P L D 1962 Supreme Court 335 (PLP)

CORNELIUS, C. J.‑

These five Review Petitions were admitted to a hearing principally, as the admitting Order shows, to take advantage of the occasion "to make a thorough examination of the scope and extent of the power of review expressly conferred A upon the Court by the late Constitution". That power was given by Article 161 which reads as follows :‑ "The Supreme Court shall have power, subject to the provi sions of any Act of Parliament and of any rules made by the Supreme Court, to review any judgment pronounced, or order made, by it." No Act of Parliament has yet been passed on the subject, nor has the Supreme Court itself made any rules to define or limit its powers of review. The arguments advanced on the two sides at the hearing have been addressed largely to the exposition of matters which might induce the Court to re‑examine the judgment already pronounced in the appeals, and learned counsel have, appropriately, refrained from treating of the matter in an academic mode. For my own part, I do not regard the absence of any guiding principles, which would necessarily be of a restrictive character, as a matter for regret. I consider that in subsection (3) of Article 163, the late Constitution has provided a sufficient indication, notwithstanding that it is couched in wide terms, of the full extent of the power of review contem plated by the late Constitution. This subsection reads as follows :‑ "The Supreme Court shall have power to issue such directions, orders, decrees or writs as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, For the present purpose, the emphasis should, in my opinion, be laid upon the consideration that, for the doing of "complete justice", the Supreme Court is vested with full power, and I can see no reason why the exercise of that full power should be applicable only in respect of a matter coming up before the Supreme Court in the form of a decision by a High Court or some subordinate Court. I can see no reason why that purpose, in its full scope, should not also be applicable for the purpose of reviewing a judgment delivered by the Supreme Court itself provided that there be found a necessity within the meaning of the expression "complete justice" to exercise that power. It must, of course, be borne in mind that by assumption, every judgment pronounced by the Court Is a considered and solemn decision on all points arising out of the case, and further that every reason compels towards the grant of finality in favour of such judgments delivered by a Court which sits at the apex of the judicial system. Again, the expression "complete justice" is clearly not to be understood in any abstract or academic sense. So much is clear from the provision in Article 163 (3) that a written order is to be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the intention to dispense "complete justice". There must be a substantial or material effect to be produced upon the result of the case If, in the interests of "complete justice" the Supreme Court undertakes to exercise its extraordinary power of review of one of its own considered judgments: if there be found material irregularity, and yet there be no substantial injury consequent thereon, the exercise of the power of review to alter the judgments would not necessarily be required. The irregularity must be of such a nature as converts the process from being one in aid of justice to a process that brings about injustice. Where, how ever, there is found to be something directed by the judgment of which review is sought which is in conflict with the Constitution or with a law of Pakistan, there it would be the duty of the Court, unhesitatingly to amend the error. It is a duty which is enjoined upon every Judge of the Court by the solemn oath which he takes when he enters upon his duties, viz., to" preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and laws of Pakistan " But the violation of a written law must be clear. An instance of review based upon such violation will be found in the Privy Council case North‑West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand (PLD 1949 PC 1). The ascertainment of a breach by a mode of interpretation will not C in all cases furnish good ground for interference. For the inter pretation of the Constitution and the laws is a function which is entrusted especially to the Superior Courts of the country, and while it is true that in doing so they will follow the generally recognised principles applicable to statutory interpretation, In elaboration of the rules contained in the interpretation statutes namely, the General Clauses Acts, that is a field in which a degree of latitude is of necessity to be allowed to them. The laws come in an infnite variety, and the use of the language, even of the simplest and commonest terms, is so kaleidoscopic and subject to such delicate shades of meaning and emphasis that the duty frequently falls upon the Superior Courts to establish principles whereby effect may be given to the laws according to the intention of the legislators, and that despite ambiguity or deficiency in the language they have employed. The task is frequently complicated through ineptitude on the part of the Legislature and its legislative draftsmen in the use of words or in the thorough delineation, by the machinery of a statutory instrument, of the whole meaning and purpose of the legislation. These are the principal aspects in which the need for a review is urged as a necessity in the present case. There may be, and prob ably, are a great variety of other basic matters which could attract the power of review in appropriate cases, but I do not propose to concern myself with them here. In this case, the principal questions which have been canvassed before us are as follows. Firstly, it is said that the judgment of the Supreme Court proceeds on an erroneous principle in so far as it reads into the text of section 57 of the Estate Duty Act, 1950, as it stood on the 23rd January and the 8th March 1956, certain words in replacement of existing words, with the object of giving effect to what was described as the "manifest intention" of the Legislature that, it is said, is a principle which is obnoxious to recognised rules of statutory interpretation, and it has had an injurious effect in relation to the appellants. Secondly, It is urged that the judgment of the Supreme Court needs to be reviewed because per incuriam it has failed to consider the constitutional question, namely, that by tire passing of the late Constitution on the 23rd March 1956, power to impose estate duty on agricultural property became vested in the Provinces to the exclusion of the Center, so that this type of property was no longer within the mis chief of the Estate Duty Act, being a Central Act, operated through Central statutory authorities and other officers. The first argument includes an allegation of failure of justice, not by irregularity, but by adoption of an erroneous principle for the interpretation of the relevant statute. The main basis of the second contention is that the Supreme Court has authorized the Central authorities to proceed with assessment of agricultural property, for imposition of the duty, in violation of the constitutional provisions. For the examination of these questions, it is necessary that the facts should be stated. I shall do so as briefly as possible. The estate in question is that of the late Sir Muhammad Akbar Khan, Nawab of Hoti, who died on the 6th October 1952, leaving immovable as well as movable property of a value which the Controller of Estate Duty has finally on the 2nd October 1956 by his notice of demand under section 58‑D of the Estate Duty Act, assessed at a total figure of Rs. 2,35,31,

600. The value of the agricultural land included in the estate has been placed by the Controller of the Estate Duty at Rs. 1,76,79,

100. The Controller called upon the accountable persons who are the petitioners before us to pay a total sum of Rs. 72,61,854 as estate duty by the 30th November 1956, on the 29th November 1956 the accountable persons moved a writ petition in the High Court of West Pakistan to have this notice of demand quashed. The princi pal ground was that the estate had already, by operation of the Estate Duty Act, been fixed 9n value by the account delivered In respect thereof on the 18th March 1953, in which the estate had been valued at about 30 lakhs of rupees. Three days later, on the 21st March 1953, the accountable persons had received from the Central Board of Revenue a direction to pay an amount of Rs. 10,84,564 as estate duty. At this stage, complications arose on account of certain legislative amendments of the Estate Duty Act. These took effect on the 3rd July 1953. Up to that time, the provision in the Act was that accounts were to be submitted to the Central Board of Revenue, which would either accept the valuation or after enquiry reach a certain figure and direct the accountable person to amend his return accordingly. If he did not accept the Board's valuation, the accountable person could move the High Court and a decision of the High Court was to be final, subject to an appeal in the then Federal Court. By the amendment however the Board of Revenue was replaced throughout the Act, except for certain supervisory functions, by the Controller of Estate Duty, who was empowered to deal with returns submitted, to enquire into them, and to require the valuation to be amended, subject to a right of appeal to an Appellate Tribunal. Further correction was to be by the technique of reference to the High Court and above the High Court to the Federal Court. There were other extensive amendments, and some of these Involved replacement of sections by other sections bearing the same number, but having a totally different content. One such section was section

59. In the original Act, this section empowered the Board to fix valuations after enquiry and also provided for appeal to the High Court and beyond. After the amendment of 1953 however, this section had no reference to valuation, whether by the Board or by the Controller, and was confined to providing for an appeal from the Controller's valuation to the Appellate Tribunal. Section 59 is still in force although it has been extensively added to by a further amendment by the Finance Act of 1956. Its provisions are attracted by such a notice of demand as that of the 2nd October 1956, which was issued in respect of the late Nawab of Hod's estate. An appeal is provided within 90 days of the receipt of such a notice, but the; Appellate Tribunal is expressly empowered to extend this period for sufficient cause, and I feel no doubt that the fact of presentation of the writ petition on the 29th November 1956, out of which the present petitions arise, would be accepted as "sufficient cause" so that the accountable persons still have their remedy against the claim by an appeal to the Appellate 'tribunal and thereafter under section 59‑A to the High Court, and even to the Supreme Court. The petitioners however are anxious to avoid such a proceeding, and they attempt to do so on the basis that the account which they had furnished on the 18th March 1953 bad, by virtue of the law and of certain events which occurred in the High Court, become the final account for the estate in question. The incidents referred to may now briefly be narrated. As has been seen, the Board had taken no action in the case beyond calling upon the accountable persons to pay the duty which on the face of the account presented by them was the correct duty. This action is relatable to section 58 of the Estate Duty Act which provided that upon delivery of the account under section 53, viz., in compliance with the duty of the accountable person to furnish an account of the estate within six months of the death of its last owner, the accountable person shall pay to the Board the estate duty payable on the declared property. Thereupon, the Board was required to grant him a certificate that such duty had been paid. Section 58 stands today in the same shape as it had in March 1953, except that the Controller has replaced the Board. It is quite clear upon the wording of section 58 that it provides for a first or Interim payment, upon the account furnished by the accountable person, without involving any acceptance by the authorities of the correctness of that account. The certificate issued in relation to such payment under section 58 must be understood accordingly, namely, as a mere receipt for satisfaction of the claim for estate duty to the extent of the payment already made, but without any implication as to the total estate duty to be fixed upon the estate. For a provision of final discharge, reference has to be made to sections 61 and 70 of the Act, providing that in a case where the accountable person has delivered an account of the estate, and the Controller has determined the estate duty payable, upon payment of that duty, the Controller shall issue a certificate accordingly, and such a certificate "shall discharge the property included therein and the grantee so far as regards that property from any further claim for estate duty" subject to certain exceptions relating to fraud and the failure to disclose certain facts. The Board had as yet not embarked upon the exercise of evaluating the estate, when it was deprived of the power to do so, and that power was transferred to the Controller by means of a new section in the Estate Duty Act, viz., section 58‑A. Accordingly, on the 9th September 1953, the Controller commenced a proceeding under the last‑mentioned section on the basis of the estate having been under‑estimated, and the accountable persons as they admitted in their several petitions, submitted to his jurisdiction, and attended hearings on several days in November 1953 and again on the 20th August 1954. It should be mentioned here that at this time, the agricultural property of the late Nawab was included in the assets whose value fell to be determined. The accountable persons at that time were protesting that the estate should not be valued "otherwise than in accordance with the scheme of the valuation which was in force at the time when the estate became liable to estate duty". Not receiving relief, on the 1st December 1954, they moved the Sind Chief Court for a writ to quash the Controller's proceedings and the matter was stayed until, as a result of the judgment of the Federal Court in the case of Tamizuddin Khan ((1955) 1 F C R 155=P L D 1955 F C 240) the Constitutional provision conferring writ jurisdiction became void, and thereafter about the middle of 1955, the accountable persons gave notice of suit under section 80, Civil Procedure Code. However, about the month of October 1955, the Constitution was validly amended so as to re‑enact the writ jurisdiction. On the 14th December 1955, the accountable persons moved a fresh writ petition (No. 39 of 1955) in the High Court of West Pakistan at Lahore on the basis that they had come to know that the Controller had a few days earlier issued a notice demanding payment of duty before the 19th December 1955, "on a grossly exaggerated valuation arrived at by him". This notice was never produced in Court, and there is nothing on the record to show that it was a notice of demand for a specific sum under section 58‑D of the Act. On the other hand, the order of the Controller dated the 2nd October 1956 shows that up to that time the notices issued to the accountable persons were under section 58‑A of the Act, namely, Intimation that the Controller Intended to enquire into the valuation of the property in the belief that the value shown in the return was under‑estimated. In the writ petition of the 14th December 1955, an undertaking was given that the notice referred to as having given rise to apprehension would be produced in the Court as soon as it was received, but it was never produced. Throughout the proceedings, the question has never been raised that prior to the issue of the notice of demand of the 2nd October 1956, any previous notice claiming a specific sum under section 58‑D of the Act had been sent, such as might have furnished ground for the objection that the Controller had exhausted his power under that section already, prior to the 2nd October 1956. In the judgment of this Court of which review Is sought it Is stated that the Controller's notice of demand of the 2nd October 1956 was issued "in pursuance of the notice which he had issued on the 28th November 1955", and there is no reason to doubt that this statement is correct in fact and in law. When the writ petition of the 14th December 1955, came up for hearing in the High Court, the Controller was represented by the then Advocate‑General of Pakistan, Mr. Faiyaz All. At that time, the Controller was placed in a difficulty by reason of the condition of section 57 of the Estate Duty Act. In carrying out the amendments of 1953, which as we have seen involved a total replacement of the previous section 59 by another section bearing the same number but having a quite different intent, the necessity of making consequential amendments In section 57 was completely overlooked. Section 57 is a section which provides for two matters of extreme importance, viz., firstly, it fixes the date from which the estate duty is due, and secondly, It prescribes upon what account the estate duty shall be collected, and In its original condition, this was to be on the return, as amended or modified in compliance with the relevant provisions in section 59, which were specified. The charging section is section 4 which lays down that estate duty shall be levied and paid upon the ascertained value of estates. The duty of the heirs to submit a return is provided for in section 53, to which section 56 is a supplement applicable where there has been a legal grant of representation to the estate of the deceased. In the terms of the Act as they stood before the amendments of 1953, correction of the return so made fell under section 59, but In the amended provisions, It fell to be made under section 58‑A, action under which was to be followed by Issue of notice of demand for a specified amount under section 58‑D. As a result of section 57 being left unamended in 1953, the condition when the case came up before the High Court on the 23rd January 1956, was that the provision for correction under section 57 read as if the estate duty was to be calculated upon the return as amended or modified under specified provisions in "section 59", which section having been totally altered in the meantime, the provision for amendment or modification was, at the very least, thrown into confusion, so as to give rise to the argument that the law stood denuded of any provision for amendment or modification, and therefore, estate duty could only be collected on the return, as made. Faced with this argument, the late Mr. Faiyaz Ali made a statement before the Court as follows:

"The Controller of Estate Duty does not intend to make any collections from the petitioners In excess of the estate duty payable on the accounts declared by them to the Central Board of Revenue until the clerical mistake that has crept into section 57 (amended) Is suitably rectified. On the present wording of section 57 (amended), I concede that no claim can be made in excess of the amount payable on the accounts declared. The balance of the estate but on the accounts declared is Rs. 79,

589. This may be deposited in the State Bank and a draft be given in the name of the Controller of Estate Duty, who will issue a discharge certificate under section 58 of the Estate Duty Act." (The description "amended" which is added in this statement to section 57 perhaps has reference to the renumbering of the section which took place at an earlier amendment of the Act in 1951 for section 57 suffered no change in the 1953 amendments) The Division Bench dealing with the case made a short order as follows: -- "In view of the statements of counsel made above, the petition has become infructuous and is dismissed as such. There will be no order as to costs". Subsequently, the amount mentioned in the above statement was duly paid, and it appears that thereafter the accountable persons sought to obtain from the Controller a certificate of complete dis charge which he refused to give, with the result that the petitioners moved another writ petition in the High Court to obtain a certi ficate of "final discharge of the full existing liability" This was Writ Petition No. 96 of 1956, which was disposed of in limine, without notice to the opposite party, by means of the following order, dated the 8th March 1956:

"We have seen the record of proceedings in W. P. No. 39 of 1955. The intention clearly was that with the deposit of Rs. 79,589 by the petitioners, the liability under the Estate Duty Act as it stands at present, would be fully and finally dis charged. Even if therefore, the Controller has chosen other words Importing an ambiguity, it does not alter the legal position viz, that with the above‑mentioned payment, the duty leviable under the Act was fully paid up and this was conceded by the learned Advocate‑General of Pakistan. With this clarification we dismiss the petition as it requires no further orders." As an ex parte order this exposition of the meaning and effect of the proceedings of the 23rd January 1956 can be given no binding P or definitive effect In law. Apart from that consideration, it appears to proceed, if I may say so with respect, upon an incom plete understanding of the legal position, and in particular upon a failure to notice that the certificate of which the issue had been promised by the Advocate‑General in his statement of the 23rd January 1956 was one, not of complete discharge under section 70, read with section 61 of the Act, but was a mere receipt acknow ledging an interim payment under section 58, which was expressly mentioned in the statement. Moreover, the stage was one at which no notice of demand under section 58‑D had yet been issued. It was a stage in the ascertainment of the total value of the estate, and the time had not yet come for assessment of the tax on that total value. There is no suggestion that the legal provisions applicable to the ascertainment of the value of the estate were In any way, inadequate or defective at that time, i.e., from 3rd July 1953 to the 8th March 1956. In other words, the steps which the Controller of the Estate Duty was taking for the quantification of the estate were perfectly valid and fully covered by proper legal provision. My learned brother Hamoodur Rahman has referred in his judgment to an English case which contains an observation of direct application in these circumstances. That is the case of McKenna v. Eaton‑Turner ((1936) 1 K B 1 at page 16.), in which it was said by Romer L J. that "if the tax is clearly imposed, the omission of the legislature to provide means for its collection must be regarded as an unfortu nate omission and nothing else". In the present case, if there was 1H an omission in section 57, it was plainly one that had resulted from a misfortune in the drafting department of the legislature. The intention of the law that the return submitted by an account able person should be subject to enquiry and fresh ascertainment by the Controller had been made perfectly clear by the amend ments of July 1953, and by the time that the Controller had been able to complete his proceedings under section 58‑A for the quantification of the estate, the Legislature had taken the appro priate step by the Finance Act of 1956 to amend section 57 it was to make it clear that the collection of estate duty would not b, upon the face of an account delivered by the accountable person, but upon such an account as amended or modified under the provisions already existing in the Act, namely, at the hands of tine Controller, and thereafter of an Appellate Tribunal, and even after the decisions of these officers through the agency of the Superior Courts. These amendments were made in early April 1956, that Is to say some 7 months before the issue of the notice of demand under section 58‑D, when for the first time it became a matter of importance that the law should be equipped with a provision enabling collection on an amended account. Consequently, it seems to me that to say that by the 8th March 1956, "the duty leviable under the Act vas fully paid up was not correct in law, and to say that this proposition was conceded by the learned Advocate‑General of Pakistan was misunderstand what the Law Officer had stated and had bees careful to elucidate by a reference to section

58. At a stage where the Controller of Estate Duty was still engaged in the exercise of ascertaining the correct value of the estate, the Advocate‑General was perfectly competent to say that until section 57 was amended, the Controller would not proceed to collect anything more than the sum due upon the return made, and when that amount was made good by payment of the balance due, a certificate under section 58 would issue. The statement was so clear that it is difficult to understand how it could possibly have been regarded as equivalent to an admission that no further revaluation of the estate was possible, or consequentially, that no further amount would ever be claimed as estate duty. One of the judgments delivered in the High Court is to the effect that by the orders on the two Writ Petitions No. 39 of 1955 and No. 96 of 1956 the High Court had fn terms decided the case, and therefore by the terms of the new section 74‑A which was introduced into the Act in 1956, the Controller is deprived of power to reopen and determine the case. The order on the second writ petition of the 8th March 1956 was an ex parte order and for that reason and also because it proceeds upon an erroneous inter pretation of the Advocate‑General's statement of the 23rd January 1956, It cannot be given any definitive effect. As for the order of the 23rd January 1956, it was made in the presence of parties, and merely dismissed the petition as infructuous. To understand it as a judicial decision requires that it should be read with the statement of the Advocate‑General, and enough has been said already to indicate that the latter statement is confined in its effect to an interim stage in the recovery of the correct estate duty, namely, the stage at which demand for duty as taxable upon the return made can be preferred by the Controller (previously by the Board) and is to be met by the accountable person. Consequently, there seems no scope for any conclusion to the effect that section 74‑A of the present Act barred the Controller from making his own valuation, upon which he issued the notice of demand on 2nd October 1956. The substantial question in the case being whether the notice of 'demand of the 2nd October 1956 should be quashed, I am satisfied as a result of the foregoing examination that there is no ground arising out of the provisions of the Estate Duty Act as it stood from time to time, or out of the decisions given by the High Court in the two writ petitions decided on the 23rd January 1956, and the 8th March 1956, to justify such action. The judg ment of this Court in the appeals has arrived at the same con clusion, and in doing so has proceeded upon an interpretation of section 57 of the Act, as It stood prior to the Finance Act of 1956, which is said to be Inconsistent with the established principles of statutory interpretation. In the field of statutory interpretation, as I have already observed, the Superior Courts must be allowed a high degree of freedom of decision, This freedom would include the ability to draw principles to be applied as a rule of reason, where the circumstances are outside any familiar pattern. For the duty Is to ascertain and carry out the will of the Legislature, and thus to incline in favour of giving effect to the expression used by the Legislature rather than towards avoidance of actions taken in the Bona fide belief that they are warranted by such expression res magis valeat quam pereat. In the view which I have taken, tile defect In the condition of section 57 at the time when the High Court dealt with the first two writ petitions was of no material or substantial importance, since at that time the stage for collection had not yet arrived. In the judgment of this Court the section has been read as if it stood modified so as to accommodate the existing provisions for ascertainment of the correct value of an estate by the authorities, fiscal as well as judicial. I am not pre pared to say that that view was erroneous, and I am quite clear on the other hand that even if it was, the result which has been brought about is one which is in complete accord with the Inten tion of the Legislature, as subsequently expressed by retrospective amending legislation, to make good what was clearly an accidental omission. Accordingly, I see no ground for interference in review with that part of the judgment. The position as respect the inclusion of agricultural property within the estate which has been quantified by the Controller is that in the High Court, it had been held that by reason of the r power of the Centre to impose an estate duty upon agricultural land having been taken away by the late Constitution, the Con troller was not empowered under the amended Act to reopen the valuation of agricultural land. Mr. Brohi's contention that the reversal of this decision by the Supreme Court has been affected per incuriam does not appear to be entirely correct, as pointed out in the judgment of my learned brother Hamoodur Rahman. I am in agreement with his view that the estate duty became a charge upon the agricultural property left by the late Nawab from the time of his death. As I have already mentioned, such property was included in the return made by the accountable persons, and it formed the subject of enquiry by the Controller of E4tate Duty as early as 1953 and 1954. It was in continuation of that proceed ing that he issued notices under section 58‑A on more than one occa sion to the accountable persons. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Controller purported to bring the agricultural property in cluded in the estate within the mischief of his powers for the first time after the promulgation of the late Constitution. He was seized of all the assets included in the estate including the agricul tural property from a time when it was fully within his power to deal with agricultural property for the assessment of estate duty. The repeal of the provision under which he commenced action was without effect upon the validity of that action, and does not prevent it from being taken to its proper conclusion as if the Estate Duty Act today applied also in respect of agricultural property. The obligation to pay the estate duty bad arisen prior to the change in the law and is clearly unaffected by that change. It appears that after the promulgation of the Constitution, the Legislature of West Pakistan passed an Act to the effect that no estate duty was to be charged on agricultural property, but that law is without effect in relation to a proceeding under the Estate Duty Act commenced long before 1956, in respect of the agricul tural property here involved. In the High Court, the argument on the point was drawn into a question whether the matter was one of procedure, It being the law that a change in the law of procedural character applies to proceedings already started. The High Court considered that such an argument if adopted would "make the legislative lists in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, extremely fluid in character, and there would be no demarcation left between Federal and Provincial legislative functions". They held that "the 1956 amend ments of the Act, could operate only in respect of property other than agricultural land". They expressed a doubt as to whether "the functionaries of the Federation, like the Controller, would be able to realize estate duty on agricultural land or not, in future, as executive power must be conterminous with the legislative power of the Federation", and finally concluded that under the amended Act, the Controller was empowered only "to re‑open the valuation of property other than agricultural land". It should be mentioned that in 1960, the Estate Duty Act was amended so as to make it clear that the Central Board of Revenue could make rules to "provide for the determination of the true value of any property consisting of agricultural land". Thus, the difficulty expressed as to the limits of executive power may be thought to be overcome, and the Controller would be competent to evaluate agricultural property subject to any existing rules, provided that the duty was legally applicable or had become attached to such agricultural property. The question appears to me to be one not so much of procedure, as of the continuation of the applicability of a law after its repeal, in respect of a liability under that law which had accrued prior to the repeal, and to this aspect of the matter no attention appears to have been paid in the judgment of the High Court. Also, it is clearly not correct to say that the Controller had acted so as to "re‑open the valuation" of the estate after the coming into force of the Constitution of 1556. Therefore, there is no ground to interfere in review with the order of this Court, setting aside the High Court's direction to the Controller not to proceed further with the evaluation of agricultural land included In the estate of the late Nawab. For these reasons, I would dismiss these petitions. There seems no reason why the ordinary rule that costs follow the event should not be applied, and I would therefore allow his costs to the Controller. FAZLE‑AKBAR, J.‑

I agree in the conclusion at which the Chief Justice has arrived in these cases. In view of the importance of the questions raised, I would like to add some observations of my own. While granting special leave, we left open the question of competency of the review petitions. Further, we indicated in the order that "the Court should first examine the question of its jurisdiction, for the granting of a review in a decided case and proceed thereafter to consider whether a review in the present set of appeals is permissible." It is therefore, necessary first to consider under what circumstances this Court should exercise its review jurisdiction. There have been several general statements by highest Judicial Authorities, namely, the House of Lords and the Privy Council on the power of the Court of last resort to review its own decision and as to the extent to which exercise of such power should be limited. Both the House of Lords and the Privy Council took the view that only in exceptional circumstances they will exercise this inherent power. The cases in which that may be done are ex plained by Lord Brougham in the case of Rajunder Narain Rao v. Bijai Govind Singh (2 M I A 181). His Lordship describes this privilege, when allowed, not as a right, but as an indulgence. He then says :‑ "It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of the last resort, where, by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard, and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard." In the case of R. N. K. R. M. Somasundaram Chetty v. N. R. M. V. L. Subramanian Chetty (AIR 1926 P C 136). Lord Atkinson remarked :‑- "Legal judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation. They are serious pronouncements, for the most part by the judicial officer of the State, touching the rights or disputes of subjects, bringing home to those subjects what the rule of justice required and are enforcible, if need be, by the forces of the State. Moreover, when once pronounced, they cannot be lightly set aside." In Henry Hebbert v. The Rev. John Purchas (1869‑71 Vol. III L R P C 664). Lord Chancellor says :‑ "Having carefully weighed the arguments, and considering the great public mischief which would arise on any doubt being thrown on the finality of the decisions of the Judicial Committee, their Lordships are of opinion, that expediency requires that the prayer of the petitions should not be acceded to, and that they should be refused with costs." One very cogent observation which‑ appears to me to have been made by the House of Lords in Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. The Court of Wards ((1886) 11 A C 660) are these :‑ "There is a salutary maxim which ought to be observed by all Courts of last resort‑Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. Its strict observance my occasionally entail hardship upon Individual litigants, but the mischief arising from that source must be small in comparison with the great mischief which would necessarily result from doubt being thrown upon the finality of the decisions of such a tribunal as this." Before Partition, the Federal Court of India in the case of Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai arid others (AIR1941FC1), following the practice of the House of Lords and Judicial Committee declined to entertain applications for review on the ground that the parties were aggrieved by their decision. Follow ing pertinent observations were made 1n the above case :‑ "It would in our opinion be intolerable and most prejudicial to the public interest if cases once decided by the Court could be re‑opened and re‑heard." It may be observed here that the Federal Court had power under section 214 (1) of the Constitution to make rules of Court for regulating the practice and procedure of that Court, but it made no such rules and preferred to follow the practice of the Judicial Committee and the House of Lords. After Partition the Federal Court of Pakistan in the case of Akbar All v. Iftikhar Ali ((1955) 2 FCR 27=PLD 1956 FC 50) also gave tacit or express approval to the observations of the Judicial Committee and the House of Lords. Article 161 of the late Constitution which was promulgated in 1956 expressly gave power of review to this Court in these terms :‑ "The Supreme Court shall have power, subject to the provisions of any Act of Parliament and of any rules made by the Supreme Court, to review ‑any judgment pronounced, or order made, by it." After the promulgation of the late Constitution in Civil Review Petition No. 3 of 1960 Ilam Din v. Muhammad Din, not yet reported, the views entertained by the Judges of this Court on the question of review jurisdiction was explained by Kalkaus, J. who in delivering the judgment of the Bench said :‑ "The case before us is one which would even be covered by the provisions of Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. because the Court had not applied its mind to a part of the case of the petitioner, but the powers of this Court are not even circums cribed by Order XLVII, rule 1, C. P. C. Article 161 of the late Constitution which empowers this Court to review Its judgments and orders does not confine the exercise of the power to any particular grounds. The Constitution by presumption is a carefully prepared document and this omission to refer to any grounds would be deliberate. The intention was to leave it to the Supreme Court to determine whether the case before it was a fit one for exercise of the power of review. The provision is similar to that for grant of special leave and there are no fetters at all on the discretion of this Court to grant a review wherever it deems proper to do so for the ends of justice, though of course the discretion will be exercised con sistently with the nature of review jurisdiction and with due regard to the principle that there must be an end to litigation. When a case has been fully heard and a decision given on all available material the party adversely affected by the decision cannot apply for review on the simple ground that it is not satisfied with the correctness of the decision." The learned Judge after considering several decisions of the Privy Council and also that of the Federal Court of Pakistan in Akbar All v. Iftikhar All and others observed :‑ "In view of what has been stated above it should be clear that there is no analogy between the powers of review of this Court and that of the Federal Court of Pakistan and no assistance can be derived from cases where the power to review was not exercised by that Court." The Court then accepted the review petition and granted special leave to appeal to consider whether this Court had not considered a part of the case of the petitioner. From the number of review petitions filed since the above decision I may not be far wrong In assuming that there is a feeling that this Court has unlimited powers to review its decisions. I think the language of the above decision excludes such an implication. No doubt the learned Judge has stated that "there are no fetters at all on the discretion of this Court to grant a review wherever it deems proper to do so for the ends of justice", but he qualifies the above in the next sentence by the expression that "though of course the discretion will be exercised consistently with the nature of review jurisdiction and with due regard to the principle that there must be an end to litigation." This decision may be more easily understood if proper emphasis is laid on the last sentence, namely, "with due regard to the principle that there must be an end to litigation". From the last sentence It is clear that the Court was fully sensible of the importance of maintaining the absolute finality of its decision. It may then be said that in view of the express provisions in the late Constitution this Court has wider power to exercise powers of review than those enjoyed by the Judicial Committee or the House of Lords. To my mind Art. 161 of the late Constitution merely gave recognition to the power which since then was exercised by the Courts of last resort in its inherent jurisdiction. It does not, however, mean that this Court has an unfettered discretion to re‑hear a case which had been conclusively deter mined by it. The precedents referred to in the earlier part of the judgment are of great authority, long standing and uniform. The principles laid down by those Courts are based on sound cogent reasons and I do not think it will be wise to depart from that practice. The warnings contained in those observations must not be lost sight of. A liberal use of this power Is bound to cause great mischief by throwing doubt on the finality of the decision of this Court. I do not think this Court would be disposed to interfere with the established current of decisions on the question as to the limit to be placed by the Court of last resort on the power of review. I may further add that I know of no authority for the proposition that the Court has unlimited power to re‑hear and re‑open a case which has been finally decided. For the above reasons I am of opinion that the power of review should be exercised within the limits laid down in the case of Ak6ar Ali v. Iftikhar Ali. In other words "a decision of this Court should be re‑opened with very greatest hesitation and only in very exceptional circumstances". This Court, therefore, may consider the desirability of framing rules prescribing the limits within which it would exercise its power of review. Out of the numerous grounds taken in these petitions only two were pressed before us. It was first contended that this Court in interpreting section 57 of the Estate Duty Act, 1950 as amended by Estate Duty (Amendment) Act, 1953 exceeded the proper limit of interpretation and assumed for themselves power of legislation. The Estate Duty Act was amended in 1953. Due to slip of the draftsman consequential amendments were not made in section 57 of the Act. This Court after referring to Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes and other decided cases held that it had jurisdiction to modify section 57 so as to rectify the draftsman's mistake. If, further, authority Is needed for this proposition it will be found In the case of Ram Kissendas Dhanuka and others v. Satya Charan Lal (P L D 1949 P C 339). In the above case, it was held g that "the omission to make such cross‑references as may be required to reconcile two textually inconsistent provisions is a common defect of draftsmanship. In such cases, the cross references have to be implied In order to remove the inconsis tency". I am, therefore, of opinion that there is no substance in this contention. It was next contended that after promulgation of the late Constitution the Controller had no power under the amended Act to re‑open the valuation of agricultural land. On this question I agree with the views expressed and the conclusions reached by the Chief Justice and I respectfully adopt the same. For the reasons stated above, I would dismiss these petitions with costs. B. Z. KAIKAUS, J.‑

While agreeing with the conclusions reached by the Chief Justice and my brothers and with much of the reasoning contained in their judgments I feel called upon to say a few words as the author of the judgment under review as well as of the judgment in the unreported Civil Petition No. 3 of 1960, Ilam Din v. Muhammad Din, In which the scope of the power of review was explained. I have been given to understand that my judgment in Ilam Din v. Muhammad Din was regarded as granting wide powers of review to this Court and that in consequence a large number of review petitions were filed. This comes to me as a surprise did say in that judgment that Article 161 did not contain any limitations but I had made it clear that limitations are implied in the very nature of review jurisdiction. Let me state now that these limitations are a logical result of the Inevitable principle of finality of litigation. It appears quite obvious that if there is to be an end to litigation (and an end there has to be) the mere incorrectness of a conclusion reached can never be a ground fort. review. If it was, the Court would be bound when an application for review was submitted to consider de nevo whether the con clusion reached was correct and against the order which it passed on the review application, whatever the nature of that order, a review petition could be filed and this procedure will continue ad infinitum. Nor can it be said that while mere incorrectness is not a good ground if the judgment appears to the Bench that hears the review petition to be clearly erroneous there is a ground for review. Difference of opinion in the views of different Benches is but natural and different Benches may be quite clear as to the conflicting views which they take. I could, if need be, quote cases where of two eminent Judges sitting side by side one said the matter was quite simple and admitted of no doubt at all and the other who took the contrary view said he was unable to see how any other view could be taken. To permit a review on the ground of incorrectness would amount to granting the Court the f jurisdiction to hear appeals against its own judgments or perhaps a jurisdiction to one Bench of the Court to hear appeals against other Benches ; and that surely is not the scope of review juris diction. No mistake in a considered conclusion, whatever the extent of that mistake, can be a ground for the exercise of review jurisdiction. On a proper consideration it will be found that the principles underlying the limitations mentioned in Order XLVII, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, are implicit in the nature of review' jurisdiction While I would prefer not to accept those limitation as if they placed any technical obstruction in the exercise of the review jurisdiction of this Court I would accept that they embody the principles on which this Court would act in the exercise of such jurisdiction. It is not because a conclusion is wrong but because something obvious has been overlooked, some important aspect of the matter has not been considered, that a review petition will lie. It is a remedy to be used only in exceptional circumstances. The Chief Justice has referred to Article 163 in support of a conclusion that for doing complete justice between the parties the Court can review a judgment. As I read Article 163 it is intended to state not the circumstances which will enable this Court to pass any order but the kind of order which can be passed. The provision is similar to Order XLI, rule 33, of the Civil Procedure Code, which grants powers to the Appellate Court. It runs :‑ "Power of Court of Appeal.‑The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection: Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section 35‑A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order." For the grant of a power to pass decrees or orders, words similar to those used in Article 163 have been employed here except that the words for "doing complete justice" do not exist but the report of the Select Committee on this rule said "it was imperative that the Appellate Court should have the fullest power to do complete justice between the parties". The words of rule 33 have been taken from the English rule 4 of Order LVIII according to which the Court has power to give any judgment and pass any order which ought to have been made and pass such further or other order as the case may require. These are ordinary provisions regarding the powers of an Appellate Court. Such provisions do not enable a Court to exercise jurisdiction in cases where otherwise they could not exercise jurisdiction. They only empower Courts to pass appropriate orders in cases in which they have jurisdiction. Similar is the effect of Article

163. It does not grant jurisdiction to the Court to review cases which it could not otherwise have reviewed. In fact as I have stated In above there are limitations which are inherent in the exercise of review jurisdiction. They cannot be got rid of as long as we are consistent. I find brother Hamoodur Rahman feels doubt as to whether we could modify the language of the relevant provisions of the Estate Duty Act. The rule which I regard as supreme In matters of interpretation of statutes is that we find out the intention of the legislature. To this rule everything else gives way. The sole function of the Courts while interpreting statutes is to find out the intention of the legislature. If that intention is clear there is nothing further to be done. The function of the Court has ended by that discovery. The remaining rules of interpretation will apply only if the intention is not clear. Of course intention does not mean intention at the back of the mind of the legislature. It means intention in the words which it used. What did the legislature mean when it said this ? That is the question we ask and when we know the answer there is no further task for us. If the legislature has not sufficiently expressed itself we have no duty to act for it, for we are concerned with what it lays down and not with what it has only in mind, but once it has been articulate enough we do no more than give effect to the intention that it has succeeded in expressing. That intention may be expressed in faulty language, in very faulty language, in extremely faulty language. This is of no consequence, as long as there is no doubt as to the intention. A draftsman's mistake as long as it relates to the form in which the legislative intent is expressed and not to the substance of it is of no effect. Of course once an element of doubt as to the intention of the legislature enters the field con siderations otherwise irrelevant may all become relevant. I have stated my own views, but turning to authority, I do not find it laid down in any case that slips of the draftsman are incurable. On the other ‑hand, we find a good deal in the commentaries and judgments to the effect that draftsman's mistakes cannot be permitted to nullify the laws. I may just quote from Maxwell where it is said that "where the main object and intention of a statute are clear it must not be reduced to nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of law". I do not see any reason why this was not applicable to the case before us. The contention before us too was that the statutes was nullified by the omission to make mere consequential amendments. It was never even contended that the intention of the legislature was not clear for there was no room for such a contention. As long as the slip of the draftsman relates not to the subject‑matter but to the form in which the law is expressed, there is no objection to its being disregarded. It makes no difference that we are dealing with a taxing statute. The rule that the intention of the legislature is supreme applies as much to taxing statutes as to other statutes though the Courts do not allow the subject to be taxed by doubtful words. At the same time, there is a distinction between provisions that create the liability and those that provide the machinery for the realization of that liability. Once the creation of liability is clear the machinery sections are to be interpreted so as to make the realization possible. Brother Hamoodur Rahman has himself referred to McKenna H. M. Inspector of Taxes v. Eastern Turner, where it was laid down that if the imposition of a tax is clear the omission to provide machinery is not a relevant considera tion. The fact that the legislature did subsequently correct the draftsman's slip cannot be employed as an argument that in the absence of such an amendment the duty was not realizable. There was an obvious slip on the part of the draftsman and the moment it was brought to the notice of the legislature it had to be corrected. It could not be allowed to stand just because on a correct interpretation even in the presence of such a drafting defect the enactment could be so interpreted that there was no obstacle in the way of the realization of the proper duty. In connection with the argument that as the duty on agricultural land became a Provincial subject it could not henceforth be realized by an officer of the Central Government, there are two points to be kept in view. The first is that the removal of a subject from the Central to the Provincial List or vice versa will not affect the appointment of a public functionary, which has already been validly made and he will continue to exercise the powers conferred on him in spite of the change in the relative jurisdictions of the two legislatures. The second is that so far as pending proceedings are concerned, they will remain unaffected. In a case where the power to impose a particular tax has been transferred from one legislature to P another the tax which has already become due will still be realized by the Government which was entitled to realize it when it accrued. It should be obvious that if a liability arose in favour of the Central Government the tax could not on account of the transference of the subject to the Province be realized by the Provincial Government. I agree that these Civil Review Petitions be dismissed with costs. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.‑--These are five applications for the review of a judgment delivered by this Court in consolidated Civil Appeals Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11 & 12 of 1959 on the 20th of December 1960. The said Civil Appeals arose in the following circumstances One Nawab Sir Muhammad Akbar Khan of Hoti died on the 6th of October 1952, leaving behind a vast estate consisting of both agricultural and non‑agricultural properties which were, according to the Estate Duty Act of 1950, liable to pay estate duty. 7 he heirs of the deceased Nawab, accordingly, on the 18th of March 1953, filed a statement of valuation within the period specified under the said Act, as it then stood, disclosing that the estate left by the deceased was of the total value of Rs. 30,57,

651. The Central Board of Revenue on the 21st of March 1953, without accepting this valuation, called upon the said heirs, on the basis of the value declared by them, to make by the 15th of April 1953, payment of a sum of Rs. 10,84,564 or furnish security for the same. Under the Act, as it then stood, the Board could either accept the value declared or call upon the declarant to amend the valuation and if he failed to comply with this direction the Central Board of Revenue, according to the provisions of section 55 (2) of the Estate Duty Act of 1950, as they stood at that time, had only the right to move the High Court to assess the value of the property. Although the respondents maintain that such a direction to amend the valuation was also issued by the Board, the petitioners do not admit this. But before the time allowable under the said section for moving the High Court had expired the Estate Duty Act was drastically amended by the Estate Duty (Amendment) Act, 1953, which came Into force on the 3rd of July 1953. By this amendment the Controller replaced the Board and he was empowered to himself enquire into any case, in which he considered the statement of valuation delivered by the accounting party to be under‑estimated, and thereafter he could himself determine the valuation upon the basis of which the estate duty was to be paid. Any person aggrieved by a valuation made by the Controller was given the right to prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal set up under the said amended provisions and then he could ask the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal From the decision of the High Court upon any such reference an appeal lay to the Federal Court. Unfortunately certain consequential amendments were omitted to be made by the amending Act of 1953 in section 57 of the said Act, with the result that though under the other amended provisions the Controller could revise the valuation declared by the accountable person the Legislature omitted to expressly empower him to collect the amount so determined by him by not specifically mentioning the amended provisions under which the valuation could be so revised in the new section

57. The Controller of Estate Duty, however, in exercise of the new powers conferred upon him to reopen the valuation, by his order of the 9th of September 1953, called upon the heirs of the deceased Nawab to produce evidence for the purpose of determining the proper value of the estate left by the deceased. The heirs of the deceased thereupon, on the 1st of December 1955, after their protest against the procedure sought to be adopted by the Controller had failed, moved the Chief Court of Sind under section 223‑A of the Government of India Act, 1935, for an appropriate writ for prohibiting him from proceeding further in the matter and for quashing the proceedings already taken. The said petition, however, became infructuous upon section 223‑A being declared invalid by the Federal Court of Pakistan but upon the restoration of the said section by the Validation of Laws Act, 1955, the heirs again moved the Writ Petition No. 39 of 1955 before the High Court of West Pakistan. In the course of the hearing thereof the then learned Advocate‑General of Pakistan, on the 23rd of January 1956, made a statement at the Bar to the effect that : "on the present wording of section 57 (amended) I concede that no claim can be made in excess of the amount payable on the accounts declared." Upon this basis only a further sum of Rs. 79,589 was payable after adjusting other payments already made, and this amount was promptly paid up. In his statement, however, the learned Advocate‑General had also mentioned that a "clerical mistake" had crept into section 57 and until it was rectified no further amount could be claimed. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the writ petition did not admit that the mistakes were clerical but agreed to deposit the balance due into the State Bank and make over the draft to the learned Advocate‑General. The writ petition was, therefore, disposed of with the following observation:‑- "In view of the statements of counsel made above the petition has become infructuous and is dismissed as such. There will be no order as to costs." Notwithstanding the above statement by the learned Advocate General the Controller of Estate Duty refused to grant a final discharge certificate to the heirs of the deceased Nawab who, thereupon, again moved the High Court of West Pakistan by Writ Petition No. 96 of 1956 for an appropriate direction upon the Controller to grant the said certificate. On the 8th of March 1956, the High Court of West Pakistan, after clarifying that the payment of Rs. 79,589 during the hearing of Writ Petition No. 39 of 1955 was in discharge of the liability for the estate duty payable under the Estate Duty Act, as it then stood, dismissed this petition in limine, without issuing any notice to the respondents, as it required no further orders. The Controller, however, continued to persist with his demand and maintains that he addressed various letters to the said heirs which were returned undelivered to him, presumably, because they refused to accept them. In the meantime, the Estate Duty Act was again amended in March 1956, by section 16 of the Finance Act of 1956 and the defects, which had crept in at the time of the earlier amendment of 1953, were removed and a new section 74‑A was also added whereby it was provided that nothing in this Act, as amended by the Finance Act of 1956, shall be deemed to empower the Controller to reopen and re determine any case decided by a High Court or by the Board determining finally the rights or liabilities of any party under this Act. After this amendment the Controller of Estate Duty again commenced to pursue the matter of reopening the valuation by his notice of the 10th of September 1956, and as no reply was given to this notice within the date fixed for the reply in the said notice, the Controller purported to refix the valuation by his order of the 2nd of October 1956 and to assess the duty payable‑at Rs. 72,61,

854. A notice of demand for the payment of the said amount was also issued. Against this demand the heirs of the deceased Nawab again moved the High Court of west Pakistan in its writ jurisdiction by Writ Petitions Nos. 662 and 663 of 1956. These were heard by a Full Bench consisting of three learned Judges and, iv accordance with the majority decision, the Controller of estate duty was directed to refrain from revising the valuation in respect of the agricultural land only as, according to this view, after the coming into force of the late Constitution the Central Legislature was incompetent to legislate in the field of estate duty in respect of agricultural land, which had thereafter become a subject of legislation within the exclusive legislative field of the Province. As against this decision both sides obtained certificates from the High Court to prefer appeals to this Court. The heirs of the deceased Nawab challenged the correctness of the decision of the High Court even with regard to non‑agricultural properties and the Controller of Estate Duty challenged its validity with regard to agricultural properties. These were the five appeals which were consolidated and disposed of by this Court by its judgment delivered on the 20th of December 1960. Before this Court, as it appears from the judgment, the main question argued on behalf of the heirs of the deceased Nawab was that section 74‑A of the Estate Duty Act introduced by the Finance Act of 1956 debarred the Controller from reopening the assessment which had been determined and concluded by the decisions of the High Curt in Writ Petitions No. 39 of 1955 and No. 96 of 1956. This Court, however, took the view that in these writ petitions no final decision bad been arrived at. The first writ petition had been disposed of on the basis of statements made by the learned counsel for .the parties and the second writ petition had been dismissed in limine after making certain general observations before even the Controller or the Government of Pakistan were called upon to show cause in the matter. Hence neither of these decisions were final decisions which came within the ambit of section 74‑A of the Estate Duty Act. In the appeals by the Controller, however, two contentions were raised, namely; (1) that the Finance Act of 1956 was intra vices the Central Legislature and (2) that in any case even if that Act was ultra vires and the position remained as it was under the Act of 1953, the Court can and should modify the language of the unamended section 57 so that it enables the realization of proper duty and also that apart from section 57 the duty could be realized in view of section 58‑D. This Court repelled the first contention and held that the Finance Act of 1956 was ultra vices the Central Legislature in so far as it purported to legislate for estate duty in respect of agricultural property, which was a subject of legislation within the exclusive legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature after the coming into force of the late Constitution. But with regard to the second contention it was held that this was a fit case in which the Court could "modify the language of an enactment", particularly, since "the failure to make a consequential amend ment in section 57 could only be due to a slip", and the modification of the language thereof would "give effect to the manifest and undoubted intention of the Legislature." In this view of the matter the provisions of section 57 were read as modified by the Finance Act of 1956. I quote below the unamended section 57:‑-- "

57. Estate duty shall be due from the date of the death of the deceased and shall be collected upon the account delivered under section 53 or section 56 or prepared under subsection (3) of section 59, and amended or modified where necessary as provided in subsection (1) or subsection (5) of section 59; and interest at the rate of 3 per cent. per annum shall be paid on the duty from the date of the death up to the date of the delivery of the account or the expiration of twelve months after the death, whichever happens first." It read after modification as follows :‑‑ "

57. Estate duty shall be due from the date of the death of the deceased and shall be collected upon the account delivered under section 53 or section :6 or prepared under section 58‑B, or on the valuation amended or determined, as the case may be, under section 58‑A, or section 58‑BB, or on the application, if any, made under section 62 or section 63, subject to the provisions of sections 59, 59‑A & 59‑B, and interest at the rate of 3 per cent. per annum shall be paid on the duty from the date of the death up to the date of the delivery of the account or the expiration of twelve months after the death, whichever happens first." In spite of the high esteem that I have for the views of my learned brothers, who pronounced the said judgment, I must confess that I find some difficulty in subscribing to the view that it Is open to the Courts to so radically alter the provisions of al statute even after the Legislature had itself accepted that its will had not been expressed in the language used by it and rectified the defect by a subsequent amendment. Although I would be prepared to concede that In certain exceptional circumstances a Court of law, which is concerned only with the interpretation of legislative measures, may interpret a legislative measure by supplying obvious omissions of a word or two but, with great respect, I doubt whether this power can be extended even to meet a case for which the Legislature has clearly and undoubtedly no made a provision or where the words of the legislative measure as enacted are capable of being given a perfectly good sense and meaning, particularly in a taxing statute. There is, I venture to think, an equally well established principle, as pointed by Rowlatt, J. in the case of Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ((1921) 1 K B 64, at p. 71), "that in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax Nothing Is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used." This passage was quoted by Viscount Simon with approval in the case of Canadian Eagle Oil Company Limited v. The King ((1946) A C 119 at p. 140), and, so far as I am aware, has not been dissented from in any other case. Thus in a statute of this nature if there is a case, which is not covered by the words of the statute interpreted according to their natural meaning, that can only be cured by legislation and not by any attempt to construe it benevolently by the Courts. This principle would, in my humble opinion, apply with greater force where the words used by the Legislature are capable of bearing a sense or a meaning. Having said this, however, I must also point out that, notwithstanding my own personal views in the matter, the question yet remains to be considered as to whether, even assuming that this Court had fallen into error, that would be a sufficient ground for a review in the strict sense. This Court is competent, no doubt, to reconsider a question of law previously decided In a subsequent case but this Court has no jurisdiction to sit on appeal over its own judgments, and although Article 161 of the late Constitution gives it the power to review its decisions in very wide terms that power, as pointed out by this Court in the case of flan; Din v. Muhammad Din (Civil Petition No. 3 of 1960), will only be exercised "consistently with the nature of review jurisdiction and with due regard to the principle that there must be an end to litigation." I for my part would be inclined to hold that a review is by its very nature not an appeal or a rehearing merely on the ground that one party or another conceives himself to be dissatisfied with the decision of this Court, but that it should only be granted for some sufficient cause akin to those mentioned in Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions whereof incorporate the principles upon which a review was usually granted by Courts of law in England. The indulgence by way of review may no doubt be granted to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of last resort, as where by some inadvertance an Important statutory provision has escaped notice which, if it had been noticed, might materially have affected the judgment of the Court, but in no case should a rehearing be allowed upon merits. It is interesting to note in this connection that Mr. Brohi, learned counsel for the petitioners has himself, in his book on the Fundamental Law of Pakistan, also expressed the view that a review under Article 161 of the late Constitution has the same meaning and content as in Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Pro cedure. The Supreme Court of India has also by rules prescribed the limits of its own review jurisdiction by adopting in toto the provisions of the said Order and I feel that this Court should also, to set all doubts at rest, frame appropriate rules in that behalf. In the present case, however, it is contended by Mr. Brohi that even if the restricted view is adopted there is here a valid ground upon which the judgment of this Court in the above mentioned appeals may be legitimately reviewed. According to him, in so far as this Court in delivering the above judgment had not taken into consideration the effect of the transference of estate duty upon agricultural property to the Provincial List by the late Constitution, the judgment was delivered per incuriam and this has been regarded by the Courts in England as a legitimate ground for review. In support of this contention learned counsel has placed reliance on two English decisions in the cases of Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited ((1944) 1 K B 718) and Gower v. Gower ((1950) 1 A E R 804). In both these cases, however, the precise question that fell to be considered was not the scope of the jurisdiction to review in the strict sense of the term but as to how far the Court of Appeal in England was bound by its own previous decisions or those of Courts of co‑ordinate jurisdiction. These decisions are not, therefore, of much assistance to us in answering the question now under consideration. Assuming, however, for the present that a failure to consider a particular provision of the Constitution may be a sufficient ground for review, I will proceed to enquire as to whether there has been such a failure in the present case. A reference to the judgment sought to be reviewed will indicate that the question of the vires of the amendments made to the Estate Duty Act by the Finance Act of 1956 was directly and substantially in issue in the appeal of the Controller of Estate Duty, and this Court, after applying its mind thereto, decided that the amendments in so far as they purported to legislate for estate duty in respect of agricultural property were beyond the competence of the Central Legislature, as that was a subject within the exclusive legislative competence of the Province after the coming into force of the late Constitution. It cannot, therefore, be now contended that the Court was not conscious of the fact that the subject had been transferred by the late Constitution to the exclusive legisla tive field of the Province. It is furthermore clear from the judgment sought to be reviewed that whilst interpreting section 57 this Court was answering the second point raised In the appeal of the Controller, namely, that even if the Finance Act of 1956 was ultra vires and the position remained as it was under the Estate Duty (Amendment) Act of 1953, the Controller had the power to realize the proper duty assessed by him both under the provisions of section 57 and section 58‑D, as they stood after the amending Act of 1953. Thus this is clearly not a case in which the Court had failed to take into consideration that since 23rd March 1956, the legal position bad changed by the coming into force of the late Constitution. It rather seems to me that this Court went into this latter question precisely because it was of the view that the amendments introduced in 1956 did not affect agricultural property. Mr. Brohi, nevertheless, maintained that the Court had omitted to take into account the fact that by reason of the change introduced by the late Constitution the Controller of Estate Duty, who was an officer of the Central Government, would not be competent after the coming into force of the late Constitution to continue to collect estate duty in respect of agricultural lands, even though it may have accrued due before the coming into force of the late Constitution, for, the executive authority of the s Federation extended only to matters with respect to which it could make laws. This argument, though attractive, cannot, in my opinion, be accepted, for, it fails to take into account the distinction between the charging and the machinery provisions of a taxing statute. The liability to pay the tax arises by virtue of the charging sections alone, though quantification of the amount payable may be postponed. As observed by Lord Dunedin at page 110 in the case of Whitney v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue (10 TC (HL) 88), "there are three stages in the imposition of a tax: there is the declaration of liability, that is the part of the statute which determines what persons in respect of what property are liable. Next, there is the assessment. Liability does not depend on assessment. That, ex hypothesi has already been fixed. But assessment particularizes the exact sum which a person liable has to pay. Lastly, come the methods of recovery, if the person taxed does not voluntarily pay." Again, as Romer L. J observed in the case of McKenna (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Eaton‑Turner ((1936) 1 K B 1 at p. 16) "if the tax is clearly imposed, the omission of the Legislature to provide means for its collection must be regarded as an unfortunate omission and nothing else. It is only where a doubt arises whether the tax is chargeable by a certain section that the absence of machinery for collection becomes a relevant consideration." Thus it would seem that the mere postponement of the quantification of a tax or a defect in the machinery designed for the realization of a tax or even the absence of such machinery does not and cannot defeat the liability for the tax. If this be so, then in the present case the estate duty having become payable by virtue of the charging section, namely, section 4, on all property which passed on the death of the late Nawab immediately upon his death, Its payment cannot be avoided because the exact amount so payable came to be assessed or quantified much later. The words used in the section are "levied and paid" upon the principal value to be ascertained by the machinery provisions, under which fell section

57. The Legislature also left no doubt as to the time of the passing of the property or the time at which the liability to pay the tax arose by providing in section 6 that "property of which the deceased was at the time of his death competent to dispose shall be deemed to pass on his death." This duty was furthermore made a first charge under section 68 on the property in respect of which it became leviable after the debts and other encumbrances allowable by the Act had been paid. The question, therefore, that now arises is whether, if the liability to pay the tax accrued at the date of the death of the late Nawab which was long before the Con stitution came into force, did that liability vanish by reason of the change introduced by the late Constitution ? In my opinion, the learned Attorney‑General appearing for the Government of Pakistan has rightly contended that taxes or duties accrued due before the coming into force of the late Constitution could even thereafter be competently continued to be quantified and collected unaffected by the change introduced by the late Con stitution. Sub‑Article (6) of Article 230 of the late Constitution, no doubt, provides that "Notwithstanding anything in the Constitu tion all taxes and fees levied under law In force, immediately before the Constitution Day, shall continue to be levied until they are varied or abolished by Act of the appropriate legisla ture." We are also informed that the Provincial Legislature of West Pakistan has since abolished estate duty on agricultural land. But that again does not affect the liability for the tax which had already accrued due, for, under section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1897, which was by virtue of Article 219 applicable to the interpretation of the late Constitution, even the repeal of an enactment does not, inter alia, affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the enactment so repealed, and any proceeding taken or commenced for the enforcement or realization of such obligation or liability can be continued as if the enactment still continued to be In force. Therefore, even after the transference of the subject `estate duty on agricultural land' to the exclusive legislative field of the Pro vince the liability for estate duty which had accrued prior thereto could not be said to have also been extinguished or become unrealizable. In this view of the matter the transference of the subject to the Provincial field of legislation could not possibly have affected the liability for the payment of the tax In the case under consideration. Thus, even if this precise question was not considered by this Court at the time of the delivery of the judgment now sought to be reviewed, the petitioners cannot thereby gain any advantage, for, this would in no way alter the decision. The effect of the interpretation given by this Court is that even under the un amended provisions of sections 57 and s8‑D, as they stood before the Finance Act of 1956, the fresh assessment by the Controller could be legitimately made and the duty so assessed realized, notwithstanding the lacunae in the language of section

57. In other words, the view taken by this Court was that the Estate Duty Act from the time of the amending Act of 1953 contained the necessary powers now claimed to be exercised by the Controller and the further amendments made in 1956 by the Legislature were wholly unnecessary. In any view of the matter, therefore, I am of the opinion that these petitions cannot succeed and should be dismissed with costs. We dismiss these five Review Petitions with costs. A.H. Petitions dismissed.