P L D 1983 Lahore 1 (PLP)

This is a petition under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution, Order, 1981. The relief claimed by the petitioners is in the following terms :- "It is, therefore, prayed that respondent No. 2 the Director, Trade Organizations be directed to take up the issue relating to the elections and the illegalities being committed by respondent No. 1 in exercise of his powers under section 9 of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961, and after holding the inquiry to fix a proper and legal schedule for the holding of the elections after all the eligible applicants have been enrolled as the members of the Chamber. It is further prayed that the Director, Trade Organization be directed to look into the affairs of the Chamber in the background of the past history and if found necessary to report the matter to the Central Government for the exercise of powers under section 10 of Ordinance, 1961. It is further prayed that pending decision of this petition this Court may be pleased to stay the elections scheduled to take place in pursuance of the election programme issued by respondent No. 1." 2. 'The Chamber of Commerce is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act (VII of 1913) . and it is also registered under the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1161 (XLV of 1961) (hereinafter called the Ordinance). This was amended by Ordinance No. XLVII of 1962 and adaptations made by means of Adaptation Order, 1964) and inconformity with Fundamental Rights (Amendment of Laws) Ordinance, 1976 (Ordinance No. IX of 1976). It amends various provisions of the Ordinance including section 9 which is the material section for the purpose of resolving the controversy involved in this petition. Respondent No. 2, i.e. the Director Trade Organization (hereinafter called the Director) is a functionary of the Federal Government.

3. The case of the petitioners is that, with regard to the activities of the respondent/Chamber of Commerce, disputes have been arising in the past and those were referred to the Director from time to time, as envisaged by section 9 of the Ordinance. Two disputes relating to enrolment of new member of the Chamber and the holding of Chamber elections were earlier disposed of by this Court vide writ petition Nos. 7636/80 and 1610/81. In the previous to writ petitions, the parties were referred to approach the Director for the redress of their grievance. Notwithstanding these directions, it is alleged that the disputes of such nature are not disposed of by the Director which tantamounts to failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in him.

4. Be that as it may, it is stated that the petitioners, in good faith, approached the Director for the redress of their grievance, namely : (i) 184 application for the enrolment of member had not been disposed of the Chamber in accordance with Article 2 of the Articles of Association of the Faisalabad Chamber of Commerce, relating to the qualifications for the members. Article 2 provides : "Any firm, Joint Stock Company, Partnership, Proprietary concern, associated body or an association of persons engaged in the export, import, or any other trade or owning a factory who pays or is liable to pay Income-tax shall be eligible for membership." (ii) The Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce raised objections that the applications were not accompanied by documents hereinafter mentioned and information which was not contemplated by the Articles of Association, that is to say

(a) the production of G I R certificate ; (b) the production of bank account number and reference and a certificate that the candidate is maintaining bank account ; and (c) the production of identity cards. These applications were stated to be submitted in September, 1981. In December, 1981, some more applications by different persons were made. It is alleged that similar treatment was met out to these applications.

5. In October, 1981, a representation (Annexure D) was made by petitioner No. 1, to the Director, concerning the enrolment of members and its repercussion on the forthcoming elections. The main grievance in the representation was that the ruling group of the Chamber was deliberately blocking new members so as to retain their power and manipulate the elections. It is submitted that the Director came to Faisalabad and made enquiry in December, 1981.

6. On 17-12-1981, the Director passed an order (Annexure A) and issued certain directions to the President of the respondent Chamber. The order reads thus : "ORDER Subject :-Affairs of Faisalabad Chamber of Commerce & Industry As a result of the inquiry held on 28th and 29th November 1981 at Faisalabed, the following decisions have been taken : (1) The Secretary of the Chamber may be directed to supply application forms for membership on receipt of prescribed fee to all traders/ industrialists or businessmen who are desirous of becoming members ; (!l) The Chamber may abide by Article 2 of the Memorandum & Articles of Association of F C C & I for qualification of membership ; (iii) The Secretary of the Chamber may be advised to ensure proper despatch of letters to the members ; (iv) The latest list of members may be supplied by the Chamber to all the members ; (v) The Chamber may finalise action on all the pending applications for membership within 15 days from the issue of this letter and send a compliance report to this Ministry ; (vi) The election programme may be chalked out in such a manner that the new members were eligible to cast their votes ; (vii) The election programme may be submitted to the Ministry for approval ; and (viii) The forthcoming elections of the Chamber would be supervised by the Director Trade Organizations or his nominee under Article 9(2) of the Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961.

2. The following allegations against the Chamber were proved to be baseless : (i) That the President of the Chamber was acting contrary to the interests of the business community; (ii) The record of the Chamber has been tampered with by the Secretary ; (iii) New members were overcharged for functions like annual dinners or printing of forms ; (iv) New members were kept on probation for 3 months and were confirmed after several months with a view to exclude the intending members of becoming eligible to vote ; and (v) Nomination papers of the candidates of opposition are rejected arbitrarily. (Sd.) M. S. Kazmi, Director of Trade Organizations Government of Pakistan To The President, Faisalabad Chamber of Commerce & Industry, 5th Floor, M. C. B. Building, Bank Square, Circular Road, Faisalabad.

7. The allegations of the petitioners are that none of these instructions were complied with by respondent No. 1 in so far as, it relates to the enrolment of members and elections.

8. On 2-2-1982, the election programme for holding the elections of five seats of the Managing Committee of the Chamber (Annexure R/1) was scheduled. Khawaja Abid Hasan Minto submitted that the election of the Managing Committee takes place every year before 31st of March in rotation as envisaged by Articles 25 and 26 of the Articles of Association. 1/3rd Members of the Managing Committee retire from their. seats and elections are held against these vacancies and the total number of the members of the Managing Committee is

27. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, nine members must retire every year, but only five seats were declared vacant for the elections held in February, 1982.

9. It is submitted that on the 7th of February, 1982, another application (Annexure B) was made to the Director to the effect that the Executive Committee has grossly contravened the Articles of Association in announcing the election programme for 19-2-1982, in that, the number of seats offered for this election were : (1) Chamber class 2 (2) Associate class 3 (3) Trade group 1 Total 6 Whereas it is submitted that under Article 24(V), 1/3rd of the representatives shall retire every year. In this background, it was prayed that the number of seats should have been 10 as follows : (1) Chamber class 4 (2) Associate class 5 (3) Trade group 1 10

10. Accordingly, prayer was made to the Director that election for 10 seats be ordered to be held. This was followed by another application of the same date (Annexure E) wherein 4t was represented that serious irregularities of procedure and gross contravention of Articles by the Executive Committee of the Chambers of Commerce, as provided under Article 9 and Article 8(iv), were committed. It was also pleaded that the Executive Committee illegally raised objections about enrolment of members which were outside the purview of the Articles and, therefore, illegal and mala fide. It is alleged that the Director failed to dispose of the aforesaid applications, notwithstanding the statutory obligation imposed on him in terms of section 9 of the Ordinance. The petitioner has specifically pointed out the grievance raised in Annexure 'B' vide paragraph 9 of the writ petition. The grievance in Annexure `E' is mentioned in paragraph 15 of the writ petition.

11. At the time of preliminary hearing, report and parawise comments were called for from respondent No. 2 by interim order dated 14-2-1982. The stand taken by the Director in his comments dated 9-3-1982 to paragraph 9 of the writ petition read thus : "In the year 1980 when four seats where declared vacant the "Chamber" instead of filling the vacancy by co-option decided to fill up these by election which was held in March, 1981. Petitioner No. 1 Mian Ijaz Iqbal contested the election in 1.981 and got only seven votes and was thus not elected. As a result therefore the following members were elected for the full term from the Chamber class : (1) Sh. Muhammad Yaseen, Messrs Ibrahim Textile Mills Ltd., 6, Karkhana Bazar, Faisalabad ; (2) Mr. Muhammad Saeed, Messrs Rashid Textile Industries, Sargodha Road, Faisalabad ; (3) Mr. Sartaj Siddiqui, 475/S/D, Peoples Colony, Faisalabad ; (4) Haji Ghulam Muhammad Messrs Kausar Textile Industry, Maqbool Road, Faisalabad ; (5) Mr. Saleem-ul-Hassan, Gole Lakkar Wala, Faisalabad ; (6) Syed Tahir Ahmud Shah, Messrs Tahir Automobiles, 1/150 Circular Road, Faisalabad ; and following members were elected from Associate class : (1) Rana Irshad Ahmad, Messrs Salma Weaving Factor, Chak No. 225/RB, Satiayana Road, Faisalabad ; (2) Mr. Munawar Hussain, Messrs Salma Weaving Factory, Mohallah Kot Khan Muhammad Opposite Choongi No. 16, Satiayana Road, Faisalabad ; (3) Sh. Abdul Bari, Messrs Bilal Industries, Mansoorabad, Faisalabad ; (4) Mr. Muhammad Siddiq, Messrs Muhammad Siddiq son of Ghulam Sabir Silk Factory, Chak No. 117/JB, Faisaladad ; (5) Mr. Pervaiz Aslam, Messrs Khan Akhtar Pervaiz Aslam, Weaving Silk Factory, St. No. 4, P. 9/3, Mai Di Juggi, Faisalabad. The matter needs further elucidation through replication by the petitioners".

12. As regards objections (Annexure E) referred to in para. 15 of the writ petition, the Director gave no comments. The grievance of the petitioners is that the Director neither issued any notice nor provided an opportunity to the petitioners to .file any replication.

13. Mr. S. M. Zafar learned counsel for respondent No. 1, respectfully drew the attention of the Court that the facts stated by Mr. Abid Hasan Minto need to be supplemented to ensure that the pleadings furnish full particulars. He submitted with the leave of the Court that the last Annual General Meeting of Faisalabad Chamber of Commerce & Industry, respondent No. 1, was held on 30-3-1981 and in accordance with section 76 of the Companies Act (VII of 1913), the office election had to be held before 30-3-1982. Mr. S. M. Zafar submitted that the objections raised by the petitioners were fully answered and the Director was satisfied about them and referred to Annexure `R/3' of the written statement, wherein respondent No. 1 informed the Director that after proper scrutiny of all application for fresh appointment of the, members, only one member had become eligible for casting vote who would be eligible to participate in the election. It was also stated that all other applications were found lacking in essential formalities and the applicants were intimated on 3-12-1982. It is alleged by respondent No. 1 that there has been no response by any one of the "so-called" applicants and as such none was qualified or could be made qualified to participate in the elections.

14. Petitioner No. 1 is neither proposer nor seconder of any member who is alleged to have been denied membership and this fact is not even asserted in the writ petition.

15. Manzoor Ahmad petitioner No. 2, although it is not asserted in the petition that he proposed or seconded any applicant, but Mr. S. M. Zafar volunteered that petitioner No. 2 presented and seconded four applications:- . (i) Application of Mehr & Sons dated 1-12-1981; (ii) Application dated 1-12-1981 of Iqbal Cycle Works; (iii) Application dated 1-12-1981 of Muhammad Khan Soap Dealer; and (iv) Application dated 1-12-1982 of Warraich & Company. These four applicants were asked to supply some particulars as envisaged by the terms of the application for membership. Column No. 10 of the application provides, "A copy of GIR/TR Certificate must be attached with the application form". Respondent No. 1 has adopted a method for the scrutiny of Membership Applications. The contents of the Scrutiny Sheet for Membership Applications are reproduced below: "Name of firm . .......... . Address ........... Class of Membership Chamber/Associate/Delegate/Group/Association, (1) Application form properly filled in (2) Bank Certificate received (3) Photocopy of GIR/NTR/TR received. (4) Identity Card of representative received. (5) Photocopy of Imp/Exp. registration received. (6) Memorandum & Articles of Association received. (7) Photocopy of partnership Deed received (8) Certificate from concerned Group received. FOR GROUP MEMBERS/TOWN ASSOCIATION (1) Application form properly filled in (2) Memorandum & Articles of Association received. (3) List of office-bearers received. (4) Bank Certificate received. (5) List of Members of the Group Photocopy of GIR/TR received. (6) Other records received for inspection (i) Minutes Book, (ii) Cash Book, (iii) Members Register. Documents checked & found in order. Application may be accepted rejected. Secretary Convenor Standing Committee on Membership. Members approved/refused vide Reasons for rejection to by recorded. Executive Committee meeting held on ...

16. It is an admitted fact that these persons were asked to appear by the Director on 1.6-2-1982 in the office of the Chamber to satisfy respondent No. 1 of their being competent to be enrolled as members. Mr. Abid Hasan Minto made a statement at the Bar, on the specific instructions from his client, that the applicants were, in fact, summoned as contended by Mr. S. M. Zafar and they did appear. The question whether these applicants did or did not. appear in the office of respondent No. 1 is a disputed question of fact, in that, according, to Mr. S. M. War, these applicants did not appear, but Mr. Abid Hasan Minto asserted that they did appear on the date on which they were summoned and took up the plea that they were under no legal obligation to furnish the information sought for.

17. The rights and privileges of members is governed by Articles 30 and 31 of the Articles of Association. Article 31 (ii) provides:- "Only such members as have been enrolled three months before the date of election shall be entitled to vote or stand ' for election or nominate a candidate for election . . . . . . . . ."

18. In this background, Mr. S. M. Zafar contended that the said applicants having applied on 1-12-1981 and even if they were enrolled on that very date could not have participated in the election, in view of the provisions of Article 31 (i).

19. Article 3 of the Articles of Association contemplates four classes of members, namely: (a) Chamber members; (b) Associate members; (c) Group members; and (d) Town Associations. who may either be local or outstation members. In the instant case the elections were in respect of first three categories.

20. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that since the Director has failed to discharge its statutory duty imposed under section 9 of the Ordinance, in disposing of the applications (Annexures B & E to the writ petition), the petitioners approached this Court under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, for the redress of their grievance and also for the reason that in the meanwhile the respondent No. I announced the election schedule on 2nd of February, 1982, according to which the elections were to commence on 13th of February 1982. This petition was filed on 13-2-1982, the date on which the nominations were to be filed. Mr. Abid Hasan Minto submits that the petition is competent, in. its present form notwithstanding the powers vesting in the Director in terms of section 9 of the Ordinance for controlling and supervising the affairs. of Trade Organizations duly registered for the following reasons: (a) That the Director having issued an order .on 27-12-1981 (Annexure A) did not see whether his directions have been followed; (b) That notwithstanding the fact that two petitions were made to the Director on 7-2-1982 (Annexures B & E), he failed to exercise his powers under section 9 of the Ordinance and kept the matter pending; (c) That in the meanwhile since the election had been fixed to commence on 13-2-1982, the petitioners had no choice but to approach the High Court because in their view, the election without the disposal of their complaint, was completely illegal; (d) That the question raised before the Director regarding the enrollment of the new members and the number of seats for which election was to take place were basic and without their settlement, no proper election could take place and, therefore, it was, necessary to settle this issue before the elections were to take place; and (e) That in any case, the Director did. not possess the powers under section 9 to stay election, though he has a power to annul election after the election has taken place on certain grounds. It was, therefore, necessary to approach this Court so that a fruitless exercise in holding election may not take place.

21. Mr. Abid Hasan Minto reiterated that on 19-1-1982 report was called for on the writ petition by this Court and meanwhile the elections were stayed. On 24-2-1982 the interim stay was modified. It was ordered that the elections may be held but the result will not be announced. According to the election schedule (Annexure R/A) the nominations were to be received on 13-2-1982. Further formalities and scrutiny etc. of the nominations were to be completed by 24-2-1982. The polls were to take place on the 27th and 28th February, 1982. From 24-2-1982 when the interim order dated 14-1-1982 was modified; all that had to be done in consequence of the election schedule which remained suspended, were to take place from 24-2-1982 onward.

22. The synopsis of the submissions made by Khawaja Abid Hasan Minto were: - (i) That the respondents deliberately having failed to determine the membership applications in accordance with Article of Association, the election cannot be held at all; (ii) That the schedule of election itself was violative or various Articles of Association. Therefore, .the same was void; (iii) That the seats for which the elections were held were not determined in accordance with the Articles, in that, only five seats were offered instead of nine, and (iv) There was a specific order of the Director under section 9 of the Ordinance relating to the enrolment of members and conduct of the elections which has been violated rendering the election null and void. It may be pointed out that Mr. Abid Hasan Minto frankly conceded that no person has a vested right to seek direction from the Director in the exercise of powers vested in him under section 9(1) of the Ordinance. I am also inclined to hold that the aforesaid provision creates no enforceable right in a party. The provision does not have the effect of conferring right on any person to make an application/representation in the matter of control and management of a registered trade organization. The power is to be exercised suo motu and or on the information received by him. Mr. Minto, however, took up the plea that this provision grants the Director overall supervisory jurisdiction over the registered trade organization with an extensive power to interfere in their internal management. His submission is that even though in striclo sensu a party is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Director under section 9(1) of :the Ordinance, writ can be issued to compel the Director to perform his duties under the Ordinance which are in the nature of public duties provided a party can make out a case before the High Court that it had approached the Director on specific ground which requires his interference for the proper management of the trade organization in pursuance of the Ordinance and he failed to perform his duties. In the instant case, it is submitted that the petitioner has no approached the High Court for issuance of any direction either under subsection (1) or subsection (2) of section 9 of the Ordinance, but that the directive already issue by the Director, be implemented in letter arid spirit. He submits that failure to do so has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice and prejudice to the petitioners.

23. Before taking up the contentions on merits, it will be appropriate to dispose of the preliminary objection raised by Mr. S. M. Zafar, that the petitioners have no locus standi to file the writ petition. The submission is that in terms of Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, a constitutional petition can only be filed by "an aggrieved person" which contemplates that the relief granted by the Court must be in relation to his direct grievance and not to the grievance of any third person. He further submitted that none of the persons whose applications for membership were rejected have made a grievance before this Court, and, therefore, the petitioners cannot have a grievance. He has further submitted that some of the applicants did not respond to the queries made by the Chamber and some did not pay for their arrears for numerous reasons, and, therefore, the question relating to refusal of enrolment of members at the instance of the petitioners is not justiceable in writ petition. In support of his contention reliance was placed on Ch. Jalal-ud-Din and another v. Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and others (1968 S C M R 995). In the precedent case, Ch. Jatal-ud-Din, petitioner before the Supreme Court, did not himself' apply on a prescribed form for the transfer of any portion of the property. His wife did so on his behalf, but she was not duly authorised -agent to do, so. His status as a displaced person was also doubtful. In these circumstances his N. C. H. form for the transfer of an evacuee property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, was rejected by the Settlement Commissioner. The writ petition filed by Ch. Jalal-ud-Din was dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches while the other connected writ petition relating to a portion of the property in dispute was adjourned, as the parties were negotiating a compromise. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the contention whether the High Court had not exercised its discretion on sound judicial principles for having directed the hearing of both the petitions together, and that they should not have taken them up for hearing separately. The appeal was eventually dismissed and it was held Writ petition can be filed only by an aggrieved person which contemplates that the relief granted by the Court must be in relation to his grievance and not the grievance of any third person." Ch. Jalabud-Din's case is distinguishable and not attracted to the facts of the present case; in that, the petitioners were candidates in the election. They admittedly participated in the election and, therefore, have some interest in the enforcement of the directives issued by the Director and thus have a locus standi to file the present petition. Reliance was also placed on The Punjab Miners' Labour Union v. The West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Jhelum (P L D 1972 Lab. 489). In the precedent case, it was held that the Punjab Miners' Labour Union, Salt Mines, Khewra, representing the registered miners employed in the Salt Mines at Kkewra under the Management of the West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation had no concern with the dispute inter se between the case of the registered miner Sher Khan vis-a-vis unregistered miner Muhammad K ban, and, as such, it was only Sher Khan who could agitate the matter provided the requirements of Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution were fulfilled. 'these observations were made by the learned Judges of the Division Bench of this Court qua the scope of section 15 of the Trade Unions Act (XVI of 1926). It was held that section 15 of the Trade Unions Act does not create a locus standi in favour of a Trade Union relating to individual case of a workman within the ambit of section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (VII of 1923). Likewise in Pakistan Steel Re-Rolling Mills Association v. Province of West Pakistan (P L D 1964 Lab. 138), it was held that the union could not have come in writ jurisdiction where the injury caused is personal to various labourers. In the case cited above the prayer was sought by the West Pakistan Steel Re-Rolling Mills Association for cancellation of Government Notification in the exercise of the powers under subsection (1) of section 6 of the Minimum Wages Ordinance (XXXIX of 1961) declaring that the minimum rates of wages as recommended by the Minimum Wages Board, that has been set up for the purpose, shall be subject to certain terms and conditions specified in the aforesaid notification, be the minimum wages for all kinds of workers, skilled and unskilled in the Steel Re-Rolling Mills in West Pakistan. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the Association was "an aggrieved party" because it enjoys a consultative status for operating the Ordinance, and that the grievance made in the petition is that the process of setting up of the Minimum Wages Board and the recommendations made by the Board, there has been a departure from the provisions of the said Ordinance. The contention was repelled with the observation : "It is the individual members, i.e. the owners of the different Steel Re-rolling Mills that have to foot the bill of the increased wages, as ordained in the notification and it is they who are individually in various decrees affected by the notification. In this situation, respectfully agreeing with the view expressed in the authorities expressed above, we are constrained to hold that this petition is not competent, as the petitioner association by itself, apart from its individual members is not at all directly affected with the practical outcome of the impugned notification."

24. It is well established that in order to maintain a constitutional' petition it is not necessary that the petitioner should have a legal right in the direct juristic sense. Reference may be made to Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement and another (P L D 1969 S C 223), where it was held; "The right considered sufficient for maintaining. a proceeding in writ jurisdiction is not necessarily a right in the strict juristic sense but it is enough if the applicant discloses that he had a personal interest in the performance of the legal duty which if not performed or performed in a manner not permitted by law would result in the loss of some personal benefit or advantage or the curtailment of a privilege of liberty or franchise."

25. In the above-cited case the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court approved the ratio laid down in the case of The Montgomery Flour and General Mills Ltd., Montgomery v. The Director, Food Purchases West Pakistan etc. (P L D 1957 Lab. 914), where it was held : "The objection which was based on the requirement of English Law for a writ of mandamus had no force. The powers of Pakistan Courts while acting under Article 170 of the Constitution of Pakistan were not circumscribed by any requirement of English Law as to any particular form of writ. 1t is true that a petitioner must have some right if he applies to the Court for a direction or order under Article 170 but he need not have a personal or a proprietary right whose correlative is a duty. Whenever an enactment empowers a public officer to pass orders that benefit or harm a citizen, the citizen gets a right that, in a matter in which he is concerned, an order be passed in accordance with law. This too is a right that can be enforced by the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 170 of the Constitution of Pakistan."

26. The scope of writ jurisdiction was extensively dealt with by the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court in 1kram Bus Service and others v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan (PLD 1963SC564). It was held : "Even an administrative body such as an R. T. A., is under legal obligation to deal with all applicants before it fairly, justly and equitably and an applicant has a legal right to demand that the administrative body should determine the matter with whose decision it is charged, in accordance with law."

27. Respectfully following the ratio laid down in the cases quoted by me, it is difficult to uphold the preliminary objection of Mr. S. M. Zafar, o that the petitioners have no locus standi to maintain the present writ petition. If I am to hold that the directive, in question, issued by the Director is lawful and has been violated to the prejudice of the petitioners, they will have locus standi to maintain the writ petition, in terms of Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981. Be that as it may, the Court has to consider in the facts and circumstances of the present case and on the material placed on the record as to whether the petitioners are entitled to the relief clamed in this writ petition.

28. Before considering the contentions of Mr. Abid Hassan Minto, learned counsel for the petitioners, I may also take note of the arguments advanced by Mr. S. M. Zafar, learned counsel for respondent No.

1. He respectfully argued that respondent No. 1 submitted a comprehensive reply dated 10-1-1982 (Annexure RII to the written statement) to the Director, requesting therein for withdrawal of the directive dated 27th of December, 1981 (Annexure R/2) inter alga on the following grounds : "(a) Items Nos. (t) to (v) of the directive are in the nature of council and we will take care, as we have done so in the past to comply with them ; (b) As per Item No. (vi) the programme is controlled by Article 37 and qualifications to vote by Article 31(ii) of Memorandum of Articles of Association ; (c) The elections are to be held before 31st of March, 1982 and we intend to abide by the rules, which cannot be violated ; (d) Furthermore, the eligibility to vote depends on Article 31(ii) subject to the above all members who are qualified or. would qualify shall be entitled to vote. (e) The general order that "New members are to be made eligible to vote" is ultra vires the fact and law." It was further inter alia stated in the reply, in question, that respondent No. 1 was complying and shall continue to comply with all the relevant provisions of Memorandum and Articles of Association and shall hold election in terms of Article 37 and the programme of the election was already with the Ministry. 29. 1n consequence, the Director had a meeting with respondent No. I. on 16-1-19$

2. After the meeting, a letter was addressed by the President of respondent No. 1 to the Director on 17-1-1982 (Annexure R-3). Thereafter, respondent No. 1 announced the Schedule of election on 2nd of February, 1982, for five seats of the Executive Committee. Petitioner No. 1 admittedly contested the election held on 27-2-1982 in the Chamber Class and Manzoor Ahmad petitioner No. 2 contested election of Associate Class held on 28-2-1982. In this background, Mr. S. M. Zafar contended that having submitted the reply dated 17-1-1982 (Annexure R-3) by respondent No. 1 and there being no contrary orders froth the Director, the schedule of election was duly announced on 2-2-1982 (Annexure C) as contemplated by section 76 of the Companies Act (VII of 1913) read with Article 38(i) of the Articles of Association which provides that the announcement of the results of the Annual Election shall be made at the Annual General Meeting. Thus visualized it is submitted that the holding of election did not suffer. from any illegal invalidity.

30. Mr. S. M. Zafar further submitted that the petitioner obtained an ex parte order, dated 14-2-1982 for stay of elections, notwithstanding the fact that the main relief was sought against the Director. The ad interim stay order was modified by this Court on 24-2-1982 to the extent that the election may take place without prejudice to the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. The elections now have been completed and the result has to be announced in the Annual General Meeting of the Chamber of Commerce, as contemplated under Article 38(i). The submission of Mr. S. M. Zafar is that no such direction can be issued by the Director in the purported exercise of his powers under section 9 of the Ordinance, till elections have been held and, therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to the relief claimed in the writ petition.

31. Mr. S. M. Zafar further submitted that the petitioner in the writ petition asked for the direction against the Director for first holding the inquiry into the alleged irregularities and to give a new schedule of election which amounts to asking him as to interfere with the schedule of election which is ultra vires of the powers vested in him under section 9 of the Ordinance till the elections have been held. Reliance is placed on Faisalabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Director, Trade Organisation, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad (1979 C L C 267). In this case, the Director stayed the holding of Annual General Meeting for 1979 pending completion of some investigation involving Faisalabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry in consequence of a complaint submitted to the Minister of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, by several groups of persons who have never been members of the company. The Chamber/respondent No. 1 approached the High Court and contended that the Director bad no jurisdiction to interfere unless the elections are held. The contention was upheld and it was observed by the learned Single Bench of this Court that : "It is clear from subsection (2) that up to the holding of the election the power of the Director is only to watch and supervise or cause to be watched and supervised any election. The interference in the election by its annulment can be exercised after the election and not before and for that also a time limit of 30 days is fixed. If the law had visualised the suspension of the election, a specific provision to that effect would have been added."

32. The learned Judge Aftab Hussain, J. also observed after examining the scope of section 9 of the Ordinance that the power of control of the Director in subsection (1) is not widened by use of a non obstante clause as has been done in subsection (2) of section

9. It will be advantageous to reproduce paragraph 20 of the reported judgment which reads thus; "From these provisions it is clear that power of control of the Director in subsection (1) is not widened by use of a non obstante clause as has been done in subsection (2) of section

9. The specific provisions of subsection (2) are such which may conflict with the Companies Act or with the Articles of Memorandum. For this reason they have been given overriding effect. But no such effect has been in subsection (1). The power of control in section 9 except as provided in subsection (2) thereof must be in conformity with other laws as well as the Articles of Association. Thus the power of control in the management and conduct of business of the trade organization cannot be exercised for example to directing the trade organization to enroll members who are not eligible or to refuse to enrol members who are eligible for membership. It cannot also cut down the democratic procedure of management provided by the Articles of Association. In short the control in the affairs of the trade organization shall be subject to Articles of Association also except when those are in conflict with what is provided in subsection (2). This can be the only reasonable interpretation of section

9. The power to stay the election or holding it in abeyance not being there in subsection (2), it cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to what is provided in section 76 of the Companies Act or even the Articles of Association." Mr. S. M. Zafar also placed reliance on Sultan Mawjee and 3 others v. Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi and 3 others (PLD1982SC174). In this case, the Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the restraints removed by non abstante contained in subsection (2) of section 9 of the Ordinance are to be read in subsection (1) so that the powers under the later provision would also be construed to operate within such limits. The answer was in the negative. It was held : "Having regard to the nature of the provision in question and the general object and purpose of the statute, it is clear that the Ordinance was intended, as pronounced by its preamble to provide for regulation and control of Trade Organizations. Section 9 confers supervising power upon the Government and the Director, Trade Organizations over the functioning of the Trade Organizations registered under the Ordinance. It is well established that statutes pertaining to exercise of Trade Organization, to eminent domain, to restraint of personal liberty, of freedom of contract, and the like are statutes in derogation of common right and subject .to strict construction. It is also well established that in general a corporation is subject to reasonable and proper regulation by the state. The authority of the executive functionaries to make regulations to enforce a statute is limited to making of regulations which are within the scope of the power granted and which are reasonable. Statutes of this nature have their justification in the well-recognized proposition that police powers inherently vests in every sovereign State, which can be delegated to functionaries of the state by legislative grant. The Police power thus granted may be exercised in any manner not prohibited by terms of the aforesaid general principles.. It is implicit in the arguments of the respondents that the provisions under consideration section 9(1) is capable of two possible interpretations--either that Government, in the exercise of supervisory powers can issue, on its own subjective judgment, directions uncontrolled by any legal instrument except the law of the land, or, that it has to be confirmed within the bounds of the Memorandum and Articles of Association, Rules and Regulations of the regulated trade organization on objective consideration. I do not think the first mentioned wide interpretation would carry out the apparent legislative intendment-rather it may impede the functioning of the traded bodies and seriously erode their representative character. Since it is concede that the 'power under consideration is a supervisory power, it is inherent in its character to confine itself to overseeing the functioning of the regulated bodies and not directly administer them, for in that case what was intended to be supervisory powers would be converted into a power to take over the functioning of the regulated bodies. Such could not be the intention of this statute. Viewed in this context it is not difficult to see that the intention must be to primarily allow the registered trade organization to function in terms of their Constitution, embodied in the memorandum and articles of their association. The Legislature must have conferred the regulatory power, with the intention that it should be used, to promote the policy and objects of the Ordinance, which must be determined by construing the Ordinance as a whole. I, is needless to emphasise that, in construing a provision of a statute by which such powers are vested, in a statutory functionary, the powers are vested to be exercised in the public interest and it cannot be argued that such powers are to be exercised in the discretion of the donee of such powers, without reference to the context of the policy and objects of the legislation. It is by now well established that the Legislature does not confer plenary power of such wide implitude, as is contended for, as that may fall within the mischief of the doctrine of excessive delegation of legislative power to the Executive Branch of the Government, except perhaps in the- case of emergency legislation. Such wide statutory discretion, in order to avoid the charge of abuse or excess of authority, must not be used, to seek promotion of purposes alien to the letter or spirit of the legislation that gives power to act."

33. Respectfully following the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, I am inclined to agree that the Director cannot interfere with the elections and can only annul it after it was held. When faced with this situation, Mr. Abid Hasqan Minto submitted that the writ petitioners have merely sought a direction against the Director to perform his duties, which is his statutory duty to perform under the Ordinance. I am afraid, the reply is not satisfactory. It is well settled that if a relief cannot be claimed directly, the same cannot be permitted to obtain indirectly in the garb of a direction to the Director to perform his duties. Reference may also be made to section 9(2)(e) of the Ordinance which would show that even in the case of irregularities in the conduct of election, the Director cannot annul it without the approval of the appropriate Government. The rationale behind the provisions of section 9(1) of the Ordinance appears to be that the Director is not competent to interfere with the internal management or affairs of a limited company like the respondent Chamber, which admittedly is not a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of tile Federation or a Province or a Local Authority. Mr. S. M. Zafar has rightly pointed out that in view of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Salah-ud-Din and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Limited Takht Blial and 10 others (1), the provisions of Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, cannot be invoked for seeking any interference directly or indirectly in the internal management or the affairs of a limited company like the respondent Chamber. In support of his contention Mr. S. M. Zafar has placed reliance on Farid Sons Ltd. v. Karachi Cotton Association Ltd. (2), V N. Bhpjekr v. K. M. Shinkar and others (3). Reliance is also placed on Mrs. Amai Fakirji Cowasji v. E. A. Pearson and others (4) wherein it was held that no shareholder before hand can seek to obtain information which can be supplied at the general meeting and ask the Court to stop the meeting till the information is supplied.

34. The petitioners have themselves admitted in paragraph 12 of the writ petition that the Director has no power to stop the election, though he can act after election to supersede the same. The Director has also taken the same view in paragraph 12 of his report which reads thus : "The whole allegation has been circumvented to claim remedial constitutional jurisdiction. In accordance with the provisions of Trade Organizations Ordinance, 1961, the D. T. O. is not empowered to forestall the election proceedings before actual holding of elections. However, he can interject in the matter within 30 days of the announcement of the results of the elections under section 9(2)(e) of the Trade Organizations Ordinance."

35. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that no interference is called for at this stage to redress the grievance of the petitioner in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction as it would have the effect of circumventing the provision of section 9(2)(e) of the Ordinance. The election results must be allowed to be announced in the general meeting, and if the Director finds any irregularity in the context of those allegations, he is fully competent to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under the Ordinance.

36. The question of enrolment of members is governed by Article

8. The provisions of sub-Articles (ii) and (iii) are material provisions for the purpose of resolving the controversy raised in this petition. These provisions read thus : "(ii') On the receipt of an application in proper form, the Secretary shall place the same before the Committee and the Committee shall decide it, and all questions relating to it, by majority vote of its members present. The Committee shall have the right to reject any application for enrolment as member, with or without assigning reasons, subject to the provision of clause (iii) below; (iii) Appeal against the decision' of the Committee in such cases shall lie with the General Meeting provided it is sponsored by at least five members of the Chamber. The General Meeting to consider such an appeal, if duly sponsored, shall be convened within one month of the date of receipt of the appeal in the Chamber.

37. A bare perusal of the above provisions of Article 8 would show that the Committee has a full right to enrol or to refuse to enrol a member the General and a person who is aggrieved has right to go in appeal before Meeting. Further more such a grievance can also be raised by means of an application under section 38 of the Companies Act and no direction can be issued by the Director in purported exercise of his powers under section 9(1) of the Ordinance, either in violation of the Articles of Association or the law. (1) P L D 1975 S C 244 (2) P L D 1956 Kar. 315 (3) A I R 1934 Bom. 243 (4) A I R 1926 Sind 295

38. Article 2 of the Association leaves to the Chamber respondent tot decide for itself what procedure it will adopt to ascertain whether an applicant pays or is liable to pay income-tax. In view of the condition specified therein, neither Article 2 nor any other Article of the Memorandum or Articles of Association lays down a procedure or methodology for ascertaining this question of fact. Therefore, in the absence of an documentary proof furnished by an applicant alongwith his application for membership though he either pays or is liable to pay income-tax, no exception could be made for investigating the entitlement of an applicant either with reference to his G. I. R. Certificate or income-tax assessment order or Certificate from the concerned Income-tax Department that an applicant for l membership either "pays" or is "liable to pay" income-tax. Thus visualized, in the absence of production of Treasury Challan in support of payment of income-tax, or at least an affidavit to the effect that the applicant pays or is liable to pay income-tax no valid objection can be taken for scrutinizing the membership application in the light of the scrutiny sheet referred to above for this limited purpose. The procedure thus adopted by the respondent/Chamber in scrutinizing the application for membership does not appear to be ultra vires of the provisions of Article 2 of the Memorandum or Articles of Association. When faced with this situation, Mr. Abid Hassan Minto placed reliance on paragraph 9 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Faisalabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry's case which reads thus : "

9. It is not, however, correct that a. person must fill up the column about G. I. R. and T. R. Numbers in his membership form in all cases. Article 2 of the Articles of Association provides that any firm, joint stock company partnership proprietary concern, associated body or an association of persons engaged in the export, import or any other trade or owning a factory who pays or is liable to pay income-tax shall be eligible for membership". It is clear from the words underlined" by me that the Article clearly contemplates that even those persons who have not been subject to assessment can be enrolled as members if they are assessable to income-tax though not actually assessed. It is not therefore, necessary that a person applying for membership should be able to show his G.

1. R. and T. R. Numbers. This notion was obviously fallacious. However on merits too the objection is proved to be incorrect."

39. The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable the learned Judge in Chamber, no doubt, observed in the precedent case that even those persons who have not been subject to assessment can be enrolled as members if they are assessable to income-tax though not assessed. The real question, however, is as to which is the authority which will determine as to whether or not a person is assessable to income-tax. In my humble view this exercise can be undertaken either by the Income-tax Authorities or for the limited purposes of Article 2 of the Articles of Association, an affidavit of an applicant can also be accepted by the Chamber respondent subject to verification by the Income-tax Authorities. Furthermore the learned Judge observed in paragraph 8 of the preceding case that it was incorrectly held by the Director Trade Organizations that 12 persons were not income-tax assessee, in that, the assessment orders of at least 8 persons were shown to the learned Single Judge in chamber as well as to the Director at the time of hearing before him. Regarding the case of 4 other disputed applicants, it was stated that they were assssees but their assessment order could not be obtained: In the instant case, the petitioners have not specifically taken the stand even in the writ petition that the persons whose applications were rejected by respondent No. 1 either pay or are liable to pay income-tax. They have merely stated in general in paragraph 6 of the writ petition that "a large number of firms and companies have applied for becoming members of the Chamber in accordance with the Articles of Association. They have deposited their requisite fee. They fulfilled the qualification allowed by the Articles of Association for enrolment of members". The petitioners have not pleaded with particularity that these applicants pay or are liable to pay income-tax, and no documentary evidence was produced before me in respect of the applicant whose membership form was rejected that he either paid or was liable to pay income-tax. The burden of proof lies on the applicant that he possesses the requisite qualifications for being legible for membership.

40. I have perused all the original applications brought by respondent No. I in the Court with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties It is no where stated by any of the applicants in his application that he either paid or was liable to pay income-tax. This being so, no prejudice has been caused in consequence of rejection of the applications by respondent No. 1, even if the impugned directive of the Director was not complied with. The question relating to the scrutiny of application for membership is procedural in nature and, therefore, in the absence of prejudice to the applicants, the constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked for an departure even if made from the lawful directive issued by the Director. Reference may be made to The Tariq Transport Company, Lahore v. The Sargodha-Bliera Bus Service, Sargodha and 2 others (1), wherein it was held : "It is a sound rule, recognised by almost all general codes of procedural law and absolutely essential for the preservation of all duly considered verdicts, that an omission or error in procedure, unless it has occasioned a failure of justice or prejudiced a party in the presentation off his case, is not a sufficient ground for reversing the decision."

41. Furthermore, the petitioners have taken part in the election and, therefore, I would not like to exercise my discretionary constitutional jurisdiction to grant any relies to the petitioners, in that, after the declaration of results, their grievance can be redressed by the Director. When faced with this situation, Mr. Abid Hassan Minto, .vehemently submitted that the petitioners have not sought any relief against respondent No. I either for enrolment of members or for re-scheduling of the election. Their only grievance is that the Director who was approached for two-fold purposes, namely, the enrolment of new members and the re-scheduling of the election after proper determination of the seats did not proceed to deal with the matter as required by section 9 of the Ordinance, even though he had earlier passed a clear order on 27-12-1981 in the exercise of his powers under section 9(1) of the Ordinance. The contention is misconceived. As earlier pointed out, what cannot be achieved directly cannot be allowed to be achieved indirectly by circumventing the law and having recourse to the constitutional jurisdiction which is primarily mean to foster justice and not to perpetuate an illegality.

42. He that as it may, the alleged failure on the part of the Director to ensure compliance of his order dated 27-12-1981, despite representation (1) P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 437 made by the petitioners has the effect of withdrawing the earlier directive on at least rejection of the representations made by the petitioners. And if no order in writing has been passed by the Director, on the representation of the petitioners and he merely orally rejected it, it may be a good ground for filing appeal before the competent authority under section 15 of the Ordinance which reads as follows : "15.-(1) Any person or any trade organization aggrieved by any decision or order of the Administrator or the Director may, within fourteen days of such decision or order, appeal to the Director against the decision of the Administrator, and to the appropriate Government against the decision or order of the Director, and the decision of the appropriate Government on such appeal shall be final. (2) Upon an appeal under subsection (1), the Director or the appropriate Government, as the case may be, may stay the implementation or execution of the decision or order appealed against until the disposal of such appeal." The petitioners have, therefore, an alternate adequate remedy for the redress of their grievance and as such the petition is misconceived. When confronted with this situation, Mr. Abid Hassan Minto submitted that the appeal is not an adequate remedy, in that, in terms of subsection (2); of section 15 of the Ordinance, the appellate authority, is, no doubt, competent to stay the implementation or execution of the decision or order appealed against until the disposal of such appeal but there is no provision for seeking interim relief for implementation of the directive already issued by the Director. The contention is misconceived. In consequence of the reply of respondent No. 1, no further direction was issued and, therefore, the stand taken by the petitioners in their reply dated 17-1-1982 (Annexure R/3) has the effect of withdrawing the directive. The petitioners cannot take any benefit of the observations made in paragraph 9 of the report to the effect that the matter needs further elucidation through replication by the petitioners. This report was submitted on 9-3-1982. Notwithstanding this, the petitioners neither filed any replication before the Director during the pendency of the writ petition nor filed any replication to the written statement filed by respondent No. 1 and, therefore, they are estopped by their conduct to take up the plea that the directive issued by the Director still holds the field.

42. Respondent No. 1 denied the allegations of the petitioners. The questions raised in the petition are partly disputed questions of facts and partly mixed questions of facts and law which cannot be challenged in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. Reference may be made to Salf-udDin v. Chamber. of Commerce Baluchistan and 2 others ( P L D 1958 Quetta 136) where it was held that disputed questions of facts as to alleged violation of Articles of Association cannot be gone into in the exercise of writ jurisdiction without proper inquiry and investigation. It was further held that electrons can only be challenged in the manner laid down in section 9(e) of the Ordinance.

43. It may be further pointed out that no person has got a vested right: to seek any direction from the Director in the exercise of powers vesting in him under section 9(I) of the Ordinance. 'The principle of locus poenitentiae (power of receding till a decisive step taken) is available to the Director and be was fully competent to withdraw or rescind the order if it had not: taken legal effect and certain rights created in favour of individual. The existence of such a power also vests in him under section 21 of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897). Such a power is necessary. in the case of all authorities empowered to pass orders to replace the wrong steps taken by them. The authority that has the power to make an order has also power to undo it. This is the case of the petitioners themselves that the directives issued by the Director have not been acted upon and, therefore, no grievance could be made if same stood withdrawn either expressly' or by implication. Reference may be made to Pakistan through The Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad .Himayat Ullah Farooqi (1). to any event, it is not in public interest to grant relief to the petitioners sought for by them which will have the effect of annulment of the election results. Such a course would be against public interest and in violation of section 76 of P the Companies Act. No wider issue is involved in this petition calling for interference in .writ jurisdiction. Reference may be made to Maher Alavi v. Pakistan and S others (2). Reference may also be made to S. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore and another (3), where it was held that a writ even against a void order may be refused if this would enable the petitioner to circumvent the provisions of a statute or if he is estopped by his conduct from challenging it.

44. This order shall also dispose of C. M. No. 2 of 1982 in which the respondent No. 1 has prayed that he be allowed to issue notices for holding the Annual General Meeting, in that, under section 76(1) of the Companies Act, 1913 read with Article 37 of the Articles of Association, the last date of Annual General Meeting is 31st of March, and penalties are also provided under section 76(2) of the Companies Act, for not holding the Annual General Meeting. It is stated in the application that there is a provision for 14 days notice prior to the holding of Annual General Meeting but the notices were not issued for the Annual General Meeting because of the order of this Court, although failure to hold the General Meeting would be a clear violation of the law. Suffice it to say, that the maxim enshrined it, actuscuriae neminem gravabit (an act of Court shall prejudice no man) is applicable to judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals including the organization we are required to perform any statutory duty. Reference may be made to Irshad Ali v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Rehabilitation, Islamabad and 13 others (4). This being so, the mere fact that by an interim order, a learned Single Judge in chamber of this Court stayed the announcement of the election, would not prima facie cause prejudice to the petitioners to attract the penalties under the Companies Act. But no relief can be granted to respondent No. 1 in terms of C. M. 3 of 1982, in these proceedings. The respondent No. 1, may if so advised, move the learned Company Judge for seeking appropriate relief. (1) P L D 1969 S C 407 (2) P L D 1980 Kar. 609 (3) 1978 S C M R 367 (4) P L D 1975 Lah. 7

45. Finally it may also be observed that towards the close of the arguments on 8-11-1982, Mr. Ijaz Ahmad learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, placed on record affidavit of M. M. Siddiqi, the Secretary of the Chamber respondent, wherein it is inter alia stated that 184 applications were received in the Chamber Office on 22-9-1981, 23-9-1981, 26-9-1981 and 1-2-1982. Out of these 184 applications, 64 were returned being not traceable. It appears that the registered letters sent to these applicants were received back by the Chamber with the endorsement of the postal authority that in some cases the addresses were incomplete and in other cases that the addresses were not traceable. As regards other applications, the same were rejected as per affidavit of Mr. M. M. Siddiqi, on various grounds stated therein. The affidavit does not particularise the dates on which the applications were actually disposed of. The President and the Secretary of the respondent Chamber were also present in Court and made a statement before me that some of these applications were rejected on 27-9-1981 and -the others on 3-12-1981. Mr. Abid Hasan Minto did not object to placing of the said Affidavit on record but pleaded and since these applications were disposed of before the directions dated 27-12-1981 and, therefore, there was no disposal at all as directed by the Director. He further submitted that information entered in the said affidavit was of no consequence because a large number of letters issued by respondent No. 1 to the registered members of the Organization returned similarly. It was, therefore, contended that the mere fact that certain letters were received back unserved would not raise a presumption that the applications were disposed of in accordance with law. It was further submitted that in any case, there was no justification for returning some of the applications mentioned in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the affidavit on the ground that either they were not accompanied by their G. I. R. certificate or they were not tax-payers.

46. Mr. Minto further submitted that in the light of the stand earlier taken by the respondent Chamber in Faisalabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Director, Trade Organization, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad, they were estopped to raise the objection that the applications were not accompanied by G. I. R. certificates or that some of the applicants were not tax-prayers. Mrs. Abid Hasan Minto submitted that in the precedent case, the Director raised the objections in the earlier proceedings which were in part materia with the objections raised in this case by the Chamber respondent as stated in the affidavit. The respondent Chamber, however, challenged the action of the Director and the matter was decided by the High Court in the precedent case where it was held that. these objections were unfounded and could not be made basis for the rejection of the applications. Reference was made to 1979 C L C 267 (paragraph 9 at page 970).

47. The question whether Article 2 contemplates production of G.

1. R. certificate is a question of law. A counsel is not bound by the stand taken in previous case on a question of law. Refer Government of West Pakistan v. Mian Muhammad Hayat (P L D 1976 S C 202), and M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (P L D 1980 S C 22). The other point-raised by Mr. Abid Hasan Minto is essentially a question of fact and as earlier pointed out cannot be examined in these proceedings. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. s. A. H. Petition dismissed.