceased's foreign assets. Thus, under both the exceptions recognised by the English Courts, this Court cannot be denied the jurisdiction to determine the question of the succession of the plaintiffs to the deceased's estate abroad, includ ing immovable and movable. As regards the doctrine of election, which is also an exception to the rule of lex sites, and is based on principles of equity and fairness, the English Courts have confined its application to testamentary succession. 1 see no valid reason to exclude the application of this principle, in suitable cases, from intestate succession, particularly where as an the present case, the succession is regulated, not according to the principle of scission, but according to the rule ref universal succession, under which the heirs take shares per Universitatem, according to the Unitary law, that is, the personal law of the deceased, acid not by a series of particular acts to each item comprised in the estate. In the preceding discussion, notice has been taken of the judgment of the High Court of Lower Burma in Mst. Ayesha Bee v. Gulam 1huain Suleman Aboo, where the Court, in effect, put an heir to election, that is that the heir should account for the 'Blue of the foreign property as a condition to his obtaining his share of the estate within the jurisdiction.

31. The third question formulated by me under issues 1, 2 and 6 is, what Law would apply to the administration of the deceased's estate up to the point of administration. I would, in this connection, reproduce Dicey's rule 109, which is as follows: "Rule No. 109.‑The administration of a deceased person's movable is governed wholly by the Law of the country from which the administrator derives his authority to collect them, that is, in effect, normally by the law of the Country where the administration takes place (before). Such administration is not effected by the domicile of the deceased. In this Rule, the term "administration" does not include distribution." There has been no contest between the parties on the point that the present proceedings for the administration of the estate of Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif, as well as the actual administration of the estate, if the Court makes a grant, would be governed by the: law which the Courts in Pakistan would apply to the administra tion of an estate.

32. As a result of the preceding discussion, I would answer the three questions formulated in para. 8 above as follows: (1) This Court has jurisdiction to administer the estate of the late Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif, including his immovable and movable situate within Pakistan, or within the jurisdiction of the Persian Gulf States, that is, Bahrein, Dubai, Sharjah or elsewhere abroad. (2) That succession to the deceased's estate, both within they jurisdiction as well as abroad, would be governed by the Islamic Law as administered in this country and as modified by section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and.1a accordingly, the three plaintiffs succeed both to the estate of the deceased in Pakistan as well as abroad. (3) That the present proceedings for the administration the deceased's estate, as well as the authority of the administrator, who may be appointed by this Court, and all questions' concerning administration up to the point of distribution would be governed by the law of Pakistan. The decision under issues Nos. 1, 2 and 3 is, therefore, according to the answers to these three questions.

33. Issue No. 3.‑‑As agreed between the learned counsel of the parties, the enquiry into the assets and properties left by late Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif, both within and outside Pakistan will be made by the administrator who may be appointed in these proceedings. The issue is decided accordingly.

34. Issue No. 4.‑‑Under this issue, Dr. I. Mahmud, the defendant's learned Advocate, has advanced two contentions : (i)that the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, in so much as it alters the ordinary rules of succession under Mohammadan Law, should not be given retrospective effect, and (ii) the word "in the event of the death of any son or daughter of the propositus before the opening of succession", in section 4 of the Ordinance, under which the plaintiffs claim succession, require that the children of the pre‑deceased son or daughter should be given benefit of succession under the Ordinance only on condition that the death of the son or daughter and the opening of the succession, both occur after the promulgation of the Ordinance.

35. The admitted position in the case is that the plaintiff's mother, Mariam, died at Bombay in 1922. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, came into effect on 15th July 1961. The propositus was a national of Pakistan and was domiciled at Karachi, where he died on 5th.May 1964. In these circumstances, the point which has to be considered is whether, if benefit of succession under section 4 of the Ordinance is given to the plaintiff, would this amount to giving retrospective effect to the Ordinance. But this at once raises the further question as to when a law can be said to have retrospective operation. A law cannot be said to be retrospec tive unless it takes away or impairs a vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates some obligation or disability with regard to closed and post transactions. According to Craise Statute Law (6th Edition) 386:‑ "A statute is to be deemed to be retrospective which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. But a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for it section is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing." Sutherland Statutory Construction (3rd Edn,), Vol. 2, Article 2202 has observed that the terms "retractive" and "retrospective" describe acts which operate on transaction which have already occurred or rights and obligations which existed before the passage of the act. The following passage on the meaning of "retrospec tive" from Halsbury's Laws of England (Simonds Edition), Vol. 36 paragraph 643, page 423 may also be usefully considered :‑

"It has been said that the word "retrospective" is somewhat ambiguous and that a good deal of confusion has been caused by the fact that it is used in more sense than one. In general, however, the Courts regard as retrospective any statute which operates on cases or facts coming into existence before its commencement in the sense that it affects, even if for the future only, the character or consequences of transactions previously entered into or of other past conduct. Thus a statute is not retrospective merely because it affects existing rights, nor is it retrospective merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing."

36. Do the plaintiffs seek to give retrospective effect to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 ? My answer is, no. The Ordinance came into operation on 15th July 1961, during the lifetime of the propositus, who died on the 5th of May 1964. The defendant cannot be said to have had any vested right in the deceased's estate during his life time. Their right to succession came into existence only on the death of the propositus, but then the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance was already in ford and operative in Pakistan. As between the plaintiffs and the defendants Nos. (1) to (10), the Ordinance does not operate so as to take away, or impair, any right which vested in these defendants before the promulgation of the Ordinance. Since the succession to the estate of the deceased had not opened when the Ordinance was promulgated, the Law cannot be said to have created a new obligation or disability or operated upon a closed or past transaction or any right which existed before the promulgation of this law.

37. To appreciate Dr. I. Mahmud's next contention, that the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance applies only in cases where the deaths of the propositus and of his pre‑deceased son or daughter, both occur after the promulgation of the Ordinance, will be useful to reproduce section 4 of the Ordinance which is the relevant provision for consideration in the present controversy. This section reads as follows: "In the event of the death of any son or daughter of the propositus before the opening of succession, the children of such son or daughter, if any, living at that time the succession opens, shall per stripes receive a share "equivalent to the share which such son or daughter, as the case may be, would have received if alive." Dr.

1. Mahmud laid stress on the words "in the event of the death of any son or daughter of the propositus before the opening of succession", which words, according to him, are relatable to the death of the son or the daughter of the propositus after the Ordinance comes into force. In other words, the death of the son or daughter and the opening of succession, must both occur after the promulgation of the Ordinance. But this construction is not borne out by the language of section 4 which, in my opinion, is plain in meaning and does not suffer from any ambiguity. The words "in the event of" refer only to the death of the son or daughter of the propositus occurring before the succession opens. These words would bring within their compass the sons and daughters dying before, as well as after the Ordinance came into force. The only condition is that the death should occur before the succession has opened, and if the succes sion opens after the promulgation of the Ordinance, section 4 would apply with full force, and the children of the pre‑deceased son or daughter of the propositus would be entitled to be included in the succession to the estate of the propositus. One consideration which has to be borne in mind in construing section 4 of the Ordinance, is the purpose for which this law was passed. The Ordinance aims at alleviating the sufferings of the children whose unfortunate lot it is to lose their father or mother during the lifetime of their grandfather, or grandmother as the case may be. The construction of such statutes should be just sensible and liberal, so as to give effect to the purpose for which they area passed. The meaning which Dr. I. Mahmud seeks to give to the words "in the event of" in section 4, is not only against the plain and unambiguous language of the section, but would lead to unjust and harsh consequences and would defeat the very intent and purpose for which this law was brought. My conclusion, therefore, is that it is not the requirement of section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, that the occurrence of the death of the son or daughter of the propositus, as well as the opening of succession, should both take place subsequent to the promulgation of the Ordinance. The only requirement of the section is that the succession should open after the Ordinance is brought into effect, even though, in some cases, a part of the requisites for its operation, such as the death of the plaintiff's' mother, is drawn from a time antecedent to the promulgation of the Or0inance. I would, accordingly, decide issue No. 4 in favour of the plaintiffs.

38. Issue No.5.‑The question under this issue,' is whether the plaintiffs Nos. (2) and (3), who are foreign nationals, are entitled to the benefit of succession under section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. It was contended by Dr.

1. Mahmud that this Ordinance is confined in its application only to the citizens of Pakistan. The question whether a foreigner can take benefit under an English statute was raised in England as early as 1854 in Jafferys v. Boosay ((1854)4HLC815). In this case, the issue was whether the British Copy Right Act, 1709, referred to British authors only or to all authors of every nation. The Hose of Lords heard the case in the presence of the Judges, and acting upon the opinion of the minority of the Judges, reversed the Judgment of the Court below and held that the Copy Right Act gave the benefit of copyright to British authors only. The question again came before the House of Lords in Routledge v. Low (1868LR3HL100) in which the act under consideration was the Copy Right Act, 1852, which had repealed tire Copy Right Act, 1709. Lord Cairns and Lard Westbury took the view that the author of any book first published in England, whether he was himself in England at the time of the publication or not, was entitled to the benefit of the British Copy Right Act. With regard to the earlier decision in Jaferys v. Boosay, Lord Westbury made the follow ing observations: "If the intrinsic merits of the reasoning on which' Jafarys v. Boosay was decided be considered, (and which we Pre at liberty to do for it does not apply to this case as a binding authority); I must frankly admit that it by no means commands my asset. I abstain from criticising the arguments in detail, for the process could hardly be consistent with the great respect due to judicial opinions delivered by your Lordships." and further, that: "by the Common Law of England, the alien friend, ami, though remaining abroad, may acquire and hold in England all kinds of pure personal property, and when a statute is passed which creates or gives peculiar protection to a particular kind of property, which it declares shall be deemed personal property, and does not exclude the alien, why is he to be deprived of his ordinary right of possessing such property or being entitled to such protection?" The rule in Routledge v. Low was applied with regard to Copy Right Act, 1911, by the King's Bench in Falcon v. Famous Players Film Co. ((1926) 1 K B 404) the judgment in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in its decision reported in (1926) 2 K B 474, Bankes, L. J. stated that he agreed with Mccardy, J in thinking that Jaferys v. Boosay did not correctly represent the law as it stood when this case was decided and the true view was that of Lords Cairns and Westbury in Routledge v. Low Scrutton, L. J. observed that he himself was of the view that the opinions of Lords Cairns and Westbury expressed in Routledge v. Low were right. The rule in Routledge v. Low was applied by Kennedy and Phillimore JJ. in Davidson v. Hill ((1901) 2 K B 606) also to which it was held that a foreigner could claim benefit under the English Fatal Accidents Acts, 1846 and 1864, which were held to apply as well for the benefit of the representatives of a deceased foreigner as for those of a British subject. Maxwell (Interpretation of Statutes (11th Ed.) 149) refers to the case of Rex v. East Bourne ((1803) 4 East 103), in which it was held that a foreigner was entitled to maintenance and to gain a settlement under the Poor Laws.

39. Thus, it is now, a well established judicial view in England that a foreigner is entitled to receive the benefit of an English statute, unless by express language or necessary implica tion the statute is confined in its application to English subject' only. This view should, with equal force, apply to the statutes passed by the Legislature in Pakistan. Dr. I. Mahmud, however, referred to section I (2) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordi nance, 1961, which is to the effect that the Ordinance "extends to the whole of Pakistan, and applies to all Muslim citizens of Pakistan, wherever the may be." It was urged that both the propositus as well as the persons claiming succession under section 4 of the Ordinance should be citizens of Pakistan. In my opinion, this is not the, correct construction of section 1(2) of the Ordinance. The expression "All Muslim citizens of Pakistan" in this subsection, in the context of section 4, refers to the oropositus, only, and not to the persons to whom the benefit of succession is extended by section

4. I would interpret section 1(2) and section 4 of the Ordinance to mean that if a citizen of Pakistan, wherever he may be, dies after the promulgation of the Ordinance, then his succession opens not only for persons who are heirs according to the ordinary rules of Islamic Law relating to inheritance and a succession, but also for the benefit of the children of his pre deceased sea or daughter. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance would not, therefore, exclude foreigners from the benefit of succession under section

4. Such exclusion should have been by express language or by necessary implication. The language of section 1(2) and section 4 of the Ordinance does not suggest the it was intended to exclude foreigners from succession under the Ordinance. Moreover, the Islamic Law, as administered in this country, does not exclude foreigners from succession to a deceased Muslim citizen of Pakistan, and the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, in matters of succession, does not make any departure from this rule. If the plaintiffs' mother, Mariam, had been living, but was a foreigner with foreign domicile when the propositus died she would have succeeded, together with the defendants Nos. (1) to (10), to the estate of her father, Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif. Section 4 of the Ordinance does no more than to extend the benefit of succession to the children of Mariam. The language of section 4 itself negatives Dr. I. Mahmud's contention. The words in the section are that "the children of such son or daughter, if any, living at the time the succession opens, shall per stripes receive share equivalent to the share which such son or daughter, as the case may be, would have received, if alive". The section clearly suggests that all the children of the pre‑deceased son car daughter should be included in the succession, and no distinction can be made between children who are foreign nationals and those who are citizens of Pakistan. My decision, therefore, under dais issue is that the plaintiffs Nos. (2) and (3) are not disqualified from succeeding to the estate of Mustafa Bin Abdul 'Latif under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.

40. Issue No. 7.‑Two points are raised under this issue, that is, (i) are the :plaintiffs owners in common with the defendants in the estate left by Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif, and (ii) if so, are the plaintiffs entitled to interfere with the affairs of any partnership in which the said deceased had a share at the time of his death. The issue was raised at the defendants' instance, whose learned counsel, Dr. I. Mahmud, did not, however, address much argu ment on these points, but only stated that the purpose of the issue ‑was to consider whether, the present administration suit was an appropriate remedy for the plaintiffs. It was only contended that under the Islamic Law, as administered in this country, the whole estate of a Moslem, if he has died intestate, devolves on his heirs immediately on his death, and the devolution is not suspended by reason of any debts being due from the deceased. It was urged, on the strength of this principle, that a suit did pot lie for the purpose of administering the estate of a deceased Moslem. This question, however, was considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Nawab Mirza Muhammad Kazirn Ali Khan and another v. Hawab Mirza Muhammad Sadiq Ali Khan and others (A I R 1938 P C 169) and by the High Court of Lahore in Mahboob Alam v. Razia Begum (P L D 1949 Lah. 263). From the Privy Council decision I would reproduce the following passage which has direct bearing on the question under consideration: "In the ordinary case of a Muslim whose whole property descended according to his personal law, it would be impossible to suggest that an heir was without remedy against his co‑hens if by the action of the judgment‑creditor under such a decree he was left with less than his proper share of the net estate of the deceased. His right to contribution would be plain. As a beneficiary, he would have the right that the deceased's estate should be duly administered, that it should be cleared of debts and valid legacies, and that he should be given possession of his share therein. Fur this purpose his suit could take various forms according to the circumstances of the case. It might ; be .denominated an administration suit or a suit for partition or a suit for contribution, but the basis of his claim would be the same in each case, viz. the right to have due administration of deceased s estate. This right might also be enforced in a proper by to application for the appointment of an administrator under section 218, Succession Act, 1925." The decision in the Lahore ease was given by Cornelius and Kayani, JJ. (as they then were), and the following propositions were laid down,‑‑ "(i) The distribution of the residue among the successors of a deceased Muslims is a duty attached to the estate notwith standing that it vests in the heirs at the time of the death of the propositus, and the distribution of the residue forms part of the administration suit. Even the Divine Book upon which the Sirajiyyah relies insists on administration before the heritage- ever devolves on the heir. (ii) The theory that the property of a deceased Muslim vests in his heirs immediately after the death is considerably tempered by the injunction that the heir is entitled only to the residue after the payment, of a legacy or debt, and since the payment of debts and legacies necessarily involve the administration of the estate, such administration is implied in the very words of the Holy Quran and of authentic texts like the Sirajiyyah. (iii) Apart from the plaintiff's right to seek his remedy in any form permitted by law: if the choice is between a partition suit and an administration suit, the latter should be preferred. (iv) If there is any estate to be administered in any form (excluding, of course, cases relating purely and obviously to rival claims), an administration suit would not only be competent, but often desirable." I would, accordingly, hold that the present administration suit is, competent and is the only proper method by which the plaintiffs could enforce their claims to succession to the deceased's estate. Issue No. 7 is accordingly decided in the plaintiffs' favour.

41. Issue No. 8.‑The defendants, as is clear from the written statements, have refused to recognize the three plaintiffs before me as the heirs of the late Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif. It has, however, been held, under issues 1, 2 and 6, that the plaintiffs, by reason of the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, are such heirs and are accordingly entitled to succession to the estate of the deceased. The decision under this issue is, therefore, that the defendants have, in fact, refused to administer the estate of Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif in accordance with law, that is, the Islamic Law as administered to this country, and as modified by the provisions of the said Ordinance.

42. Issue No. 9.‑The question raised in this issue has been discussed at length under issues 1, 2 and

6. It is accordingly held that the defendants are in possession of the plaintiffs' shares in the deceased's estate in fiduciary capacity.

43. Issue No. 10.‑It has not been denied that the businesses- owned by the deceased Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif or those in which he was partner, have continued to be carried on even after his deat

6. I would, therefore, hold that since the plaintiffs have shares is these businesses, equivalent to the share which their mother would have received if alive, the defendants have traded with the plaintiffs' shares.

44. Issue No. 11‑The defendants (1) to (11) are admitted to be in control and management of the deceased's estate in Pakistan. It is agreed that the deceased also left considerable estate, including businesses, in the Persia Gulf States. This estate, I would hold, is also in the control and management of the defendants Nos. (1) to (10), who have claimed to be the only heirs to the deceased, through Ishaque Bin Abdur Rehman, Mohammad Yousuf Najibi and Abdur Rehman Arif.

45. Issue Nos. 12, 13 and 14.‑‑In view of the findings under the preceding issues, it is held that the plaintiffs do have Noon cause of action in the present suit and that the defendants are liable to render account to the plaintiffs for the latter's shares in the estate of deceased Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif. The decree in the suit shall be in accordance with the directions contained in paragraph 48 hereunder.

46. Issues No. 15.‑In view of the findings under issues 1, 2 and 6, it is held that the plaintiffs do have cause of action against the defendant No. (11), who stands in fiduciary relationship towards the plaintiffs with regard to the businesses in which this defendant was partner with the deceased, and with regard to the deceased's assets in the hands, or in the control, or in the manage ment, of this Defendant.

47. The conclusion of the above discussion is that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for the administration of the estate left by Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif within Pakistan and abroad. The plaintiffs also succeed together with the defendants Nos.1 to 10, to the deceased's property situate in this country as well as property situate in foreign jurisdictions. The defendants are under obligation to hand‑over to the administrator to be appointed by this Court, and this Court is competent, as held in Ahmad Din and others v. Muhammad Taqi and others (A I R 1936 Lah. 365) to give them directions in this behalf, all the local and foreign assets of the deceased. The defendants are accordingly directed to do so, and it is further ordered that if the Administrator is unable to obtain possession or administration of the deceased's foreign assets, or if the 3 plaintiffs before me are, for any reason, unable to inherit the deceased's foreign estate, the defendants will be put to election that is, (i) they will be required to bring the whole of the deceased estate, within and outside Pakistan, within the administration to be carried out under this decree, or (ii) they will compensate the plaintiffs out of the estate within Pakistan for the plaintiffs' shares in the foreign assets, which they are entitled to under the law applicable to succession to the deceased's estate, and further, the defendants shall account for such foreign assets as condition precedent for taking their shares in the deceased's estate within Pakistan. It is further ordered that the obligations of the defendants to account to the plaintiffs and to the Administrator for the said plaintiffs' shark's in the deceased's estate will be enforceable by the Court by such orders against the persons and property of the defendants as the Court may deem appropriate from time to time for the purpose of giving effect to the preliminary decree which is granted hereunder. 48. (a) Accordingly, it is ordered that there will be a preliminary decree in the plaintiffs' favour according to Form 17 of Appendix 'D' to the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, subject, however, to the conclusions in the preceding paragraph and to the directions contained hereunder :‑

(i) Mr. Muhammad Safdar, an Advocate of this Court, is hereby appointed Administrator to administer the estate of the late Mustafa Bin Abdul Latif situated within as well as outside Pakistan. (ii) The defendants Nos. 1 to 11, by themselves, their agents and servants, are hereby ordered to put the said Administrator in possession of the said estate and to render to the Adminis trator true and full accounts of the deceased's estate within Pakistan as well as the estate situate in foreign jurisdictions. (iii) The said Administrator is hereby directed to apply for, and take necessary steps to obtain, ancillary administrations of the estate of the deceased in such foreign jurisdictions in which the said estate or part thereof, whether immovable or movable, may be locally situate, and, further, to take all such steps as may be necessary to take possession of the whole of the deceased's estate. (iv) The said Administrator will take action to determine the extent and value of the immovable and movable property which the said deceased was seized of, or entitled to, at the time of his death within and outside Pakistan. (v) The said Administrator shall, unless and otherwise directed by the Court, bring within Pakistan all the deceased's foreign assets or the proceeds thereof as may come into his hands, and, further, shall be empowered, subject to the orders of this Court to be given from time to time, to sell the deceased's movable and immovable property or part thereof. (vi) The said Administrator shall determine what shares, if any, the plaintiffs and the defendants Nos.1 to 10 are entitled? to in the deceased's local and foreign estate. (vii) The said Administrator shall also be Receiver in the suit and receive and get all outstanding debts and outstanding movable property of the deceased and pay the same into this Court: (viii) The said Administrator shall perform all such functions and duties as are performable by the Receiver or nominee of this Court under the preliminary decree according to Form 17 of Appendix 'D' to the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure. , 48. (b) The plaintiffs are directed to deposit, in this Court, Rs. 2,000 towards the preliminary expenses of the administration, of the estate. A. E. Suit decreed.