1992 PLP D﷓﷓833 (MLD)

The peculiar facts of this First Appeal involve a suit instituted by the appellant‑plaintiff against the respondents‑defendants in the Court of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad, on or about 13‑4‑1980, which came to be numbered as suit No.179 of 1980. Plaintiff‑appellant (where convenient referred to only as plaintiff) is the only son of late Muhammad Saeed Shah and was the sole heir and survivor of his mother, Bibi Husan Bano, widow of the deceased Muhammad Saeed Shah. Kist. Bibi Husan Bano under reference is shown to have acquired title, through a gift mutated on 20‑4‑1960 ,from her husband, over the suit property bearing City Survey Nos. 1090 to 1038, admeasuring about 5000 square feet and consisting of several tenements, situated at Qazi Abdul Qayyum Road Ward `F, Hyderabad. According to averments in the plaint, after the death of plaintiff's father, the defendants respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (if convenient called herein defendants only) filed a suit bearing No.140 of 1969 against the legal representatives of deceased Muhammad Saeed Shah for declaration and other reliefs in respect of their title in the suit property and other agricultural holdings, which, till the institution of the present suit, was still pending. Similarly, suit No.42 of 1971 was filed by plaintiff's (step) grand mother and aunt against plaintiff's mother and others in respect of their alleged 20 paisas share in the suit property and agricultural land held by plaintiffs father, which suit was decreed Ex Parte in January, 1978. Plaintiffs mother, Bibi Husan Bano, aforesaid, herself is stated to have died in May, 1972, whilst the property in suit was already under the custody and protection of the Court of Wards much like the property of the plaintiff himself. It is next averred that, during the pendency of the two aforementioned suits and merely 14 days after the death of Bibi Husan Bano, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 produced an affidavit, purporting to have been affirmed by such deceased lady before the defendant No.4, City Mukhtiarkar and Survey Officer, Hyderabad, whereunder she had, purportedly, gifted away the property in suit to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in equal shares. The Mukhtiarkar on the basis of such affidavit, allegedly, without notice to the plaintiff or otherwise observing the mandatory requirements of the Land Revenue Act mutated the referred property in the names of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on 22‑5‑1972. Since such property as well as other properties of the plaintiff's mother and those of the plaintiff himself, then a minor, were under the custody of the Court of Wards, the Deputy Commissioner, Hyderabad Ex‑Office Court of Wards, agitated the resultant mutation dispute upto the level of the Board of Revenue, the defendant No.5 in the suit, but the relevant revision application was dismissed. Thereafter the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 arc said to have withdrawn the amount of rent lying with the Court of Wards and allegedly started collecting and mis‑appropriating the accruing rents falling due. This was followed by another suit filed by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in the Court of the learned IInd Senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad, against the plaintiff's step‑grand‑mother and step‑aunt, Mst. Zainu and Mst. Shahzadi respectively, who, as stated, had obtained a decree in the aforesaid suit bearing No.42 of 1971, claiming that such decree, awarding 20 paisas share in favour of the said ladies was invalid and lx set aside. Such suit, numbered as 249 of 1978, was, however, later on withdrawn. Scam after the withdrawal of Suit No.249 of 1978 the defendant No.2, allegedly, illegally sold her disputed 40 paisas share to the defendant No.3, an old tenant of the disputed property and a practising Advocate at Hyderabad, the sale having taken place in the month preceding the institution of Suit No.179 of 1980, herein involved. At the same time, the plaintiff averred that the defendant No.1 was also poised to sell her disputed share to the same gentleman in like manner. The referred alleged 20 paisas share of the decree‑holders of suit No.42 of 1971 was also claimed to have been sold to the defendant No.3 at about the same time. It is maintained that the alleged gift from Bibi Husan Bano, purportedly, favouring the defendants Nos. 1 and 2, is forged and was never executed by the deceased lady, such lady, avowedly, not only observed strict pardah, according to the traditions of her well known orthodox family of Syeda of Sindh and never moved out in public but was also subject to Marzul Maut and hospitalised for treatment of her disease, which proved to be fatal. The orders of mutation in the Revenue hierarchy upto the level of the Board of Revenue are said to be equally bad, being based on a false, fabricated and fictitious transaction, besides being void for want of notice to the plaintiff and the Court of Wards, non‑compliance of mandatory requirements of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, and of the Muslim, Personal Law, prohibitions under the Court of Wards Act, 1905, and dis abilities con‑commitent to the applicability of the Doctrine of Lis‑pendens in the face of subsistence of suits Nos. 140 of 1909 and 42 of 1971. The suit for necessary Declarations is valued at Rs.200 each, and at the same figures for Accounts and Injunction. Amongst the documents filed with the plaint are photostat copies of extracts of City Survey record. Documents relied upon in the suit are the decree in suit No.42 of 1971, plaint in suit No.140 of 1969, order in revision passed by the Senior Member Board of Revenue dated 23‑5‑1977 and order of the District Judge, dated 13‑3‑1978 (1980), relieving the properties of Bibi Husan Bano and the plaintiff from the custody of the Court of Wards. The three private respondents‑defendants have submitted separate written statements, the officials not defending. The defendant No.1 pleads that suit No.140 of 1969 was filed by the defendant No.2 alone. She denies that the suit property is under the custody and protection of the Court of Wards or such was the case with the property of the plaintiff. She, though, admits that Bibi Husan Bano, plaintiffs mother, died in the year 1972, leaving the plaintiff behind as her sole surviving heir. As regards the alleged gift such defendant maintains that "the affidavit affirming the gift alongwith the application was given to the defendant No.4 on 20‑4‑1972 when the donor, Bibi Husan Bano, was alive". According to such averments the names of the respondent defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were mutated in the City Survey record by the defendant No.4, Mukhtiarkar, according to law and all formalities were observed to the knowledge of the plaintiff. It is admitted by the defendant No.1 that the, matter was agitated by the Deputy Commissioner, Hyderabad, but the submission is that he failed before all the relevant authorities and the gift was found to be valid, genuine and operative. The amounts of collected rents, lying with the Court of Wards, were admittedly withdrawn by the defendants Nos. 1 and

2. Suit No. 2M) of 1978, filed against the decree‑holders of suit No.42 of 1971, is stated to have been withdrawn under a compromise but the decree hollers in such latter suit arc claimed to have backed out from the alleged compromise, whereafter the defendants Nos. 1 and 2, avowedly, filed a separate suit against them. The defendant No.1 denies that she intends to sail her share to the defendant No.3 and, on the contrary, avers that she has filed a suit for pre‑emption against the defendant No.3. It is denied that the alleged gift is false, forged or frivolous or that Bibi Husan Bano was suffering from Marz‑ul Maut or was hospitalized at the time of making the gift. It is denied that any cause of action arose to the plaintiff. Legal pleas advanced by the plaintiff are also denied. The suit is claimed to be under‑valued and also barred by time. Amongst the documents filed with the written statement is the order, dated 23‑5‑1977 of the Senior Member, Board of Revenue and a letter dated June, 1972 addressed by the Senior Member Board of Revenue, Sindh, to the Deputy Commissioner, Hyderabad, intimating to him of transfer of 50% share in the suit land favouring defendant No.1, Mst. Bushra, by way of gift from Bibi Husan Bano and communicating her request as a lady ward that the rent of her share may be recovered from the tenants of the said property. Relief upon in the written statement are the Court of Wards and other relevant records, if any. The written statement of Mst. Bibi Kaniz Bano, respondent‑defendant No.2 is, in substance, similar. She maintains that suit No.140 of 1969 was filed only by herself and is pending. As regards suit No.42 of 1971, she urges that the decree in such suit was obtained Ex parte and by dint of mis‑representation and fraud, the defendants having already challenged its validity. While the defendant No.1 had only vaguely admitted that Bibi Husan Bano died in 1972 the defendant No.2 admits the demise to have occurred in May. 1972, but such death, according to this version, was on account of heart failure. The alleged gift, per averments of this defendant, was made on April 18, 1972. (April is scored off in pen). It was, subsequently, mutated in the City Survey record, allegedly, after completing and observing all the required formalities. According to her avowal in the written statement the terms of compromise which allegedly resulted in the withdrawal of suit No.249 of 1978 were to the effect that "the plaintiff" (apparently the plaintiffs in suit No.42 of 1971) was to get 20%, share in the urban and agricultural properties (perhaps of late Muhammad Saeed Shah) leaving 80%o such share to the two defendants in the instant suit. On such alleged understanding suit No.305 of 1980, filed by Mst. Bibi Zainu and Mst. Bibi Shahzadi, plaintiffs decree holders in suit No.42 of 1971. was also claimed to have been withdrawn. Subsequently, however, "the plaintiff". allegedly, again started disputing the share of the respondent defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in the urban and agricultural properties and, therefore, suit No.508 of 1980 was riled which is said to be pending. About the alleged gift it is urged that such was effected by Bibi Husan Bano "out of her love and affection for the donees" Rest of the pleas in the written statement of the defendant No.2 are more or less common to those of the defendant No.1. Documents filed from the side of the defendant No.2 are Nil whereas those relied upon are record and proceedings of suit No.140 of 1969, suit No.42 of 1971, Suit No.249 of 1978, Suit No.305 of 1978 and Suit No.508 of 198(1 together with record and proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner and Court of Wards, Mukhtiarkar and City Survey Officer, Hyderabad, and the Board of Revenue. The reply of P.M. Amer, the defendant No.3, on the material question of gift is more or less perfunctory, that defendant, ostensibly, leaving the issue to be tackled by the defendants Nos. 1 and

2. He, however, admits that he purchased 20 paisas share in the suit property, apparently that of Mst. Zainu and Mst. Shahzadi, decree‑holders of suit No.42 of 1971, through a registered sale deed dated 25‑3‑1980 on the basis of which mutation was effected on 29‑3‑1980. The alleged gift is maintained to have been all along in the knowledge of the plaintiff. In the concluding part of the written statement, the defendant No.3 admits that he earlier purchased 40 paisas share from the defendant No.2 vide registered sale deed, dated 9‑3‑1980. Such was for valuable consideration and the defendant No.3 is claimed, admittedly, to have been in possession of the property for the preceding 13 years, which is hard to comprehend since the defendant's written statement was presented on 18‑10‑1980. On the legal plane, it is maintained that no cause of action arose to the plaintiff, and the suit is under‑valued and improperly stamped, besides being barred by Articles 91 to 93 of the Limitation Act and the provisions of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act as well as those of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act. Though nowhere pleaded it would seem that the lady defendants are the first cousins of late Muhammad Saeed Shah. The learned Senior Civil Judge, on the pleadings, framed as many as 11 issues. Such duly figure in the judgment of the trial Court and need not be reproduced here. Upon issues being framed, the plaintiff examined only Fazlullah, who stated that he is a clerk in the office of the Deputy Commissioner/Court of Wards Hyderabad. Thereupon plaintiff closed his side, subject to rebuttal. Whereafter amongst the defendants, defendant No.3, P.W. Amer, alone was examined. No other evidence was offered by the parties. The purport and effect of the oral and documentary evidence, which subsists on the record, together with that of the pleadings, which are on oath, shall be discussed in the course of examination of this appeal. On issue No.1 the learned trial Court found the suit to be within time. Relevant to issue No.2 it was held to be under‑valued and improperly stamped. Issue No.3 carried a finding that the suit was in proper form and issue No.4 regarding legal bar, if any, was decided in the negative. Issues Nos. 5 to 10 in substance, pertaining to validity of the gift, mutation and transfer to the defendant No.3 were decided in the affirmative and, pursuant to issue No.1l, the suit was dismissed with costs on 8‑2‑1983. The plaintiff appealed against the judgment and decree by preferring Civil Appeal No.58 of 1983, which came to be placed before the learned IV- Additional District Judee. Hyderabad, but before judgment could be recorded therein, respondent No.3, P.M. Amer, moved an application, apparently under sections 10 and 12 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, which, on being heard, was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge directing the return of the memo of appeal for presentation before this court subject, however, to payment of court‑fee on an amount of Rs.4,15,000 within one month. Such order, having been passed on 21‑1‑1984, was itself challenged by way of Civil Revision Application No.23 of 1984. This Revision application, filed by the plaintiff‑appellant, coming up on 11‑5‑1989 before my learned brother, Qaiser Ahmed Hamidi, J., was allowed, the learned Judge being of the opinion that if a Court finds that it has no ,jurisdiction it should, at once, return the plaint .or the memorandum of appeal, as the case may be for presentation before the proper Court, without saying anything more on the subject e.g. requiring the plaintiff or the appellant to pay additional court‑fees. In the result, the learned appellate Court was directed to return the memorandum .of appeal for due presentation before the Court having jurisdiction, the latter Court having alone been opined to be competent to determine the questions of valuation and court‑fees. The order in revision is dated 11‑5‑1989 and this appeal was presented in the Court on 16‑5‑1989. When, however, the matter was laid in Court it was ordered that the questions of court‑fee and delay, as covered by plaintiff‑appellant's application, under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, (C.M.A. 328/89), would be determined at the time of hearing. Subject to this, the appeal itself was admitted to regular hearing. An application, (C.M.A. 329/89), pertaining to the demise of Mst. Kaniz Bano, respondent‑defendant No.2, during the interregnum, as well, came up at the time of admission. At the same juncture, another application, (C.M.A. No.330/89), for joining M/s Ahmed & Sons Builders and Developers, they having purchased the disputed property from the defendant‑respondent No. 3, through a Regd. Sale Deed dated 22‑12‑1986 for a consideration of Rs.10,00,000, was also preferred by the plaintiff‑appellant. Yet another application, (C.MA. 331/89), was appellant's application for stay. Notices were ordered on all such applications, C.M.A. 329/89 was later allowed. Following Ghulam Fatima and others v. Rahim Bux and others 1988 SCMR 250 the' purchaser from the respondent No.3 was found to be irrelevant and C.M.A. 330/89 was dismissed. C.M.A. No.331/1989, for stay, having been treated as infructuous was dismissed on the same date viz. 14‑6‑1988. C.M.A. 328/89, the aforesaid application under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act and C.M.As. 367/89 and 368/89, the first under section 3 of the Limitation Act for dismissal of the appeal on the ground of limitation and the second under section 12 of the Court Fees Act, regarding determination and payment of court‑fee, both filed by the defendant‑respondent No.3, P.M. Amer, remain to be disposed of and would be dealt with hereunder. The questions, therefore, which arise for consideration in this First, Appeal may be summarised as under:‑‑‑ (1) Whether this appeal is in time and if not whether a case for condonation either under section 5 or section 14 of the Limitation Act is made out? (2) Whether the valuation of the suit was improper? If so, what should the valuation have been and what, if any, is the effect of valuation of the appeal in line with plaintiffs valuation of the suit? (3) Whether Mst. Bibi Husan Bano gifted away the property in dispute in the suit and whether the gift, if any, satisfied the requirements of law and was valid and binding? (4) Whether mutation of the purported gift was lawfully effected and whether the appellant‑plaintiff had cause of action for filing of the suit? If so, whether the suit was in time? (5) Whether the appellant‑plaintiff is entitled to any relief in this appeal? If so, what relief? At the out‑set, it may be 'stated that this appeal was taken up on several dates viz. the 13th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 23rd, 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th of May, 1991 and when heard, proceeded in such manner that on practically every question, which was raised from the side of the appellant, the respondent No.3, who, as noted is a practising Advocate, customarily rose and addressed arguments in rebuttal, always emphasising that the questions raised in and covered by C.M.As 307/89 and 368/89, filed by himself, should alone be dealt with. The respondent also urged that the appellant‑plaintiff never subscribed to the plaint in suit. He, who alone contested for the respondents, was duly accorded necessary hearing and on conclusion of arguments from the side of the appellant also separately advanced his contentions, largely on technical and procedural aspects of the matter and partly on merits. On the date on which he was supposed to conclude his arguments he did not appear but the case, as requested, was adjourned. On the following date. Mr. Naimatullah Qureshi whose power apparently only subsisted in the above referred revision, partially addressed arguments from the side of the respondent but only on technical aspects of the matter. The session at Hyderabad coming to an end on that very day request for further adjournment was declined and this appeal was allowed through a short order for reasons to be recorded in due course. Incorporated herein are such reasons. Before proceeding to deal with each point involved in this appeal seriatim, it may be observed that on the question of the plaint in suit, not having allegedly been signed by the plaintiff himself, (even though no such plea seems to have been raised in the suit, from the side of any of the respondent defendants), the appellant, solely towards advancement of justice, was required to be present in Court and, on appearance, was questioned whether he had himself signed the plaint. He replied in the affirmative. Where it is questioned that signatory to a document is other than the one, who purports to have signed the same, as a rule, the acceptance and acknowledgement of execution by the purported signatory as his own should, normally, fore‑close and set at rest such a controversy. The only possible exception to the rule, which comes to mind, may be a case where a third party is sought to be pinned down by an act or deed, admittedly, under‑taken on delegated or assumed authority and the principal or other affectee disputes the factum of exercise of delegated or other power, in which event, in spite of admission by the ostensible executant, the principal or the affectee may be permitted to prove the contrary. The situation here, falling within the rule and not the exception, the objection, as to the. signature on and verification of the plaint properly by the plaintiff himself, stands disallowed. Reverting to the first point for consideration, whether this appeal is m time, a question covered by C.M.A. 328/89, for condonation of delay or exclusion of time, and C.M.A. 367/89. for dismissal of the appeal under section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is nobody's case that the appeal in the District Court at Hyderabad, initially filed by the appellant‑plaintiff, was beyond time. The sole question, therefore, is whether such appeal was filed in good faith and was diligently pursued so as to attract the relief envisaged in section 14 of the. Limitation Act or, failing that, condonation in terms of section 5 of the same Act. Here may usefully be reproduced section 14 of the Limitation Act:‑‑

1. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction. (1) In computing the period of Limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of alike nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted m good faith in a Court which from defect of ,jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. Explanation. I. In excluding the time during which a former suit or application was pending, the day on which that suit or application was instituted or made, and the day on which the proceedings therein ended, shall both be counted. Explanation II. For the purposes of this section a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding. Explanation III. For the purposes of this section, misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be cause of like nature with defect of jurisdiction: It will, at once, be seen that section 14 of the Limitation Act incorporates a rule for exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation prescribed for "any suit" or "an application", the former covered by subsection (1) and the latter by subsection (2) thereof. This, in turn, gives rise to a query, whether the section cannot be pressed into service as regards appeals, albeit satisfying the other postulates of the principle enacted in the provision. Section 2(10) of the same Act, unless there be anything repugnant in the subject or context, stipulates that a "suit does not include an appeal or an application". As a result, time consumed, however, honestly and diligently, in the pursuit of an appeal in a wrong forum cannot be excluded in terms of section 14(1), which limits itself to suits, since a suit, as defined in the statute, docs not embrace an appeal. This leaves us with section 14(2) ibid., which extends the principle, enshrined in the section, also to applications. Now, can the expression "an application", occurring in section 14(2) of the Limitation Act be considered broad enough to include an appeal? The concept of "application" has not been defined in the enactment. Nor has the legislature chosen to define an appeal for the purposes of the Act of 1908, prompting the Supreme Court in Tahir Ali v. Chief Judge, Karachi Small Causes Court PLD 1963 SC 147, to hold that a revision under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953, was included in the broad and generic concept of appeal and thus the benefit under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act could be extended to it. As to the meanings and implications of the word "application", spoken of in section 14(2) of the Limitation Act Muhammad Afral Zullah, J., as he then was, in General Secretary PWR Union (Workshop) v. Registrar Trade Unions, PLD 1969 Lahore 1086, upon an exhaustive examination of case‑law, declared it to include an appeal thereby extending the ambit of section 14(2) ibid, to cover appeals as well. It is a time honoured principle that the provisions in the Limitation Act, which operate to extend the relief arc to be liberally construed, so as to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief, while those introducing penalties of repose arc to be strictly interpreted. The enunciation in General Secretary PWR Union may thus be in line with the rule of beneficial construction. However, in spite of strong inclination to follow the case of General Secretary PWR Union, I find two distinct impediments in adopting such dictum, the first of a binding nature and the other requiring to be resolved at another level. I respectfully refer, in the first place, to the observations of the Supreme Court in Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar PLD 1977 SC 102, where at page 107 of the report, Dorab Patel, J., who handed down the judgment of the Court, quoted with approval the Privy Council observation in Rajendra Bahadur v. Rajeswar Bali, AIR 1937 PC 276, to the effect that section 14 aforesaid applied "only to suits" though the Privy Council, presumably misakenly, had made no mention of applications in the provision. Still, I am bound by the dicta, as implying that the section did not contemplate appeals. In the second place, it may have to be examined whether section 2(10) of the Act, subject to context, defining a "suit", as not including an appeal or application, does not distinguish between these concepts in the Limitation Act, no less so when in the body of the enactment the two are accorded separate treatment, the first Schedule therein itself providing distinct terms of limitation for suits, appeals and applications. This aspect shall have to be left open in view of the pronouncement in Abdul Ghani's case. Looking at the matter in this perspective it is not easy to conclude that the principle of exclusion in section 14(2) ibid. can, unequivocally, be extended to the filing of an appeal in a wrong forum, though in good faith, and diligent pursuit thereof. Assuming that section 14 of the Limitation Act does not apply to appeals, the question may yet be tested on the touch‑stone of section 5 of the Limitation Act, which is squarely applicable to delayed filings of appeals. Indeed the Privy Council in Rajendsra Bahadur v. Rajeshwar Bali, AIR 193'; PC 276, not only resorted to section 5 ibid, in relation to a belated appeal, resultant upon an earlier submission in a wrong forum, but also applied the principle of extension in section 14 to such matters. The question there was similar to this case. If the proceeding, deemed a suit, was valued at less than Rs.5,000 appeal against the decision thereon lay to the District Judge but if more, appeal could be filed in the Chief Court of Oudh alone, attracting 30 and 90 days' limitation respectively. The District Judge returned the appeal and the Chief Court, upon re‑filing, dismissed it, as beyond time. The Privy Council found that valuation exceeded Rs.5,00() but saw "no proof of negligence in the fact that counsel took another view of the application and the value to be. assigned to it". It will be of advantage to recall the observations of Sir George Rankin on the question of want of due care and attention on the part of counsel, claimed to be bordering on gross negligence, in approaching the wrong forum. The learned Councillor said in the report: "Upon the footing that the appeal lay to the Chief Court the appellant cannot be charged with dilatoriness as he challenged the Assistant Commissioner's decision within a month; nor can respondent No.1, in view of that challenge, be regarded as having on the expiry of the 90 days more than a conditional right to treat the appellant's suit as at an end. It is not disputed that in valuing the suit for the purposes of his appeal the appellant acted in good faith on the advice of counsel honestly given. Indeed the error is not shown to be attributable to bias‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑In these circumstances it does not appear to their lordships that the view taken by the appellant's counsel was un reasonable or that he can be deemed to have been negligent in valuing the appeal; to describe his action as "gross negligence" is in their lordships' view to visit him with a censure undeserved. The question of negligence being out of the way, their lordships are of opinion that the facts of the present case disclose sufficient cause within the meaning of S.5, Limitation Act. They are of opinion that in applying S.5 to such a case as the present the analogy of S.14 (which applies only to suits) is an argument of considerable weight. Mistaken advice given by a legal practitioner may in the circumstances of a particular case give rise to sufficient cause within the section though there is certainly no general doctrine which saves parties from the results of wrong advice." There being a plethora of case‑law following such a course, reference may conveniently be made to Ismail Khan v. Bagga Khan PLD 1975 AJK. 131 and Muhammad Amin v. Afzal Ahmed, 1986 CLC

126. The opinion of the Board, as already noticed, was also quoted with approval in the Supreme Court case of Abdul Ghani Supra. The sole question which, therefore, emerges is whether the present appellant has been able to show sufficient cause in terms of section 5 of the Limitation Act and whether, the principle in section 14 of the Limitation Act being extended to this appeal, he can successfully seek condonation on both such scores, as read together. Concommitant with either is the element whether the filing and pursuit of the initial appeal in the, apparently, wrong forum was in good faith and with due diligence. That the LIS was against the same parties and for the same relief is not in dispute. As to the ingredients of good faith and due diligence, clearly enough the learned trial Court, even though it found the plaintiff's suit to be under‑valued did not categorically value the same itself nor, proceeding under Order 7 rule 11, sub rule(b), required the plaintiff‑appellant to make up the deficit. It will be interesting to quote the conclusion of the learned trial Court on the point:‑‑‑ "In the plaint the plaintiff under para. 19 has come for the declaration that he be declared as owner of 80 paisas share in the suit property by virtue of inheritance from his mother and that he has claimed that the defendants be directed to render accounts. As such this is a consequential relief. Therefore, he is liable to pay the ad valorem court‑fee and not the court‑fee as fixed by him arbitrarily. The suit, is, therefore, undervalued and improperly stamped." In such back‑ground, when the question of valuation as to court‑fee was far from appropriately settled at the trial stage and with it was the inseparable ingredient of jurisdiction as regards the appellate Court to which the appeal could be taken, the appellant could genuinely be misled. Even otherwise and even if such question was duly approached at trial, the judgment and decree passed in the suit, as to the questions decided therein, would open up in appeal and if an un‑successful party had reservations about any such finding, it could very well insist on adopting its own assessment of facts and interpretation of law to determine upon the forum in which the appeal could be taken. Had it not been so preferment of an appeal in accordance with the findings in the suit would constitute acquiescence and submission to relevant findings thereby importing finality and conclusiveness of the decree, thus negating the very concept of appeal itself. It must, therefore, be found that the plaintiff‑appellant was within his rights to prefer the appeal in the manner he did and in the forum which was attracted consequential upon his pleadings and his stand in the Court of first instance. Conversely speaking, the appellant could have submitted to the findings and appealed to this Court at the out‑set. Nor is this to say that the appellate Court was bound to accept the valuation of the plaintiff‑appellant as to court fee or jurisdiction and could not independently approach the question, even in the preliminary stages and return the memo. of appeal for proper presentation, if it came to a contrary finding, as it in fact did. Even then if, upon re‑presentation, the appellant was out of time he could show sufficient cause in terms of the rule in section 14 of the Limitation Act, as assimilated, for the purpose of appeals, in section 5 of the same Act. Unfortunately, in exercising its own powers, the !earned Court of Additional, District .fudge, Hyderabad, did so in a manner which was open to question, resulting in setting aside of the relevant order in revision, as already noted. There is hardly any loss of time in presenting the returned appeal in this Court because the order in revision was passed on I1‑5‑1989 and this appeal was presented on 16‑5‑1989. Nor can it be said that the appeal in the District Court at Hyderabad was, as would partly be discussed below, filed in bad faith or was not diligently pursued or such appeal was not defeated because of a defect of jurisdiction. All such circumstances, therefore, clearly attract the principle in section 14 of the Limitation Act and the appellant‑plaintiff cannot arguably be said to be disentitled to seek condonation of the time consumed in such manner from the date of filing the appeal in the Court of the learned District Judge at Hyderabad and representing it, upon return, in this Court. A case in point, though for the converse of the proposition, is Muhammad Latif v Muhammad Hafeez, PLD 1951 Lah. 479, where the appellant‑defendant, objected to plaintiff's lower valuation of the suit but was over‑ruled. He appealed to the concerned District Court. There, the parties agreeing to a higher valuation, the appeal was returned for proper presentation,. The High Court, on representation, condoned the period so spent, opining that the appellant had no choice except to appeal, where he did. It may also be observed that the element of' bad faith in such matters may well qualify for a set off since the period of limitation for preferring an appeal in the District Court would only be 30 days, whereas such period, as applicable to appeals in the High Court, is 90 days. Thus the appellant can be said to have chosen, quoting the Privy Council from Re Rajendsra Bahadur, a forum requiring greater promptitude and had also approached it in time. As will be discussed below, the element of valuation too was not free from doubt, as regards merit itself, thereby generating due satisfaction of "sufficient cause", envisaged in section 5 of the Limitation Act. Resultantly, if section 14 of the Limitation Act was not technically applicable, nothing has been shown to disentitle the appellant‑plaintiff from seeking condonation pursuant to section 5 of the Limitation Act. I have, therefore, allowed C.M.A. 328/89 under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act and dismissed C.MA. 367/89 under section 3 of the same Act. The next aspect to be considered, though intermoven with the first, is relevant to the valuation of the suit for the purposes of payment of court‑fee and determination of jurisdiction. It has been seen that the issue on the point was inconclusively decided on trial‑ Such, on appeal initially taken to the District Court at Hyderabad, was at a preliminary level assessed at Rs.4,15,

000. The assessment last mentioned, as noted, stands set aside in revision, coming up afresh for consideration at this stage. It is by no means a simple question. The Gift Deed, which could only be produced by the respondents Nos. 1 to 3, never figured in evidence. As it is, even if submitted in Court, it may have been no more than a bare declaration in the form of an affidavit by the alleged donor. The plaintiff maintained it to be forged and was not directly a party to it. In cases requiring valuation of relief it is the substance of the claim which has to be seen. Plaintiff cannot be held to have made a prayer by implication (Daibakilal Basak v. Iqbal Ahmed PLD 1965 Dac. 439). Redundant or unnecessary prayers can be excluded from consideration. Consequential relief arises only if it is warranted and essential. Though where consequential relief is necessary plaintiff's arbitrary valuation may be rejected and the Court may, in its discretion, evaluate the relief Lakhomal Deepchand v. Deepchand Tolaram AIR 1937 Sindh 241; S. Zafar Ahmed v. Abdul Khaliq, PLD 1964 Kar. 386; Muhammad Siddiq v. Haji Ahmad & Co. PLD 1967 Kar. 468; Aisha Bai v. Usman Muhammad PLD 1967 Kar. 733; Manohar Khan v. Mst. Momin Jan Bibi PLD 1967 Dacca 164 and Haji Gul v. Aisha PLD 1973 Kar.

653. The crucial point, none‑the‑less, often is whether simple declaration of title would do in a given case or cancellation or other relief is also called for. As regards documents tending to detract from title the principle evolved seems to be that F cancellation or other consequential relief would be totally unnecessary if such incorporate or evidence a void transaction or operate between third parties, not involving the plaintiff, though a claimant under a party is to be visited with draw‑backs attaching to the party. Voidable transactions, covered by documents, on the other hand, require to be set aside and necessitate consequential remedies attracting Ad Valorem court‑fees Abdul Hamid v. Saseque Ali PL.D 1909 Dac. 357 and Hamida Begum v. Murad Begum PLD 1975 SC

624. Law having shortly been stated thus, the reliefs in the plaint may now be examined. The plaintiff‑appellant claims the alleged gift to be void, mutation in the Revenue record to be equally so and the sale by the alleged donee in favour of the defendant‑respondent No.3 to be likewise. He prays for Accounts and an Injunction prohibiting the respondents from coming in the way of realisation of rents. If the gift was not executed by deceased Bibi Husan Bano or did not satisfy the material requirements of law, such would be void or a nullity and the super‑structure of rights resting on it no less so. Following the Full Bench case of Daibakilal Basak Supra the suit may have been covered by section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, alone or partly under that section and partly under section 39 of the same Act. If the former and in effect for a bare declaration, it may have fallen under Article 17(iii) of the second Schedule to the Court Fees Act (Article 12(iii) in Sindh). However, irrespective of a requirement for seeking cancellation, if it is seen that accounts and an injunction, regarding accruing recoveries, were sought, that aspect could present some difficulties. Valuation for Accounts and Injunction, if consequential reliefs alongwith Declaration, would fall to be governed by section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act. What is a consequential relief and what may be no more than a further relief is a tricky question. To put it simply, though the concept defines simply treatment, that which flows inseparably from the main relief is consequential and what does not necessarily so ensue is merely a further or additional relief. The question, however, is hardly anything more than academic because Injunction and Accounts, even if independent prayed for, are covered by section 7(iv), clauses (d) and (f) respectively and. not unlike section 7(iv) (c), the plaintiff is to state his valuation therefore, in the plaint, similarly amenable to correction in Court. However, the Court in relation to Injunction and Accounts need not value the relief Ad Valorem to the value of the property in question and, depending upon the circumstances of each case, if it does so, it may as much partake of arbitrariness as the plaintiff indiscriminately using his discretion, which discretion law confers on him. In the case of Haji Gul Supra. Z.A. Channa, J. in spite of very valuable properties involved and while acting under section 7(iv)(c), as contemplating declaration with consequential relief, still raised a query whether the consequential relief attracted valuation of the property in suit, himself answering that it did not. To put the matter succinctly even where consequential or other relief is to be assessed Ad Valorem the question to be addressed always is as to what is the subject matter of the suit or, what may occasionally be same thing, what is the focal point in the relief sought. It may not invariably be the property itself. Take the case here. Plaintiff had only sought an Injunction restraining interference with recovery of rents, a more or less intangible quantity. He had likewise sought Accounts of rents improperly, recovered. The figure: could either be ascertained from the Court of Wards or determined on Accounts being taken or both. The prayers would hardly call for valuation, equal to the value of the property, which was continuously in the occupancy of tenants. Only reasonable valuation could, therefore, be expected from the plaintiff and failing that by the Court. That the matter could even attract the residuary Article 17(vi) in Schedule‑II of the Court Fees Act (Article 12(vii) in Sindh), importing fixed court‑fees, as in fact did the relief concerning the orders of the Revenue Courts which fell within Article 17(i) of the same Schedule (Article 12(1) in Sindh), I see no need to hazard a guess. No technicalities, however, may detain us here. The fact remains that bulk of the Karachi precedents noted above pertained to setting aside of decrees or awards and firstly, in not adequately appreciating and then in applying them, without due examination were unceremoniously approached on trial. The initial Court of appeal itself, apart from the blemish discussed above, also did not duly advert to the weighty passing coveted here. A solution, and a just one at that, to the problem must therefore be found. All in all, if what the respondents urge is accepted it is in this Court alone that the appeal would have laid whereas according to the case of the applicant‑plaintiff the Court of the District Judge, Hyderabad, had rightly been approached. Something may be said from either side on the subject. If what the respondents say is accepted the inevitable ,question would be of condonation and payment of deficit court fees. However, if what the appellant‑plaintiff urges is found to be correct, this appeal shall have to be remitted back entailing further and unending agony. Another cycle of litigation, thereupon, will ensue. The matter has already dragged on for more than a decade, not to mention the period immediately preceding pendency from the date of the alleged gift in 1972. In the result, the appellant‑plaintiff would, at the minimum for the time being, himself lose in spite of success of his plea. Confronted with this prospect, Mr. ‑ Roshan Ali Shah, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted before me that if there were no repercussions on the question of limitation the appellant‑plaintiff would be prepared to pay and make good the same amount of court‑fee for the purposes of the suit and this appeal separately, as opined by the learned Additional District Judge whose order, as aforesaid, was set aside in revision. On the basis of what has been said here, the mode of valuation at the level of either of the Courts below is far from correct but so also should be the valuation put by the plaintiff‑appellant himself. Yet a Court ought, advisedly, avoid making a fetish of technicalities. The object of all litigation is to administer justice in accordance with law. In my view, no useful purpose can be served by hair‑splitting at this juncture as to the question of valuation. Suffice it to say that it was and remains a complex question. If the appellant‑plaintiff made a mistake, that is if what he did was exclusively his mistake, it was a genuine one and he has already paid for it and in full measure. It has already been found, as reflected above, that the time spent from the date of filing the appeal before the District Judge and upto its re presentation here can be condoned in terms of the principle in section 14 of the limitation Act as read with section 5 of the same statute. Accordingly, but with all just reservations, accepting the concession from the side of the appellant‑plaintiff, he is directed to make up the requisite court‑fee both on the plaint and the memo of appeal separately in terms of the order of the learned Additional District Judge, discussed above. This course is consonance with what transpired in the Re Haji Gul above where this Court accepted the appellant's own concession of a higher valuation in the sum of Rs.15,

500. C.M.A. 368/89 is, accordingly, dismissed. This brings us to the merits of the controversy. The first question which requires to be addressed pertains to the factum of the alleged gift. Pleas from the side of the plaintiff were that there was no such gift as alleged by the defendants‑respondents 1 and 2 and that even, if there was one such was invalid, not being a completed transaction according to the principles of Muslim Personal Law, being in contravention of the Sindh Court of Wards Act, 1905, and in negation of the Doctrine of Lis Pendens. In like previously, ever since the advent of the law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, plaints are no longer based on mere verifications but are rendered on oath. For this reason, where a defendant fails to appear or defend a suit, the plaint therein having been duly affirmed on oath, an Ex parte decree can be passed, without the plaintiff formally entering the witness box or submitting an affidavit in Ex parte proof. Under the present dispensation, as soon as due averments in a suit are made on oath and the defendant is served, the initial burden of proof, if resting or: the plaintiff, stands in appropriate cases already shifted to the defendant. This is in addition to the rule, as incorporated in Articles 119 and 122 of the Qanun -e‑Shahadat, 1984, that burden of proof of a particular fact lies on the person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence and of a fact especially within the knowledge of any person upon that person. Two incidents follow for this: first, the plaintiff proceeded with averments on oath that there, in fact, was no gift and that the affidavit of declaration, if any, was a forged and fictitious one, besides, at any event, not being a completed transaction, as per requirements of the Muslim Personal Law, an essential in which concept is the delivery of possession, which could not be and was not handed over to the two respondents‑defendants. In addition, the alleged donor herself died preceding the date of the purported disposition (mutation) being, allegedly, subject to Marzul Maut. Similar effect was claimed on the plea founded on the Doctrine of Lis Pendens. However, neither the plaintiff examined himself nor any of the two relevant defendants offered themselves as witnesses. Plaintiff, though examined one witness, closing his side, subject to rebuttal. Requirement for rebuttal did not arise, according to Mr. Roshan Ali Shah, because the main defendants did not enter the witness box nor even produced the alleged declaration of Gift itself, while the trial Court errs meously assumed that the Deed was produced. According to the same view, the deposition of the defendant‑respondent No.3, who alone registered defence is to be confined to his pleadings and, in any case, the best evidence having been withheld necessary implications, inferences and consequences should follow. More so, because even such defendant only said that there was a gift, without producing the declaration and in cross‑examination even admitted that he had not required the title documents from the purported donees, contenting himself with the mutation entries alone. That he, a practising advocate, a tenant of the disputed building and a one‑time neighbour of the plaintiff (as he admitted; would not have been aware of the disputes between the parties is unimaginable, These are weightly considerations. Still, assuming but without conceding that plaintiffs contentions are unworthily of credence, brings up the second incident, adverted to above. The maximum that can be said for the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 is that this is not a case of the averments in the plaint going un‑controverted. If the plaintiff made averments on oath so did not defendants Nos. 1 and 2 by presenting due written statements. Such defendants neither failed to appear nor were they Ex parte. What would be the consequence? In such cases, presumably, the Court should; upon drawing up the issues, determine the onus on each point in controversy and then putting together relevant probative material decide the Lis accordingly. Now, the plaintiff alleged that the donor, since deceased, suffered from Marz‑ul‑Maut The two concerned defendants denied it and said that though she breathed her last shortly after the disposition the cause of death was heart failure. Burden of proof regarding Marz‑ul‑Maut was on the plaintiff but, leading no evidence Oil the point, he failed to discharge it. Marz‑ul‑Maut therefore, was not established. Next, the plaintiff pleaded Lis Pendens but that hardly serves any purpose. Doctrine of Lis Pendens would make the demise by way of gift subject to the outcome of the pending Lis but no outcome of such pending Lis is known yet. Nothing, therefore, for the present, turns on it. Then the plaintiff maintained that the donor never executed the transfer and that the Declaration was a forged and fictitious transaction. This was a negative fact. It were the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 who wanted the Court to believe in the factum of the allegedly valid gift and such was clearly in their especial knowledge, attracting Articles 119 and 122 of the Qanun‑e‑Shahadat, 1984, Even otherwise, upon bare denial of the plaintiff, covered by the assertion on oath the burden, if cast on the plaintiff, shifted on the defendants‑respondents Nos. 1 and

2. Accordingly, the defendants Nos. 1 and 2, having maintained that the donor, out of "love and affection" and free volition, did so dispose of the property were in law required affirmatively to prove the gift. Not only they did not lead any evidence of their own, they did not even produce the Declaration of Gift itself. The defendant No.3 must be restricted to his pleadings. Best evidence in the case, being that of the defendant‑respondents Nos. 1 and 2, was unaccountably withheld. The appellant‑plaintiff in the absence of plausibly the only evidence on the subject may have been within his rights not to have examined any evidence in rebuttal, since there arose little to rebut. As a consequence, the defendants‑ respondents should fail. There is yet another aspect to the question of gift and this rests on the positive evidential material in the case. Such comprises of the deposition of P.W.1, a clerk from the office of the Deputy Commissioner‑Court of Wards, Hyderabad, and D.W. Amer, respondent‑defendant No.3, who alone was examined in defence, together with the documents they produced. The witness from the Court of Wards stated positively that the properties of Bibi Husan Bano, since deceased, the alleged donor, and those of the appellant‑plaintiff, who was then a minor, were under the control and management of the Court of Wards. The rents of such properties ever since 30‑3‑1968, when purportedly an order under section 10 of the Court of Wards Act was passed, were being recovered by the Court of Wards. This, in spite of protestations and unwarranted denials in the written statements of the defendants‑respondents Nos. 1 and 2, on record is now an established position. Such was the state of affairs when the alleged gift was made and should have enured till the properties were released by the learned District Judge, Hyderabad, per his order, dated 13‑3‑1980 (Exh.I1I). The contention of the respondent‑defendant No.3 before me upon a reference to sections 4, 5, 13 & 37 of the Sindh Court of Wards Act, 1905, was that the disputed property never remained in the superintendence of the Court of Wards and that, at law, there was no prohibition against its conveyance, as would emerge upon the phraseology of section 37 of the Sindh Court of Wards Act. The ultimate admitted position, on the other hand, was that the custody of the property in question only temporarily vested with the Court of Wards within the terms of section 10 of the Court of Wards Act, 1905. That even the last concession is contrary to the averments in the written statements of the three contesting respondents defendants may not be totally beside the point because they, in effect, denied even such custody and control in their pleadings, though, upon the material on the record and before the filing of the relevant written statements, were all the time in the know of the subsistence of such custody and control. The respondent‑defendant No.1 even went to the extent of posing as a Ward herself and obtaining a directive from the Senior Member Board of Revenue to the Deputy Commissioner to recover rents on her behalf w.e.f 18‑4‑1972 (see letter of June, 1972 appended as Annexure II to her written statement). These, inter alia, are the equities in the case. Claim of a bare donee without consideration, all other things being in place, ought to be based on equity and justice. The foregoing state of pleadings coupled with the evidential and admitted material negates any claim to equities from the side of the respondents‑defendants 1 to

3. Besides and this is crucial, even on questions of law emerging under the Sindh Court of Wards Act the alleged gift did not and could not qualify as one recognsied under the precepts of Muslim Personal Law. True that the Sindh Court of Wards Act, 1905 seems to contemplate specific meanings of the expression "Superintendence of the Court of Wards" and there are certain formalities that would require to be gone into before such vesting. This evidently was not the position of the property under reference. as implicit in the order of the learned District Judge, dated 13‑3‑1980 (Exh.III). It is also true that the prohibitions as to disposition of properties vesting in the Court of Wards, as contemplated in section 37 of the Act, are peculiar to the properties falling in the "superintendence of the Court of Wards" and upon the language of the statute may not extend to the disputed one. To this extent what Mr. P.M. Amer, respondent‑defendant No.3 here, has contended appears to be correct. However, action under section 10 of the Court of Wards Act of taking over custody and control of properties covered by that provision, as apparently in the instant case, may or may not be followed by a further take over of the property under the "superintendence of the Court of Wards" or the vesting may be altogether independent of section 10 aforesaid. Apparently, in the case of a simple take over of a property in "the custody and control" of the Court of Wards the embargo on transfers envisaged in section 37 ibid. will not apply. So far as this goes also, Mr. P.M. Amer is right. However, what the respondents‑defendants Nos. 1 to 3 cannot escape is the factum of possession of the property in dispute at the time of the alleged gift with the Court of Wards. Indeed such appears to be an incontrovertible position on the record. The consequences of this state of things have to be examined. As already adverted to above, it is one of the essential requirements of a valid gift under the Muslim Personal Law that the declaration of gift should be coupled with transfer of possession of the subject matter of the gift, if not physical at least to the extent the subject is capable of. In the event there was a valid gift it was necessary for the alleged donor to address the Court of Wards for release of the property in question from the custody and control of the latter and for passing on of the possession thereof to the purported donees. Patently enough not only that this was not done, the Court of Wards even questioned the factum of the gift upto the level of the Board of Revenue. Of course it regretably failed in its attempt but that is beside the point. The fact remains that possession was never sought to be passed on to the alleged donees nor was it in fact at any material time passed on. To boot all this is the further fact that when the property was released from the Court of Wards it was so released largely at the instance of the plaintiff‑appellant himself (Exh.I1I). As per evidence of P.W.1, the Court of Wards' clerk, relevant recoveries of rents continued till 1979 (albeit release order being subsequent and dated 13‑3‑1980) and the defendants‑respondents were paid the cheques of rents for a little over Rs.25,000 though how, why and when he does not explain. As a result, it cannot be said that even on the state of record, as it is, and upon the admitted position therein the alleged gift was a completed transaction, conformable to the requirements of Muslim Personal Law and finding must follow on the question in favour of the plaintiff‑appellant. (Shamshad Ali v. Hassan Shah PLD 1960 Lah. 300 and PLD 1964 SC 143). There may be another angle to the matter, that of circumstantial material. The plea of the defendant No.2 in her separate written statement was that the purported donor had transferred the disputed property by way of gift to the donees on account of mutual love and affection. It is an admitted position on the record that not only on the date of the alleged gift but even upto the filing of the written statements, (late 1980 and early 1981) the suit of one such lady (defendant No.2 herself) against the purported donor, questioning the latter's title, remained pending. What possible love and affection was this that even when expression was given to it from the side of the purported donor no reciprocity was shown from the side of the donees even to the extent of withdrawing the suit against the donor, which had remained pending since 1969? Add to this the fact that the two respondents‑defendants never entered the witness box to sustain the so‑called gift in their favour, for what it may have been worth and the conclusion can only be one; there was no such gift. The facts germane to the gift are themselves shaky, contradictory and un‑inspiring. To begin with, amongst the documents filed with or relied upon in the written statements of the three defendants the declaration of Gift finds no mention. The defendant No.2 in her written statement maintains it to be of April 18, 1972 (the month though legible is itself scored off in the transcript). The defendant No.1 does not even care to disclose the date of the disposition though the declaration is stated by such defendant to have been submitted for mutation on April 20, 1972. However, the affidavit and mutation order appear to be dated 22‑5‑1972, as reflected in the Extracts, Exhibits 113/1 to 113/8, and admittedly Bibi Husan Bano died in May 1972. Coupled with it remains the fact that the declaration has never seen the light of day. Even the defendant No.3 in his cross‑examination admitted that he never asked for the title documents from the alleged donees, his own transferors, and proceeded only on the mutation. Bibi Husan Bano is shown to have died on May 7, 1972 as reflected in the order of Commissioner, Exh.119. Mutation on May 22, 1972, pertained, therefore, to a dead person. To crown everything the defendant respondent No.1 denied all allegations in the plaint that she contemplated any transfer of her purported share to the defendant‑respondent No.3 and urged that she had even filed a suit for pre‑emption against the latter and yet such defendant‑respondent No.3 admitted, in cross‑examination, that he had, Pendents Lite, also purchased this so‑called share. Though there has been evidently continuing litigation between the defendants‑respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and the plaintiff's step‑grand mother and aunt, the defendant‑respondent No.3, apparently, again pendente lite, purchased their 20 paisas share in the same property. The more one examines the case the more it becomes manifest that there have been deep rooted Mala Fides in the whole episode. No gift thus can be said to have been established. The superstructure founded on it also falls with the gift. This brings up the matter of mutation in the Record of Rights. In the first place, it falls for clarification that the Revenue records or the record of Rights, all things being equal, do not of themselves confer title but usually only evidence it, still, a degree of care and caution is to be exercised by the officers effecting mutations. Unless there be a contrary provision of law, such mutations are to be made either in the presence of and with the consent of parties or upon due notice to them so that all prospects of fraud or mis representation are thereby effectively precluded. Where mutation is based on registered document, the requirement may be claimed to have been satisfied implicitly, since registration itself constitutes notice. Gifts under Muslim Personal Law, however, are of a genus of their own. Requirement of registration for cognate declarations stands relaxed. The obligation of notice for corresponding mutations thus appears to be firmly embedded there. Indeed, it is inherent in the proceeding. This arises from the Rule of Natural Justice which, as said, unless excluded by legislation, is to be read in all statutory provisions. That this is settled law is not disputed nor has it been shown that there is any provision in the Land Revenue Act, 1967 or the Sindh Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, barring the application of the principles of Natural Justice. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the City Mukhtiarkar and Survey Officer, respondent No.4, either to have effected mutation of the alleged gift in the presence of the purported donor or after notice to her and failing her, to her legal representatives or Estate. It is not the case of either side that the donor was present at the time of mutation or any notice, as required, was even addressed, let alone its being served. In fact, the un assailable position on the record is that while the mutation was effected on May 22,1972, the donor already lay dead on May 7,1972. Besides, P.W.1, clerk of the Deputy Commissioner‑Ex Officio Court of Wards, categorically stated that no notice had gone even to the Court of Wards. The unescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the mutation in question was void, being in negation of the principles of Natural Justcie. It must be held to be so. A good deal was emphasised by Mr. P.M. Amer, the respondent defendant No.3, that the suit was barred under the provisions of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, and the Sindh Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. He was unable to show how nor have I been able to discover any such bar. On the contrary, it seems to be well established in law that the Revenue Authorities cannot finally decide disputed or intricate questions of title. That jurisdiction lies either exclusively or ultimately in the Civil Courts, which exercise a kind of supervisory powers in such matters. If, therefore, the Revenue Authorities misconstrue or mis‑apprehend the facts or ignore or side‑track them or proceed illegally in the exercise of power, there appears to be no bar for the Civil Courts to appropriately correct their mistakes, with a view to redress the wrongs and to give effect to the law. Such was the precise situation in this case and the trial Court correctly found the suit to have been maintainable. In fact, even Mala Fides at the level of the Revenue Authorities cannot be ruled out. Thus the letter dated June, 1972, addressed by the Senior Member of the Board of Revenue, at the instance of the respondent‑defendant No.1, improperly treating her to be a Ward and requiring the Deputy Commissioner to make recovery of rents from the tenants on her behalf, pursuant to the alleged gift, was totally unwarranted. How such jurisdiction was exercised also remains unclear. It could also be a pointer to Mala Fides. Lastly, Mr. P.M. Amer has urged that the plaintiff had no cause of action for the suit and that such cause as there may have been attracted the bar of limitation. If the appellant‑plaintiff was the sole surviving heir of deceased Bibi Hunan Bano, he could certainly have a cause of action for seeking redress through a suit. On :imitation, it is an admitted position that the disputed property was under the control and management of the Court of Wards upto 13‑3‑1980, on which date it was released under orders of the District Judge, Hyderabad. Earlier to that, the Deputy Commissioner/Ex‑Officio Court of Wards, was engaged in litigation before the Revenue Authorities seeking the cancellation of mutation, effected on 22‑5‑1972, and the order in revision of the Senior Member Board of Revenue himself was passed not earlier than 23‑5‑1977. The instant suit, brought on 13‑4‑1980, was, therefore, clearly in time and so it has been found also by the learned Senior Civil Judge, even though he dismissed the suit on other grounds. There is no reason to deviate from such a finding. For the foregoing reasons. I have found that this appeal merits to be allowed and it has, accordingly, been allowed. Costs shall follow the event. K.BA./Q‑58/K Appeal accepted.