P L D 1976 Peshawar 66 (PLP)

ABDUL HAKEEM KHAN, J.‑Muhammad Aslam Khan and 10 others have moved this Constitutional petition in their own right as well as on behalf of other owners whose cases had been decided by civil Courts and the authorities under Martial Law Regulation 64 of 1959 (hereinafter called M. L. R. 64), with a view to obtain a direction from this Court that the Federal Land Commission and the other respondents should refrain from proceeding ahead in pursuance of order of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission, dated 28‑1‑1975 as in Annexure 'A' for that order of suo motu revision is without jurisdiction and of no legal effect.

2. It may be mentioned that respondent No. 2 is the Federal Govern ment, while respondents 3, 4, and 5 are Chief Land Commissioner N.‑W. F. P. Peshawar, Land Commissioner Peshawar Division and Deputy Land Commis sioner Abbottabad respectively. Noor Khan respondent No. 6 alongwith others happens to be one of the petitioners before the Chairman, Federal Land Commission. Muhammad Akbar and 6 others were impleaded as respondents at their own request on the basis of their representation that their interest as the case was with 4 to 5 thousand other peasants and tenants was also under scrutiny in pursuance of the impugned order of the Land Commis sion. It is noteworthy that though this application was accepted by the order of the Court dated 6‑5‑75, the title of the writ petition originally filed as also that of the amended writ petition recites the names of Muhammad Akbar, Muhammad Noor and Ghulam Rasool as respondents 7, 8 and 9 respectively. We will direct that this omission should now be supplied and Abdur Rahman, Mohammad Yaqub, Mozam Shah and Alam Khan shown as respondents 10 to 13.

3. In this context we should like to mention that the amended writ petition was filed with a view to bring on record some events that had taken place during the pendency of the petition after that it was admitted; parawise comments on the stay application moved by the petitioners were invited from Chairman Federal Land Commission; and proceedings before him were stayed by the Court's order dated 17‑3‑

75. The events are that paragraph 29 of Land Reforms Regulation of 1972 (M. L. R. 115), was further amended by Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1975 (hereinafter called the amending Act, 1975), promulgated on 18th April 1975, the bill having been moved by respondent No. 1 himself in his capacity as Minister of the Central Govern ment so as to extend the scope of the revisional powers even to the proceedings pending as also orders passed under the repealed Regulation, namely, M. L. R.

64. The petitioners contend that this amendment was ultra vices of the Constitution inasmuch as it was made without the previous sanction of the President as required by Article 268 of the Constitution. It was questionable because it had been moved by respondent No. 1 to cover his illegal action, which had been impugned through the writ petition. In any case the amendment was ultra vires because it reopens the past and closed transactions, which stood concluded by the judgments of the Superior Courts and as a matter of fact the Government of Pakistan has already paid million of rupees to the petitioners on account of compulsory acquisition for the purposes of the Tarbela Dam. There are the three grounds, which find place in the amended writ petition, which were vehemently argued before us during the course of his address by the leaned counsel for the petitioners.

4. It will be necessary to place on the record that in the writ petition as originally presented the main ground of attack was that respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to revise or review a final order under M. L. R. 64 It was also submitted that neither Federal Land Commission nor the Federal Government had any powers to decide the question of title simplicitor and that being in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Courts had been decided in favour of the petitioners in a litigation which was taken even to the Supreme Court. Another important ground that was taken up in the petition as originally submitted was that respondent No. 6 was giving out that he was a friend of respondent No. 1 and that the latter has identified himself with him and was in all probability annoyed with the petitioners because of a resolution moved by the MAJLIS-I-AMMAL ITTIHAD MALKAN TAHSEEL MANSAHRA", wherein they have demanded from the Prime Minister that respondent No. 1 be relieved from the Minister-ship because he was the moving figure behind the class warfare. In any case respondent No. I had expressed opinion "that he would slaughter the petitioners and other land owners represented by them despite the orders of the civil Courts how high so ever they may be".

5. Before we proceed further, we should like to give the history of the land as we find it in the judgment of Mr. Justice Qaisar Khan (as he then was) to a title suit between the parties. The learned Judge has said:‑ "The, estate of Upper Tanawal consists of two parts, one part was under the administration of Nawab of Amb and the other called 'Phulra' under the administration of Khan of Phulra. Reference in this connection can be made to Regulation (1I) of 1900 given at page 19 of the Punjab and N.‑W. F. P. Code Volume 111, 5th Edition. The Punjab Land Revenue Act was extended to the whole of the estate of Upper Tanawal by the N.‑W. F. P. (Upper Tanawal) Exclud ing Areas Laws Regulation 1950. As a result of this extension settlement operations started in the said estate. The Misal Haqiat of Phulra was prepared in 1951‑52 in which Khan of Phulra was shown as the owner of the land and the persons in occupation as his tenants paying rent. So far as the estate under the administration of the Nawab of Amb was concerned, the settlement authorities recorded the statements of the proprietors and tenants in a Register and the Register of rents was also prepared. Orders were passed by the settlement authorities in both these Registers. But before the Misal Haqiat could be prepared disturbances broke out in the whole of the Upper Tanawal between the tenants and the proprietors. The Govern ment thereupon took possession of the whole of the estate and in the revenue record Government was recorded as the owner of the estate. Arrangement was made by the Government for the recovery of rent from the tillers of the land and this rent after the deduction of the expenses of the recovery was paid to the proprietors i.e. Nawab of Amb, the Khan of Phulra and Guzara Khors under them. It may be mentioned here that by Guzara Khors are meant the relations of the Khan and the Nawab to whom some land had been given by them for their maintenance. This arrangement continued uptil 1959. The Government thereafter admitting the rights of the Nawab and the Khan ordered that the respective estates be transferred in their names. Mutations were attested in the Revenue record in the names of the Nawab and the Khan who were shown as owners in the subsequent jamabandis. It may be mentioned here that the Government also approved that the settlement carried out in the estate under the administration of Nawab of Amb be considered as correct for the preparation of the Misal Haqiat. Later on the Government also decided that Guzara Khors be also shown as owners of the land which bad been given to them, for their maintenance. Mutations in the names of the Guzara Khors were also attested and they were shown as owners in place of the Government in the Revenue Record."

6. We will like to clarify the factual position a little further by referring to Annexure 'C', which is a copy of a judgment of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan in writ petition moved by Mirza Khan and others, i.e. tenants. When the records in pursuance of the settlement were prepared, the ruler of Upper Tanawal and Khan of Phulra were shown as jagirdars in the sense of grantees of proprietary rights. At their protest and representations the Government recognised them as owners on the 15th of April 1959, subject of course to the limitations imposed by M. L. R.

64. It may be mentioned that the said Regulation was enforced in Upper Tanawal with effect from 7th February 1959 vide, Notification No. A. S. P: 155‑59/3131‑L. C. dated 27th of July 1959.

7. It was by their notification dated 5th of April 1960 as in Annexure'B' that the Commission directed the owners of Upper Tanawal to file their declaration forms in L C. I and L C‑II before the 1st of May 1960. The declaration form filed by Muhammad Umar Khan as in Annexure B/1 was disposed of by the Deputy Land Commissioner Hazara in October 1960 and it appears that similar declaration forms by other owners were disposed of in 1961. This situation was the direct result of the orders of the Government passed on the 15th of April 1959, declaring the Nawab of Amb and Khan of Phulra as owners of land in Upper Tanawal. This compelled Mirza Khan and other tenants to move Writ Petition No. 40 of 1961, wherein they questioned the validity of the aforementioned orders. This petition was unsuccessful as it will appear from the orders dated 18th May 1962 as in Annexure 'C', their Lordships were of the view that the objection of the tenants was futile, because if the Government was the owner or had taken upon itself the role of owner, then it could confer ownership on any person. Their Lordships elaborated that that the ownership should have been conferred on the petitioners in respect of the land, which they held as Ghair Dakhilkars was not a matter either for a writ petition or for any other form of legal action. The contention of the tenants that they should be treated as occupancy tenants was found to be a matter for evidence and it was further observed that a declaration of rights was a fit subject for a civil suit, and if the petitioners before their Lordships were so advised, they could have a recourse to the civil Court.

8. There is yet another writ petition that requires to be mentioned and that was moved by the tenants to question the gifts made by the declarants to their heirs. The writ petition is 260 of 1964. This petition was dismissed in limine and petition for Special Leave to appeal was also dismissed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court vide, Annexure 'D'. Not being successful in invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court against the orders of the Government declaring the Nawab of Amb and Khan of Phulra to he the owners instead of jagirdars and those of the Land Commission upholding the gifts by the Nawab in favour of his heirs, the tenants had a recourse to a representative civil suit as in Annexure 'E'. In this they claimed title, but this suit was dismissed. The appeal also failed and the Regular Second appeal in this Court was also luckless. The order of this Court is Annexure 'G'. Thereafter the tenants moved civil petitions for Special Leave to appeal in the Supreme Court but those were dismissed as withdrawn as by then the tenants had moved the Federal Land Commission for redress vide Annexure 'H'.

9. The proceedings culminating in the impugned orders in Annexure 'A' were started by respondent No. I after notices Annexure 'J' on pages 51 to 72 of the record. The most crucial part of the impugned order, is being quoted below:‑ I have perused the petitions and subsequent record by which these proceedings were initiated. After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel and perusal of the record I find that this is a proper case for invoking the suo moto revisional Jurisdiction of the Federal Land Commission. I, therefore, act accordingly. The record of the case may be called for and the parties summoned for I st March 1975, as all the learned counsel agree to this date. I learn that Mufti Mohammad Idrees who would be possibly representing the heirs of the Nawab Mohammad Saeed, has also agreed to this date. Gifts made by Nawab Mohammad Saeed in favour of Salahuddin will also be scrutinised on that date. The parties concerned with that may also be summoned and the relevant record called for.

10. That the respondent No. 1. proposes to go ahead with the suo motu revision stands fully established by the Court notice in suo motu Revision No. S. M. 28/FLC/75 and S. M. 29/FLC/75 under para. 29 of M. L. R. 115, issued in the Pakistan Times of 21‑3‑75 and copy of which is Annexure AD‑8 and which after addressing the petitioners recites:‑ The above‑mentioned Revision is pending before the Chairman, Federal Land Commission under his suo morn jurisdiction to examine as to whether Nawab of Amb, Khan of Phulra and the Guzara Khors were jagirdars or they were owners and what is the effect of M. L. R. 64 and M. L. R. 115 on their rights in the lands of Upper Tanawal. The next date fixed for hearing is 28‑3‑1975 at the office of the Federal Land Commission, Pakistan Secretariat No. 111, Rawalpindi. If any of such persons chooses to be heard in the above noted Revision proceedings, he can do so either in person or through his recognised agent.

11. Even though some allegations of personal nature were levelled against respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 6 in the original as also the amended writ petition duly supported by affidavits, none of the respondents bas cared to file a written statement or to controvert the allegations of the petitioners by a counter affidavit. Even seven respondents, we refer to respondents 7 to 13, who moved an application through Qazi Abdur Rashid for being impleaded as respondents have not filed any written statement or affidavit to counter the allegations of the petitioners. All that they have done is that by C. M. No. 99 of 1975 they prayed for interim stay of ejectment proceedings against them and this application, it may be mentioned, was granted. In all fairness to respondent No. 1 and the Commissioners under him as also their learned counsel Mr. Hidayatullah Khan on the factual plane, there is the solitary statement of the learned counsel at the bar and that too was made on the third day of the arguments that previous sanction of the President had been obtained for the enactment of the amending Act, 1975. We also wish to add that when Mr. Muhammad Hussain Lughmani, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Qazi Abdur Rashid, the learned counsel for respondents 7 to 13 concluded their arguments, Mr. Hidayatullah Khan adopted the arguments of Qazi Abdur Rashid and made the statement that follows:‑ That previous sanction of the president was obtained under Article 268 of the Constitution before the amending Act (No. XXXIX of 1975) I, however, cannot say whether the previous sanction of the President was obtained before the introduction of the Bill into the Assembly. I also cannot say if notice regarding the previous sanction was given alongwith the Bill as provided by rule 89 of the National Assembly Rules, 1973. If the Court requires I can produce the file.

12. Two preliminary points were taken by Qazi Abdur Rashid, the learned counsel for respondents 7 to 13:‑ (1) The Federal Land Commission being located at Islamabad was outside the jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, the direction prayed for by the petitioners could not be granted. (2) The Federal Land Commission had not decided the matter so far and the petitioners were unnecessarily apprehensive. Their action was in anticipation.

13. Before R a examine Article 199 of the Constitution, which has been invoked by the petitioners in their support, we should like to place on the record that the jurisdiction now being invoked is in the nature of the prerogative Writ of Prohibition and to appreciate the purposes and scope of that jurisdiction Re can do no better than to quote from the Fundamental Law of Pakistan by Mr. A. K. Brohi and the Prem's Law of Writs. On page 469 of his Treatise Mr. Brohi defines the Writs of Prohibition and quotes Lord Atkin in support of his formulation. This is what the learned author has said:‑ A Writ of Prohibition, as its name indicates, is issued to prohibit an inferior body or tribunal from continuing to act in relation to a matter, which is beyond its authority or jurisdiction. Certiorai proceedings are commenced with a view to quashing orders passed by inferior bodies or tribunals, and prohibition will go to stop them from going on further with proceedings that are adjuged to be without foundation. Lord Atkin, in the case of Rex v. Electricity Commissioners Ex parte London (1424) 1 K B 171 (C A), E. J. Co. remarked:‑ 'I can see no difference in principle between certiorari and prohibition except that the latter may be invoked at an earlier stage. If the proceedings establish that the body complained of is exercising its jurisdiction by entertaining matters which would result in its final decision being subject to being brought up and quashed on certiorari, I think the prohibition will lie to restain it from so exceeding its jurisdiction.' 'The object of the writ was to protect the jurisdiction of Common Law Courts from being usurped and the writ could reach any tribunal with limited jurisdiction that was exercising a jurisdiction that belonged to common Law Courts or was found exceeding the Jurisdiction conferred upon it by law. The writ could issue from the Court of King's Bench Division in England even to Privy Council while exercising appellate jurisdiction from ecclesiastical Courts (See Halsbury's Laws of England 2nd Edn., Vol. 9, 1408th Para.)'.‑In Paem's Law of Writs at page 37 he observes as follows:‑

4. In England certiorari and prohibition were two prerogative writs whereby the Courts prevented lower Courts, and Courts of special jurisdiction, from exceeding their proper functions. They are of highest importance in legal history. Certiorari owes its name to the idea that the King desires to be certified of what is going on in a Court. It directs the issue to be brought before King's Bench. Prohibition, as the name implies, orders the immediate cessation of the trial of an action in the Lower Court to which it i3 directed. The former writ is appropriate when the usurpation of jurisdiction is a fait accompli; the latter when it has not yet taken place, but is merely proposed, as when a Court Martial has been assembled for the trial of a person not in fact subject to Military Law. The learned author has further supplemented it in another para. on page 465 of his publication and the same reads: A writ of prohibition like a writ of certiorari is in the main issued for the purpose of restraining inferior Courts or authorities exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions from exceeding their jurisdiction. The fundamental difference between these two writs is that they are issued at different stages of the proceedings. When an inferior Court or a quasi‑judicial Tribunal assumes jurisdiction to try or inquire into a matter over which it bas no jurisdiction, the aggrieved person can move the Nigh Court for a writ of prohibition and if he succeeds, an order will issue from the High Court forbidding the inferior Court Or Tribunal from continuing the proceedings. But if the inferior Court or Tribunal has concluded the proceedings and given a decision, the party aggrieved would have to move the High Court for a writ of certiorari to quash that order. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to a private individual or an authority, which is not clothed with judicial or quasi‑judicial functions. Ghulam Mohammad Mata v. State P L D 1960 Azad J & K

12. It is noteworthy that according to Lord Atkin a writ can be issued from the Court of King's Bench Division in England even to Privy Council while exercising appellate jurisdiction from ecclesiastical Courts.

14. After becoming fully conversant with the history and scope of a writ of prohibition we now advert to Article 199 of the Constitution and its relevant part reads "199.‑(1) Subject to the Constitution, a High Court may, if it is satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law,‑ (a) on the application of any aggrieved party, make an order,‑‑ (A directing a person performing, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority, to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do, or to do anything he is required by law to do; [The words on which we propose to lay emphasis are being underlined*].

15. On a careful reading of the above quotation it would appear that this Court bas got the powers to make an order directing a person performing within its territorial jurisdiction functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, or of a province, or a local authority to refrain from doing any thing he is not permitted by law to do the crucial points for the exercises of the jurisdiction, therefore, are that the person should be performing functions within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and again he is doing that which he is not permitted by law to do. It is true that the Federal Land Commission is located at Islamabad, but a mere reference to its order dated 28‑1‑1975 as in Annexure 'A' and the advertisement as in copy, Annexure AD‑B would show that it wants to perform some functions in the area of Upper Tanawal which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The fact that this function is being performed in connection with the affairs of the Federation or the province is immaterial, for in either case it will be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court. In this view we are reinforced by the weighty pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Asghar Hussain v. The Election Commission, Pakistan and 2 others (P L D 1968 S C 387), and a recent authority of this Court as in Khaista Gul v. Akbar Khan and 7 others (P L D 1975 Posh. 146).

16. The language of Article 199 is quite clear when it invests us with the jurisdiction to make an order directing a person to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do within our territorial jurisdiction. The next submission of Qazi Abdur Rashid is that we should wait till the decision of the Federal Land Commission. So to speak, the learned counsel wants us to overlook for the time being the action of the Federal Land Commission, even though what it may do, may not eventually be found to be a thing which was permissible for it to do under the law. The facts of the authority viz., Virasat Ullah v. Bashir Ahmad, Settlement Commissioner (Industries) and another (1969 S C M R 154), relied upon by the learned counsel are clearly distinguishable inasmuch as all that the learned Settlement Commissioner had done in the precedent case was that he had issued a notice to the peti tioner so that he should satisfy him that the property had been transferred to him. There was no dispute about the jurisdiction of the Settlement Commis sioner to issue such notices. On the contrary in the instant case the gravamen of the petitioners' submissions is that the Federal Land Commission bad no jurisdiction whatsoever to examine as to whether the Nawab of Amb, Khan of Phulra and other Guzara Khors were jagirdars or they were owners and how M. L. R. 64 affected their rights in the lands of Upper Tanawal. National Steel Rolling Mills and others v. Province of West Pakistan (1968 S C M R 317 (2)), is also distinguishable, for in that case there was mere anticipation of penal action and the substantial defence available to the petitioners could be taken before the competent forum. In our view the legal proposition enunciated by Sardar Muhammad Iqbal, J., in Messrs Colony Textile Mills Ltd., Lahore v. The Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal (Pakistan) and another (P L D 1971 Lah. 861), contains an exposition of law, which we must respectfully follow. The following is a quotation from pages 863 and 864 of the report:‑ In Kensington income‑tax Commissioners v. Aramayo (1916) 1 A C 219, affirming the decision in Rex v. Kensington Income‑tax Commissioners (1914) 3 K B 429, it was decided that prohibition will lie and is an appropriate remedy if the Commissioners acted without jurisdiction. In Reg. v. Bolton (1841) 1 Q B 66 which was approved in Colunial Bank of Australia v. Willan (1874) 5 P C 417 it was observed that the test of jurisdiction was whether or not the Authority in question 'had power to enter upon the enquiry, not whether its conclusions in the course of it were true or false'. In any such case, it may be futile to pursue the alternative remedy and an aggrieved party may move the High Court under Article 98 for issuing an appropriate writ without his being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. The question of absence of jurisdiction does not arise in the case. In order to see that there is an absence of jurisdiction it is necessary to establish that the authority or the Court had not been constituted as required by the statute or the person proceeded against was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court or the authority or the ground of which action is taken was not within the grounds stated by the statute. Zafarul Ahsan v. The Republic of Pakistan P L D 1960 S C 113 and Fazal Din v. Commissioner, Peshawar P L D 1968 Pesh.

30. Now the test in the instant case is as to whether the Land Commission had the power to enter upon the enquiry. It seems to us if the petitioners establish the contrary, it will be futile for them to pursue their grievance before the Commission and they will be justified in praying for issuance of an appropriate order without being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course.

17. For the reasons we will repel both the preliminary objections that have been taken by Qazi Abdur Rashid, the learned counsel for respondents 7 to 13.

18. The points that have been urged on behalf of the petitioners are:‑ (1) The Federal Land Commission had no jurisdiction whatsoever to review or revise orders passed under Martial Law Regulation 64 (the repealed Regulation) in the exercise of its powers under paragraph 29 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 as substituted by the Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1973 and further amended by section 3(5) of the Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974. (2) The Amending Act, 1975 which came into force during the pendency of these proceedings on 18th April 1975 and further amended aforesaid paragraph 29 so that cases or proceedings pending or orders passed under Martial Law Regulation 64 (the repealed Regulation) come under revisional powers of the Federal Land Commission was ultra vires of the Constitution. (3) The manner for the exercise of the jurisdiction neither under the law as it stood before the amending Act 1975 nor after it has been followed. (4) The Land Commission had no jurisdiction whatsoever to go into the questions of title already settled by the judgments of the civil Courts taken right up to the Supreme Court. (5) Respondent No. 1 had identified himself with the peasantry and the Amending Act, 1975 was brought by him on the statute book so as to give semblance of legality to the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction on his part. By his conduct he had forfeited his right to be a Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction even if there‑was any.

19. My Lord the Chief Justice has given ample reasons in his detailed order of the 11th March 1975 admitting the writ petition. We respectfully agree with his Lordship that Paragraph 29 of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972, as it stood on the 11th of March 1975, did not confer any jurisdiction upon the Chairman, Federal Land Commission to revise cases that had bee decided under Martial Law Regulation

64. The very fact that the Legislature itself thought it fit to amend Paragraph 29 by the amending Act, 1975 by twice adding the words "or under the repealed Regulation" after the word "this Regulation" will demonstrate that without the amendment of the paragraph the Federal Land Commission had no powers to revise orders in the proceedings pending under or made under M. L. R. 64, that is to say, the repealed Regulation.

20. It remains to be seen if the amending Act, 1975 is ultra vires of the Constitution on the ground, which was mainly pressed, namely, the previous sanction of the President had not been obtained. Before we proceed further, we should like to reproduce the first two clauses of the Article 268, for the learned counsel for the petitioners thinks that the first clause also governs the second clause: 268. (1) Except as provided by this Article, all existing laws shall, subject to the Constitution, continue in force, so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations, until altered, repealed or amended by the appropriate Legislature, (2) The laws specified in the sixth Schedule shall not be altered, repealed or amended without the previous sanction of the President.

21. Question arises as to whether previous sanction of the President was obtained. The preamble of the amending Act, 1975 is silent on the point but this appears to be in confirmity with the practice of the Central Legislature. Land Reforms (Amendment) Acts of 1973 and 1974 also do not recite in their preambles that previous sanction of the President required under Article 218(2) of the Constitution had been obtained. The preambles of Finance Acts of 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975 which also could not be introduced without the previous sanction would also not show that such sanction had been obtained. It may, however, be mentioned that Land Reforms Punjab Amendment Act, 1973 refers to the previous sanction of the President under Article 280 of the Interim Constitution but this circumstance can be explained away by the fact that the legislation was being amended by the Provincial Legislature and it was, therefore, thought necessary by them to have introduced this fact in the preamble. The practice of the Central Legislature will not make the legislation vulnerable, for the law passed by it will have to go to the President in any case for his assent. All that the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the National Assembly 1973 require is that when a Minister introduces a bill, the written notice of introduction shall be accompanied inter alia by the previous sanction of the President if that was required for the introduction of the bill. It appears to us that after the allegations in the amended writ petition, which were duly supported by an affidavit, it was clearly the duty of respondents 1 and 2 to have filed a written statement and counter‑affidavit so as to reinforce the initial presump tion that previous sanction for amendment of the Land‑ Reforms Regulation 1972 had been obtained before the Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill, 1975 was introduced. Mere statement of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 at the Bar could not, in our view, dislodge the allegations that had been so vehemently and seriously made. It is true that the learned counsel had offered to produce the record but this offer was made when the arguments had been concluded. Anyhow we don't think that it will tie necessary for us to conduct an elaborate enquiry in the circumstances of this case.

22. In support of his contention that failure to obtain previous sanction will render the enactment ultra vires the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that Article 268 is a special provision. Chapter 7, which is entitled "Transitional" and as such would prevail over the general provisions earlier enacted, namely, Article 75(3), which reads: 75.‑(3) No Act of Parliament and no provision in any such Act, shall be invalid by reason only that some recommendation, previous sanction or consent required by the Constitution was not given if that Act was assented to or deemed to have been assented to in accordance with the Constitution. In support of this view the learned counsel relied very heavily on the Reference by the President of Pakistan under Article 162 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, reported in P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 219, wherein Article 225 of the Constitution of 1956 was held to be a special provision and the advice was that notwithstanding the provision of Article 83 of that Constitution the then Legislature of West Pakistan for which a provision had been made under Article 225 could not be dissolved. We are not prepared to subscribe to the view that the title "Transitional" given to the v Chapter will also na4ki; such provisions in that Chapter transitional as are unequivocally otherwise or in the very nature of things permanent. Heading and marginal notes cannot control the express language and for that reason every provision occurring in the transitional part of the Constitution cannot be termed as a proviso to the Constitution. In this connection a reference to the observations of Maxwell are pertinent. On pages 9 and 10 of the Inter pretation of Statutes Twelfth Edition he says:‑ But the weight of the authorities is to the effect that they (he refers to Marginal notes) are not parts of the statute and so should not be considered, for they are inserted not by Parliament nor under the authority of parliament, but by irresponsible persons. As far as headings are concerned, the learned author has observed on page 11 (ibid) "They cannot control the plain words of the statute". It would follow that we will have to concentrate on the language of the statute. No provision can be special unless it is couched in such terms or there is necessary intend ment. In this very Chapter there Article 274 which relates to vesting of property, rights, liabilities and obligations. Is it not a permanent provision? Again can it be at all seriously argued that the operation of Article 268 or the Constitution is limited in point of time, that is to say, until elections for the new Legislature under the present Constitution take place. Rather it seems to us that this provision will remain so long as the laws specified in the Sixth Schedule remain on the statute book or the Constitution itself is amended. On a consideration of the language employed in Article 225 of the 1956 Constitution their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in P L D 1957 S C came to the conclusion that the Constitution intended that the West Pakistan Assembly shall continue till new elections and it was, therefore, that the general provision for the dissolution, as contained in Article 83, could not be invoked. It is noteworthy that their Lordships were clearly of the opinion that Article 83 in certain aspects, namely, summoning and prerogation was applicable to that Assembly. This was because there was no provision or intendment to the contrary.

23. Now provisions of Article 268(2) of the Constitution are special to the extent that a bill as respects Laws in the Schedule will not be moved without the previous sanction of the, Government. But similar provisions exist elsewhere in the Constitution as well which the learned counsel for the petitioners was at pains to distinguish as permanent part. For instance, Article 162 of the Constitution, which occurs in the permanent part requires that previous sanction of the President shall be required to Bills affecting taxation in which provinces are interested. It seems to us that in the absence of express language or clear intendment that laws without previous sanction of the President will be invalid we ought not to read the words to that effect either in Articles 268 (2) or in 162 of the Constitution. There is no non obstante clause in Clause (2) of the Article 268 so as to take it out of the gene rality of law made by Articles 69 and 75 (3) of the Constitution. Proceeding in the Assembly are internal matters and unlike the American Constitution those have not been made immune from attack in Courts in Pakistan. Reference to Collye's Constitutional Limitations, Eight Edition, in particular to his observations on page 266 will not be helpful and we need not examine those in derail. The submission that if the Constitution givers intended that Clause (2) should also be subject to the provision of the Constitution as in Article 75 (3), they would have used those words in Clause (2) as well, has not impressed us inasmuch as in the case of Clause (1) use of these words was necessary and repetition of these words in Clause (2) would have been otiose. Articles 280 and 281 of the Interim Constitution are in peri‑materia with Article 269 of the Constitution and, therefore, the observations in The State v. Zia‑ur‑Rehman and others (P L D 1973 S C 49), will not be applicable. Provision in Article 268 (2) corresponds to Article 280 (3) of the Interim Consti tution.

24. The position that emerges in the ultimate analysis is that though previous sanction of the President was necessary for the introduction of the amending Bill, that becomes a mete technicality or formality not going to the root of the jurisdiction no sooner the President assented to the Bill. Even if Article 75 (3) of the Constitution had not been explicit in this behalf, the maxim Quod fieri non debuit factum valet or popularly called factum valet will, sustain the enactment as a valid piece of legislation. President could not be unconscious of the fact that by giving his assent to the legislation even though it was not introduced with his prior sanction, he shall be deemed to have condoned the default.

25. It remains to be seen if there is any substance in the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners that the National Assembly could not pass the amending Act, 1975 with effect from a date prior to the enforcement of the Constitution, that is to say, the 13th of August 1973. The learned counsel has referred us to the following observations of Mr. A. K. Brohi on page 217 of his Treatise and a paragraph on pages 205 and 206 of the Cooley's Consti tutional Limitations, Eighth Edition. We need not quote Cooley in extenso, for the passage relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners plainly questions the authority of the Legislature to adjudicate upon the parties and make valid proceedings which had been taken in Courts without jurisdiction. The quotation from Mr. Brohi reads: It is the view of the present writer that the Legislatures establishes by the Constitution cannot pass laws affecting acts and omissions that have taken place before the coming into force of the Constitution. And before such an abnormal power could be suffered by Courts to be assumed by the Legislatures, it must be shown that it was expressly conferred upon them. Once it is conceded that the Legislatures established by the Constitution are new legal institutions deriving their powers from the terms of the Constitution itself, it would be difficult to justify the assumption of the power by such newly created institu tions to pass laws affecting acts and omissions countenanced by subjects during the pre‑Constitution period.

26. With due deference to Mr. Brohi we do not feel persuaded by his observations. Assuming that the observations in Union of India v. Madan Gopal Kabra (A I R 1954 S C 158), are obiter, it will be difficult to brush aside the reasoning which prevailed with their Lordships. What their Lordships have observed reads:‑ While it is true that the Constitution has no retrospective operation, except where a different intention clearly appears, it is not correct to say that in bringing into existence new Legislatures and conferring on them certain powers of legislation, the Constitution operated retrospec tively. The legislative powers conferred upon parliament under Article 245 and Article 246 read with List I of the Seventh Schedule could obviously be exercised only after the Constitution came into force and no retrospective operation of the Constitution is involved in the conferment of those powers. But it is a different thing to say that parliament in exercising the powers thus acquired is precluded from making a retroactive law. The question must depend upon the scope of the powers conferred, and that must be determined with reference to the 'terms of the instrument by which affirmatively, the legislative powers were created and by which, negatively, they were restricted.'

27. It will be seen that reliance has been placed by their Lordships on a Privy Council authority and it, therefore, becomes our duty to find out the basis for the exercise of the powers under the Constitution and further to determine the scope of the powers with reference to the terms of the instru ment by which affirmatively, the legislative powers were created and by which, negatively they were restricted. The Land Reforms Regulation of 1972 and the amendments in that Regulation prior to the commencement of the Constitution were "existing laws" as the expression has been defined in Clause (7) of Article 268 of the Constitution. This very Article in the Constitution continues in force all the 'existing laws' unless those are altered, repealed or amended by the appropriate Legislature. The power of the Legislature to amend the existing laws is reaffirmed, of course, after adding a pre‑condition that in the case of laws specified in the Sixth Schedule, previous sanction of the President shall require for alteration, repeal or amendment. Though the proposition was not specifically discussed, the weighty pronounce ment of the Supreme Court in Tofazzal Hussain and others v. The Province of East--Pakistan and others (P L D 1963 S C 251), which gives effect to post‑1956 Constitution enactment as respects the 'existing law' of 1950, the amendment being retrospective, will afford a safe precedent in support of the view that even though the Constitution itself may not be retrospective, powers can be exercised by a Legislature under the Constitution with retrospective effect, provided of course there is express language to that effect or necessary intendment.

28. On the view of the matter that we take we are perfectly clear in our R mind that not with standing the fact the Constitution came into force after the promulgation of Land Reforms Regulation 1972, it has given ample powers to the appropriate Legislature to amend, alter or repeal the law and that this power can be exercised with retrospective effect.

29. It is, however, no teworthey that proceedings and action under the M. L. R. 64 were brought under the revisional jurisdiction of the Federal Land Commission for the first time by the amending Act, 1975, and that came into force en the 18th of April 1975. Prior to that date, as already observed somewhere else, the Federal Land Commission had no jurisdiction to revise and as such the order dated 28‑1‑1975 as in Annexure "A" and the Court notice that followed it on the 21st of March 1975 as in copy Annexure AD‑B were without jurisdiction. It seems to us that the powers which did not exist before the enactment could not be continued after the amending Act 1975 without a validation clause to that effect, the validity of which, as said before, has been doubted by Cooley, which recourse was adopted by section 11 of the Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1973. It may be reiterated that when the orders as in Annexure 'A' and notice as in Annexure AD‑B were made and issued, Paragraph 29 of the Regulation had not been amended and para graph 32 created a bar on reopening of transactions past and closed under M. L. R. 64, that is to say, the repealed Regulation.

30. It, however, appears to us that the amending Act, 1975 will also not confer any jurisdiction upon the Chief Land Commissioner to issue fresh orders for suo motu revision. Paragraph 29 as amended by the amending Act, 1975, will in any case require to be considered alongwith paragraph

32. A reference to sub‑clause (d) of clause (2) of paragraph 32 of the Regulation will show that not with standing the repeal of M. L. R. 64 any investigation, legal proceedings, or remedy in respect of any such right, title, penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if Land Reforms Regulation 72 had not been enacted. Again Clause (3) of Para. 32 makes provision for the transfer of pending proceedings under M. L. R. 64 and elaborates that the authorities to which such cases may be transferred will have td act in accordance with the repealed Regulation, as if the authority had been appointed under the repealed Regulation. We have to place such interpreta tion upon paragraphs 29 and 32 of the Regulation in their amended form as would make them harmonious. It is our bounden duty not to impute to the Legislature an intention to reopen past and closed transactions. We cannot be but aware of its aversion to tamper with the vested rights. Viewed in this perspective which appears to be the true perspective, the insertion of the words "or under the repealed Regulation" at two places after the words "this regulation" in paragraph 29 by the amending Act, 1975 has only enlarged the powers of revision in such cases which could be continued under sub clause (d) of clause (2) or transferred under clause (3) of para. 32 of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972. Any other view will mean that though the Land Reforms Regulation, did not intend to interfere with actions already taken under M. L. R. 64, it nullifies the effect of clear provision made in this behalf in clause (2) of para. 32 of the Regulation and this they did without saying so expressly. It is true that Clause (2) of para. 32 is prefaced with the words "subject to the other provisions of this Regulation", but these words cannot be so construed that the Legislature intended to take away vested rights, rather than to provide for situations in which M. L. R. 64 was attracted despite its repeal by the Regulation. It cannot be overlooked that in pursuance of the vested rights in the petitioners millions have been doled out to them under the Land Acquisition Act by Tarbela Dam authorities. How can we assume an intention to the Legislature that it intended to nullify the title decrees obtained from Civil Courts and challenge to which decrees even upto the Supreme Court was unsuccessful.

31. We cannot give any more effect by way of retrospective operation than it is absolutely necessary. Bowen L. J. in the case of Reid v. Reid ((1886) 31 Ch. D 402), at p. 408 made the following observations:‑ It seems to me that even in construing an Act which is to a certain extent retrospective and in construing a Section which to a certain extent is retrospective, we ought, neverthelss to bear in mind that maxim (omnis nova constitutio futuris forman imponere dilect non practeritis) is applicable whenever we reach the line at which the words of the section cease to be plain. That is a necessary and logical corollary of the general proposition that you ought not to give a larger retrospec tive power to a Section, even in an Act, which is to some extent intended to be retrospective, than you can plainly see the Legislature meant. This exposition is reiterated by Maxwell vide, page 216 of the Twelfth Edition. As far as annulment of decrees by a retroactive Legislation is concerned, their Lordships in Jhon Lemm v. Thomas Alexendar Mitchell ((1912) A C 400), made the follow ing observations, which are pertinent:‑ In the absence of appeal, the judgment was final determination of the rights of the parties and the ordinary principle that a man is not to be vexed twice for the same alleged cause of action applies unless it be excluded by Legislature in explicit and unmistakable terms. This is not the case here. It would require a language much more explicit than that which is to be found in the Ordinance of 1908 to justify a Court of law in holding that a legislative body intended not merely to alter the law but to alter it so as to deprive a litigant of a judgment rightly given and still subsisting. The following observations of Lord Blackburn in Gardner v. Lucus ((1878) 3 A C 582), will elaborate the matter further:-- Now the general rule, not merely of England and Scotland, but I believe of every civilised nation, is expressed in the maxim, `Nova constitutis futuris forman imponere debet non practerits, prima facie, any new law that is made affects future transactions, not past ones. Neverthe less, it is quite clear that the subject‑matter of an Act might be such, though there were not any express words to show it, it might be retrospective. But where the effect would be to alter a transaction already entered into, where it would be to make that valid which was previously invalid‑‑to make an instrument which had no effect at all, and from which the party was at liberty to depart as long as he pleaded, binding--I think the prima facie construction of the Act is that it is not to be retrospective, and that it would require strong reasons to show that is not the case. This position is also endorsed by Australian High Court in Hedderwick and others v. Federal Commissioner of Land Tax ((1913) 16 C L R 27), at p. 36 where it has ob served:‑ It is a well `recognized rule that statutes should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested rights'. For it is not to be presumed that interference with existing rights is intended by the Legislature, and if a Statute be ambiguous the Court should lean to the interpretation which would support existing rights. It will also be not out of place to quote some views from corpus juris. In Vol. 69 under Article 692 at pp. 1158 to 1169 the following general observa tions appear Retrospective and retroactive legislation is not favoured. Hence, it is a well settled and fundamental rule of statutory construction, variously stated that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, and not as operating restrospectively. It is equally well settled as a fundamental rule of statutory construction supported and established by numerous judicial decisions that statutes are not to be construed as having a retrospective effect. Both the above statements and rules are of course contingent upon the absence of any words expressing a contrary intention, or, more specifically unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect clearly, expressly, plainly, obviously, unequivocally and unmistak ably appears or is clearly, or as it has some times been stated in instances where the subject‑matter was under consideration, distinctly, indisputablely manifestly, most positively, most explicitly, plainly, unambiguously, unequivocally or unmistakably or shown by express declaration, or command or by a very clear, fair, necessary, unavoid able, or unequivocal implication. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be solved against the retrospective effect and in favour of prospective construction only. Where a statute is expressly or by clear implication made retroactive to a certain extent or for a certain purpose, the Courts will not by construction give to it a retroactive operation to any greater extent or for any other purpose. Article 696 adds:‑ Retroactive legislation changing rights is not favoured, and the rule that statutes are not to be construed retrospectively unless such construction was plainly intended by the Legislature applies with peculiar force. Hence, in so far as affecting vested rights, a statute will be construed as prospective only, and not as operating retrospectively or retroactively unless that intention is made manifest either by express words or by a clear, distinct, necessary, plain, strong, unmistakable implication. A statute, therefore, is not to be construed to impair the validity of contracts entered into before its passage. It is only where the intent of the Legislature to make as Act retrospective is plainly expressed that Courts will undertake to apply it to antecedent contracts and determine whether it impairs their validity. Where a particular contract is lawful when made, but such contract or its further performance is rendered illegal or void by a subsequent statute, acts done or rights acquired in pursuance of the contract and before the passage of the statute are not affected by it ; but the contract is discharged from the time the statute takes effect, without liability of either party on account of such discharge. A statute subsequent to a judgment vesting rights in a party can have no retrospective operation to divest such rights unless such intention of Legislature is clearly expressed.

32. In this context we will like to reinvite attention to P L D 1963 S C, 251, wherein an amendment was interpreted as retroactive and Courts decisions were nullified but might we add that the amendment had added what follows: (2‑a) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument or in any judgment or decree or order of any Court, lands of the classes referred to in the clauses (a): and (b) of subsection (2) do not include and shall be deemed never to have included (i) any land or building in a Hat or Bazar. It was quite explicitly provided that judgments, decrees or orders of Courts contrary to the amendment will stand nullified. Needless to say that in the Amending Act, 1975 there is no such wording which should have the effect of nullifying the decree obtained by the petitioners as regards their title ands in the circumstances we are clear that notwithstanding the Amending Act 1975, the vested rights of the petitioners remained inviolate and in tact.

33. But even for the sake of argument one was to overlook the strong objections, there is yet another insurmountable difficulty for the respondents who assert jurisdiction in respondent No. 1 in pursuance of the Amending Act, 1975. A reference to paragraph 29, as amended up‑to‑date, will show that the Federal Government or a person authorised by it in that behalf, in this case Federal Land Commission, may on its own motion or otherwise call for the record of proceedings under the Land Reforms Regulation of 1972 or the repealed Regulation, which is pending or in which Commission or any authority appointed under the Land Reforms Regulation or under the repealed Regulation, has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself about its validity, and may pass such order as it may think. The language of the statute, as we read it, is quite clear and unequivocal when it confers revisional jurisdiction and this jurisdiction is there only if the order to be revised has been passed by the Commission, or an authority appointed under either of the two Regulations. In the instant case the admitted position is and in this we are supported by various judgments brought on the record that the orders whereby the petitioners were not to be treated as jagirdars but as owners were made by the Government of West Pakistan or one of its departments. That order was certainly not made by any Commission or any authority under the present or repealed Regulation. For the reasons we fail to understand haw can the revisional powers under para. 29 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 can at all be invoked in the circumstances of the present case.

34. It will be seen that the above order of the Government was made on the 15th of April 1959 more than three months earlier than the Land Commission's notification, which reads : No. A S P‑155‑59/3131-L. C.‑In exercise of the powers conferred on the West Pakistan Land Commission by paragraphs 1(3) and 4(5) of Martial Law Regulation No. 64, as amended by Martial Law Regula tion No. 64‑A, the Commission is pleased to direct that all the provisions of the aforesaid Regulation shall be deemed to have come into force in the Upper Tanawal Area of the Hazara District with effect from the 7th February 1959.

1. The Commissioner's Notification No. A S P‑3461‑59‑2247‑L. C. dated the 22nd June 1959, shall stand superseded so far as Upper Tanawal Area is concerned.

35. It is true that the notification enforced M. L. R. 64 as amended by M. L. R. 64‑A in Upper Tanawal area or Hazara District retrospectively with effect from 7th February 1959, but a reference to clause (3) of paragraph 1 of M. L. R. 64 will show that powers were not given to the Commission to make the Regulation applicable with retrospective effect, muchless in a way that it divests the rights vested by the Government itself in the petitioners. Needless to say that the history of the dispute between the parties will not show that the land belongs to the Government. Rather the dispute was that the petitioners claimed the land in Upper Tanawal as theirs on account of conquest and the peasantry also had similar claims. The entry in the revenue papers showing the petitioners to be jagirdars was ad hoc and the department, which made it revised it on the representation of the petitioners. That a notification will not have any retrospective effect unless the powers in that behalf have been expressly conferred is a proposition, which gets support from Modi Food Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. (A I R 1956 All. 35). Reference with advantage may also be made to Abdul Majid Khan v. Shahzada Asif Jah (P L D 1970 Pesh, 37). In any case Commissioner of Sales‑tax (West), Karachi v. Messrs Kruddosons Ltd. (P L D 1974 S C 180) is conclusive.

36. Be that as it may a reference to M. L. R. 64 as also the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 would show that no jurisdiction was conferred thereunder to adjudicate upon questions of title. All that the two Regula tions brought about is that a limit on individual holdings was placed and in that connection certain transfers by the existing owners were to be scrutinised. Again under paragraph 11 Jagirs subsisting immediately before the commencement of the Regulation of 64 were abolished and the question as to whether a property was or was not in fact a Jagir, was not a matter, which had been left for the determination of the Commission under the Regulation. Both the Regulations postulate action under those Regulations on the assumption that persons affected thereby possessed a particular character. The Supreme Court authorities that have been pressed into service on behalf of the respondents 7 to 13, namely, Mst. Bibi Ayesha and another v. The Chief Land Commissioner, West Pakistan and another (P L D 1966 S C 84), and Mst. Hajiani and others v. West Pakistan Land Commission, Lahore and others (P L D 1966 S C 114), have been since distinguished and the settled law by now which supports the view which we are taking is to be found in Muhammad Khizar Huyat Khan v. Chief Land Commissioner end others (P L D 1968 Lah. 145), Sar Anjam Khan v. Mir Afzal Khan and 14 others (P L D.1972 Pesh. 37), Haji Ali Bux Khan and 3 others v. The Chief Land Commissioner, West Pakistan, Lahore and 2 others (1974 S C M R 98), and Mst. Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad and others (P L D 1975 S C 624). It is the duty of the authorities administering Martial Law Regulations to respect the decisions of the civil Courts on the questions of title. Moreso when such decisions are between the parties.

37. There is yet another objection which appears to us to be of a sub stantial nature. The third proviso to paragraph 29 of the Regulation provides that the record of any case or proceedings shall not be called for under the paragraph on the application of any aggrieved party made after the expiration of sixty days from the date of such order or from the enactment of the Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1973, whichever is later, excluding the time requisite for obtaining a copy. Annexure 'H' which is a copy of the Supreme Court order shows that Qazi Abdur Rashid admitted having moved an~ application and this is also supported by the narration of facts as it appears in Annexure 'A'. That in fact applications were made by respondents 7 to 13 stands fully established by the summonses issued by Annexure 'J' (pages 51 to 72) comprising several processes issued at the instance of Nur Khan and others. There is no denying the fact that these applications were barred by time. It is true that the Federal Land Commission can move on its own motion and the last date for the exercise of his jurisdiction, namely, the 14th day of August 1974 was first extended upto 31st day of March 1975 by the Amending Act of 1974; to 30th of September 1975 by the Amending Act, 1975 and to 31st of March 1976 by Ordinance XXI of 1975, but it does not appear to be the intention of law that suo motu powers should be exercised so as to help the petitioners whose remedy is barred by limitation. When) a law has provided a particular mode, then action has to be taken accordingly and in no other way. Suo motu powers can only be exercised in which no application has been made at all.

38. After having recorded our finding that paragraph 29 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 was not retroactive to the extent that vested rights can be wiped out, particularly when those stand affirmed by decisions of the Civil Courts and that the scope of the jurisdiction conferred was limited to the decisions of the authorities exercising powers under either of the two Regula tions and as such the action of the Government in the exercise of its plenary jurisdiction could not be challenged, we do not feel it necessary to prononuce upon the question of mala fide even though there is no rebuttal of the allega tions made by the petitioners in this behalf. Nevertheless we should like to place on the record that Tribunals exercising quasijudicial powers are expected to observe all the requirements of natural justice. The parties before such Tribunals should feel that justice is being done to them. Needless to say, justice has got to be dyne when its name is being invoked.

39. Before we part with the case, we should like to clarify that we do not subscribe to the view that the petitioners can bring a matter in a represen tative capacity. We can only grant relief to the persons aggrieved and who come before us. Nevertheless we expect that when the legal position has been clarified, the respondents will not do anything from the doing of which we have refrained them by this judgment in similar cases. The petition is accepted and respondents 1 to 5 are ordered to refrain from reopening the question of petitioners' title that stands finally settled under the decrees of civil Courts in a well contested litigation between the petitioners‑landlord on one side and the peasantry, including respon dents 6 to 13 on ‑the other. Respondents shall pay the costs to the petitioners. S. A. H. Petition accepted.