P L D 1967 Dacca 67 (PLP)

MURSHED, C. J.‑This is an application for committal of the opposite‑parties before us for contempt and it arises out of the following circumstances:‑ The petitioner was appointed a lecturer in the Department of Economics in the University of Dacca in 1949 and continued to function as such until his appointment in 1963 as a temporary Reader in the said department. Some years later, one Dr. K. T. Hossain, a pupil of the petitioner, was also appointed a lecturer in the same department. Being junior to the petitioner, Dr. K. T. Hossain was given a lesser salary than what was enjoyed by the petitioner. In 1957 petitioner obtained a Rockfellor Award and proceeded, on leave, to Harvard, in U. S. A., in order to obtain a Ph. D. degree from the said University. Sometime later, defendant No. 5 also proceeded to another University in the United States. It is unnecessary to repeat what is well‑known, namely, that Harvard is the leading University in the United States, occupying a position and reputation similar to that possessed by Oxford and Cambridge in England. Petitioner took about five years to obtain his doctorate and the time‑factor is usually governed by the requirement of research and scholarship for the doctoral thesis because the merit of a student is normally assessed in accordance with the learning and scholarship displayed by him as reflected in the thesis, which he submits. The time devoted in the preparation of the thesis is not necessarily a decisive factor. Petitioner has averred that he was sent as a visiting professor to another University in U. S. A. during the period of his stay in Harvard and that, subsequently, he also obtained an assignment in the United Nations Organisation. Upon obtaining his Ph. D. from Harvard and while he was working with the United Nations Organisation, the University of Dacca recalled him to his position as a lecturer in the University. In compliance with the requisition, the petitioner came back to Dacca and joined his former post in the Department of Economics. Thereafter, in the year 1963, when a number of professors and senior teachers had left the University (with a lien on their posts) to take various other kinds of assignment; it was decided to fill up two ~ vacancies temporarily in the grade of Readers in the said department. According to rules and regulations, in this behalf, and particularly in terms of Statute No. 13 of the University Statutes, a Selection Committee was constituted for such appointments with the Vice‑Chancellor of the University as Chairman and with, among other, a Member nominated by the Chancellor and three experts, one of whom was to be an external expert, from outside the University of Dacca. It is patent that the experts constituted the vital elements in the formation of the Selection Committee. A regularly constituted Selection Committee, after due advertise ment, (another vital legal requirement) interviewed the petitioner, along with several other candidates, including Dr. K. T. Hossain (defendant No. 5 in the suit). After assessment of the relative merits of candidates, the Selection Committee recommended the petitioner for one of the posts as its first nominee and also recommended one Dr. Anisur Rahman as the second nominee, for appointments as temporary Readers in the Department of Economics in the two vacancies which were proposed to be filled up as a temporary measure. The Selection Committee further recommended one Dr. Rahman Sobhau for a third vacancy, if required to do so. The said Selection Committee recommended the name of the petitioner in preference to all the other candidates. The second preference had gone to Dr. Anisur Rahman and the third preference to Dr. Rahman Sobhan. There was no recommendation with regard to Dr. K. T. Hossain. It is patent that Dr. K. T. Hossain (defendant No. 5 in the suit) was not considered by the Selection Committee fit for receiving even the third preference. This happened in the year 1963 and Dr. IL, T. Hossain, soon thereafter, left the University of Dacca to take an appointment with the Planning Department of the Government of East Pakistan, keeping his lien on his post as a lecturer in the Department of Economics. Thereafter, Dr. Rahman Sobhan was appointed a temporary Reader against another vacancy in the said department. This is the back'‑round of the appointment made in the University of Dacca in the Department of Economics. Early in 1965, the Syndicate passed a Resolution, in conformity with legal requirement, that the Heads of various Departments be asked to furnish particulars of qualifications of teachers, having regard to the needs of the departments concerned with. a view to advertise vacant posts. A system of advertisement firmly establishes a device to ensure justice in the selection of candidates and to attract qualified candidates for an assignment from all available quarters. It is a well‑recognised method of attracting the best available candidates in an open competition. In pursuance of the said resolution, the Registrar of the University of Dacca (opposite‑party No. 10) addressed a letter, in August 1965, to the Head of the Department of Economics, namely, the petitioner, who was acting as the Head of the Department since sometime in the month of September‑October 1965. On receipt of the letter from the Registrar of the University, petitioner specified the requisite qualification. for future vacancies, having regard to the requirement of the Department of Economics. It so happened that the Vice‑Chancellor of the University left Dacca for a visit abroad and when he came back, the recommendations of the petitioner were put into cold storage. I am not called upon to examine the merits of the reasons given, on behalf of the opposite‑parties for not advertising the proposed post, but, the fact is that no advertisement was made. In the affidavit‑in‑opposition by opposite‑party No. 10, which was not sworn by the Vice Chancellor himself but which was merely adopted by him, it has been stated that the suggestions of the petitioner were impractical. I need not go into this issue which is irrelevant to this application. On the 16th of October 1965, the Syndicate passed the following resolution in the aforesaid context: "Resolved that, in view of the situation obtaining in the Department of Economics, due to the absence of some senior teacher on leave Dr. K. T. Hossain, Deputy Chief, Planning Board, Government of East Pakistan, Lecturer in Economics on leave, be appointed a temporary Reader in Economics Vice Prof. Nurul Islam, until further orders on an initial salary of Rs. 1,050 P. M. in the scale of Rs. 750‑75‑1,200‑E.B. 75‑1,500 and that for regularising the aforesaid appointment the case be referred to the Selection Committee. "Resolved further that the above post be not advertised." Thus, by the above‑mentioned resolution the Syndicate appointed as fait accompli, Dr. K. T. Hossain as a Temporary Reader on a higher salary than that enjoyed by everybody else in the Department. Dr. K. T. Hossain, on his failure to obtain a nomination from an earlier Selection Committee, left the University .to function elsewhere and was thus divorced from academic activities when he was away from the University. Dr. K. T. Hossain, having gone elsewhere, suddenly made his appearance in the University according to the terms of the resolution specified in the preceding paragraph. The relevant Selection Committee, without the aid of experts, in this context, has 'been described by Mr. Hafez as a "Ratification Committee rather than a Selection Committee." The petitioner was naturally apprehensive at this turn of events and made an abortive attempt, by a representation to the Vice‑Chancellor, to secure a consequential revision of salary awarded to himself and to Dr. Rahman Sobhan. Having failed to obtain a redress of his grievances the petitioner filed a suit in the Court of a Munsif at Dacca on the 6th of November 1965. The plaint filed in the said suit contains a number of grievances, namely, in the first place, that there was no advertisement with regard to the appointment, as required by law; secondly, that there was no prior recommendation of a Selection Committee, again as required by law; thirdly, that the Syndicate had illegally and irregularly appointed a person junior to the petitioner on a higher salary received by the latter without the former possessing a higher academic qualification. In the suit the petitioner impeached the legality of the laid resolution on the aforesaid grounds collectively. It is evident from the aforesaid plaint that the awarding of higher salary to Dr. K. T. Hossain, namely, defendant No. 5, was one of the basic grievances of the petitioner. Prior to the filing of the‑suit, the petitioner had asked the Vice‑Chancellor to make good the anomaly by upgrading his (petitioner's) salary and that received by Dr. Rahman Sobhan, who was another temporary Reader in the Department with a higher academic qualification. It seems that if this had been done, the petitioner would not have in all probability, filed the suit In the suit, the petitioner further asked for an injunction on the Syndicate restraining it from giving effect to the impugned resolution, For the purposes of this application, it is important to bear in mind the nature of the suit in the light of the averments made in the plaint that was filed by the petitioner in respect thereof. ‑ In the suit, the parties were, (1) the University of Dacca, (2) the Vice‑Chancellor of the University of Dacca, (3) the Registrar of the University of Dacca, (4) the Syndicate of the University of Dacca, as represented by its Chairman, the said Vice‑Chancellor (Defendant No. 2) and (5) Dr. K. T. Hossain, who, by the said resolution, was appointed as a temporary Reader in the Depart ment on salary higher than that which was received by the petitioner and by Dr. Rahman Sobhan. The main prayer was for a mandatory injunction on the Syndicate and defendants Nos. 1 to 4 prohibiting them from giving effect to the resolution. This seems to be the main relief which the petitioner had invoked in the suit. There was a further prayer, incorporated in the plaint as the first prayer, for a declaration that the impugned resolution was without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Simul taneously with the filing of the suit on the 6th of November 1965, the petitioner made an application for the issuance of an ad interim injunction which sought to restrain defendants 1 to 4, including the Syndicate, from giving effect to the impugned resolution. After the suit was filed, the said "Selection Committee" was summoned to meet on the 3rd of December, the' Vice‑Chancellor having directed the Registrar to give notice to Dr. K. T. Hossain in this behalf. The `Selection Committee" was, undoubtedly, summoned with' such haste that it could not be reasonably expected that an expert from outside the University of Dacca would be able to attend the same. In fact, no expert did attend the meeting of the "Selection; Committee" which has been described as a "Ratification Committee". Consequently, the petitioner filed another application with a view to meet the new exigency created by the summoning of the so‑called "Selection Committee", particularly, because the learned Munsif did not issue any ex parte interim injunction upon the earlier application but had directed the issuance of notices upon the parties to show cause as to why it should not be issued. When the second application was moved, the learned Munsif felt the necessity of preserving the status quo ante litem. A written objection was filed on behalf of all the defendants other than defendant No. 5, Dr. K. T. Hossain, who submitted a separate written objection. We have heard the Registrar of the University of Dacca, that is, defendant No. 3, before us, and in the statement that he has made to this Court he has said that the written objection was directed to be filed by the Vice‑Chancellor on behalf of all the parties to the suit, including the Syndicate and excluding defendant No. 5, who had filed a separate objection. When the application came up for hearing, it was fully contested by all the parties and the learned Munsif, after a full hearing of the case, delivered a comprehensive judgment in issuing an injunction, which was prohibitory in character. The present application is based on an allegation of wilful disobedience to the aforesaid order of injunction. I shall endeavour, consistent with the disposal of this application, to keep clear off the merits of the suit itself or the merits of the above‑mentioned order of injunction. The learned Munsif passed the following order: "It is accordingly ordered that the prayer for injunction as made on 22‑11‑65 be allowed on contest against the defendants. Defendants 2 and 3 are restrained by order of ad interim injunction from giving effect to the order dated 19‑11‑65, directing defendant No. 5 to appear before the committee of selection on 3‑12‑1965 or any other date and defendant No. 5 is restrained from appearing before such committee and defendants 1 to 4 are further restrained from taking any step affecting the status of the plaintiff till disposal of the suit." I need hardly repeat what is elementary and well‑understood by every reasonable man that any portion of written composition must be understood and construed in the light of the entire written instrument, that is to say, that it must be understood with reference to the context. , The plain purpose of the order passed by the learned Munsif was to preserve the status quo ante litem and, in fact, he has said so in the judgment that the learned Munsif had pronounced in regard to the injunction. The legality of the resolution itself was one of the primary issues which the Court was called upon to adjudicate and one of the main grievances of the petitioner, as he sought to make out in the suit itself, was the awarding of a higher salary to defendant No. 5, Dr. K. T. Hossain on the ground that receipt of higher pay affects the status of the petitioner‑as compared with Dr. K. T. Hossain who was a new entrant to the post of a Reader and junior to the petitioner in the Department of Economics. The word "status" must be understood in that context and it is easy to understand that the word includes and involves the salary assigned to a post when compared with what is received by the petitioner. Whether the petitioner will; ultimately succeed in proving the case he has sought to establish is another matter, but there can be no difficulty in understanding the import of the word in the background of the case itself. In the circumstances enumerated above and in the light of the case sought to be made out in the plaint filed by the petitioner, the order of injunction passed by the learned Munsif prohibited the Syndicate from "affecting" the status of the plaintiff. Now, in this context, the word "status" bears, inter alia, a clear reference to awarding a higher salary to Dr. K. T. Hossain. . The word "Status" is, in this context, incapable of being viewed in a vacuum and it cannot be misconstrued by any reasonable body of men, particularly, when they had contested the issuance of the prohibitory order. It postulates that nothing should be done with regard to the position of the petitioner in relation to defendant No. 5 so as to jeopardise that position any further. One of the main grievances of the petitioner, which has been clearly stated in the plaint filed by him in the suit, was the conferment of a higher salary to defendant No. 5, that is, to Dr. K. T. Hossain. The very appointment of the defendant No. 5 with a higher salary was sub judice, inter partes and the controversies, including the awarding of higher salary to defendant No. 5, were in medio in the said Court. According to the case of the petitioner, as stated in his plaint, the appoint ment of Dr. K. T. Hossain, on a higher salary, would upset the status of the petitioner in relation to the former who was junior to him in the Department of Economics, as it prevailed prior to the impugned resolution. This is plain enough. It is clear, as a matter of plain common sense, that the order passed by the learned Munsif has to be understood in the light of circumstances, in which, and the object for which, the injunction was granted. There can be no misconception on this question. The defendants, including the Syndicate, preferred an appeal against the ad interim injunction issued by the learned Munsif, which was admitted for hearing by the learned District Judge of Dacca, who vacated, ex parte, a portion of the order, that is, only in so far as it prohibited the Selection Committee from holding its contemplated meeting and in so far as it restrained defendant No. 5 from appearing before the said Selection Committee. The rest of the prohibitory order remained intact. With the modification of the order passed by the learned Munsif, as indicated above, the Selection Committee hastened to meet and only defendant No. 5 was summoned before it. There was no selection to be made, because selection postulates a choice in a competition between more than one candidate. There was no choice made. The Selection Committee was convened with a view to "regularise" the appointment. It met without the experts, three of whom are required by law to be the constituents of such body. They had sent their written opinions to the said Committee. We had asked for the production of the necessary file with regard to the Selection Committee and, from the documents which have been produced by the defendants in this behalf, it transpires that one of the experts outside the University of Dacca has expressed an opinion in a letter which had been transmitted to the said Committee, that, on merits and personal qualification, petitioner 'and Dr. R. Sobhan possessed higher qualification. There was also a recommendation by the said expert that defendant No. 5 should not be given a higher salary than that obtained by the petitioner and Dr. Rahman Sobhan. Notwithstanding such expression of opinion by an expert, as embodied in the letter written by him, the Selection Committee ratified and "regularised" the impugned resolution and recom mended the name of defendant No.

5. Having regard to the fact that the learned District Judge of Dacca had modified the prohibitory order passed by the learned Munsif, in so far as it related to the Selection Committee, there was no illegality, apart from its impropriety, on the part of the Selection Committee in holding its meeting, as stated above, and in defendant No. 5 appearing before the said Selection Committee. I now come to the main events which have led to the present application. Defendant No. 2, the Vice‑Chancellor of the University of Dacca, soon after the meeting of the said "Selection Committee", summoned a meeting of the Syndicate in which he directed inclusion of the recommendation of the Selection Committee, with reference to the impugned resolution of the 16th of October 1965, in a "supplementary" agenda. Item No. 16 in the said supplementary agenda ran thus: "Recommendations of the Selection committee held on the 15th December 1965, for appointment of a Reader in Economics. (With reference to S. M. (Syndicate Minute) of the 16th October 1965). (The recommendations will be placed before the Syndicate)." It is important to note that by directing the aforesaid Item No. 16 to be included in a supplementary agenda, the Vice- Chancellor deliberately invited the Syndicate, during the pendency of the suit and while the modified injunction subsisted, to confirm and approve the very resolution which was the subject‑matter of the controversy awaiting adjudication before the learned Munsif who had restrained the opposite‑parties from taking "any step" affecting the "status" of the petitioner whose case was that the resolution had affected his status. This is the first step taken by defendant No. 2 (Vice -Chancellor) in violation of the order passed by the learned Munsif. Inviting the Syndicate to consider the resolution of the 16th October is a "step" towards affecting the status of the petitioner, It may be re‑called that the impugned resolution of the 16th October which was impeached in the suit, included a higher salary as given to defendant No. 5, Dr. K. T. Hossain. The "Selection Committee", mentioned above,, merely ratified the impugned resolution. It has been submitted that an attempt to get the impugned resolution, as ratified by the "Selection Committee", approved by the Syndicate, amounts to an attempt in breach of the injunction issued by the learned Munsif, to affect the "status" of the petitioner. The matter was not included in the original agenda circulated to the members of the Syndicate, but, was, as a result of the direction given by the Vice‑Chancellor, included as item No. 16 in the above‑mentioned "supplementary" agenda. This item was, in fact, taken up for consideration by the Syndicate at its meeting on the 18th of December 1965. The petitioner has averred, and the averment is not denied by the opposite‑parties, that opposite‑party No. 10 namely, the Registrar of the University of Dacca, cautioned the Syndicate as to the subsistence of a prohibitory order passed by the learned Munsif. Notwithstanding this, the Syndicate proceeded to consider this very item, which was the main subject‑matter of dispute before the learned Munsif. The Syndicate affirmed and approved the very self‑same resolution on the 16th of October 1965, whose vires was challenged in the suit. There can be no room for doubt that the matter, to which the Syndicate addressed itself, was sub, judice between the parties in the Court of the learned Munsif. By removing the controversy before `itself, the Syndicate, at the invitation of the Vice‑Chancellor, practically disposed of the suit. Not being satisfied with re‑affirmance of what was contested in the suit, the Syndicate proceeded to clinch the issue when it passed the final part of the resolution of the 18th of December by which defendant No. 5 was permanently appointed as a Reader, against the next vacancy. The Syndicate further proceeded to dispense with a Selection Committee in making the permanent appoint ment. Having noticed that item No. 16 in the above‑mentioned supplementary agenda, which was included for consideration of the Syndicate by the Vice‑Chancellor in violation of the operative part of the injunction issued by the learned Munsif, I propose to set out the resolution or resolutions of the 18th of December 1965, which, together with the said Item No. .16 of the supplementary agenda are the material particulars of the alleged breach of the aforesaid injunction. The resolutions read thus: "RESOLVED: That in pursuance to the resolution of the Syndicate adopted at its meeting held on the 16th October 1965 and as recommended by the Selection Committee at its meeting held on the 15th December 19651 the appointment of Dr. K. T. Hosain as a temporary Reader in Economics on an initial salary of Rs. 1,050 p.m. in the scale of Rs. 750‑75‑1,200 E.B.‑75‑1,500, be confirmed. "RESOLVED further: That, in view of the fact that Dr. K. T. Hosain had to forego a permanent appointment of a Reader in Economics in the Rajshahi University on the same pay, i.e. Rs. 1,050 p.m. to accept this temporary post, he be appointed on a permanent basis when a permanent vacancy in the Readership" occurs without reference to the Selection Committee." Now, can there be any doubt that the act of including item No. 16 in the agenda and the aforesaid resolutions violate and contravene the injunction. The second part of the aforesaid resolutions is, to say the least, a curious act because an appointment presupposes a vacancy in a post or, at least, a vacancy in sight, but it does not contemplate a vacancy, in future, which may or may not occur. What was the purpose of such a strange course of action? As admitted in the written objection filed before the learned Munsif, and denied before us, it was done in fulfillment of a commitment that was previously made by the Vice‑Chancellor to defendant No.

5. In the written objection, filed before the learned Munsif, on behalf of the Vice‑Chancellor and the Syndicate, the said objective was admitted. But, be that as it may, what is directly in issue in the present application is the fact that the second part of the resolution, namely, the one by which defendant No. 5 was permanently appointed as a Reader against a future vacancy, constitutes a deliberate and flagrant violation of the prohibitory order, issued by the learned Munsif. The participant in the second resolution (dated the 18th December 1965) were all the members of the Syndicate, who were apprised of the order by opposite‑party No. 10, and on whose behalf (the Vice‑Chancellor and the Syndicate) the suit and subsequent applications were contested. Defendant No. 2, the Vice‑Chancellor, had caused a written objection to be filed on behalf of himself and on behalf of the Syndicate. The parties concerned had direct and implied knowledge of the prohibitory order. It would be seen that the learned District Judge, having vacated the portion of the prohibitory order, as mentioned above, namely, that which related to the Selection Committee, and to defendant No. 5, who was no longer restrained from appearing before it, petitioner approached this Court, in its civil revisional jurisdiction, for a rule nisi calling upon the opposite‑parties to show cause why the impugned modification should not be vacated. The said application by the petitioner to this Court sought to restore the operation of the entire order as passed by the learned Munsif, a substantial part of which was, and still is, intact and fully operative. On petitioner's application, a rule nisi, was issued by this Court and, during the pendency of the said rule nisi, a meeting of the said Selection Committee, as stated above, was held, resulting in the recommendation which has been also set out hereinbefore. Technically, however, no interim order having been made by this Court, there was no illegality in holding a meeting of the Selection Committee, apart from the propriety of such a meeting. But, in any event, the plain and simple effect of what remained of the prohibitory order is, that uptil this day the prohibitory order against the Vice‑Chancellor and the Syndicate, of which the Vice‑Chancellor is the Chairman, is still in operation. What then is the subsisting part of the injunction? It may be stated thus: "Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 are restrained from taking any, step affecting the status of the plaintiff till the disposal of the suit." . It should be remembered that the word is not "changing", but "affecting" and, the distinction must be borne in mind. Now, the gist of petitioner's case in the suit is that the previous resolution of the 16th October "affects" his status. Affirming and approving the said resolution of the 16th October by a subsequent resolution of the 18th December is a positive "step" calculated to "affect" the status of the petitioner in relation to defendant No.

5. The second part of the resolution, dated the 18th December is a decisive and definite "step" "affecting" the status of the petitioner who has been thus debarred from being a candidate for the next permanent vacancy. The inclusion of item No. 16 is also a "step" in the same direction. Being hit by item No. 16 of the agenda and the consequent resolutions, dated the 18th December 1965, passed by the Syndicate, the petitioner approached this Court for a committal of the opposite‑parties for contempt on information s set out in the petition and on grounds fully mentioned therein. The petition was sought to be moved before a Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Abdulla. The Bench being, otherwise busy, directed the petitioner to move the petition before a Bench presided over by Mr. Justice K. M. Hasan, who, sitting with Mr. Justice A. S. Chowdhury, had the necessary authority to entertain the application. I was then not even conscious of what the application contained nor did my learned Brother know what it was 'about. I gave this direction to the learned Advocate for the petitioner on the 3rd of December 1965. But, on the 4th of December 1965, that is, the very next day, learned Advocate for the petitioner Mr. Hafez, came back to the Bench presided over by the Chief Justice stating that Mr. Justice Hasan had sent him back with a direction to move the application before a senior Bench. I thought that I would not be justified in sending the petitioner from one Bench to another ‑and decided to hear the application'. On reading the petition, and, upon hearing learned Advocate for the petitioner, the Bench, for the first time, received the information contained in it. Abdulla, J. and I took a very serious view of the matter, in the context of circumstances, which were brought to the notice of the Court. We viewed with grave anxiety a growing tendency to flout an order passed by a Subordinate Court. It was patent that our duty was to investigate the matter and to punish such contempt‑ with a firm hand, if the allegations were proved. Our duty was all the more imperative because similar allegations are pending investigation in this Court with regard to some other cases. A Rule nisi, was thereupon issued in obedience to a judicial duty which this Court was called upon to perform. Initially, the Division Bench, which had, in the first instance, heard this application, allowed three weeks' time for the return of the Rule nisi knowing full well that a shorter period would have been enough. This was done in the vain hope that the, interval would cause some cool deliberations in the minds of the opposite‑parties, who may be impelled to make amends for the wrong alleged to have been done by them. On the expiry of three weeks, that Bench (over which I had presided) allowed a few more days before putting the matter, on the peremptory list, for hearing on the 31st December 1965. A larger Bench was not, till then constituted, again in the vain hope that due respect would be shown to the legal processes of a Court of law, which may be that, of a Munsif, but which is nevertheless, within the limits of its jurisdiction, as much a Court as any Court in this country. Not having received any affidavit‑in‑opposition on the 31st December the Bench further sensed a meaningful silence on the part of the opposite‑parties. Mr. Asrarul Hussain, learned Counsel for the opposite‑parties, only asked for further time to show cause. The prayer for extension of time, at that late interval, was not very reasonable. The Bench would have been within its rights to refuse such a prayer, but, it was felt that in dealing with bodies of persons like those who were opposite‑parties before us, a further indulgence might not be inappropriate. We allowed sufficient interval for filling affidavits on behalf of the, opposite‑parties and gave a shorter period to the petitioner for giving a reply. This was done, once more, with a somewhat fading hope, that the opposite‑parties might still take suitable steps which might, in all likelihood, obviate the unsavoury course to which this Court was eventually driven in the discharge of duties to which it had committed itself by its office and by the oath it had taken. The opposite‑parties, however, employed the interval in a premature and misadvised venture in making an abortive application to the Supreme Court of Pakistan instead employing the "cooling" period, allowed by this Court in a more profitable direction and in an appropriate mood of chastened sobriety. Petitioner asked for permission to file formal documents, namely, the plaint, written objection and some other papers which were filed in the Court of the learned Munsif. Such a prayer was granted, reminding the parties that, if the matter was pressed to a hearing on the merits of the case, it must be heard with. due expedition. Once again, we, in vain, looked for some expression of regret on the part of the opposite‑parties, that is, a becoming ventilation of sorrow, which arises out of higher sense of civic duty for having done an act which is being construed as causing obstruction to the course of justice, Finding that all lingering expectation of a happier ending of the case had vanished and that the attitude of the opposite- parties was adamant I felt that a larger Bench should be constituted in the best interest of the case. I felt that for ends of justice the assistance of a few more colleagues would be helpful to everybody concerned in the case pending before us. This is the genesis of the constitution of the present Bench. When we started hearing the application there was an addition to the array of lawyers who appeared on behalf of the opposite- parties, in the person of Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury, who argued on their behalf at the hearing of the Rule nisi. Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury did not canvass before us some of the points, which were taken on behalf of the opposite- parties, in their affidavits, defences which have become out moded and which were exploded long ago. At an earlier stage, the Bench which had issued the Rule nisi, made it clear to counsel for the opposite‑parties that the view taken by this Court was that if the averments in the petition were proved, it would amount to serious obstruction to the course of justice. That Bench had given due intimation to the opposite‑parties as to the nature of the charge involved against them having regard to the serious nature of the allegations that have been made in the present application. In order that this Court may acquaint itself, to the fullest extent, as to what had transpired in regard to this case, the Court directed that the Vice‑Chancellor of the Dacca University, the Registrar of the said University and Mr. Md. Nurul Huda, who is a Deputy Attorney‑General of Pakistan, to file separate affidavits. There has been only a superficial, literal and an indirect compliance with this direction because the said opposite- parties have practically evaded pledging directly their own oath in respect of the affidavit, that was filed on behalf of the other opposite‑parties although they have subscribed to it in an oblique manner. The Vice‑Chancellor and Mr. Nurul Huda merely adopted the aforesaid affidavit. The Registrar of the University of Dacca did file an affidavit, which included matters as to which the Vice‑Chancellor only was competent to pledge his testimony. What was done by the opposite‑parties, viz., the Vice‑Chancellor of Dacca University and Mr. Nurul Huda, was merely to adopt, wholesale, the affidavit, which was, filed by the Registrar. The affidavits filed on behalf of the opposite‑parties, are, furthermore, punctuated with rather intemperate vitupera tions, which contrast with the comparative sobriety displayed in the application submitted by the petitioner. In view, of the circum stances, enumerated above. I unhesitatingly accept the statements made by the petitioner in preference to those filed by the opposite -parties whose affidavits do not inspire as ;ouch confidence as the petition and affidavits submitted by the petitioner. With this preface I shall now indicate, discuss and dispose of, seriatim, the points which were pressed before us on behalf of the opposite‑parties. In the first place, it was sought to be argued that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to pass the prohibitory order that was made; but, Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury, eventually, placed this argument from the point of view of excess of jurisdiction rather than a total want of it. He described the order as improper and, in that sense, illegal. The first question is: Had the learned Munsif jurisdiction to make the order? On this question the law is clear and well‑settled. The questions which must be asked in this behalf are only two. Now, the first question which has to be posed is: Had the Court jurisdiction to decide the subject‑matter of the controversy? The answer is, yes. The next, and the only other, question is: Were the parties to the suit amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court? Again, the answer is, yes. If both the questions are answered affirmatively, the order' must be obeyed. In High on "injunctions", (Fourth Edition) the proposition is stated thus at page 1426: "And upon proceedings for contempt in this class of cases the only legitimate inquiry is whether the Court granting the injunction had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject- matter, and whether it made the order which has been violated; and the Court will not, in such proceedings, consider whether the order was erroneous." if the subject‑matter of the suit and the parties are within the jurisdiction of the Court, then it must be held that the Court has jurisdiction to make the order as distinguished from its propriety or legality on other grounds. What is the suit which the plaintiff had instituted? The plaintiff (petitioner) had asked for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from giving effect to the impugned resolution of the 16th of October 1965, and for declaration that the said resolution was, illegal, void and passed without lawful authority. The. most effective remedy would have been the injunction if the plaintiff had succeeded in the suit. The declaration which was asked for in the suit would be an ancillary, though a vital, relief. The two prayers must be read together and understood from the point of view of the reliefs which the petitioner was seeking. The sequence in which the reliefs were claimed is not the decisive factor in this behalf. In the case Md. Nabi Shirazi v. The Province of Bengal (A I R 1942 Cal. 343) where there was a prayer for such a declaration as well as a prayer for an injunction, it was held that the prayer for declaration was an ancillary relief to the prayer for injunction which must be taken to govern the nature of the suit itself. It, therefore, follows that under Order XXXIX, rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, the learned Munsif had jurisdiction to issue the injunction as given by him with a view to restrain the defendants from a repetition or continuance of an injury to a right claimed by the plaintiff. Whether the order is improper, erroneous or irregular and, even, illegal, is a different question altogether. Having regard to the nature of the suit the learned Munsif could grant the temporary injunction as issued by him under either the Specific Relief Act or Order XXXIX, rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure or under an inherent power which has been held to exist insubordinate Courts in an overwhelmingly large number of decisions. I unhesitatingly overrule the contention that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction whatsoever, apart from its propriety or irregularity, to issue the aforesaid prohibitory order which was merely directed to preserve the status quo ante litem till the disposal of the suit itself. At the utmost it could be held to be a voidable order and not one which was void ab initio. What is the effect of the injunction? It sought to restrain the opposite‑parties, in the first place, from taking any step to confirm the impugned resolution which must necessarily affect the "status" of the plaintiff in relation to defendant No. 5 and also affect the subject‑matter of the suit as to which the learned Munsif was in seisin. I am compelled to decide this question as it is directly in issue in this application with a caution that the District Judge of Dacca, before whom an appeal is pending, is free to take a different view. I have approached the question from a different standpoint. With regard to any other alleged impropriety in the order or any other kind of, imputed illegality, I have not given my views. It would also be seen that the question whether section 55 of the Ordinance relating to the University would operate as a bar to the suit, was also negatived by the learned Munsif. Whether ultimately, on an analysis of the respective cases and, upon a full investigation of various questions, arising in the suit, it may transpire that the order was erroneous or illegal, is a matter which may be described as erroneous exercise of jurisdiction rather than a want of it. It would become, under such circumstances, a voidable order and not a void order. The law on the subject is that an injunction issued b, a Court must be t implicitly and faithfully obeyed as long as the injunction subsists even if it is illegal until it is vacated by a competent Court. The parties are not permitted to take the law in their own hand or to decide for themselves the legality or propriety of the order or to act on their own view that the order was wrong or erroneous. See, Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Ed. (Hailsham Ed.), Vol. 18, p. 126, para. 186, where the passage runs thus: "The order cannot be disregarded so long at it stands, even though it has been irregularly or erroneously obtained, and it must be obeyed until it is discharged." In Oswald on Contempt, 3rd Ed., p. 107, it, has been observed: "An order irregularly obtained cannot be treated as a nullity, but must be implicitly obeyed, until by a proper application it is discharged." In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed. (Lord Simonds), Vol. 8, it has been stated at page 20: "But if there was jurisdiction to make the order, the question whether it was rightly made on the merits will not be considered" The principle involved has clearly been enunciated in High on "Injunctions", 4th Ed., Vol. II, at pp. 1424‑26 in the following terms: "The granting of injunctions being justly regarded as one of the highest prerogatives of Courts of equity, the most exact and implicit obedience is required from those against whom the mandate of the Court is directed. With whatever irregularities the proceedings may be affected, or however erroneously the Court may have acted in granting the injunction in the first instance, it must be implicitly obeyed so long as it remains in existence, and the fact that it has been granted erroneously affords no justification or excuse for its violation before it has been properly dissolved. And the party against whom an injunction issues will not be allowed to violate it on .the ground of want of equity in the bill, since he is not at liberty to speculate upon the intention or decision of the Court, or upon the equity of the bill, or to question the authority of the Court to grant relief upon the facts stated, except upon application to dissolve the injunction. So if defendant is in doubt as to the scope or extent of the injunction he should not wilfully disregard or violate it with a view of testing such questions, but should apply to the Court for a modification or construction of its order." In Eastern Trust Company v. Mekenzie Mann & Co. Ltd. (A I R 1915 P C 106) it was held that a party is required to approach a Court whenever it is in doubt as to the true meaning of the order as long as it subsists. It was further held that, even if statutory powers are exercised, it must not be exercised in a manner which would amount to a violation of an order issued by a Court. It has been held that even when it is proved that an order should not have been made, it must be obeyed until vacated. See Fennings v. Humphrey (10 L J Ch. 251). An order cannot be disregarded however certain a party may be that the order is erroneous. See Chuck v. Cremer (16 L J Ch. 92). In the case of All India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Sardar Sunder Singh (A I R 1937 Cal. 601) Ameer Ali, J. has observed that one is not justified in disobeying an injunction because he thinks that the order is wrong. It has also been held that an order must be obeyed even if it is issued by mistake. See Woodward v. Lincoln (36 E R 100 L C). It is well‑settled that even an impractical and ill‑conceived order must be obeyed and obeyed implicitly, faithfully and to the letter and spirit of the injunction. See Spokes v. Banbury Board of Health ((1865) 1 Eq. Cas. 42). This is a case in which a private individual had a small plot of land by the side of a river. He obtained an injunction against the Board of Health restraining them from committing nuisance in respect of a parcel of land belonging to him. His grievance was that because of a lack of proper sewage the out‑take of water, which fell into the river polluted the stream and created the impugned mischief. The Board undertook to build the sewage in a manner so as to prevent the nuisance. The Court had issued a prohibitory order. The Board of Health, which was a public body, appointed a company to carry out the aforesaid scheme, but the company failed to do so because it was considered impracticable to deodorise the sewage effectively without inordinate delay and expense. The company and the Board of Health did their best to obey the order of the Court. Besides, there were also other difficulties with regard to the prohibitory order: One difficulty was that it would lead the defendant to commit breaches of other statutes. The result was that the mandatory and the prohibitory order could not be fully obeyed. When the matter was brought before the Court it was held that it was no compliance with the order to say that best efforts were directed towards compliance thereof and, furthermore, that it was no excuse to say that the order would entail financial loss to the generality of the people. It was next held that it would not do to say that the order was impracticable and that it was no answer to a charge of non‑compliance to say that the order in favour of a single individual was disregarded in the interest of a very large body of persons. It was on served that a higher duty required obedience to the processes of law which ultimately served the larger interest of the public. At page 48 of the report, Sir W. Page Wood, delivering the opinion of the Court, has observed: "Although I was not a little surprised to hear an eminent counsel tell me, not precisely that he would advise his clients to commit a wilful breach, but that he would not advise them to do what was necessary to comply with the order of the Court. I confess I was surprised to hear that, and I think it due to the dignity of the Court, to say, that that is not the view which the Court can take of any of its orders; but that the simple and only view is, that an order must be obeyed, and that those who wish to get rid of that order must do so by the proper course, an appeal." In the case of United Telephone Co. v. Dale ((1884) 25 Ch. D 778) the defendant was restrained from selling a particular kind of machine, the spare parts of which were also sold in the market. What was done by the defendant was to sell separately We spare parts which had different names, by themselves so that he may keep within the letter of the prohibitory order and may not be charged with a breach thereof. On a motion for committal on the ground that the acts of the defendants amounted to an indirect violation of the order, it was held that the spare parts which were separately sold in the market could be easily assembled and made into the very machine with regard to which there was a prohibitory order. It was held that the selling of spare parts in the aforesaid manner was within the mischief of the order. The order of a Court is required to be obeyed with meticulous punctiliousness. If any misconception, misapprehension or misgiving arises in respect of the order or if any inconvenience is caused by the order, the Court must be approached to, rectify or modify the order. In the case before us can it be said that the order was not violated? The main and the most important issue for adjudication by the Court was the legality of the very resolution, which the Syndicate had ratified and finalised. What was then left in the suit? What would the learned Munsif decide? It is obvious that the word "status" must be understood with reference to the context in which it has been used. It plainly means "status" inter partes that is such a position as governs the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant No.

5. It would not do to say that there was no express word by which the Syndicate was restrained from finalising the appointment of defendant No. 5, namely. Dr. K. T. Hossain. T he answer is that, that was, in fact, the mandate of the Court and that there is no scope for any misunderstanding on this point. Furthermore, it would not do to say that awarding a higher salary to Dr. K. T. Hossain does not affect the "status" of the petitioner in relation to the former, for that was exactly the case of the petitioner before the learned Munsif. The legality of the appointment of Dr. K. T. Hossain in the manner in which it was made by the impugned resolution of the 16th October was in issue in the suit. The status of the plaintiff in relation to defendant No. 5, in giving the latter a higher salary than that which was received by the former, was directly in issue in the suit. The word "status" must be understood in such a sense and obviously in relation to defendant No.

5. It is not reasonably possible to misconstrue the expression "status" in such a context. Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury has said that the order was vague. I have said enough in the preceding paragraphs to that the order could not be described as vague or incapable of being understood, although it might have been more happily worded. The purport and import to the order could not be misunderstood by any reasonable body of men. It should be remembered that in deciding whether there has been an actual breach it is important to observe the objects for which the relief was granted, as well as the circumstances attending it. And it is to, be observed that violation of, the spirit of an injunction, even though its strict letter may not have been disregarded is a breach of the mandate of the Court (See High on "Injunction", 4th Ed., Vol. II, p. 1456). It should also bet borne in mind that where an injunction is couched in general terms and is not restricted by reference to a particular act, any act causing an injury sought to be prevented will be regarded as a breach. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 21, p. 433, para. 915). In this case the import of the order was easily understandable. Confirmation of the impugned resolution, further consideration of the same and any act towards affirming the higher salary of defendant No. 5, are undoubtedly steps "affecting" the "status" of the plaintiff in relation to defendant No.

5. These were matters in respect of which the opposite- parties were restrained from taking any further step towards their affirmance. But, to appoint defendant No. 5, permanently against the next substantive vacancy in preference to the claim of the petitioner was a flagrant and deliberate "step" towards "affecting" the "status" of the petitioner. The duty of the Syndicate was to obey the injunction or to approach the Court for clarification. If the Syndicate was really in doubt, it should have gone to a competent Court as it did by way of an appeal. It should have awaited its. adjudication. The Syndicate could ascertain the real position from the Court if the order had, in fact, created any difficulty in its mind. It is clear that the requirement of the order was that the Syndicate was enjoined not to do anything which would "affect" the "status" of the plaintiff in relation to defendant No.

5. It is no answer to say that there was no prohibition with regard to the appointment of defendant No.

5. This is exactly the import of the prohibition that was passed by the Court. The order did not prevent the Syndicate from appointing a teacher of the University of London as a Reader of Economics in the University of Dacca. But the order did prevent the Syndicate from making any appointment in respect of defendant No, 5 in the said University the result of which would be to affect the position of the petitioner vis‑a‑vis defendant No. 5 in terms of higher pay and various over matters. It must be remembered that the grievance of the plaintiff was entirely directed towards the appointment of defendant No. 5 in the manner as it was done by the impugned resolution of the 16th of October, that is, in giving him a higher salary than that enjoyed by the petitioner. It should also be remembered that defendant No. 5 was a party to the suit When it is recalled that amongst the opposite‑parties there was, at least, two lawyers, one of them, being the Deputy Attorney‑General of Pakistan, and that the rest were men of not inconsiderable academic position, there can be no room for any doubt that the import of a plain and simple order was fully understood by such body of persons. The act of making a permanent appointment in advance m the manner in which the resolution of the 18th of December was couched, bolted the door against the plaintiff petitioner from competing for the next permanent vacancy. And yet it is claimed that no step was taken which would "affect" the "status" of the petitioner. The affidavit‑in‑opposition, which was merely adopted by the Vice‑Chancellor, disclose an undoubted casuistry which cannot gloss over the truth that the said act was a calculated and a conscious breach of the order passed by the learned Munsif. The sequence of events after the filing of the suit by the petitioner, as disclosed in this case, culminating in the passing of the resolutions of the 18th December which is the subject- matter of the contempt proceedings, see unmistakable circum stances which lead to the irresistible inference that entire course of action was actuated by a desire to forestall the decision which might be given in the suit in direct contravention of the injunction that was passed. The putting of item No. 16 in a "supplementary agenda" and the passing of the resolution of the 18th December in spite of the suit and during the subsistence of the injunction constitute a till‑tale chain of circumstances which speak loudly against the Vice‑Chancellor and the members of .the Syndicate. It was contended that there was no intention on the part of the defendants to violate the order of the Court. The psycholo gical and internal process of the minds of the opposite‑parties must, of necessity be deduced from what they, in fact, did. Besides, if the result of their action is a violation of the mandate, it is immaterial that their motive was uninten tional when the impugned act was intentional and not accidental. A breach of an order passed by a Court would, under the aforesaid circumstances, amount to "wilful dis obedience". "Wilful disobedience" merely excludes accidental, casual and unintentional acts. Unintentional, in this context, means that the impugned act was inadvertent and accidental. If the act was not inadvertent its motive would be irrelevant. It would amount to "wilful disobedience". Reference may be made, in this behalf, to the case of Stancomb v. Trowbridge ((1910) 2 Ch. D 190) where it has been observed that wilful disobedience only excludes, excludes casual, accidental and unintentional acts. It was next argued that where an alternative remedy was available under the Code of Civil Procedure, namely, under Order XXXIX, rule 2, of the Code, which enabled the learned Munsif to enforce obedience to his order, this Court would not exercise its summary jurisdiction to 'proceed by way of committal for contempt. I would like to observe that, in the first place, there is no alternative remedy available to the learned Munsif, in the sense that he had no jurisdiction to punish by way of committal for contempt when the action is looked upon as causing obstruction to the course of justice. That is to say, the learned Munsif could not punish with regard to a criminal contempt for impeding the course of justice. It is this Court and this Court alone which could punish such contempt in, what is called, brevi manu, that is, summarily. The view that we had taken of the, matter was that, if the facts which have been stated in the petition were established, it would amount to causing obstruction to the course of justice. In other words, it would amount to a criminal contempt. The acts committed by opposite‑parties would amount to impeding the course of justice and not merely to a simple disobedience of a judicial order. We have given them notice that we look upon the impugned acts from a different point of view, namely, that they amounted to impeding and obstructing the course of justice. Secondly, the existence of any other kind of power or remedy to visit a recalcitrant person with penalty for disregarding a mandate of the Court. does not bar the jurisdiction of this Court to punish summarily a delinquent who has been proved to be guilty of disobeying an injunction issued by a Court of law. I shall, hereafter, deal with this point more elaborately. While on this topic I may deal with a rather longish argument addressed to us as to what constitutes a civil, as distinguished from a criminal, contempt. The text‑books have discussed the problem threadbare and the distinction is well‑established. Ultimately it boils down to this that if disobedience is dealt with from the point of view of merely enforcing ant order of a Civil Court, it would amount to a civil contempt, but if the same act is viewed from another stand point, that is causing obstruction to the course of justice or if the disobedience amounts to a deliberate disrespect to a Court, it would become a criminal contempt in the sense that it calls for a punitive measure directed towards keeping the streams of justice clear. It is from this point of view, in the light of the circumstances of this case, that the present case must be viewed. This Court had given prior notice to the opposite‑parties that such was the view which this Court had taken of the matter. I may quote the portion of the order dated the 31st of January 1966, which reads thus: "It seems to us that if the allegations made by the petitioner are accepted by the Court, on hearing the cause shown by opposite‑parties and, on full hearing, they would amount to a case of impeding and subverting the course of justice." I may, in this connection, dispose of another point which was canvassed before us on behalf of the opposite‑parties. It was urged that the opposite‑parties must be given notice of the charge they are called upon to meet. But, opposite‑parties had more than sufficient notice of the charge. It is also evident from the affidavits which have been filed on their behalf that they fully understood the import of the case they were called upon to meet. The charge, as stated above, is obstructing or impeding the course of justice and the particulars of the charge are .the aforesaid acts of disobedience of the order of the learned Munsif, in the manner set out in the petition, which has impeded and obstructed the course of justice. There can be no confusion whatsoever with regard to this matter. The charge was clearly formulated and its import is simple and easily comprehensible. Coming back to the question which has been described as an alternative remedy, I would like to say that it is well‑settled that the inherent power of this Court in summarily 'punishing an offender for contempt is available to it notwithstanding the fact that some other kind of remedy is open to the petitioner or the Court whose order has been violated. So far as we are concerned, we have acted more in the interest of the adminis tration of justice than with a desire for merely enforcing the Court's order or for redressing any individual grievance. We have treated the petition filed before us as supplying information to this Court and we have been concerned not so much with a mere enforcement of the order passed by the learned Munsif as with a wilful disregard to judicial process because we have been constrained to feel that the order of a Court has been flouted and flagrantly disobeyed in a manner which is calculated to obstruct and impede the course of justice. We have been impelled to take this step by an imperative sense of duty which we owe to the administration of justice as a matter of an obligation imposed upon us. The Court of a Munsif, acting within its jurisdiction, is as much a Court as, say, for example this Court. If an order is issued by it, it is entitled to as much respect as an order of this Court. The existence of any alternative remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of this Court to convict an offender for contempt of a Court subordinate to it, except when it,, is punishable as contempt under the Penal Code. Reference may be made to the case of Ali Mahomed Adamalli v. Emperor (A I R 1945 P C 147). In the aforesaid case the impugned act was punishable under the Wakf Act for disobedience to an order passed by a Court in pursuance of the said Act. The High Court of Bombay, notwithstanding the Wakf Act; exercised its inherent jurisdiction to punish for criminal contempt a violation of an order made by a Court subordinate to it. The view expressed by Sir John Beaumont, C. J., in the High Court, was fully approved and, in fact, extensively quoted in the opinion delivered by the Board. It was held that the existence of, and alternative mode of enforcement of an order did not oust the High Court's inherent power to punish by way of committal for contempt although the existence of an alternative remedy is at matter which the Court will consider in deciding whether or no, it would act under its summary power of committal for contempt. In the aforesaid case the Court did exercise such power. The same 'view was taken in the case of Official Assignee, Madras v. P. Suryakanthammal (A I R 1938 Mad, 927) which is a judgment of a Special Bench of the Madras High Court in which it was held that the High Court had an inherent power to commit a person for contempt notwithstanding the remedy provided by section 58 (5) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act of 1909. There are a number of decisions to the same effect; but, what I have stated above, is sufficient to bring home the point that a High Court's inherent jurisdiction in this behalf, is exercisable in spite of an alternative method for enforcing obedience to Court's mandate. It is rather late in the day to urge that this Court has no jurisdiction to punish for contempt a wilful contravention of an order of a Court inferior to it where another ' kind of remedy exists for enforcement of an order passed by a subordinate Court. Whatever lingering doubts might have persisted in this connection have been set at rest by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, subsection (1) of section 2 whereof expressly declares the inherent power of a High Court to punish for disobedience of its own order or an order made by a Court inferior to it. This, to my mind, clinches the issue and the argument to the contrary is without any substance whatsoever. Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury has next founded his argument on a somewhat different footing. He has urged, that the existence of other kinds of remedy should produce in the High Court a self‑imposed limitation on its own power. We are not unmindful of the fact that we are exercising a jurisdiction of an exceptional kind. We are also not unconscious of the fact that the assumption of such jurisdiction places the opposite- parties in a much more inconvenient position than they would have faced if they were called upon to meet an ordinary charge with regard to a criminal offence under the Penal Code. We are, furthermore, aware of the fact that contempt proceedings in the High Court are' in brevi manu, that is, summary. We are again alive to the fact that such jurisdiction should not be lightly assumed. It is because of such consciousness that I constituted a larger Bench of five Judges to hear this case. It is because of these considerations that this Court had adjourned the case from time to time in the hope that in the event of an appropriate expression of regret and remorse no punitive action need be taken. In spite of our best endeavour to avoid the unpalatable course that this case has taken, we have been forced to perform an unpleasant but imperative duty in furtherance of the ends of justice. Such disobedience as has been disclosed in this case can no longer be lightly brushed aside. I have viewed, with no small measure of consternation, a growing tendency on the part of responsible persons to ignore an order passed by a subordinate Court. The High Court exercises superintendence and control over such subordinate Courts. It prevents such Courts from exceeding their jurisdiction or from committing a 'material irregularity in the exercise of such jurisdiction. This Court's jurisdiction of supervision and control over Courts subordinate to it imposes a corresponding obligation to punish, in a suitable manner, an act calculated to undermine the dignity and authority of such subordinate Courts. It has been next urged on behalf of the opposite‑parties that the prohibitory order was not personally served on the defendants. Personal service of an injunction is, for obvious reasons, the normal requirement of law. But, to make a fetish of it is unwarranted either on authority or on principle. The import of the general rule is frequently misunderstood. It is clear that if a person is required to carry out an order, he must be acquainted with it. In the vast majority of cases the normal defence is that the answering defendant is unaware of the order. In such cases service of the order is the only means by which knowledge can be effectively, brought home to parties affected by the injuction. Personal service of the order, in such eventua lities, is the only effective mode of proving knowledge of the order. One cannot be fixed with a liability for breach of an order about which he has no knowledge. But, if it is proved that the person bound by the injunction had, in fact, actual notice thereof, he cannot take the defence that the order was not personally served on him. This proposition cannot be contested. In: In re Bryant ((1876) 4 Ch. D 98) it was held that service of the order need not be proved, if it was shown that the party had actual notice of the order aliunde as by a telegram, newspaper report or otherwise. In United Telephone Co. v. Dale it was held that actual service of the order was not essential if it was proved that the party knew of the order. In Seaward v. Paterson ((1897) 1 Ch. 545) it was held, inter alia, that if it was proved that an order was known to a party, it was immaterial that a copy of the judgment was not put into his hands. R. v. Dignam ((1835) 4 Dowl. 359) is an authority for the proposition that where there is reason to believe that the order has come to the knowledge of the party affected by it, an attachment will be granted, although strict personal service has not been effected. The position has been very lucidly explained in Spelling on "Injunctions and other Extraordinary Remedies", Vol. II; 2nd Ed., at pp. 952 and 955 in paras. 1122 and 1124. The passages are in the following terms: 1122. "In order to subject a party to punishment in contempt proceedings, it is necessary that if be shown that he has had' notice of the contents of the restraining order or writ of injunction, at least to the extent of imparting to him the knowledge that the acts imputed to him were prohibited therein. Such notice may be official or unofficial. The former is imparted in substantial conformity to existing statutes on the subject of service of injunctions or process generally. But where a party is in a Court, and hears an order of injunction pronounced, he is as much bound as if he had actually been served with the writ. And where an order of injunction forms part of a decree rendered in regular course, upon issue joined by answer, the parties to the suit are bound to take notice thereof, without being served with a certified copy of the decree." 1124. "It is well‑settled that a party is guilty of punishable contempt who violates an injunction order or decree of which he has actual, though not official, notice. Thus, a notice by telegraph as to the granting of an injunction is sufficient to place the party disregarding such notice in contempt, provided the notice was entitled to credit, and informed the defendant clearly and plainly from what act he must abstain." In High on "Injunctions", Vol. II 4th Ed., p. 1455, para. 1444, it has been stated: "It is sufficient for the Court to know that the person enjoined had actual knowledge of its order." In Oswald on "Contempt", 3rd Ed., it has been observed at page 108: "But actual service is not essential if it is shown that the party knew or might have known of the order." Again, at page 203 there is a passage which' runs thus: "In order to justify committal for breach of a prohibitive order it is not necessary that the order should have been served upon the party against whom it has been granted, if it be proved that he had notice of the order aliunde." This point has been fully explained and stated by Pearson, J. in United Telephone Company v. Dale as follows: "Although the order has been drawn up, passed and entered, it has never been served upon the Defendants, and the rule relied upon is that which is thus stated in the text‑books (but, for the reasons which I am about to give, I think stated wrongly), that in no case, after an injunction has been granted, and there has been sufficient time to pass and enter the order and to serve it, will the Court commit the defendant to prison for a breach of the injunction, unless the order has been served upon him . . . . . But I do not believe the rule to be, and I shall not act upon the rule as it has been stated to me, that in no case will the Court enforce obedience to its injunction by means of a committal to prison, simply upon the ground that the order has not been served, when it appears beyond all doubt or dispute that the defendant is aware that the injunction has been granted, and that it ' is the intention of the plaintiff to enforce it . . . . . . " I think that the decision of my brother Mr. Justice Kay, .in Avory v. Andrews 30 W R 564 was perfectly right. In that case it was not disputed that the defendant knew perfectly well that in what they were doing they ‑were violating the order of the Court, and Mr. Justice Kay, therefore, refused to attend to the objection that the order had not been served. He said, distinctly in so many words, when that objection was raised, `but you did know of it', and I say the same thing here. The Court would be to a great extent incapable of doing its duty to itself, as well as to Her Majesty's subjects, if it were to say, that, with perfectly accurate knowledge of the order of the Court, a defendant is at liberty to defy the Court's authority, and then come to the Court and say, `You cannot visit me for that breach of your order, because the order has not been served upon me:' What is the necessity of serving an order upon a defendant, if he knows perfectly well without that service what it is which he is bound to obey? " . . .I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion, that the service of the order was unnecessary, and that there has been a most flagrant and discreditable breach of the injunction; and I should be declining to do the duty which I owe to all the public, sitting here as, the Judge of this Court, if I did not grant the present application . . . . . ." Lastly, I may add that, in keeping with the aforesaid observations and decisions, the case of C. P. Syndicate v. K. P. Ghiara (A I R 194.7 Bom. 468) has fully exploded the misleading myth that there can be no power of committal for breach of an order, which has not been served upon the defendant. What really matters is that the party sought to be restrained must be ‑proved to be, in fact, and, in reality, acquainted with order although the same was not served upon him, when there is nothing in the conduct of the person, who obtained the, order, to indicate that he did not mean to enforce the same. In the present case there has been a positive averment, in the petition filed before us that all the opposite‑parties knew of the order and, furthermore, that opposite‑party No. 10, namely, the Registrar of the University of Dacca, had also apprised them of the order. There is no denial of this assertion. Then again, all the opposite‑parties contested the issuance of the order by filing a joint written objection, except Dr. K. T. Hossain, who filed a separate written objection. One of the opposite‑parties in respect of the application for obtaining the prohibitory order is the Syndicate itself, represented by its Chairman, the Vice‑Chancellor. It is argued that individual members of the Syndicate were not parties to the suit and that they cannot, therefore, be fastened with violation of the order. This is correct as far as it goes; but, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, all the members of the Syndicate have been properly brought into the suit as represented by the Vice‑Chancellor, namely, the Chairman of the Syndicate. The Vice‑Chancellor directed the filing of the written objection on behalf of defendants 1 to

4. The opposite‑parties, the members of the Syndicate, do not say that the Vice‑Chancellor had no authority to represent them. Therefore, it must be assumed that the members of the Syndicate were, in fact, represented by the Vice‑Chancellor, as Chairman of the said body, who caused a written objection to be filed on their behalf. It is true that, in the case of a company, the Directors are not individually bound by an order merely because the company has been made a party when the Directors were not themselves individually brought into the suit. But, the Directors, as such, could be sued through a representative if the representation is accepted. In the present case a "statutory" body, in the sense that it has been created by a Provincial Ordinance relating to the University of Dacca with functions assigned to it by the said Ordinance, that is, the Syndicate has been sued as represented by its Chairman, the Vice‑Chancellor. The Syndicate is a juristic personality created by law and charged with functions enumerated and defined by the same. It is certainly a body corporate in a jurisprudential connotation of the term although the Ordinance does not specifically say so. The Ordinance also does not say that it shall not be deemed to be a body corporate. The relevant enactment does not indicate the manner in which that body can sue or be sued, although it has been indicated how the University of Dacca can sue or be sued. In the absence of any statutory indication as to how a corporate body is to be sued, it must be done according to the best mode which the exigency of the situation demands or requires: This is a situation which is parallel to what happened in the case of Rorke v. Russell (2 Lans (N Y) 242) noted at page 956, para. 1125 of Spelling on "Injunction", Vol. II, 2nd Ed. In that case, in an action against a joint stock company represented by its president there was service on him of an injunction restraining him as president of the association, from doing a certain act. It was held that it was sufficient notice to individual members of the joint stock company who knew of the service and the contents of the injunction to render them liable for contempt. The passage runs thus: "And in an action against the president of a stock company, service on him of an injunction restraining him, `as president of the association, its officers and members' from doing a certain act, is sufficient service on those members who know of the service and the contents of the injunction to render them amenable for contempt if they violate its prohibition." In the present case the University of Dacca was sued and the Syndicate itself was also expressly sued, as represented by its Chairman, the Vice‑Chancellor. The Vice‑Chancellor was also impleaded individually as a defendant. Therefore, the principle which I have indicated above, applies fully to the present case. It is true that if a company is merely sued, as such, without impleading the Directors individually, then the Directors, in their individual capacity, cannot be fastened with liability for breach of an order that is passed; but, if the Board of Directors are impleaded, making its President, the representative, through whom the Board is sued, then the individual Directors of the company cannot absolve themselves from a direct liability. See Rorke v. Russel as quoted above. In any event, individually, the opposite‑parties cannot disown knowledge of the impugned order. Since they had actual notice of the order, they are bound by it, although they were not personally served with notice. I have said enough in the preceding pages to indicate that actual knowledge of the order is enough even where no official notice is given. It is said that individual members of the Syndicate, who were not parties either to the suit or to the proceedings which led to the issuance of the prohibitory order including the Vice- Chancellor cannot be held to be responsible for such disobedience. It is also said that as the opposite‑parties had collectively acted on behalf of the University of Dacca, namely, defendant No. 1, no action can be taken in the present proceeding as the petitioner did not impleaded defendant No. 1 and because no rule was issued against the said defendant, the University of Dacca. The answer is that equity acts in personam and, therefore; the opposite‑parties have been properly impleaded in the present petition. The same would be the answer in respect of the Vice‑Chancellor, who had, furthermore, undoub tedly directed the inclusion of item No. 16 in the Supplementary Agenda of the Syndicate. I have 'already noticed that the opposite‑parties, under the circumstances of the present case, must be held to have directly violated the order of which they had full knowledge as to its contents and import. The Syndicate (a legal body created by the aforesaid Ordinance) was specifically restrained by, a prohibitory order, being impleaded through its representative, namely, its Chairman, the Vice- Chancellor. The Syndicate filed a written objection through its Chairman, the above‑named Vice‑Chancellor, opposing the issuance of the said prohibitory order. The representation of the Vice‑Chancellor has not been disowned by the members of the Syndicate. I must; in this context, dispel a misconception which has frequently recurred in course of the arguments addressed to this Court, namely, that the Syndicate is not a "juristic person". Sections 21 and 22 of the Dacca University Ordinance of 1961 specifically deal with the formation, consti tution, powers and duties of the Syndicate which is a mere creature of law. Be that as it may, there is no escape from the position that, if actual knowledge of the prohibitory order is brought home to the parties, the Vice‑Chancellor would be guilty of disobeying the order in violation thereof and the rest of the members of the Syndicate would, in any event, be guilty of aiding and abetting the same. The leading case on the subject is the case of Seaward v. Paterson where it has been held that a Court has an undoubted jurisdiction to commit for contempt a person, not included in an injunction order and not a party to the action, who knowing of the injunction or the order, wilfully aids and abets in committing a breach thereof. Rigby, L. J., has observed that he was astonished that such a jurisdiction was questioned at that late stage in 1897. At page 558 of the report mentioned above, Rigby, L. J. observed thus: "That there is a jurisdiction to punish for contempt of Court is undoubted. It has been exercised for a very long time‑for longer than any of us can remember‑and it is a punitive jurisdiction founded upon this, that it is for the good, not of the plaintiff or of any party to the action, but of the public, that the orders of Court should not be disregarded and that people should not be permitted to assist in the breach of those orders in what is properly called contempt of Court. It is astonishing to me to find that jurisdiction questioned at this date." Again, at page 559 of the said report it was stated: "Now, with reference to the argument that this jurisdiction is only to be exercised for the benefit of the plaintiff, it is quite true that, in cases of this kind, the Court does not act of itself. It is again quite true that there is no public informer or public officer, charged with the duty of bringing before the Court cases of contempt, and in the vast majority of cases it is upon the information brought by a party to an action that the Court entertains the question of committing for contempt. But I entirely dissent from the suggestion that when once the Court is seised of the matter any party to the action can exercise any influence whatever. The Court acts upon its own jurisdiction and upon its own authority, though doubtless it would have due regard to the wishes and feelings of the person who has brought the matter before it. It is perfectly clear, I think, that the cases in which the plaintiff or a party litigant can waive a right have nothing to do with a case like the present. I have no doubt whatever of the jurisdiction here; and I have no doubt that the facts call for an exercise of that jurisdiction; and although, no doubt, the Court must be very careful how it acts in matters where the discretion is so wide, and the jurisdiction so extensive and important, I do not question for a moment that this is one of those cases in which the jurisdiction ought to be exercised, and the sentence ought to be an exemplary one; for I have no doubt whatever that the aiding and abetting in breach of the injunction here on the part of Murray was both wilful and in a high degree reprehensible. I cannot think that the committal which North, J. has pronounced against him was in any way excessive; and I do not think we ought to interfere." At page 554 of the aforesaid report Lindley, L. J., has given the following opinion: "Now, let us consider what jurisdiction the Court has to make an order against Murray. There is no injunction against him‑he is no store bound by the injunction granted against Paterson than any other member of the public. He is bound, like other members of the public, not to interfere with, and not to obstruct, the course of justice; and the case, if any, made against him must be this‑not that he has technically infringed the injunction, which was not granted against him in any sense of the word, but that he has been aiding and abetting others in setting the Court at defiance, and deliberately treating the order of the Court as unworthy of notice. If he has so conducted himself, it is perfectly idle to say that there is no jurisdiction to attach him for contempt as distinguished from a breach of the injuction, which has a technical meaning. Mr. Seward Brice has endeavoured to persuade us that there is no such jurisdiction; and that the only course‑to pursue would be to proceed against him by indictment. I confess that it startled me, as an old equity practitioner, to hear the jurisdiction contested upon the facts in this case. It has always been familiar doctrine to my brother Rigby and myself that the orders of the Court ought to be obeyed, and could not be set at naught and violated by any member of the public, either by interfering with the officers of the Court, or by assisting those who were bound by its orders." At page 555, he proceeds to say: "The law is defined in a way which is familiar to anybody accustomed to the procedure in Chancery. A motion to commit a man for breach of an injunction, which is technically wrong unless he is bound by the injunction, is one thing; and a motion to commit a man for contempt of Court, not because he is bound by the injunction by being a party to the cause, but because he is conducting himself so .as to obstruct the course of justice, is another and a totally different thing. The difference is very marked. In the one case the party who is bound by the injunction is proceeded against for the purpose of enforcing the order of the Court for the benefit of the person who got it. In the other case the Court will not allow its process to be set at naught and treated with contempt. In the one case the person who is interested in enforcing the order enforces it for his own benefit ; in the other case, if the order of the Court has been contumaciously set at naught the offender cannot square it with the person who has obtained the order and save himself from, the consequences of his act. The distinction between the two kinds of contempt is perfectly well known, although in some cases there may be a little difficulty in saying on which side of the line a case falls," Then again, at page 556 he adds: ' "He knew perfectly well that what was objected to and was restrained was making a disturbance by betting. Very likely he did not intentionally do anything which he thought would get himself sent to gaol. He would not be so foolish. But he knew very well what the objections were, and; there is not the slightest doubt that what was done was a gross breach of the injunction; and that the Court would be utterly wrong in listening to this appeal. It must accordingly tie dismissed ." A. L. Smith, L. J., has at page 557, expressed himself thus: "The real question to be decided in this case is whether or not Murray, on October 9 and 21, 1896, or either of those dates, was party or privy to, in other words, aided and abetted Paterson in committing a breach of the injunction which North, J. had granted on July 15, 1896. As regards the law, I have myself no doubt that if a person who knows that an injunction has been granted aids and abets in committing a breach of it the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to commit him for contempt, although he is not a defendant in the action, and is not a person against whom the injunction has been granted. That Murray knew of the injunction is clear." The ratio decidendi of the aforesaid case has been discussed and followed in a decision of a Special Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Official Assignee, Madras v. P. Suryakanthammal and another. The fact that all the defendants had full knowledge of the order passed by the learned Munsif has been fully established. In such a case, failure to effect a personal service of the order is immaterial. It has been proved that the opposite‑parties have wilfully violated the order. They did not ask for an early hearing of the suit. When they preferred the aforesaid appeal against the ad interim injunction issued by the learned Munsif, the petitioner asked for an early hearing of the appeal but, no such anxiety was displayed by the opposite‑parties. If the operation of the order fell harshly on the University they could have pressed before the District Judge that it should be vacated. They should have waited for the disposal of the appeal. They did nothing more than getting a partial modification. Instead of doing that, they arrogated to themselves the function of misinterpreting the order in their own way and, thereafter, proceeded to stifle the suit. In this connection, it would be pertinent to quote the observations of Bacon, C. J. in In re: Bryant, which are thus stated at page 100: "There can be no kind of excuse for the conduct which the sheriff's officer has thought fit to pursue. He knew, or ought to have known, that after notice of an act of bankruptcy he should have suspended his proceedings. There was no urgency in the case; it was rot incumbent on him to sell at once, and it is no reason for his selling to say that he incurred a liability to the execution creditor. It is perfectly clear that he knew that an act of bankruptcy had been committed, and he admits that a telegraphic communication had been made to him before the sale of the fact that an injunction to restrain the sale had been ordered by the Court. He and the auctioneer are b9th equally to blame. They both violated what they must nave known to be the plain law, and proceeded to sell. What may have been the damage caused to the estate I have no means of knowing at present; but it is incumbent upon the Court to insist, for the sake, of justice, and in regard to the rights of creditors, that when injunctions are granted they shall be obeyed. It is an admitted fact that an injunction had been granted, and that the sheriff's officer and the auctioneer after they knew this disregarded it and proceeded to a sale. As soon as the sheriff's officer knew that an injunction had been applied for or was about to be applied for (I do not say that he was bound to take any notice of the intention), without instructions from any body, and without any risk to himself, he could have postponed the sale. But instead of this he chose, in violation of the law and in contempt of the Court, to proceed to a sale, thereby occasioning not only loss but considerable expense to the estate. I am willing to believe that he did not intend to commit a contempt of the Court, but I find that he did wilfully and with full knowledge disobeyed the order." In the present case the Syndicate could wait for a decision of the appeal, which it had preferred and as to which the petition before us asked for an early hearing. It did not do so, but proceeded to "affect" the status of the petitioner vis‑a‑vis Dr. K. T. Hossain by depriving the former of a right to be considered for the next permanent vacancy which was consciously given to the latter; I have already stated that there has been no regret what soever for having committed acts which tend to subvert the processes of justice and to obstract its free and smooth course. This is, to say the least, highly detrimental to the interest of the public, using the expression in the highest sense of the term. With regard to opposite‑party No. 10, namely, the Registrar of the Dacca University, we have also given our anxious consideration as to whether he could be held guilty of dis obedience of the order so as to justify a committal for contempt. He had ver3 nearly crossed the borderland and, it would be no defence to say that he violated the order under compulsion of superior authority. His paramount duty is not to disobey a Court's injunction. But, can it be said that he is guilty of disobedience? He did not, and in fact, could not pass the resolutions, which are held to be within the mischief of .the order. It should be remembered that the Registrar is neither a member of the Selection Committee nor a member of the Syndicate; he is merely an officer of the University and, as such, he cannot participate in passing the impugned resolution. Even the agenda of the Syndicate is prepared under the direction of the Vice- Chancellor. This does not mean that he is totally absolved of any duty whatsoever. The duty of such a person was to faithfully convey the terms of the order to persons, who were bound by it. On the petitioner's own showing he has faithfully discharged such duty. We prefer to give him the benefit of a doubt, which legitimately arises in his favour in the circumstances of the present case. We, therefore, hold and find that opposite‑party No. 10, the Registrar of the University of Dacca, is not guilty of the offence with which we have charged all the opposite‑parties before us. We have endeavoured our very best to take a most dispassionate view of the case. We have taken a detached view of the matter and have approached it from a sense of duty which we must perform. We are fully conscious that the Syndicate is a high‑powered body charged with the responsibility of administering the affairs of one of the foremost teaching corporations of the country. I share the anxiety of the generality of public for its welfare. Most of us ate familiar with this institution which is engaged in a work of seminal consequence to the nation and entertain feelings of reverence and respects, forwards it for it is a sanctified institution which is entrusted with the sacred duty of directing the norms and conduct of the rising generation. I am not unmindful of the natural assumption that the halls of learning are usually surrounded by a serene climate which is conducive ‑to academic pursuits and that the writs of Courts should not be lightly allowed to disturb its placidity. It is sad to reflect that during the past two years this vital teaching corporation, the University of Dacca, has constantly in a series of cases figured as a litigant in this Court and Courts subordinate to it. These have not been the result of the Court's seeking. They were imposed upon us in the course of our normal judicial work. None of us were even aware of the existence of the present suit pending before the learned Munsif and of the facts and circumstances of the present application which were brought to our notice, again, for first time, by the petition that was filed before us. The circum stances of this case have compelled us to take the course we propose to take in obedience to what we consider to be our bounden duty. The higher the 'rank and status of an individual or a corporate body, the greater is the obligation imposed upon such a body or individual not to interfere with the course of justice. Respect for law and authority and for institutions entrusted with the duty of enforcing them is born of a higher sense of duty which impels avoidance of a conduct which is likely to endanger public interest in this behalf. Obedience to law and legal processes is a primary condition of civilised existence. This Court hardly expected such conduct, as was brought to its notice, by a body, like the Syndicate which did not remind itself that its course of action might have the effect of undermining the authority of a Court. At the time when the petition was heard by this Special Bench Mr. Hafez drew our attention to a tendency towards disregarding the authority of the lower hierarchy of Courts. Members of the judiciary subordinate to this Court perform a difficult duty under trying circumstances. It is right and proper that due respect should be shown to them in the performance of their judicial functions. The pious protestations which adorn the affidavits that have been filed by the opposite‑parties are negatived by deliberate acts which amount to disobedience of the fiat issued by a Court. Of what avail is an empty profession which is not reflected in conscious deeds and acts that point to a contrary direction. Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudury has sought to make a distinction between disobedience of an order passed by a Superior Court and violation of an injunction issued by a Court which is not a Superior Court. It is true that the Superior Courts are vested with a considerably greater power and jurisdiction than those which are reposed inferior Courts. But, nevertheless, whenever an order is passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction it is entitled to the same obedience as must be shown in respect of a mandate issued by a Superior Court. Wilful disobedience to a Court's order is contempt and, from this point of view, there is no distinction between a prohibition issued by Superior Courts or an inferior Court, provided that there is jurisdiction to make the order. In the case of a Superior Court there is a presumption as to the existence of the jurisdiction until rebutted. There is, however, no such presumption in the case of an inferior Court; whose jurisdiction must be proved. The distinction ends here. He has cited the case of Sultan Ali, Nanghiana s/o Muhammad Ali v. Nur Hussain (A I R 1949 Lah. 131), which is a decision of Full Bench of the Lahore High Court. This is a case in which certain directions were given to an Election Tribunal, to stay its proceedings in respect of a particular Election case, at a time when the High Court of Punjab was not empowered to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, quo warranto or any direction of a like nature. Such jurisdiction was not then vested in the High Court. On a contest as to whether the High Court had jurisdiction to make the "stay order", the next question, which arose was, whether disobedience to an order made by the High Court under such circumstances, would amount to contempt. The majority of the Bench, which heard the matter, decided that it did not amount to contempt because the Election Tribunal was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court, although the decision might have been different if the High Court had been clothed, at that time, with the same jurisdiction as it had been given under Article 98 of the Constitution or that under the previous Constitution. The aforesaid case is an authority for the proposition that a party is not bound by an order which is wholly outside the jurisdiction of the Court issuing it. It was held that the order was "void". It was a case of total absence of jurisdiction. The order was void and not merely avoidable. Because of the peculiar facts of that case reference was expressly made to Superior Courts. The point canvassed before us was not discussed in that case. There is no difference, in principle, between violation of an order passed by a Superior Court and that issued by an inferior Court from the point of view of the requirement to obey it. Subordinate Courts may not have the power to punish for contempt as, the Superior Courts have but the offence of disobedience is just the same. Viewed from this stand point, a Subordinate Court is as much a Court as the High Court itself. Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury has rightly refrained from pressing a frivolous point enunciated in the affidavits‑in‑opposition namely, that this Court is not a Court of Record. Apart from the Letters Patent of 1865, the Regulating Act of 1773 and the Charter of the Supreme Court of the year 1774 which impart to this Court its inherited jurisdiction as preserved in the High Court (Bengal Order), 1947. Besides, the last mentioned order expressly states in clause 5 that the High Court of East Bengal shall be a Court of Record." What is the import of a Court of Record can be gathered from Halsbury's Laws of England, Oswald on "Contempt" and Mr. Brohi's "Fundamental Laws of Pakistan". A well‑known and popular test is, has the Court the power to punish in contempt for disobedience of its own order? The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, however, settles the matter and reference to Letters Patent has been omitted by an Ordinance of 1949. Since we have heard rather lengthy arguments as to the nature of the jurisdiction we have exercised in this case I would take this opportunity to explain its import and purpose. "Contempt of Court" is an expression, which is usually synonymous with what is described as disobedience to the Court or despising the authority, dignity or justice thereof. It commonly consists in a party doing otherwise than he is enjoined to do, or not doing what he is commanded or required by the process or order of the Court. See Millor v. Knox ((1878) 4 Bing N C 574). As Oswald puts it, these powers are given to the Court to keep the course of justice free: powers of great importance to society; for by the exercise R of such powers law and order prevail. It is the best insurer of the rule of law because those who violate the law and desecrate its streams are shown that the law is irresistible. This "obstruction" to the free flow of justice is known legal phraseology as "contempt" and it has nothing to do with the personal feelings of the Judge. (Oswald on "Contempt", page 9). The law has armed the High Court of Justice with this power and has imposed on it the duty of preventing brevi manu and by summary proceeding, any attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. Per Bowen, L. J. in, In: re Johnson ((1887) 20 Q B D 68). This Court exercises a general superintendence and control over all other Courts within its jurisdiction, and watches over their proceedings, not only to prevent them from exceeding their T jurisdiction or otherwise acting contrary to law, but also to prevent persons from interfering with the course of justice in such Courts. We have tried to discharge that duty. Lord Coleridge, C. J. has observed in the case of In re Maria Annie Davies ((1888) 21 Q B D 236 at p. 240): "Where the Court has given its decision, and the person against whom the Court has decided defies the Court, ignores U its decisions . . . . . however‑reluctant the Court may be to do so, it has, in my opinion, no choice but to enforce its judgment by the imprisonment of the contamacious person." We may add that we had no other choice. Since this Court was addressed on the distinction between a "Civil" and "Criminal" contempt, I may repeat the opinion expressed by Lord Redesdele in 1803, 1 Sch. & L. 169 in the case of In re M Williams at page 174. "There can be no doubt that the thing to be considered is, not the form of the process, but the cause of issuing, it; if the ground of issuing it is debt, it is a process of debt; if the ground be a contempt, as for instance, disobedience to some order of Court, where the object was not to recover a debt by means of the process, the consequence of such a process is in some degree of a criminal nature." In the present case our purpose, in issuing the Rule nisi was, as this Court had initially made it clear, not so much to enforce a right appertaining to the petitioner, as to visit with an appropriate step, a disobedience to an order made by a Court of law. The object of the discipline enforced by Court in case of "contempt" is not to' vindicate the dignity of the Judge in person, but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice or the doing of an act the tendency of which is to deprive the Court of an unfettered course with a view to dispense even‑handed and impartial justice in accordance with law. It is a part of our legal system that the Court should call upon the delinquents, if so found, to answer for the impediment which they have caused to the steady course of judicial administration. The danger of such obstruction is greater in case of ‑inferior Courts, for trey have no such power as we propose to exercise in this case. It is not a new‑fangled jurisdiction, which is purely a creature of Article 123 of the Constitution. It is as old as the system of law which this Court has inherited. The affidavits‑in‑opposition contain a number of frivolous defences, which have been exploded more than hundred years ago. I have no desire to embarrass the lawyer who advised their drafting but, I may remind him that "prolix, frivolous and scandalous pleadings have been held to constitute a contempt on the part of counsel" involved in drafting it. (See Oswald on "Contempt", p. 61). Before parting with the case, I may add that we have sometimes heard, in this Court, an argument that Article 123 of the Constitution is a special kind of constitutional provision which has been re‑declared as a codified constitutional jurisdiction by the present Constitution and that the said Article no longer authorises the Provincial Government under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to remit or suspend any punishment or sentence imposed by a Court. It has been pointed out that such power of remission and suspension of punishments are now exclusively vested in the President, in so far as punishment for contempt is concerned, under Article 18 of the Constitution. . So far as committal for contempt for violation of an order of the High Court itself is concerned, this argument has the strongest possible substance, because the Constitution now provides for "punishment" for contempt and the jurisdiction is directed specifically and expressly towards "a power to impose punishment." The jurisdiction has been described as a jurisdiction "to punish" and "punishment" is the essence and substance of that jurisdiction. No non‑constitutional and non -fundamental law can operate to moderate and mitigate the operation of the Constitution. The Code of Criminal Procedure cannot operate to derogate or to modify the constitutional jurisdiction, which is expressly directed towards "punishment" which is specifically and, in express terms, the gist of the constitutional jurisdiction under Article

123. That is to say, the power of awarding "punishment" is expressly given to the Supreme Court and High Court as a matter of constitutional jurisdiction. In this context, such jurisdiction, namely, the power "to punish" cannot be whittled down or modified by any law, which is not on the same footing as the Constitution itself. The Penal Code of Pakistan or any other Penal Law of the country is on the same footing as the Criminal Procedure Code, which must, if possible, be so construed as to allow it to co‑exist with the former. The principle of co‑existence as a canon of construction has arisen out of the necessity of reconciling laws of equal status so as to obviate a repugnancy, Nevertheless, the rule is artificial in its genesis and application. But, the rule cannot be imported into a competition between a consti tutional provision and a law made by any other ordinary law‑making agency. The Constitution must prevail, in its letter and spirit, against any other law, which is not fundamental like the provisions of the Constitution. In this behalf, it is said, that the President of Pakistan alone can exercise such function under Article 18 of the Constitution, This Article is a relic of the doctrine that the sovereign has an undoubted prerogative of granting pardon or of remission or suspension of a sentence passed as a punishment. It is argued that such sovereign power can now be exercised only by the President who does not share this prerogative with any other authority. In this view of the matter, there is a good deal of substance in the argument that section ‑401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is no longer available to the Provincial Government with regard to punishment imposed by a High Court by way of punishment for contempt under Article 123 of the Constitution It is said that it must be remembered that the co‑existence of the Penal Code and section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code is based on a cardinal requirement of interpretation that laws of a similar status must be made to operate side by side unless they cannot co‑exist. Such a principle cannot be prayed in aid when the Constitution itself is pitted against a non‑fundamental law. There can be no manner of doubt that section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has the effect of moderating operation of the Penal Code, but it is permitted on the doctrine of co‑existence. Such a doctrine is not available in the case of an exercise of a constitutional power. Although this Court has had occasion to hear such arguments, but, inasmuch as it was not expressly made out in this case, we prefer not to give any final opinion in this behalf. In any case, since we ourselves propose to stay the operation of the sentences that we propose to pass in this case for a period of two months the question raised above is irrelevant to the disposal of the case I conclude by saying that when we started hearing this application, an application was filed by Mr. Asrarul Hussain asking us to adjourn the hearing of this case till the disposal of an appeal against the order passed by the learned Munsif which is pending before the District Judge of Dacca. This is rather a tall order particularly, because the points involved in the contempt petition is distinct from those raised in the said appeal, We rejected the application on the ground that the said appeal was entirely irrelevant to the disposal' of the present case, the law being that even if the order is vacated and found it to be voidable, the opposite‑parties will still be guilty of contempt if it is proved that they disobeyed the order while it subsisted, We are not concerned with the question as to whether the order was improper, erroneous, irregular or illegal. The learned District Judge is free to decide the appeal, irrespective of any order that we have passed. The learned Munsif is also free to dispose of the suit pending before him on its merits. Of necessity, we had to decide the question as to whether the prohibitory order passed by the learned Munsif was wholly void, that is, void ab initio, because it was relevant to the disposal of this case. We have, however, refrained from deciding whether the said order was improperly, erroneously, irregularly or illegally issued. The learned District Judge is free to decide these questions which will have no bearing on the points involved in the case before us. The result, therefore, is that we find all the opposite‑parties, excluding opposite‑party No. 10; namely, the Registrar of the University of Dacca, guilty of contempt in causing obstruction to the course of justice by disobedience to the order passed by the learned Munsif. Opposite‑parties Nos. 1 to 9 are convicted accordingly. The rule issued by this Court is thus made absolute, so far as it concerns the said opposite‑parties Nos. 1 to 9, and it is discharged as against opposite‑party No.

10. The order of the Court, therefore, is that having been convicted as aforesaid, opposite‑party No. 1, namely, Mr. M. O. Ghani, Vice‑Chancellor, University of Dacca, do pay a "fine of a sum of Rs. 500 (Rupees five hundred) only, because the main responsibility for the breach must be his. We further direct that opposite‑party No. 2, Mr. Nurul Huda, Treasurer, University of Dacca, do pay a fine of Rs. 400 (Rupees four hundred) because, being the holder of the office of Deputy Attorney- General for the Government of Pakistan, he should have shown a better conduct. We, further, direct that all the rest of the opposite‑parties (again excluding opposite‑party No. 10, the Registrar of the University of Dacca do pay a fine of Rs. 300 (Rupees three hundred) each. In default of payment of the fines, as indicated above, the said opposite‑parties will undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months each. We further direct that the operation of the aforesaid sentences of fine imposed upon the said opposite‑parties, as stated above, be stayed for a period of two months from today. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, we direct that each party do bear its own costs. K. M. HASAN, J.‑I agree. A. S. CHOWDHURY, J.‑I agree. ABDULLA, J.‑I agree. TALUKDAR, J.‑I agree. K. B. A.