P L D 1957 (W (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.

Lt. Colonel Aziz K. M. Khan, at present Professor of Surgery in the Dow Medical College, Karachi, was the Head of Department of Surgery of the Karachi University and had been elected Dean of the Faculty of Medicine. On 2nd June 1955, the Vice-Chancellor of the University removed him from the office of Head of Depart ment and later omitted to serve on him a notice of the meeting of the Senate of the University fixed for 31st December 1955 on the ground that by ceasing to be a Head of Department of Surgery he automatically vacated his office as Dean (a Dean is ex-officio member of the Senate). At this meeting the University was to elect its representative for the Pakistan Medical Council out of the members of the Faculty of Medicine. In this Writ Petition Lt. Colonel Aziz K. M. Khan claims that he is still a Dean of the Faculty of Medicine and a membar of the Senate and prays that the proceedings of the meeting of 31st December 1955 be quashed and a fresh meeting ordered to be held after due notice to him. Before I proceed to state the facts it will be convenient to give in brief the provisions of the Karachi University Act, on an interpretation of which Act the decision of this case depends. The Act provides for the creation of a University at Karachi the object of which is to provide for instruction ill various branches of learning. The governing body of the University is a Senate consisting of (1) ex-officio members who are various officers of the University, (2) members appointed by the Chancellor and (3) elected members. The managing body of the University is the Syndicate. The officers of the University are the Chancellor who is the Governor-General, the Pro-Chancellor who is the Minister for Education in the Central Government, the Vice-Chancellor who is appointed by the Chancellor and is the principal executive officer of the University, the Registrar, the Dean of Faculties, the Principals of affiliated Colleges, the Heads of Teaching Departments and some others who need not be mentioned. In addition to the Senate and the Syndicate, there are two more authorities functioning in the University, the Faculties and the Academic Council. The Academic Council has the control and general superintendence of instruction, education and examinations, while the faculties have, subject to the control of the Academic Council, the charge of teaching, courses of study and research work. The teaching depart ments include teachers appointed by the University and teachers recognised by the University, the term "teacher" being applicable to professors, readers, lecturers etc. "Appointed teachers" are those who are appointed by the University itself, while "recognised teachers" are those who are teaching in the affiliated colleges and are recognised by the Academic Council to be teachers in particular department. To each faculty are assigned a number of subjects which are called Departments and in each department one of the teachers is to be its Head. If there is only one professor or reader in a department, he is automatically the Head, .and if there be more than one, the Vice-Chancellor has to appoint one. The faculty is constituted by (1) Heads of Departments, (2) re cognised teachers of the various departments who are appointed to the faculty by the Acamenic Council, (3) teachers of the connected departments appointed to the faculty by the Academic Council and (4) experts of the subjects assigned to the faculty, also appointed by the Academic Council. From the Heads of Departments of each Faculty, a Dean is to be elected who supervises the teaching and is responsible for the due observance of the law relating to the faculty. The University has Residence, Health, and Discipline Boards and also a Board of Advanced Studies. The laws applicable to the University may be divided into four categories. In the first category is the University Act itself which cannot be changed by any authority of the University. Next come the Statutes which are contained in a schedule to the Act, but can be altered or added to by the Senate. In the third category are Ordinances which are promulgated by' the Syndicate, and in the last category are regulations which can be made by the various authorities and the boards of the University. We are concerned in the present case with the Faculty of Medicine. The Dean of this Faculty was Mr. S. M. K. Mallick, Principal of the Dow Medical College. He left oil the 1st of September 19:54 and the petitioner was appointed Principal in his place. On the 21st of October 1954; the Academic Council appointed the petitioner to the Faculty of Medicine. On the 25th of November he was recognised as Professor of Surgery. Previously there was only one Pro fessor of Surgery, i.e., Dr. A. H. Siddiqi, respondent No. 2 in the present case, and being the only professor he was automatically Head of the Department of Surgery. When the petitioner was recognised as Professor there arose the need, under the provisions of the University Act, of appointing a Head of the Department, and on the 15th of December 1954 the Vice-Chancellor, respondent No. 1 in the present case, appointed the petitioner as Head of Department of Surgery. On the same date he was elected as Dean of the Faculty of Medicine. On the 17th of May 1955, a representation was made by Dr. A. H. Siddiqi to the Vice-Chancellor that as the petitioner was going to retire, he (Dr. A. H. Siddiqi) may be appointed Head of the Department of Surgery. On the 6th of May 1955 the petitioner retired from the office of Principal of the Dow Medical College and on the 2nd of June 1955 the Vice-Chancellor appointed Dr. A. H. Siddiqi Head of the Department of Surgery in place of the petitioner whom he removed. It is the petitioner's case that he received no notice of his removal from the office of the Head of Depart ment. After retirement he was immediately employed as Professor of Surgery in the same college and continues to serve there as such. On the 31st of December 1955, a meeting of the Senate was held in which the Senate was to elect the University's representative on the Pakistan Medical Council. This representative was to be elected out; of the members of the Faculty of Medicine. The. petitioner's grievance is that he was not served with a notice of this meeting although lie was entitled to such notice in his capacity as the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine and an ex-officio member of the Senate. He approached the Vice-Chancellor' for being served - with a notice, but the Vice-Chancellor refused to do-so on the ground that on his vacating the office of the Head of the Department he automatically ceased to be the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine as well as a member of the Senate. The points urged by the petitioner are : (1) the order of the Vice-Chancellor removing him from the office of the. Head of the Department was illegal because he had no authority to remove him at all, and in any case because the order was vitiated for want of notice to the petitioner and on account of being arbitrary and mala fide ; and (2) even if the Vice-Chancellor had authority to remove him from the office of Head of the Department, he still continues to be a Dean of the Faculty of Medicine and a member of the Senate and he was, therefore, entitled to a notice of the meeting. Before proceeding to discuss the points raised it will be convenient to quote here the relevant provisions of the University Act and the Statutes " Section 22.-(1) Provision shall be made as soon as possible, after the commencement of this Act for the inclusion in the University of the Faculties of Arts, Science, Medicine, Commerce. Engineering and Technology and Law and Islamic learning and such other Faculties shall be included in the University (whether by the subdivision or combina tion of an existing Faculty or Faculties or by the creation of a new Faculty or otherwise) as may be prescribed by the Statutes. Each faculty shall, subject to the control of the Academic Council have charge of the teaching and the courses of study and the research work in such subjects as may be assigned to such Faculty by the Ordinance. (2) The constitution and powers of the Faculties shall be such as may be prescribed by the Statutes. (3) There shall be a Dean of each Faculty, who shall be responsible for the due observance of the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations relating to the Faculty. (4) Each Faculty shall comprise such departments of teaching as may be prescribed by the Ordinances. The head of every such Department shall be the Professor of the Department, or if there is no Professor, the Reader. If there is more than one Professor or more than one Reader of a Department, the Vice-Chancellor shall appoint to the Head of the Department such one of the Pro fessors, or if there is no Professor, such one of the Readers as he thinks fit. The Head of the Department shall be responsible to the Dean for the organisation of the teaching in that Department. (5) The Dean of the Faculty shall be elected by the Faculty from among the Heads of Departments of the Faculty, and shall hold office for such term as may be prescribed by the Statutes. Statute 5 (1). The members of the Syndicate in addition to the Vice-Chancellor and the Treasurer shall be :- Ex-Officio Members. (i) the Dean of the Faculties Section

7. The following shall be the officers of the Uni versity :- (6) The Dean of the Faculties. Statute 8 (i)-The members of the Academic Council in addition to the Vice-Chancellor shall be :- Ex-Officio Members. (ii) The Dean of the Faculties. Section 16 (1). The Senate shall consist of the following persons, namely :- Ex-Officio Members. The Deans of the Faculties. Statute

10. Each Faculty shall consist of :- (i) the Heads of the Departments comprised in the Faculty ; (ii) Such teachers of subjects assigned to the Faculty as may be appointed to the Faculty by the Academic Council ; (iii) such teachers of subjects not assigned to the Faculty but having in the opinion of the Academic Council, an important bearing on those subjects, as may be appointed to the Faculty by the Academic Council. The number of such teachers shall not exceed two ; (iv) such other persons as may be appointed to the Faculty by the Academic Council on account of their possessing expert knowledge in a subject or subjects assigned to the Faculty. The number of persons shall not exceed two. (2) The total number of members of each Faculty shall not exceed in the case of the Faculties of Arts, Science and Medicine twenty-five, and in the case of any other Faculty fifteen, except with the sanction of the Chancellor given on request of the Academic Council. (3) Subject to the provisions of the Act each Faculty shall have the following powers, namely :- (a) to constitute committee of Courses and Studies ; (b) to recommend to the Academic Council the courses of studies for the different examinations, after consulting the committees of Courses and Studies ; (c) to recommend to the Academic Council after con sulting the committees of Courses and Studies, the names of examiners in subjects assigned to the faculty ; (d) to recommend to the Academic Council, the condi tions for the award of degrees, diplomas and other dis tinctions ; (e) to deal with any matter referred to it by the Academic Council. (4) (a) The Dean of each Faculty shall be the executive officer of the Faculty, and shall preside at its meetings. He shall hold office for three years. (b) He shall issue the lecture lists of the University in Departments comprised in the Faculty, and shall be responsible for the conduct of teaching therein. (c) He shall have the right to be present and to speak at any meeting of any committee of Faculty, but not to vote unless he is a member of the Committee. 10. (1) The following Faculties shall be included in the University, namely :- the Faculty of Islamic Learning, the Faculty of Arts, the Faculty of Science, the Faculty of Law, the Faculty of Medicine, the Faculty of Education, the Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry, the Faculty of Engineering and Technology, the Faculty of Commerce. (2) The members of each Faculty other than those mentioned in sub-clause (1) of Statute 9 shall hold office for a period of two years. So far as the authority of the Vice Chancellor to remove the petitioner is concerned, although there is no express provision my the Karachi University Act, there is, in accord ance with section 16 of the General Clauses Act, always a power to remove when there is a power to appoint, unless there be a provision to the contrary. There is nothing in the University Act to the contrary. There are, it is true, no words in section 22 relating to removal of the Dean, but on account of the existence of section 16 of the General Clauses Act, it is not considered necessary to put in such words, and provisions relating to the power to appoint, have C to be so read as if such words existed therein and a reference to power of removal is needed only when the intention is to take away or limit the power. Nor would it be reason able to hold that there is no power to remove. Suppose, the Head of the Department, who is one of the recognised professors of the Karachi University, is dismissed from service and ceases to be a teacher in the University. It will be impossible to contend that he cannot be removed or that a new Head of the Department cannot be appointed. A Department consists of teachers whether appointed or recognised and if a Head of Department ceases to be a teacher, he has at least formally to be removed from his office. A Head of Department may also have to be removed if he does not discharge his duties properly as a Head of Department, though no fault is found with his work as teacher so that he cannot be removed from the post that he holds as a teacher. Also if he is only a recognised teacher the authority that can remove him from his teacher's post is not the University and in case of misconduct by the Head of Department that authority may not agree with the University. The University, if it finds misconduct, must remove the Head of Department. There is no specific provision in the University Act that some other authority is to pass such order, The Vice- Chancellor, therefore, is obviously the authority that is to remove the Head of Department. If the need for removal be there, there must be some authority that is to order removal and it can hardly be contended that a Head of Department once appointed holds for life, happen what may. There is little force also in the other objections relating to the order of the Vice-Chancellor removing the petitioner from the office of Head of Department. In support of the proposition that notice was essential, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Ratan Chandra v. Adhar Biswas (A I R 1952 Cal. 72) but that case does not refer to notice. So far as the mala fides are concerned, there was no allegation to that effect in the petition and there is no material on the record from which mala fides may be inferred. It has been alleged by the petitioner that he had received no informa tion with respect to the passing of this order till the 28th of December 1955. From the 2nd of June 1955, when the order removing him was passed, to the 28th of December 1955, there is an interval of about six months during which the Faculty of Medicine had been functioning. There is no affidavit by him that he ever acted as the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine during that period. On the other hand, there is an affidavit of Dr. A. H. Siddiqi that he had during this period been functioning as the Head of the Department without any protest from the petitioner. There is no counter affidavit by the petitioner and I see no reason for holding that the petitioner was not aware of his removal. There is an affidavit too by, the Vice-Chancellor 'that he had orally informed the petitioner. It appears that it is only when a representative was to be elected to the Pakistan Medical Council that the petitioner though of impeaching the order of the Vice-Chancellor. I now come to the second objection which is the more serious one. Mr. Suhrawardy for the petitioner contends that as according to Statute 10 (4) a Dean has to hold office for three years and this provision is without any qualification or limitation, the petitioner continues to be the Dean even if he ceases to be head of the Department. There is no provision he says, about the Dean vacating his term of office if he ceases to be a Head of Department within the period of three years. The logical conclusion of such an argument would be that even in the event of the person elected ceasing to be a member of the Faculty, he would continue to hold the office of Dean. To this extent however Mr. Suhrawardy is not prepared to go. He concedes that if a person ceases to be a member of the faculty, he 'Would cease to be a Dean. This, he says, is necessarily implied. He urges, however; that the petitioner, even though he has ceased to be a Head of Department, is still a recognised teacher of the University, and therefore, he has not ceased to be a member. It may be stated that the Vice-Chancellor accepts the petitioner to be still a recognised teacher of the University. Let me first explain that the concession which Mr. Suhrawardy makes is one which he is forced to make. Whenever in similar circumstances, a person ceases to be a member of an institution he would cease also to hold an office therein. Suppose there is a rule which says the members of the Constituent Assembly shall elect from amongst themselves a Speaker and there is a second rule that the. Speaker shall hold office for three years, can it be urged that a person will continue to be the Speaker although he ceases to be a member of the Constituent Assembly altogether ? A similar case could be that of a club or association, the members of which elect a president , who according to rules has to hold office for a term of years. If the president ceases to be a member, it can hardly be urged that he would still continue to be the president. From these examples and from .a consideration of analoguous cases, it will be clear that whenever a member of an existing and functioning body is elected to an office connected with the functioning of that body; he ceases to hold office on his ceasing to remain a member. This proposition is, I hold, not liable to be contested and the result is that even if a legislature does not while providing for the election of a member of such body to an office expressly lay down that he would hold office only as long as he remains a member, this would be a necessary implication. I do not see any good ground for not accepting this as a rule of interpretation. The only question is whether this necessary implication will govern the present case. Section 22 (5) and Statute 10 (4) are to be read together. The body 'with which we are dealing consists of four classes of persons and the election is out of one of these classes. Had the faculty con sisted only of Heads of Departments, there would be no difficulty of interpretation, and a Dean of ceasing to be a Head of the Department would cease to be a Dean. The point to be considered is whether we can say that as the Dean is elected out of one of the four classes of members, that is, the Heads of Departments, there is a necessary implication that he should continue to be a member of that class. In order to decide this we should look to the principle involved in the proposition that I have stated above. To repeat, the proposition is that whenever the members of a functioning body elect one of themselves to an office, which office is connected with the functioning of that body, the continuance of membership is a necessary condition for con tinuance to hold office. The reason for this would obviously be that the elected office-holder is to function in his capacity as member of the body. The Speaker of the Consti tuent Assembly is to function in his capacity as member of the Constituent Assembly. A president of an association is to function in his capacity 'as member of that association. Does this reason hold good in the present case ? The decision would depend on answer to the question. Does a Dean function in his capacity of Head of Department ? The opposite view would be that he does not function as a Head of the Department, but only a member of the Faculty. A consideration of the various provisions of the Karachi University Act and the Statutes in the Schedule to the Act would lead one to the conclusion that the office of Dean appertains to the class of persons known as Heads of Department. This faculty consists of four distinct classes of persons as will appear from Statute

10. The Dean is to be elected only out of Heads of Departments. The reason for this provision can either be that the Heads of the Departments only are the persons who are capable of properly discharging the functions of Dean or that such a person is important or learned enough to hold the office of Dean, I would reject the second alternative. If the intention was that we are only to look to the importance or learning of person to be elected and are not concerned with whether he is functioning as a Head of Department, then the provision would be that any person who had ever been a Head of Department could be elected. Also there may be learned and distinguished persons in the other three classes, and the persons in the last class, it may be observed, are those whose inclusion in the faculty is due only to their distinguished position as experts. It is difficult to accept that all that the Legislature needed was that the person should be a Head of the Department at the moment when he is elected and that the Legislature is careless as to whether he remains a Head of Department after he is elected. It may be urged that in some cases the qualifica tions of the persons who are elected may be only for the time being, and reference may in this connection be made to the election of the members of the Legislative Assembly who are elected out of electors and whose election to the Legislature is not affected by their losing the qualifications of electors. But such bodies are not within the rule which I have stated above, I have said that a member of a functioning body who is elected to an office connected with the functions of that body must retain his membership in order to continue in office. This rule has no application to a case where those who elect exhaust their functions by electing and those whom they elect then become a function ing body. The only function of the electorate in the case of elections to the Legislative Assembly is to elect the members of the Assembly. The legislative Assembly then becomes a functioning body to which the proposition I have stated above will apply. In order to determine whether a Dean is to function in his capacity of a Head of Department one should con sider the functions of the Dean and see whether it could be the intention of the Legislature that such functions be discharged by any person other than a Head of Department. But before I consider the functions 1, have to refer to Statute 19 (2) which I regard significant. Statute 19 (2) provides that members of a faculty other than Heads of department are to hold office for two years only. It could hardly be the intention that a member whose total term is for two years may hold an office which is to be held for three years. For the Heads of the Departments, however, there is no term at all. They remain members of the faculty as long as they are Heads of Departments. Let us now consider the functions of a Dean. In the words of section 22 the faculties "have charge of the teaching and the courses of study" and the Dean is to see that the faculty functions properly. He is responsible for the observance of the Statutes etc. applicable to the faculty and the Heads of Departments are responsible to the Dean for the organisation of teaching in their departments. This means that the Dean is to supervise and be responsible for a proper organisation of teaching of the subjects included in a faculty. A person who is not a teacher in the University at all or who does not teach the subjects assigned to the faculty will be altogether unsuitable for discharging such functions. A Dean is, as a representative of his faculty, an ex-officio member of the Senate and the Syndicate. His true position is that he represents in these two bodies those teaching departments which have been assigned to the faculty of which he is the Dean. Only a person who is himself one of the teachers should be such representative. The Dean is also an officer of the University under section 10 (vi). A consideration of the provisions of the Karachi University Act does not, to my mind, leave any doubt as to its intention. The only objection can be that there is no express provision for a Dean vacating his office if he ceases to be a Head of Department. I have shown that such provisions can be implied. That a continuation of member ship is essential for holding office is admittedly implied. There can be no bar to the inference of an implication very similar in character. The only difference in the present case and a case of membership is that here the body consists of four distinct classes and the implication relates not to membership of -faculty but to membership of the class from which the office holder is elected. If the intention of the Legislature be sufficiently clear there is no reason why we cannot read in Statute 10 (4) such an implication. After all the supreme rule of interpretation to which all other rules are subordinate is that a statute is to be interpreted according to the intent of them that made it. (Maxwell, Nineth Eddition, p.I.) It has been suggested that a Head of Department may not be a member of the faculty at all or the term of office of a Dean may be longer than the term of office of a Head of Department as these matters are to be provided by Statutes framed by the Senate. I do not feel any difficulty about this matter. In the first place, I do not accept that Heads of Departments from amongst whom Deans are to be elected may not be members. In the second place if my interpretation of section 22 (5) be correct and a Dean could continue only as long as he was a Head of Department, any statute which is inconsistent with this interpretation would be avoid. It has been urged that I am departing from the rule that plain language must be given effect to. The statute, it is contended, says Dean is to hold office for three years and I am trying to cut down that term. As I have stated above, even learned counsel himself is unable to stick to this three years term in case when membership is lost and I will presently refer to other consequences of regarding this as a case of plain language. But let me explain that I am not departing from that rule at all. I am only reading section 22 (5) in the following manner : "The Dean of Faculty shall be elected from among the Heads of Departments. The Head of Department who is elected a Dean shall hold office for such term as may be prescribed by the rules". Is there anything particularly wrong in reading the section like this in order to bring out its proper meaning ? Either section 22 (5) means "the person who is elected as a Dean shall hold office for such term etc." Or it means "the Head of Department who is elected as a Dean shall hold office for a term etc." The former interpretation that the person "who is elected as a Dean shall hold office" is one which learned counsel for the petitioner himself cannot support, for if the person ceases to be a member, he ceases to be a Dean. Learned counsel wants to read it in this way "the member who is elected shall hold office etc." If it cannot be the person, I do not see why it should not be .the "Head of Department." I have said there is nothing improper in reading the section in this manner and in support of what I say, I would refer to the rule relating to the election of the office holders of any body corporate, association or club. If the rule says : "A president shall be elected from amongst the members and shall hold office for three years." How do you read the rule ? If you do not read it as I do, the president even if he ceases to be a member will remain a president. If one reads into a statute an implication that does not mean that one is departing from the rule that plain language is to be given effect to. Literally thousands of cases could be referred to where implications far less apparent have been read into statutes. As Crawford says: "In a broad sense, true implications are as much a part of the language which makes up the statute as the meanings of the various words are a part of it. Viewed from this standpoint, no exception is created to the general rule that the intent of the law-makers must be derived from the language used in, the enactment. And the Court in ascertaining a necessary implication is simply determining and making effective the legislative will." In Maxwell there is a whole Chapter dealing with implications. Is not the jurisdiction of a Civil Court taken away sometimes only by implication ? Is it not implied in all cases where judicial power is granted that all rules of natural justice are to be observed and is riot the exercise of judicial power, without compliance with those rules held illegal? When we apply the rules of ejusdem generis is that not an implication ? It will be useful to mention in this connection the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Arif v, Jadunath Majumdar (A I R 1931 P C 79) wherein the interpretation of the Statute of Frauds has been referred to. The Statute of Frauds did not allow a contract to be proved unless it was in writing. A person who was in possession under an oral contract was allowed to prove the contract because, in the words of Lord Selbourne the Statute only contemplates the case of a person being charged upon the contract only : It has not in view the case of a person being charged upon the contract coupled with acts done in pursuance of the contract." The rule of plain language is not easy of implication. In Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries ((1940) A C 1014) all the Judges in the Courts below including the Chief Justice and Master of the Rolls had held that the language was plain while the House of Lords by a majority of four to one held that it required interpretation. And if we accept this so-called plain language, what is the result ? The result is that the Dean (1) though he be dismissed from his post as a teacher, (2) though he be convicted of misappropriating the funds of the University in connection with his duties as a Dean, (3) though he be found guilty of misconduct, and (4) though it be discovered that the degree on the strength of which he secured employment as a teacher was either not genuine or did not connote those qualifications which it was alleged it did, he will still remain a Dean in charge of-supervision of the teaching of the faculty, a member of the Senate, a member of the Syndicate and an officer of the University. He will also, if this line of argument is accepted, remain a Head of Department. But it is urged in reply to this argument ; if he does not remain a teacher at all, how will he remain a Dean ? If he is dismissed from his post as a teacher, he will automatically vacate his membership and, therefore, his Deanship and the results which I have stated above will not follow. He will also, it is said, cease to be a Head of Department automatically. The argumennt involves an inconsistency. In the first place, a conviction or proof of misconduct will not necessarily entail his removal from the post of teacher in the case of recognised teachers who belong to affiliated institutions and are liable to dismissal by the authorities of those institutions. Those authorities may not see eye to eye with the University and may not remove the teacher. In the second place, where is the provision that on ceasing to be a teacher, a person ceases to be a member of the faculty ? Learned counsel for the petitioner says it is implied, for he is appointed from amongst the teachers., But learned counsel forgets this implication when arguing the question of continuation of the office . of Dean. In the case of membership of the faculty and Headship of Department, he applies the principle that if a person is appointed out of a class, he has to remain a member of that class in order to continue in office, but refuses to apply it in the case of a Dean. It will be observed that provisions relating to the term of a member of the faculty and the term of a Dean are similar. According to Statute 19, a member is "to hold office for a period of two years." If it be accepted that there is a necessary implication that the member should remain a teacher (if he was appointed from amongst the teachers) why is there not a similar implication in the case of the office of a Dean ? There are two simple approaches to the question before us, each of which will dislodge the petitioner's case. The first approach is : are the words which we have to interpret capable only of one meaning ? If the answer be in the affirmative, no question of interpretation arises. The verdict must be in favour of the petitioner. If, on the other hand, the answer be in the negative all considerations of reason, intention of legislature etc. arise and if those considerations do arise, it can hardly be contended that the decision should not be against the petitioner. So the simple question is, are words capable only of one meaning ? But learned counsel admits that these words will not apply in their plain sense if the person concerned ceases to be a member. That means, learned counsel does not regard them so plain and unequivocal that the question of interpretation does not arise. He is himself trying to put an interpretation on them which, according to him, they do not bear on their face. Confronted with this situation learned counsel says although the words are otherwise plain they cannot be interpreted so as to -lead to an absurdity. Here again learned counsel is not correct. If the words be capable only of one interpretation, it does not matter that they lead to an absurdity. There is abundant authority for this proposition. I need refer only to Muhammad Hayat Haji Muhammad Sardar v. Commissioner of Income-tax (A I R 1931 Lah. 87) and Emperor v. Banwari Lai Sharma (AIR 1945 P C48). Once it is admitted that in some circumstances the apparently plain words of a parti cular statute are not to be adhered to, the whole contention relating to the words being plain disappears. Words which are plain mean words capable of one meaning only. If words are capable of one meaning only the task of interpretation never begins. Once it does begin, all rules of reason, justice and intention begin to apply. The second approach is this. If the whole of the argu ment of learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, the result is that the present Dean of the Faculty of Medicine is Mr. S. M. K. Mallick. He was elected on the 4th of February 1954, and his term according to law will expire on the 7th of February 1957. He has never resigned (even resignation may not affect the term, if argument of learned counsel is accep ted). He simply ceased to be the Principal of Dow Medical College and, therefore, left Karachi. I put a question to Mr. Suhrawardy as to what he had to say about the tenure of Mr. S. M. K. Mallick. He admitted that there was "some difficulty" about this matter. What learned counsel considers "some difficulty" is anin superable obstacle. If the term remains unaffected by ceasing to be Head of Department, Colonel S. M. Mallick is still the Dean of this Faculty and the petition is infructuous. My conclusion is : There is no doubt about the intention of the legislature ; there is no objection to that intention being given effect to, it being only a question of reading an implica tion on the principle that a member of a class elected 'as such' holds office only till he remains member of that class ; the result of the opposite interpretation will lead to results which N could not have been contemplated and to which I can never reconcile myself. The petitioner is not the Dean of this University. I would dismiss the petition with costs. AKHLAQUE HUSAIN, J.

The facts relevant to the matters in dispute are as follows. According to section 20(c) of the University of Karachi Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the Syndicate of the University, " subject to the provisions of this Act and the Statutes, shall appoint . . . . teachers . . . . . . . of the University and shall define their duties and conditions of service . . . . " "Teachers", according to section 2(g) of the Act, include professors, readers, lecturers and other persons appointed or recognised in accordance with the Statutes for imparting instruction in the University or in any College or Hall. The current Statutes of the University are, as provided by the provisions contained in section 27(1), those set out in the Schedule to the Act. By Statute 6, the Syndicate of the University, which is one of the Authorities of the University, has been given, inter alia, the power "to appoint or recognise teachers of the University . . . in accordance with the Statutes." Statute 17(1) provides that " no person shall be appointed or recognised as a teacher of the University except on the recom mendation of a Committee of Selection constituted for the purpose." By paragraph (2) of this Statute, this committee consists of (i) the Vice-Chancellor; (ii) the Educational Adviser to the Government of Pakistan; (iii) a person appointed by the Syndicate; (iv) a person appointed by the Academic Council; (v) three persons having expert knowledge of the subject to be nominated by the Chancellor. I have described the procedure for appointment and recognition of professors at length in order to bring out the fact that the Vice-Chancellor possesses no powers either to appoint or recognise or dismiss the professors. On the 23rd of December 1953, the Syndicate recognised the respondent No. 2, Dr. Muhammad Abdul Hameed Siddiqi, as a professor of Surgery. It would appear that at the time of his recognition Dr. Siddiqi was the only professor in the Department of Surgery and, by virtue of the following provisions in subsection (4) of section 22 of the Act, he automatically became the Head of the Department of Surgery :- "22(4) . . . . The Head of every such Department shall be the Professor of the Department, or if there is no Professor, the Reader. If there is more than one Professors or more than one Reader of a Department, the Vice-Chancellor shall appoint to be Head of the Department such one of the Professors, or if there is no Professor, such one of the Readers as he thinks fit. Tie Head of the Depart ment shall be responsible to the Dean for the organisation of the teaching in that Department." By a resolution of the Syndicate, dated the 25th of November 1954, the petitioner, Lt. Col. A. K. M. Khan, was recognised as a Professor of Surgery. On the 5th of December 1954, the Vice-Chancellor, the respondent No. 1, purporting to exercise his powers under section 22(4) of the Act, as there were two recognised Professors of Surgery, nominated the petitioner as Head of the Department of Surgery. The reasons for the petitioner's appointment as the Head of the Department are stated by the respondent No. 1 in paragraph No. 3 (II) of his counter affidavit as follows:- "That the petitioner . . . . . . represented to me that in consonance with his position as Principal of Dow Medical College, Karachi, he should be considered for appointment as Head of the Department of Surgery in the Faculty of Medicine . . . . .Since there were two Professors of Surgery, namely the petitioner and Dr.. M. A. H. Siddiqi, respondent No. 2, in the Department of Surgery, I took into considera tion the representation made by the petitioner and appointed the petitioner as Head of the Department of Surgery ir, the Faculty of Medicine by virtue of the powers vested in me in accordance with section 22(4) of the Act." The petitioner, on the other hand, in the affidavit filed by him by way of rejoinder alleges:- "(9) That I was appointed as Head of Surgery in the University in recognition of my high academic qualifications, better experience and seniority and not because I happened to be the Principal of the Dow Medical College. The present Principal of the Dow Medical College, Dr. M. A. Shah, is not even a recognised professor of the Karachi University." It need only be pointed out that beyond the allegation contained in the above-quoted passage from the affidavit of the respondent No. 1, there is no evidence of the representation which the petitioner is alleged to have made to him. It is also clear that the Principalship of the Dow Medical College, which is an institution quite separate and distinct from that of the University of Karachi does not confer upon its holder a right or claim either to a professorship or to the Headship of a Department in the University. After having been appointed the Head of the Department of Surgery the petitioner was, in accordance with subsection (5) of section 22 of the Act, elected as the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine; and by virtue of section 16 of the Act he became an ex-officio member of the Senate of the University. On the 17th of May 1955, Dr. Siddiqi wrote letter to the Vice-Chancellor, respondent No. 1, in which he represented as follows:- " Now that Col. Khan is retiring on the 26th May (as Principal of the Dow Medical College and he will no more be Principal. I would request that the position be reviewed and I may be reappointed the Head of the Department of Surgery. I may add for your information that Col. Khan may be re-employed by the Government and as such he will occupy a junior position in the Professorial cadre as against the position that could have been created by grant of extension which has not been given to him." As has already been pointed out, the Principalship of the Dow Medical College has nothing to do with Headship of a Department in the University-at any rate there is nothing either in the Act or in the Statutes to connect the two; nor was the learned counsel for the respondent able to show such a connection. Dr. Siddiqi's allegation, or expectation, that the petitioner, after his retirement as Principal, "will occupy a junior position in the Professorial cadre", is contradicted by the fact that even after his retirement the petitioner continues to occupy in the Dow Medical College a position senior to Dr. Siddiqi. In the 5th paragraph of his affidavit in rejoinder, the petitioner states:- "That the respondent No. 2's averment in his representa tion to the Vice-Chancellor (annexture 1 to the counter affidavit of A. B. Haleem) that after my retirement as Principal of the Dow Medical College and on my re-employ ment I would occupy a junior position to him in the Professorial cadre is wrong and baseless, as on re-employ ment I have been appointed as Head of the Department of Surgery in the Dow Medical College, which position I still occupy, while respondent No. 2 is employed only as one of the several professors in that department under me and is 'not yet even confirmed. I file a copy of extract from the letter of the Ministry of Health addressed to the Director of Health Services; Karachi." It is alleged by the respondent No. 1 that on the represen tation of Dr. Siddiqi, he appointed him the Head of the Department of Surgery on the 2nd of June 1955 in exercise of the powers vested in him by section 22(4) of the Act. No order of appointment has been produced. As, according to the respondents, the petitioner on account of his removal from the Headship of the Department ceased to be the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine, which office he could hold only for as long as he was the Head of a Department in that Faculty, he (the petitioner) also ceased ipso facto, on the 2nd of June 1955, to be a member of the Senate, of which body he was only an ex-officio member by virtue of his Deanship of a Faculty. The first respondent, therefore, did not give the petitioner any notice, to which every member was admittedly entitled, of the meeting of the Senate held on the 31st of December 1955, at which a representative of the University on the Pakistan Medical Council was elected. The petitioner challenges the factum, legality and Dana fides of his removal from the Headship of the Department of Surgery. The relevant allegations are contained in the following paragraphs of his affidavit :- "

6. That the respondent No. 2 is a Professor in Dow Medical College in the same Department of which I am the Head, and he is also a recognized Professor in the Department of Surgery in the University of Karachi.

7. That in the year 1954 there were two Professors in the Department of Surgery of the University of Karachi viz., Dr. Abdul Hameed Siddiqui, the respondent No. 2 and myself, and I was duly appointed as Head of the Department of Surgery in the University of Karachi. 8 That later on I was duly elected as the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine in the University of Karachi and in the said capacities I have been working uptil now.

9. That by virtue of my holding the aforesaid offices of the Head of the Department of Surgery and the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine I was also ex-officio member of the Senate of the University.

10. That till recently I was also Principal of the Dow Medical College, which is a Government institution, and in that capacity also I was a member of the Senate of the University of Karachi.

11. That in the discharge of my various duties on several occasions I had to disagree with and oppose the respondent No. 1 and on this account he began to bear ill-feelings towards me and started favouring the respondent No. 2.

12. That one of the items on the agenda of the First Annual Meeting of the Senate of the University which was held on 30th October 1954 was the election of a representative to Pakistan Medical Council ' for which I was a candidate, but the respondent No. 1 openly canvassed for respondent No.

2. However, on account of certain objections the said meeting was adjourned sine die without transacting any business and that very item is now on the agenda of the meeting scheduled to be held on 31st December 1955 ". The petitioner further alleges that the proceedings of the meeting of the Senate held on the 31st of December 1955 are null and void, because no notice of it had been admittedly given to him as required by law ; and prays that they may be quashed. It will have been observed that only the Headship of the Department of Surgery and the Deanship of the Faculty of Medicine are the two subject matters of dispute in the present proceedings. The position taken up by the res pondent No. 1 is as follows: Under subsection (4) of section 22, already reproduced above, he has the authority to appoint the Head of the Department whenever there be more than one professors in it. As the power to appoint includes, under section 16 of the Pakistan General Clauses Act, the power to dismiss the person appointed, he (the respondent No. 1) had the authority to dismiss the petitioner and to appoint the respondent No. 2 in the exercise of his powers under subsection (4) of section

22. According to subsection (5) of that section, only a Head of a Department of a Faculty can be the Dean of that Faculty. Therefore, on his dismissal from the Headship of the Department of Surgery, the petitioner automatically ceased to be the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine. The petitioner, on the other hand, asserts that the Vice-Chan cellor possesses no power to dismiss a person from the Head ship of a Department even when he has himself appointed him under subsection (4) of section 22, and that in any case his, that is to say, the petitioner's position as a Dean of the Faculty cannot be affected by any act of the Vice-Chancellor because a Dean is elected by the Faculty and not by the Vice-Chancellor. The petitioner also contends that he holds the Deanship for a fixed period of three years under Statute 10 (4) (a), and cannot be removed by anyone, least of all by the Chancellor, before the expiry of that period. It will be noticed that according to the contention of the respondents, the petitioner ceased to be the Dean of the Faculty only because he had been removed by the Vice-Chancellor from the Headship of the Depart ment. Therefore, it follows that in case the petitioner succeeds in establishing that his removal from the Headship is illegal, he has the right to continue to be the Dean. The petitioner, however, contends that even if the respondent No. 1 had the power to remove him, and did in fact validly remove him, he is, according to law, nonetheless entitled to remain the Dean of his Faculty for the unexpired period of three years. I shall first deal with the question relating to the Deanship upon the assumption that the petitioner has been validly removed by the respondent No. 1 from the Deafship of the Department of Surgery. Subsection (5) of section 22 of the Act provides as follows :- " The Dean of. a Faculty shall be elected by the Faculty from among the Heads of Departments of the Faculty and shall hold office for such term as may be prescribed by the Statute 10 (4) (a) runs :- " The Dean of each Faculty shall be the executive officer of the Faculty, and shall preside at its meetings. He shall hold office for three years ". Subsection (5) of section 22 clearly hays down that the Dean shall hold office for a term and leaves it to the Statutes to prescribe the term. The statute lays down that the term shall be three years. These are the only two provisions relating to the term of the office of a Dean and, in language which can brook no other meaning, they provide that the term shall be three years. Neither the Act nor any of the Statutes lay down any provisions terminating the term of a Dears before the expiry of the prescribed period of three years. There is again no provision relating to suspension or dismissal of a Dean. He may, of course, resign the post because he cannot be compelled, to continue to hold it against his wishes. In any case, the Dean, is elected by a Faculty and not appointed by the Vice-Chancellor and, therefore, the latter cannot, upon any principle, have the power to remove him : and what the law does not permit to be done directly cannot be done indirectly. It is contended that it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the real intention of the legislature and that it is the intention of the Act that when a person ceases to be the Head of the Department, he must also cease to be the Dean of the Faculty which elected him. It is true that Maxwell at the first page of his Treatise on the Interpre tation of Statutes lays down "A statute is the will of the legislature, and the funda mental rule of interpretation ' to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded according to the intent of them that made it ". But the learned author proceeds to add: "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the Legislature ". Again at page 3 "When the language is not only plain but admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. It is not allowable, says Vattel, to interpret what has no need of interpretation. Absolute sententia expositore non-indiget. Such language best declares, without more, the intention of the law-giver, and is decisive of it. The rule of construction is to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually ex pressed. It matters not, in such a case, what the consequences may be. Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, any thing is enacted by the Legislature, it must he enforced, even though it be absurd or mischievous. The underlying principle is that the meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the plain and unambiguous ex pressions used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the Court as to what is just or expedient. The words cannot be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should be excluded or embraced. However unjust, arbitrary or inconvenient the meaning conveyed may be, it must receive its full effect. When once the meaning is plain, it is not the Province of a Court to scan its wisdom or its policy. Its duty is not to make the law reasonable, but to expound it as it stands, according to the real sense of the words ", "The principles of construction which apply in inter preting such a section ", observed Viscount Simon L. C. in the case of Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamation Collieries Ltd. (1940 A C 1014 at p. 1022) decided by the House of Lords "are well established; the difficulty is to adapt well-established principles to a particular case of difficulty ". In this case the well established principle of construction applicable is : If the language of the relevant provision be clear and admits of only one meaning, it must be given its full effect regardless of all consequences unless there be some other provision in the Act which, being in pari materia, is inconsistent and irreconcilable with it, in which case it becomes the duty of the Court to reconcile, if possible, the two conflicting provisions by interpreting them in accordance with the object or intention of the legislature ascertainable from the Act itself. It is not disputed that the petitioner was properly elected as the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine, and rightly continued to hold that office until his removal from the Headship of the Department of Surgery by respondent No.

1. According to subsection (5) of section 22 of the Act, a Dean " shall hold office for such term as may be prescribed by the Statute " ; and para. (iv) (a) of the 10th Statute framed by the Legislature, which passed the Act, lays down that " he shall hold office for three years ". There is not the slightest ambiguity or doubt about the language or the meaning of the words used in prescribing the term of the Dean. The contention of the respondents amounts to this: that the Vice-Chancellor can by adopting an indirect and roundabout method bring about the termination of the term earlier than the period prescribed by the Legislature. The onus of substantiating this position lies very heavily and squarely on the respondents. They can succeed only by showing that the Legislature has given the power to the Vice-Chancellor in as clear language as the one in which it gave the petitioner the right to hold the office of the Dean for three years. No such provisions can be found either in the Act or in the Statutes ; nor was the learned counsel for the respondents in his long and full arguments able to point out any. An attempt was made to discover such a power in the Vice-Chancellor by implication. A provision can be implied in a Statute only when it is necessary and unvoidable ; the more so when it will have the effect of modifying or altering a clearly expressed provision with regard to the same matter. Much stress is laid on behalf of the respondents upon the fact that subsection (5) of section 22 of the Act requires the Dean to be elected from a certain class, vie., the Heads of the Departments and the inference is sought to be drawn from that fact that the person elected can continue to hold the Deanship provided he also continues to be the Head of some department in the Faculty. It is argued that this consequence must always flow whenever an election or appointment is made from a class. I am not aware of any rule or principle of law to that effect. The contention could be only based upon logic or reason ; and I see none to support it. What is there, in law or logic to prevent a legislature or a rule making body from providing that while a person from a certain class alone can be elected to an office he shall-or shall not-continue to hold the office on his ceasing to be a member of that class ? Since the provision might well have been either way, we again come back to the basic question: What has been actually laid down ? The rule only says : " The Dean shall be elected from among the Heads of the Depart ments of the Faculty ". It does not say that the person elected shall cease to be the Dean on his ceasing to be the Head of a Department. It is possible that that may have been the intention of the Legislature. Let us assume that it was most probably the intention ; even then a Court cannot be justified in giving effect to it. A further step must be taken and it must be shown from the language of the section, or some other clear provision in the Act, that this alone would have been the intention. As was said by Brett J. in Clementon v Mason (44 L J Rep. 171) " although strong grounds exist for suspecting that intention was to give only a limited right, still there is nothing to make it sufficiently certain that it was so ". In the same case Denman, J. observed : " This I do not feel at liberty to do from a mere suspicion, however strong, that it might have been the intention ". There is nothing in the office of a Dean which can be performed only by a Head of a Department. In the Act itself the functions of a Dean are described by sub section (3) of section 22 thus "There shall be a Dean of each Faculty, who shall be responsible for the due observance of the Statutes, Ordi nances and Regulations relating to the Faculty ". Para. 4 of the tenth Statute lays down the rights and duties of a Dean as follows :- "(a) The Dean of each Faculty shall be the executive officer of the Faculty, and shall preside at its meetings. He shall hold office for three years. (b) He shall issue the lecture lists of the University in Departments comprised in the Faculty, and shall be respon sible for the conduct of teaching therein. (c) He shall have the right to be present and to speak at any meeting of any committee of the Faculty but not to vote unless he is a member of the Committee." The only necessary qualification of a Dean which emerges from a consideration of these functions is that he should possess the experience of teaching and of running one of the Departments in the Faculty. As regards the latter, be it noted, it is not necessary according to subsection (5), that he should have had experience in all the departments of the Faculty. Both of these qualifications are equally possessed by person who was, like the petitioner or the respondent No. 2, a Head once but is no longer so. The object of the rule that only that person can be elected who is, at the time of the election, a Head may have been to limit the election to a narrower class of persons ; or there may have been some other object which cannot be readily or easily guessed by a law Court. The fact remains that the real object of the rule can at best be a matter of speculation, a process which a Court cannot resort to in interpreting an Act. The meaning of the language, is clear. The petitioner was the Head of a Department in the Faculty when he was elected the Dean and there is nothing in the section, or in the Act, to show that he must cease to be the Dean with the termination of his Headship. The matter, however, does not rest at that. The obvious meaning of the words under consideration, viz. "The Dean of a Faculty shall be elected by the Faculty from among the Heads of the Faculty," is further clarified, and fortified, by the second part of the sentence, viz., "and shall hold office for such term as may be prescribed by the Statutes"-The term for which the person elected as 'Dean' shall hold office is not prescribed by the Act but is left to be provided for by the statutes which, by section 27 (2), may be amended, repealed or added to by Statutes made by the Senate-Under Clause (e) of section 20 the Syndicate has the power to define the conditions of service of the officers ; and Heads of Departments are officers of the University (Section 7). As the Act stands, it is open to the Syndicate to provide that every teacher, or the Head of a Department, shall retire at the age of 55 and to the Senate to so amend the Statutes that the Dean shall hold the office until the age of

60. Since there is nothing express in the language of section 22 (5) to prevent the Syndicate and the Senate from making such provisions, and, on the contrary, the Act expressly authorises them to do so, it cannot be maintained that the intention of the Act, as gathered from all the provisions of the Act, was that a person can hold the office of the Dean only for so long as he remains the Head of one of the Departments in the Faculty. Or again supposing the Senate by amending Statute 10 (4) (a) lays down that a Dean shall hold office until two years after his retirement from the Headship of the Department. There is nothing in the first part of subsection (5) of section 22 to prohibit this. On the contrary the second part of this clause gives ample and unrestricted authority to the Senate to make such a provision. Thus the Act itself has conferred an authority upon the Syndicate and the Senate which shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the object which is sought to be imputed to the provisions in question could not have been the inten tion of the Legislature; or, in any case, the Legislature has failed to express it effectively. It is urged that when a member of a body is to be elected as its Head, Chairman, or Speaker he can retain that office only for so long as he remains a member. That principle or rule, even if valid, is not at all applicable to the present case. So far as the Act goes, it does not lay down the constitution of the Faculties at all ; it leaves to the Statutes to prescribe their constitution and powers (vide subsection 2 of section 22). The Act only lays down that there shall be a Dean of each Faculty and that he shall be elected by the Faculty. This shows that before the election of the Dean the Faculty is already fully con stituted and that the person elected does not thereby necessarily become a member of the Faculty. In any case the Act nowhere provides that the Dean shall be a member of the Faculty. It is true that the tenth Statute says that, inter alia, the Heads of all the Departments in a Faculty shall be members of that Faculty ; but the Statutes are not part of the Act and may be amended, repealed or added to by the Senate. The Senate may amend the 10th Statute by providing that only some of the Heads shall be members of a Faculty. Since under section 22 (5) any Head may be elected as a Dean it cannot be said that the Act has made membership of the Faculty the sine qua non for the office of Deanship. There may have been some force in the contention if the relevant provision of the tenth Statute had been incorporated in the Act itself. The fact that by Statute 19 (2) the terms of the members of the Faculty, other than the Heads of the Departments, is limited to two years is not 'of any significance because, as already pointed out, the Act does not require the Heads to be members of the Faculty at all while the choice of a Dean is restricted by it to that class. The present case must be distinguished from the case where it is provided, either expressly or by necessary implication, that a member of a body or a class shall hold a particular office. There is no provision express or implied, in the Act which makes the holding of the office of the Dean, as distinguished from the election to it, dependant either upon the membership of the Faculty or the Headship of one of its Department. Therefore, where the Statute 10 (4) (a), provides, in accordance with section 22 (5) of the Act, that the Dean "shall hold office for three years" there can be justification to read any implied condition in it. Delivering his judgment in House of Lords in Kent Country Council v. Lord Gerard (1897 L R H L 633) Lord Watson said : "I entertain a strong objection to any canon of interpretation Which introduced by implication into a statutory clause qualifying expressions which are not there, and alters the plain meaning of words which are to be found in it." Two recent cases in which Courts felt considerable doubt and difficulty in giving effect to the plain meaning of a statutory provision, may be noted. The first case, London Brick Co. Ltd. v. Robinson (1943 I A E R 23) was decided by the House of Lords in 1942. 'The father of the infant respondent died on 22nd January 1941, as the result of personal injury by accident arising out of, and in the course of, his employment with the appellant company, which occurred on 20th December 1940. The deceased workman left a widow . . . . . and the respondent, then aged about one year'. 'When fatal injury . . . . . is caused to a workman, the workman's depend ants are not in all cases confined to the remedy under the (Workmen's Compensation) Act, but may, in the facts warrant it, proceed independently of the Act to enforce any civil liability of the employer, such as that which might arise under the Fatal Accidents Act . . . . . the Employers Liabi lity Act, 1880, or at common law.' Section 25 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, however, lays down :-- '' . . . . but the employer shall not be liable to pay com pensation for injury to a workman by accident arising out of, and in the course of, the employment both independently of and also under this Act . . . . . . ." 'By section 48 (3) of the Act any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants.' Although 'the employer is declared by the Statute not to be liable to pay compensation in respect of the accident both independ ently of and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the employer is nevertheless liable to pay compensation both independently of and also under the Act if one dependant has only one remedy and another dependant pursues another remedy.' In Avery v. London and North Eastern Ry. Co. ((1938) A C 606) the House of Lords decided that, in assessing the damages recoverable by the widow (under the Fatal Accidents Acts and Employer's Liability Act), it was right to ignore the fact that the children were claiming compensation under the (Workmen's Compensation) Act, and similary that the amount of compensation that the children would receive would not be affected by the fact that the widow had exercised her option to claim damages independently of the Act.' In Robinson's case the widow took proceedings under the Fatal Accidents Act and the Law Reform Act and her claim was satisfied by payment to her of pound 1,

750. She was thus excluded from claiming under the Workmen's Compensation Act, under which Act the respondent elected to claim and his claim fell to be ascertained under section 8 of the Act. The material words in that section are :- " . . . . together with, if the workman leaves a widow or other member of his family (not being a child under the age of 15). wholly or partially dependent upon his earnings and in addition leaves one or more. children under the age of 15 so dependant, an additional sum (hereinafter referred to as the children's allowance) of an amount calculated in accordance with the law (which shall be added together and dealt with as a single sum) shall not in any case exceed in the aggregate pound 600." The appellant's contention, and the decision of the House thereon, are thus stated by Viscount Simon, L. C. :- "Section 8 provides that the compensation, where death results from injury, shall be a lump sum, which in the present case is pound 300, together with an additional sum which is referred to as the children's allowance, of an amount calcu lated in accordance with the Act, which in the present case is pound 288'12S. These two amounts are to be added together and dealt with as a single sum. "It is a admitted that this infant is entitled to be awarded the pound 300, and the dispute is whether the additional sum of pound 228'12S also fails to be paid to him. Section 8 provides that this additional sum is to be added to the lump sum' . . . . if the workman leaves a widow or other member of his family (not being a child under the age of 15) wholly or partially dependant upon his earnings, and in addition leaves one or -more children under the age of 15 so dependant. Reading these words literally, the condition they prescribe is satisfied. The workman did leave a widow and in addition left a child under 15; and they were both dependant wholly on his earnings. The appellants contend that the reference to a widow in the conditional phrase which I have quoted is to a widow who is making a claim under the Act. The Court of Appeal felt constrained to reject this argument . . . . . . Lord Greene, M. R., Mackinnon and Goddard, L. JJ. were fully alive to the strange consequences of rejecting the appellants' contention and the illustrations contained in those judgments do indeed show that results follow which, to me at least, seem surprising. The maximum amount for which the employer could be liable under- the Workmen's Compensation Act in the present case, if the widow and the infant child joined in claiming it, would be pound 528, which would be distributed between the two dependants in a suitable proportion. If, however, the widow makes her claim independently of the Act and receives pound 1,750 as damages, so that there is now only one dependant to claim under the Act instead of two (or more), the result is that this one dependant now takes the whole sum of pound 528 in which he otherwise would only be entitled to a share. I agree with the Court of Appeal that the words which we have to interpret are not in themselves obscure or ambiguous, and there is no justification for construing the phrase "If the workman leaves a widow" as though it ran "if the workman leaves a widow who is claiming compensation under the Act." The words of the Statute 10 (4) (a), 'He (the Dean) shall hold office for three years', also of section 22 (5) of the Act, 'The Dean . . . . . . Shall hold office for such term as may be prescribed by the Statutes', are equally unobscure and un ambiguous and must be read literally and given their full effect regardless of seemingly strange and surprising con sequences of such an interpretation. There is no justification whatever for adding the qualifying words `provided he continues to hold the office of the Head of a Department of the Faculty' to the words of either Statute 10 (4) (a) or section 22 (5) of the Act. The second case, Grundt v. Great Boulder Proprietary Mines Ltd., ((1948) L R 1 Ch. 145) in which the Court of Appeal reserved the decision of Wynn-Parry, J., turned upon the construction of article 102 of the Articles of Association of the respondent company, This article reads :- "If at any general meeting at which an election of directors ought to take place, the place of any director retiring by rotation is not filled up, he shall, if willing, continue in office until the ordinary meeting in the next year, and so on from year to year until his place is filled up, unless it shall be determined at any such meeting on due notice to reduce the number of directors in office". At the annual general meeting in 1947 the plaintiff was the director retiring by rotation. He was proposed for re-election, but on a show of hands the resolution was declared to be lost. No poll was demanded, no other person was proposed for election instead of the plaintiff, and no resolu tion was proposed (nor had any notice been given of any such resolution) to reduce the number of directors in office. It was contended for the plaintiff-appellant 'that as a matter of construction an article in the form of article 108 cannot in common sense operate when a company intimates by express adverse vote that it does not desire the retiring director to continue as a director'. Cohen L. J., rejecting the argument observed :- ' . . . . What may appear to one judge as sensible and legitimate may appear to some other judge, or to the persons responsible for forming the company, as neither sensible nor legitimate. I do, not think that on grounds of that kind we are justified in disregarding what seems to me the plain meaning of the English language even though in a particular case it does appear to produce an equitable result . . . . Bynn-Parry, J. expressed his pleasure at reaching the result he was able to reach, because as he viewed the matter, the construction which in my view is the right construction involves an absurdity, namely, the absurdity that shareholders having rejected the resolution that the plaintiff be re-elected now find that he has continued in office. However, I am not satisfied that this is necessarily an absurdity. It may well be that the persons responsible for the adoption of the articles in their present form deliberately took the view that having regard to the small number of directors to whom this business was being entrusted there should be no reduction of the number left in charge without the attention of the shareholders being specifically drawn to what was proposed in the notice convening the meeting. Therefore, I am not prepared to agree that the provision, although it produces a strange result, is absurd". Similarly in this case I find no justification in principle' for departing from the plain meaning of the language used in the relevant provisions on the ground that the Legislature may have intended, or even most likely did intend, that no person should retain the post of the Dean if he ceases to be the Head of a Department. That may or may not, or ought or ought not to, have been the intention ; but it is not for a Court to enter upon such a speculation. In the present case it has not been contended, nor could it be reasonably con tended, that strange or absurd consequences will result if the plain and obvious meaning of the language in question is accepted the only consideration urged is basically one of propriety. I am far from satisfied of its correctness. It may well have been that the intention was that, in the interests of stability and continuity, the Dean should remain in office for the full term of three years regardless of the fact whether after his election as such he remains or not the Head of One of the Departments of the Faculty. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that according to the correct interpretation of the relevant provisions in the Act and the Statutes the petitioner is entitled to hold the office of the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine for the full term of three years from the date of his election to that office by the Faculty, even though, for some reason or other, he has in the meanwhile ceased to be the Head of the Department of Surgery, in which capacity he was elected to that office. Before parting with this aspect of this case I may point out that at no stage of the arguments was it contended that the petitioner had not been validly appointed as the Head of the Department of Surgery or that Dr. S. M. K. Mallick still holds that post in the eye of the law. In fact all the pleadings of the respondents are based upon the admission that the petitioner had been rightly appointed. For all that we know Dr. Mallick may have resigned. I am therefore, unable to see the relevancy of the arguments that if my interpretation of the Act is correct Dr. Mallick should be deemed to be still the Head of the Department. That is nobody's case, -nor can I see how an incautious, or even a wrong, admission by Mr. Suhrawardy on a pure question of law can bind either us or his client. As regards the question whether the respondent No. 1. the Vice-Chancellor of the University had the power to remove the petitioner from the Headship of the Department of Surgery, I am clearly of the opinion that he had not. The relevant provision is contained in the fourth subsection of the twenty-second section of the Act which is as follows :- " The Head of every such Department shall be the Pro fessor of the Department, or if there is no Professor, the Reader. If there is more than one Professor or more than one Reader of a Department, the Vice-Chancellor shall appoint to be Head of the Department such one of the Pro fessors, or if there is no Professor, such one of the Readers as he thinks fit." It will be noticed that although the Vice-Chancellor is given the powers to appoint the Head of a Department under certain circumstances no power whatever has been given toy him to remove a Head. The respondents, however, seek to derive this power from the sixteenth section of the General Clauses Act. That section provides :- "Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to make any appointment is conferred then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having for the time being powers to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed whether by itself or any other authority in exercise of that power". To me it seems that this section is not, in terms, appli cable to the present case. The section would apply only when a person has the power to appoint any one' to a post or office ; in other words, when a person possesses a general and unqualified power of appointment. The section does not provide for a case where a person has not been given the power to make every appointment to an office or post when ever it may fall vacant or to appoint any person; but is f required to make an appointment only in the presence of certain circumstances or when a specified situation arises. Such a person is the appointing authority only for a particular purpose and once the purpose is fulfilled he becomes functus officio as regards the appointment to, and removal from, the office in question. In such cases the person possessing the power of removal, if any, must be ascertained with reference to some provision of law other than that contained in section 16 of the General Clauses Act. Section 22 (4) of the Act declares, in the first instance, that the Professor of the Department, or if there is no Pro fessor the Reader shall be the Head of the Department. The Professor, or the Reader, therefore, automatically becomes the Head by operation of law without the intervention of any agency. No appointment is permitted as a rule. It is also necessarily implicit in this provision that the tenure of the Head of a Department is co-extensive with his tenure of the Professorship, or Readership, in that department. The tenure of a person as a Professor or a Reader appears to be dependant upon the terms of his contract ; and no provision in the Act, or the Statutes or the Ordinances, has been pointed out which gives the power to the Vice-Chancellor to remove the Professor or a Reader. Even if the Vice-Chancellor did possess the power he must first exercise it in order to effect, indirectly, the removal of a person from the Head ship of a Department. The power of removal in section 16 of the General Clauses Act is not an arbitrary power. It is a power which must be exercised in accordance with the law, that is to say, in accordance with the rules or terms relating to the tenure of the office to which the appointment was made. Even if the Vice-Chancellor did possess the power to remove the petitioner from the Headship of the Department it was incumbent upon him to do so in accordance with relevant rules or law. From the provisions that the Vice-Chancellor shall appoint from among the Professors, or Readers, such one "as he thinks fit", it may be argued that he has the power to remove such one "as he thinks fit" ; but it cannot be reasonably maintained that thereby he has also been given the power to remove whenever he thinks fit. This is really a question relating to the tenure of the office and, as has already been pointed out the tenure of the Head of a Department appears to be the same as that of his Professorship in that Department. The respondents have been unable to point out, beyond the will and pleasure of the Vice-Chancellor, any other basis for determining tenure of the Head of a Department. Even if it be contended-although, in my opinion, the contention is unsustainable-that the Vice-Chancellor must be deemed to possess the power of removal in the circums tances in which he has the authority to appoint this cannot help the respondents in the present case. The only power which has been given to the Vice-Chancellor by subsection (4) of section 22 is to settle competing claims, when they arise, by appointing one out of two or more competitors. Thus he has the power to appoint only when there are two or more Professors, or Readers, and none of them is the Head of the Department. If some power of removal is to be inferrentially given to him it must be confined precisely to the same circum stances in which -he has the authority to appoint. But once the power of appointment has been exercised the situation is altered materially. There can be no competition for the office because it has already been filled in and its occupant continues to hold it under, and' in accordance with, the law. Only in one other situation the Vice-Chancellor may conceiveably exercise the power of appointment, viz., when after he has appointed a Professor or Reader, out of two or more Professors, or Readers, as the Head of the Depart ment the appropriate authority of the University appoints in that Department another Professor or Reader. In such a case it may be said-but not in the present case because the question does not arise-that because the section confers upon every Professor, or Reader, the qualification for the Headship of the Department, a conflict arises between the new-comer and the old Professors, or Readers ; and, there fore, the Vice-Chancellor is once more called upon to settle the conflict. But then he can only appoint or not appoint the new Professor or Reader. If he thinks fit to appoint him to the Headship of the Department the old incumbent will vacate the office by operation of law and not by removal by the Vice-Chancellor. The proposition that whenever a Head of the Department, whether appointed by the Vice-Chancellor or not, ceases to hold that office before the termination of his Professorship, or Readership, he does not do so on account of his removal by the Vice-Chancellor but by operation of law may be further illustrated by reference to other possible situations. An only Reader of a Department who, in the absence of any Professor, becomes, by virtue of the statutory provisions, the Head of that Department must, under the same provisions, vacate that office as soon as a Professor has been appointed. Similarly a Reader who, out of several Readers, has been appointed by the Vice-Chancellor must vacate the office in favour of a Professor appointed by the appropriate autho rity. Again, take the case of one out of two Professors, or Readers, who has been appointed to the Headship of the Department by the Vice-Chancellor. If the other Professor, or Reader, thereafter resigns, or retires from, the Professorship or Readership, can it be maintained that the Vice-Chancellor, in such a case, possesses the power to remove the only remaining Professor, or Reader, from the Headship of the Department simply because he had appointed him to that office by virtue of the power which he had undoubtedly possessed ? He obviously cannot be removed by the Vice-Chancellor because, under the Act, he is entitled to hold the office for, at least, so long as he continues to be the only Professor, or Reader, in the Department. To my mind, therefore, it would be wholly wrong to hold that simply because the Vice-Chancellor has been given the limited power to appoint, or rather to arbitrate between conflicting claims, only in certain circumstances he must be deemed to possess the power of removal of his appointee, and much less so at his sweet will. It is not for the Courts to speculate whether the Vice-Chancellor should or should not have the power to remove c the Head of a Department whom he has appointed. But were it permissible I would say that there is nothing in principle or reason why he should have the power. The Head of a Department is not at all responsible for the discharge of the duties of his office to the Vice-Chancellor. Under sub section (4) of section 22 itself he is "responsible to the Dean (of the Facutly) for the organisation of the teaching in that Department", who, in his turn, is ultimately "responsible for the conduct of the teaching" in the whole Faculty (vide Sta tute 10 (4) (b)). Under section 21 "the Academic Council (an authority not shown to be subordinate to the Vice-Chancellor) shall . . . . . . . .subject to the provisions of this Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances, control and have general superintendence- over, and be responsible for, the maintenance of standards of instructions, education and examination within the University . . . .". The Syndicate has the power, subject to the powers conferred by the Act on the Vice-Chancellor, to regulate and determine all matters concerning the University in accordance with the Act etc. (Section 20 (i)) ; and it also possesses "all other powers of the University the exercise of which is not otherwise provided for by this Act or the Statutes" (Section 20 (j)). No provision, either in the Act or the Statutes or the Ordinances, has been pointed out under which the Vice-Chancellor has any control or supervision over the work of the Head of a Department. There seems, therefore, no valid reason for giving the Vice-Chancellor the power to remove the Head of a Department when the control, and supervision of, and the responsibility for, the latters's work rests with the Dean of his Factuly, the Academic Council and the Syndicate. Again the intention, which can be gathered from the language of the section seems to be that once having been appointed, or having become, the. Head of a Department a person should continue to hold that office for so long as he holds the qualifying post of a Professor or Reader. It would indeed be a strange and anomalous state of affairs that while the Vice-Chancellor has no power of appoint ment and dismissal of the Head of a Department when there is only one Professor or Reader, he should have the power of continuously appointing and dismissing the Head "as he thinks fit" when there are two or more Professors or Readers in the Department. Although he cannot dismiss a Reader from the Headship of the Department when there is no other Reader or Professor he claims the power to dismiss a Professor holding that office if there should happen to be another Professor in the Department. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that in the present case the first respondent had no authority to remove the petitioner from the Headship of the Department of Surgery. Section 16 of the General Clauses Act has no application to the facts of the present case and even if it were initially applicable "a different intention" does "appear" from an analysis of the provisions of section 22 (4) as made above. In consequence of my conclusions on the two questions involved in this case, I declare that the petitioner is still the legally constituted Head of the Department of Surgery and the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine in the University of Karachi and also, by virtue of section 16 (1) (vi) of the Act, a member of the Senate of that University ; and I order the respondents to refrain from in any way obstructing the petitioner in the performance of the duties, or in the enjoy ment of the benefits and privileges, of these offices until the latter (the petitioner) has been removed, or resigned, or retired, from any, or all, of the said three offices in accordance with law. Since the second respondent deliberately and wrongfully omitted to notify the petitioner of the meeting of the Senate held on the 31 st of December 1955, I hold all the proceedings of that meeting to be illegal and hereby quash them. The petitioner shall have his costs in these proceedings against the respondents. (ORDER OF REFERENCE) KAIKAUS & AKHLAQUE HUSAIN, JJ.-(11th July 1956)-- As both of us have differed on the two points on which the decision of this case turns we direct that the case be laid before the Chief Justice for nominating another Judge to decide the following questions (1) Had the respondent No. 1, - in the circumstances of this case, the authority to remove the petitioner from the Headship of the Department of Surgery in the University of Karachi and to appoint the respondent No. 2 instead ? (2) Can the tenure of a Dean of a Faculty in the University of Karachi terminate before the expiry of three years from the date of his election to that office by his being removed, by the- Vice-Chancellor of the University, from the Headship of a Department in the Faculty in the circum stances in which the respondent No. 1 has purported to have removed the petitioner from the Headship of the Department of Surgery in this case ? KAIKAUS, J.

Announced in open Court. Let parties' counsel be informed. (ANSWER TO REFERENCE) CONSTANTINE, J.

(26th November, 1936)-Upon a difference of opinion between my learned brethren Kaikaus and Akhlaque Husain, JJ., the following two questions have been referred to me for decision :- (1) Had the respondent No. 1, in the circumstances of this case, the authority to remove the petitioner from the Headship of the Department of Surgery in the University of Karachi and to appoint the respondent No. 2 instead ? (2) Can the tenure of a Dean of a Faculty in the Uni versity of Karachi terminate before the expiry of three years from the date of his election to that office by his being removed, by the Vice-Chancellor of the University, from the Headship of a Department in the Faculty in the circum stances in which the respondent No. 1 has purported to have removed the petitioner from the Headship of the Department of Surgery in this case ? The facts of this case have been stated at length in the judgments of my learned brethren and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. The provision of law relevant to the first question is sub section (4) of section 22 of the University of Karachi Act, which is a Central Act for the purposes of The General Clauses Act X of 1897. Subsection (4) of section 22 of the University of Karachi Act reads as follows :- "(4) Each Faculty shall comprise such Departments of teaching as may be prescribed by the Ordinances. The head of every such Department shall be the Professor of the Department, or if there is no Professor, the Reader. It there is more than one Professor or more than one Reader of a Department, the Vice-Chancellor shall appoint to be head of the Department such one of the Professors, or if there is no Professor, such one of the Readers as he thinks fit. The head of the Department shall be responsible to the Dean for the organisation of the teaching in that Department". Section 16 of the General Clauses Act reads as under :- Power to appoint to include power to suspend or dismiss.- "Where, by any (Central Act) or Regulation, a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having (for the time being) power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed (whether by itself or any other authority) in exercise of that power." My learned brother Akhlaque Husain was of opinion that the section does not apply to a case where a person has not been given the power to make every appointment to an office or post whenever it may fall vacant, or to appoint any person but is required to make an appointment only in the presence of certain circumstances or when a specified situation arises. Such a person is the appointing authority only for a particular purpose and once the purpose is fulfilled, he becomes functus officio as regards the appointment to, and removal from, the office in question. Again, the same learned judge considered that the tenure of the post of Head of the department is co extensive with his tenure of Professorship or Readership in the Department. Another reason advanced was that appointment in substance meant the settling of competing claims of two or more competitors. The appointment once made, competition has ceased and could only revive in case of a further Professor being appointed in the same Department. Even if upon the appearance of a fresh Professor, the Vice-Chancellor appointed him as Head of the Department, the old incumbent would vacate office by operation of law, and not by removal by the Vice-Chancellor. Lastly, the learned judge considered that a different intention was apparent from a consideration of the Karachi University Act as a whole. No provision, so runs the judg ment, either in the Act or in the Statute's or the Ordinances has been pointed out under which the Vice-Chancellor has any control or supervision over the work of the head of a depart ment. It was also anomalous that while tile Vice-Chancellor had no power of appointing or dismissing the Head of the Department when there is only one Professor or Reader, he should have the power continuously of appointing and dis missing the Head of a Department "as he thinks fit" when there are two or more Professors or Readers in the Department. To my mind the position appears to be that the Legislature in giving the power of appointment to the Vice-Chancellor. A presumably had in mind the provisions of section 16 of the General Clauses Act. I can find no intention to the contrary D expressed in the Act. The vast majority of appointments involve the decision of competing claims. The fact that the choice of the Vice-Chancellor is restricted, is not peculiar: In many cases of appointment the appointing authority has his field of choice restricted by the Legislature. I know of no authority that section 16 applies to only a case when a person possesses a general and unqualified power of appointment. As Mr. Justice Kaikaus pointed out there is no provision in the University of Karachi Act for dismissing a Head of a Department. It is true that if he ceases to be a Professor or Reader the words of subsection would involve as a necessary consequence the vacation of the post as the Head of the Department, since only a Professor or Reader is entitled to be the Head of a Department. It appears to me that in regard ing the intention of the Act it appears necessary that there should be a power to dismiss. Besides, the contingency of the appointment of a third Professor, the relative merits of two professors may change. Suppose the Vice-Chancellor has appointed A in preference to B, yet B may resign and a more distinguished Professor C may be appointed; or A may cease to be the Principal of a college, while remaining a Professor, and B succeeds him as Principal. Such considerations may well require that instead of A, either B or C should be appointed and, therefore, that the Vice-Chancellor should be able to remove A from the post of Head of the Department. Mr. Brohi also relied in argument upon clause (j) of section 20, which provides that the Syndicate shall exercise all other powers of the University, the exercise of which is not otherwise provided for by this Act or the Statute. He argued that the power of dismissal is not provided for by this Act but, on the respondent's contention, by the General Clauses Act, and hence the power of dismissal is to be exercised by the Syndicate. The answer to this is that the power of dismissal has not been given by the Karachi University Act to the University either impliedly or expressly ; it has been given specifically by the General Clauses Act to the person who has the power of appointment, i.e., the Vice-Chancellor. The second question concerns the interpretation of sub section (5) of the same section 22, which reads:- "The Dean of a Faculty shall be elected from among the heads of Departments of the Faculty, and shall hold office for such term as may be prescribed by the Statutes". The Statute has provided, "He shall hold office for three years." The Act provides that a Dean is one of the officers of the University and is an ex-officio member of the Senate : so also are Heads of Departments. His duties are prescribed by subsection (3) of section 22 : (he) shall be responsible for the due observance of the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations relating to the Faculty. One of the Deans shall be a member of the admission Committee (section 34). There is nothing in the Act itself which indicates that a Dean cannot carry out the duties of Dean unless he continues to be a Head of a Department. The Legislature by subsec tion (5) of section 22 read with section 18 has given to the Senate the power of determining the tenure of a Dean and has not qualified this power by any express condition. If the f Senate in the exercise of the discretion granted to it by the Act has said that a Dean shall hold office for three years, then prima facie he is entitled to hold office for this period unless the Senate provides otherwise by Statute. It is argued, however, that the qualification for election must necessarily be intended by the Legislature as a qualification for continu ance in office, if so, the Statute must be subject to this necessary intendment of the Legislature. The case of the Speaker, adduced as analogous, is governed not by necessary intendment, but by express provision. As I have said, there is nothing in the Act itself which indicates that a Dean cannot carry out his duties unless he continues to by a head of a Department. It appears to me that the Legislature has left the term of office to the discretion of the Senate. The Senate's language in the Statute being perfectly clear, effect must be given to it. If the Senate considers, that a Dean must conti nue to be a head of a department or a member of the Faculty, it can alter its Statute ; till such alteration the authorities must observe it. I therefore answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative and return the reference to my learned brethren. (ORDER OF DIVISION BENCH) KAIKAUS AND AKHLAQUE HUSAIN, JJ.

(19th Decem ber, 1956).-In accordance with the opinion of the majority it is held that the petitioner, though he has ceased to be the Head of the Department of Surgery, continues to be the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine. Mr. Nasir-ud-Din, who appears on behalf of respondent No. 1, wants to argue that even though the petitioner conti nues to be the Dean, the proceedings of the meeting of the 31st December 1955 were not invalid. This point had not been taken on behalf of the respondent in the lengthy argu ments that were addressed to us at Karachi and we do not think that the point should be allowed to be argued at this stage. Mr. Nasir-ud-Din says that the effect of our judgment may be that the whole proceedings of the meeting of the 31st December and even of the subsequent meetings in which the petitioner was not allowed to participate, become invalid. We do not-think any such result follows. In the first place, we are deciding this question against the respondent on the sole ground that the point was not argued ; secondly we are confining our decision only to one item, i.e. election of the representatives to the Pakistan Medical Council, in the meeting of the 31st of December 1955. Our decision does not affect either other items in the same meeting or any subsequent meeting in which the petitioner may not have been allowed to participate. As a result, respondent No. 1 is directed to admit the petitioner to the meetings of the Senate, to treat the petitioner as the Dean of Faculty of Medicine and to rectify the list of the members accordingly. He is directed further to hold a meeting of the Senate after due notice to the petitioner, for the election of the representatives to the Pakistan Medical Council because the election on the 31st December was void. The petitioner shall have his costs from the respondents. A. H. Order accordingly.