2004 PLP 1612 (YLR)

PRTC Depot (Ichhra Lahore) Punjab Government property‑PRTC Depot Ichhra Lahore measuring approximately 75 Kanals, 12 Marlas is offered for sale through sealed bids on "Where is as is "basis. Previously a bid of Rs.235 million for the whole property has been received. For the sale of this property sealed tenders (bids) are invited on the following terms and conditions:‑‑ The sealed bids should essentially be more than Rs.235 million and should reach the office of the undersigned latest by 12‑00 Noon on 8‑10‑2003 (Wednesday). The prospective bidders will have to deposit 10% of their bid as Earnest Money in the form of Bank Draft/Pay Order, payable at National Bank of Pakistan, Shadman Chowk Branch, Lahore in favour of Punjab Privatization Board. No bid shall be accepted if not accompanied by draft/pay order for earnest money. The Earnest Money will be returned if the bid is rejected. All the sealed bids will be opened on 8‑10‑2003 (Wednesday) at 1‑00 p.m. in presence of all the bidders in the office of undersigned under supervision of Auction Committee. Auction Committee will have the right to further negotiate with the bidders. The present highest bidder will have the pre‑emptive right to match the new highest bid. Total payment schedule will stretch over a maximum period of 365 days from the date of issuance of bid approval as detailed below:‑‑‑ 25% of the offered price (including Earnest Money) in the form of Pay Order/Bank Draft payable at National Bank of Pakistan. Shadman Chowk Branch, Lahore within 30 days from the date of issuance of bid approval. Remaining 75% of the total price is to be paid within 90 days of issuance of the approval letter in the form of Pay Order/Bank Draft payable at National Bank of Pakistan, Shadman Chowk Branch, Lahore or in the form of an irrevocable and unconditional Bank Guarantee for the remaining period of the payment schedule from a 1st Class Scheduled Bank which must be en cashable without recourse to any third party. After verification of the said Bank Guarantee or clearance of Pay Order/Bank Draft, all rights to possession and transfer of title shall be vested into the successful bidder, on payment of prescribed stamp duty, registration fee, local and special taxes, if any, by the bidder. Advance Income Tax will not be charged. Any violation of payment schedule would be liable to confiscation/forfeiture of Earnest Money/any other amount deposited. PPB reserves the right to reject any or all the bids/offers without assigning any reason. For further information please contact: Secretary Punjab Privatization Board, Government of the Punjab Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry Building, Second Floor, Awan‑i‑Tijarat Road (Race Course Road), Lahore. Tel 042‑9200529,9200534,5 Fax: 9200538 Web site: http://www.punjabgov.pk./ppb/index.htm E‑mail: privatizationboard@hotmail.com The petitioner being the highest bidder, he was sent a letter on the 24th of September, 2003 by the Deputy Secretary of the Board to the following effect:‑‑ "In accordance with Board decision taken in its 44th meeting to re advertise PRTC Bus Depot Ichhra property, the Punjab Privatization Board has invited through Press (copy enclosed) sealed bids/offers for the sale of subject property. The sealed bids will be received latest by 12‑00 on Wednesday the 8th of October, 2003 and will be opened on the same day at 1‑00 p.m. in the PPB Committee Room in the presence of the bidders under the supervision of Auction Committee. The Auction Committee will have the right to negotiate with all bidders for higher price. If you want to match the highest negotiated bid please participate in the bid opening meeting to be held on the date and time mentioned above. If it is not possible for you to attend the bid opening meeting personally, please depute your representative duly authorized to attend and participate in negotiations on your behalf, failing which you will exhaust the privilege of right to match the highest bid." On the 3rd of October 2003, the petitioner responded to the above letter as under‑ "The Secretary, Punjab Privatization Board, 2nd Floor, Chambers of Commerce Building, Aiwan‑e‑Tijarat (Race Course) Road, Lahore. Subject: Opening of sealed bids invited for the sale of old PTRC Bus Depot Ichhra. Dear Sir, With reference to your letter No. SODG/PPB/6‑12/2003/2926/03 dated September 24, 2003, on the subject noted above. I would like to point out for your information that consequent upon the Publicity/ Advertisement for sale of land of old PTRC Bus Depot Ichhra, Lahore. I partici pated in the bids on 7‑11‑2002. Thereafter, it was decided by the PPB to negotiate with the 4 highest bidders for which a Special Committee for Negotiation was constituted. On 19‑4‑2003, the Negotiation Committee held its meeting and was deliberated that open auction will be carried out. In this process, I offered Rs.235 million which was accepted by the Committee and then approved by the Board in its 43rd meeting, duly lauded and appreciated by the members of the Committee and other bidders as well. Thereafter, a schedule for the payment was drafted for issuance of the formal letter. It was pity that due to the sub judice case in the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in connection with about 2 Kanal of land Mr. Khalid Qureshi, has filed writ petition. The Lahore High Court, Lahore, directed the Secretary of the Board "in the meanwhile, auction proceedings of the Bus Stand shall not be concluded", therefore, the formal letter of acceptance could not be issued. On 10‑9‑2003, the Honourable Lahore High Court, Lahore dismissed the writ petition of Mr. Khalid Qureshi despite of the vacation the letter in question was not issued with mala fide intention. You are well aware that I turned out to be highest bidder and after hard competition owing to my hectic efforts my offer was accepted and approved. In this state of affairs I am not prepared to put my efforts on the altar for the sacrifice of my vested and valuable rights at this stage. I am not in a position to participate in this bid. However, I may be intimated the purported highest price offered by the bidders so that I may be able to give my consent thereafter, i.e. After receipt of your intimation. Thanking you. Yours faithfully, Sd/ - Muhammad Younas Malik 39‑Industrial Estate, Gulberg‑III, Lahore" The petitioner then filed on the 24th of September, 2003, the instant Constitutional petition with the following prayers:‑‑ "It is, therefore, prayed most respectfully that this Honourable Court be pleased to declare that the intention and attempt of the respondents, particularly those of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to re auction the land in question is without lawful authority and of no legal effect. As a consequential relief the respondents be restrained from denying the rights of the petitioner acquired by him under the law and from attempting to re‑auction the land i.e., land measuring 75 Kanals, 12 Marlas 44 Sq. Ft., located in Mauza Ichhra and situated at Ferozpur Road, Tehsil and District Lahore and they be directed to issue necessary letter enabling the petitioner to deposit the necessary amount so as to make up 25 % of his highest bid as stated above. Any other relief to which the petitioner is found entitled may also be granted by issuing appropriate order, writ, directions to the respondents." Alongwith the Writ Petition, the petitioner filed an application (C.M.No.1 of 2003) for injunctive relief to the effect that till final disposal of his main petition, the respondents be restrained from auctioning the land. The Writ Petition, alongwith miscellaneous application, referred to above, came up for preliminary hearing on the 25th of September, 2003 before the Honourable Chief Justice when notice was issued to respondent‑Board (respondent No. 1) for 7‑10‑2003. When the matter again came up for hearing on the 7th of October 2003, the following order was passed:‑ "Learned Advocate‑General Punjab, who has to address the Court, is not available today. (2) Hearing of the matter is postponed to 24‑10‑2003. (3) The auction is going to take place tomorrow and that is not being stayed. However, it will be subject to decision rendered in the writ petition. " Pursuance to the above extracted advertisement, the bids, received in the form of sealed tenders, were opened on the 8th of October 2003, and were found to be as follows:‑ Messrs S.M Zeeshan Rs.235.1 Million Messrs Saeed Akhtar & Sons Rs.235.2 Million Employees Old‑Age Benefit Institution Rs.235.2 Million On the bid sheet, the following Note also was appended by the Chairman of the Committee in his own hand:‑ "Previous highest bidder Malik Mohd Younis was present in the bidding process and was fully allowed to participate. He did not participate in the bidding process nor he matched the final bid" Before the next date of hearing, to be exact on the 23rd October 2003, an application (C.M. No. 1620 of 2003) under Order I, rule 10, C.P.C. was filed by one Dr. Farooq Saeed Khan for being impleaded as a party. Needless to mention that when the sealed tenders were originally invited and opened on the 7th of November 2003, his bid stood at Rs.177.50 Million, whereas he raised the same to Rs.195.00 Million during negotiations on the 19th of April 2003, in which meeting the petitioner had raised his bid to Rs.235.00 Million. Dr. Farooq Saeed Khan sought to be impleaded on the ground that during subsequent negotiations, whereas Employees Old‑Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) had increased its bid from Rs.235.20 Million to Rs.311.10 Million, he had raised his bid from Rs.235.00 Million to Rs.310.00 Million. When the main writ petition alongwith C.M. No.1620 of 2003, came up for hearing on 24.10.2003, the following order was passed by the learned Chief Justice:‑ "Mian Nisar Ahmad and Saleem Shahnazi, Advocates for petitioner. Mr. Naveed Ashiq Alvi, Advocate. Mr. Tahir Mahmood Gondal, Assistant Advocate General for respondents Nos.1 and 2 with Naeem Khan, Legal Advisor, PPB. C.M. allowed subject to all just and legal exceptions particularly when learned counsel for the petitioner has not opposed the prayer made by applicant respondent. (2) Learned counsel for Punjab Privatization Board has submitted that Employees Old Age Benefit Institution (EOBI) was the highest bidder in the subsequent auction, which had taken place. I would like to hear the learned counsel for EOBI in the matter, as well. (3) Office shall issue notice of this petition to EOBI at the following address:‑‑ Employees Old Age Benefit institution, EOBI House, Ex Awami Markaz, Main Shahra‑i -Faisal, Karachi. (4) Relist on 7.11.2003." Later on, the file was transferred to my cause list. Respondents 1 to 3 have filed a joint written statement. An application (C.M.No.211 of 2004) under Order I, rule 10, read with section 151, C.P.C., has also been filed by EOBI for its impleadment as a party, on the ground that it has first right of purchase having offered the highest bid of Rs.311.10 Million on the 8th of October 2003 as against the petitioner's highest bid of Rs.235.00 Million, which is Rs.76.10 Million less than the offer of EOBI and that the latter had also deposited the earnest money.

5. I have heard Mian Nisar Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner; Mr. M. Saleem Sahgal, Advocate who has appeared on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 and Ch. Muhammad Anwer Bhinder, learned counsel for the intervenes‑EOBI. I have also scanned through the record made available by the parties.

6. Before proceeding further, it may be mentioned that Dr. Farooq Saeed Khan, although applied for being impleaded as a party and his learned counsel Mr. Naveed Ashiq Ali, Advocate having appeared on three dates of hearing viz. the 24th of October, the 7th of November and the 14th of November 2003, neither the petitioner nor his learned counsel thereafter entered appearance and, it appears, they have lost interest.

7. Mian Nisar Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously contended that the offer of Rs.235.00 Million of the petitioner had been accepted by the Special Committee constituted by the Punjab Privatization Board for Negotiations and it was approved by the Board, which was the competent authority, in its 43rd meeting held on the 7th of June, 2003 and, therefore, vested right stood created in the petitioner. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the Minutes of the said meeting of the Board which for facility of reference are reproduced:‑-- "Minutes of the 43rd Meeting of the Punjab Privatization Board held on 07‑06‑2003. .. .. Item No.1................ Item No.2. Disposal of old PRTC Workshop/Depot located at Ichhra, Lahore. The Board considered the report of the Special Committee for Negotiations in this case and appreciated the excellent work done by the Committee to get the highest bid of Rs.235.00 Million. The case was deliberated upon in detail and it was unanimously decided as under:‑ (1) The highest bid of Rs.235.00 Million offered by Mr. Muhammad Younis Malik be accepted as per the following conditions/terms of payment: (a) 25 % of bid upfront within 30 days of the bid approval (b) 75 % Bank Guarantee within 90 days of bid approval. (c) Bank Guarantee for 365 days from bid approval date. (d) On as is where is basis. (e) Possession furnishing of Bank Guarantee thereafter all title transfer wholly or partially with bidder. It will be ensured that the Bank Guarantee provided by the bidder is from a Scheduled Bank and the Guarantee will be got verified from the Bank before delivering possession. "

8. Mr. M. Saleem Sahgal, Advocate supported by Ch. Muhammad Anwer Bhinder, learned counsel for the intervener (EOBI) have submitted that keeping in view the prayer in the writ petition, no relief can now be granted as the petition itself has become infructuous in view of intervening factors, namely fresh advertisement and pursuant thereto yet another offer of EOBI amounting to Rs.331.10 Million which is far above the highest bid of the petitioner amounting to Rs.235.00 Million; that on the facts established on record there was no absolute and unequivocal acceptance of the alleged offer of the petitioner by the competent authority which was Chief Minister of the Province of the Punjab; that a writ petition arising out of alleged contractual relationship, as claimed by the petitioner, is not competent and the remedy of civil suit being available to the petitioner, the same cannot be permitted to be by‑passed; that the status of the petitioner is one of a "bidder" and no right having vested in him, the Constitutional petition is not maintainable; that neither a concluded contract between the parties has come into existence nor any legal right has vested in the petitioner, performance of which may be enforced by issuing of a writ of mandamus; that the petitioner has not approached the Court .with clean hands inasmuch as documents filed at Annexes R/6, R/7 and R/8 with the written statement filed by respondents 1 to 3 were deliberately omitted, suppressed and concealed; that the terms and conditions settled vide Minutes of the 43rd Meeting of the Board, held on the 7th of June, 2003, being different from those in the Bid Documents on the basis of which the petitioner had made his offer, the decision, dated the 7th of June, 2003 did not constitute an acceptance of his offer, rather it was a counter offer, which neither having been communicated by the Board to the petitioner nor he having accepted the same, no concluded contract has come into existence between the parties; that the admission of acceptance and approval of the petitioner's bid, as mentioned in the application (C.M. No. 1147 of 2003) as well as admission in paragraph 5 of the written statement filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 3, did not amount to communication of the acceptance and approval of the offer; that the jurisdiction enjoyed by this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution being discretionary, the same cannot be exercised in a case in which Public Exchequer will suffer a loss of Rs.76.10 Million; that allegations of mala fides have been made but no particulars thereof have been given in the Writ Petition, and that the persons against whom. mala fides have been alleged, have not been impleaded as parties.

9. The first plank of the objections raised by Mr. M. Saleem Sahgal, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3, to the maintainability of this petition is that the property was owned by the Province of Punjab and the competent authority to accord final approval was the Chief Minister, Punjab, whereas the Board enjoyed only the status of a recommendatory body. His precise submission was that Ministerial Committee headed by the Law Minister, with Ministers of Agriculture, and Communications and Works, as Members had been constituted to consider the recommendations of the Board and to formulate their final recommendations for approval by the Chief Minister. He placed reliance on a Note, dated the 26th of September, 2003 recorded by the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister, Punjab, in the following terms:‑ "Subject:‑ Auction of PRTC Depot Garden Town. Lahore. 11 The Chief Minister has seen and has been pleased to observe as under:‑‑ "I must compliment the Privatization Board for undertaking its assignments in a transparent and diligent manner. I also realize that the Board, having taken a decision would be reflected in a poor light, were it to reconsider its decision. Given the specific nature of this case, when substantial moneys are likely to be available to the government, it is a difficult decision whether to ratify the action of the Board directly or allow the constitution of a Ministerial Committee, as proposed by the Finance Secretary, to take up the issue and make a final recommendation. I, am prone to take this advice in the larger interest of the public resources of the Province. Accordingly, a Ministerial Committee headed by the Law Minister, and with Ministers of Agriculture and Communication and Works as Members is hereby' constituted to consider the entire issue, meet the bidders, if necessary, and make final recommendations to me within the next two weeks. Till we take a decision in this case, all matters incidental thereto may be put on hold. Regarding the policy issue of constitution of a prominent Cabinet Committee, let the matter be brought before the Cabinet.

12. Further action may kindly be taken in the light of the observation/ directions of the Chief Minister. Sd/ - (G.M.Sikander) PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO CHIEF MINISTER, PUNJAB". In both the Notifications, first, dated the 1st of August 1997 whereby the Board was constituted, and the second, dated the 22nd of February 2000, whereby it was reconstituted, its functions were unequivocally laid down: "to undertake privatization/disinvestments of assets/ properties owned by the Punjab Government". In clause (2) of section‑B titled "Terms of Reference" of the Notification, dated the 4th of August 1997 whereby the Board was constituted, it was provided as follows‑.‑ "To determine suitable modalities for carrying out privatization/sale/ transaction with wide possible participation" In paragraph 5 of the same section B of the same Notification, it was provided as follows:‑‑ "To hold negotiations with prospective buyers and sign agreement after approval by the Government". The Board was reconstituted by Notification, dated the 22nd of February, 2000 which is relevant for the present purposes. In the opening part of the Notification, it was mentioned that the Board had been constituted "to undertake privatization/dis‑investment of assets/ properties owned by the Government of the Punjab". Whereas in paragraph 5 of the first Notification, dated the 4th of August 1997, one of the functions entrusted to the Board was "to hold negotiations with prospective buyers and sign agreement after approval by the Government," in the subsequent Notification referred to above, it was provided in clause (v): "To hold negotiations with prospective buyers and to sign agreements after approval by the Board". It will thus appear that for the word "Government" as existing in the first Notification, the word "Board" was substituted in the subsequent Notification. The Notification, dated the 22nd of February, 2000 under which the present Board is functioning, and is indisputably applicable to the present case, read as a whole, leaves nothing for the Government, or for that matter, for the Chief Minister of the Province of Punjab, to accord approval to the privatization/dis‑investment of assets/properties owned by the Punjab Government, and to the sale transactions concerning the same. I am fortified in this view by the decision of the Board itself taken in its 43rd Meeting, held on the 7th of June, 2003, whereby the offer of highest bid of the petitioner was "accepted" by the Board, without leaving anything for the Punjab Government. Moreover, in C.M. No. 1147 of 2003, filed in Writ Petition No. 19555 of 2002, the Board itself took inter alia the following stance:‑ "The highest bid received before the Special Committee for Negotiations amounting to Rs.235.00 Million was approved by the Punjab Privatization Board in its 43rd Meeting held on 7‑6‑2003 (Annex‑"F"). However, due to the pendency of that writ petition the formal approval of the bid was not issued to the highest bidder". (Emphasis supplied.) The following averment was made by the petitioner in paragraph 5 of his writ petition:‑‑ "The petitioner's bid was accepted by the Special Committee (respondent No.3 herein) and approved by respondent No.1 (the competent authority.)" In the corresponding paragraph of the written statement filed by respondents 1 to 3 it is stated: "Correct". Thus, in view of the categorical admission of respondents Nos.1 to 3 that the petitioner's bid was "approved" by the Punjab Privatization Board which was the competent authority, respondents can have no cheeks to say that the Board was not the competent authority; rather Punjab Government; or for the matter that the Chief Minister of the Province of Punjab, was the competent authority. In this connection, reference to the Minutes of the 43rd and 44th Meeting of the Board held respectively on the 7th of June, 2003 and 1st of July 2003 also appears to be apt. While unanimously accepting, in the 43rd Meeting, the highest bid of Rs.235.00 Million of the petitioner, the Board had not said any where that the acceptance of his bid was subject to approval by the Chief Minister, Punjab, or by any other functionary of the Provincial Government. Then, in the Minutes of the 44th Meeting also while mentioning that the petitioner's highest bid had been "approved in the last meeting of the Board" it was recorded that the "approval of the bid could not be issued due to restraint order issued by Lahore High Court, Lahore" and not that any other person's approval was required. In the said Minutes, it was further unequivocally recorded inter alia as follows:‑ " It was therefore, decided that:‑ (1) (2) .... (3) ..... (4) The present highest bidder will have a lien of first right of refusal or acceptance to match any highest bid. If he matches the highest bid, Board management is allowed to issue bid approval in his favour. In case he does not match the highest bid, Board management is allowed to issue bid approval in favour of the new highest bidder. (Emphasis supplied). (5) In case no higher bid is received, the property will be sold to the existing highest bidder, for which Board management is allowed to issue bid approval in his favour: (Emphasis added). The above decision of the Board admits of no ambiguity. Its plain meaning is that the Board has plenary power' to accept or reject a bid and to sell away the property, without reference either to the Chief Minister or to any other functionary of the Government. The objection taken in this Court, therefore, appears to be an after‑thought. The respondents cannot, in the circumstances, be allowed to turn round with a volte‑face. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that the Board itself was 'the competent authority to accept and approve the highest bid, without any reference either to any functionary of the Government, or to the Chief Minister, Punjab. The objection fails and is repelled.

10. So far as the Note recorded by the Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister, Punjab, is concerned, suffice it to say that the same does not pertain to the property in dispute, as is clear from the subject‑matter of the said note viz: "Auction of PRTC Depot, Green Town, Lahore", which was a property quite distinct and separate from the one in dispute herein. Moreover, relevant record of that case has not been made available. Therefore, it is not possible to record any definite finding about the powers and functions which the Board was performing qua the said property and whether there were any existing directions/ instructions from the Government concerning the same.

11. So far as the second objection raised by Mr. M. Saleem Sahgal that the writ petition, as presently constituted, is not maintainable for the reason that the property subject‑matter of the writ petition was owned by the Province of the Punjab which has not been made a party and that therefore, in the absence of a necessary party, no relief can be granted to this petitioner, is concerned, reliance was placed on Article 174 of the Constitution which reads as follows:‑ "

174. Suits and proceedings:‑‑‑The Federation may sue or be sued by the name of Pakistan and Province may sue or be sued by the name of the Province". As held in Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi PLL 1970 SC 1, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (No.V) of 1908 are applicable to the proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution if the same relate to a civil matter, or to a dispute of civil nature, and the provisions of Order 1, rule 10(2) C.P.C. would be aptly attracted which lays down in unequivocal term that:‑‑ "The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and. completely, to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added." The object of this provision is to overcome technicalities and prevent a bona fide plaintiff, or for the matter of that a petitioner, from being non‑suited. It is trite law that neither mis joinder nor non‑joinder of parties can defeat a suit or petition, and the Court has plenary power to strike out or I, add parties at any stage of the proceedings.

12. The matter can be looked at from another angle. It is a common ground between the parties that the property in dispute was acquired for Punjab Road Transport Corporation which was closed, and eventually disbanded and dissolved in the year 1997. Assuming for the sake of argument that the ultimate beneficiary is the Province of Punjab, then too the question' arises as to in whom, under the law, the property stood vested when PRTC withered away. Article 173(2) of the Constitution mandates in the following terms:‑ "All property acquired for the purposes of the Federation or of a Province shall vest in the Federal Government or, as the case may be, in the Provincial Government". (Emphasis added.) Thus, as per Constitutional mandate, the property in dispute stood vested in the 'Government of the Punjab" and not in the "Province of the Punjab" as has been contended for by Mr. M. Saleem Sahgal, Advocate for respondents 1 to

3. The objection is not sustainable, hence repelled.

13. The next objection of Mr. M. Saleem Sahgal, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 that the relationship between the parties, even if it be assumed to have come into existence, is contractual in nature, and no writ petition is competent. Suffice it to say that, there is no hard and fast rule that even though legal rights have vested in an aggrieved party, the same cannot be enforced through a Constitutional petition, in particular when the facts are not in dispute, and to decline exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction, would be E tantamount to hardship and unnecessary delay in the determination of the rights between the parties. In D.F.O., South Kheri v. Ram Sanehi AIR 1973 SC 205, the contention raised was that since the dispute arose out of terms of the contract and the Divisional Forest Officer under the terms of the contract had the authority to modify any action taken by a subordinate forest authority, the remedy of the respondent was to institute an action in the Civil Court and that the writ petition was not maintainable. The contention was overruled by observing as follows:‑ "But in the present case the order is passed by a public authority modifying the order or proceeding of a subordinate forest authority. By that order he has deprived the respondent of a valuable right. We are unable to hold that merely because the source of the right which the respondent claims was initially in a contract, for obtaining relief against any arbitrary and unlawful action on the part of a public authority he must resort to a suit and not to a petition by way of a writ. In view of the judgment of this Court 'in K.N. Guruswamy's case AIR 1954 SC 592 there can be no doubt that the petition was maintainable, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged was of a public authority invested with statutory power." The question was considered in Messrs Pacific Multinational (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Inspector‑General of Police, Sindh Police. Headquarters and 2 others PLD 1992 Karachi 283 and it was observed as follows:‑ There could be no cavil with the proposition that enforcement of a purely contractual obligation could not properly from the subject matter of proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution. However, it could not be ignored that the State had a Constitutional obligation to act fairly even when performing an administrative function. Therefore, when a party complained before the Court that the State while awarding a contract to a party had acted in an unfair or arbitrary manner or had discriminated against one of the parties who contested for the award of the contract, such grievance could be looked into by superior Court in exercise of its powers of judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution and if the Court was satisfied that the Government while entering into a contract had acted arbitrarily or in an unfair manner or had discriminated between the parties before it , in matter of awarding the contract, it could interfere and strike down such action." In Messers Airport Import Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid‑e‑Azam International Airport, Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268 the decision of the Apex Court took the following form:‑ "Further a contract, carrying elements of public interest, concluded by functionaries of the State, has to be just, proper, transparent, reasonable and free of any taint of mala fides, all such aspects remaining open for judicial review. The rule is founded on the premise that public functionaries deriving authority from or under law, are obligated to act justly, fairly, equitably, reasonably, without any element of discrimination and squarely within the parameters of law, as applicable in a given situation. Deviation, if of substance, can be corrected through appropriate, orders under Article 199 of the Constitution. In such behalf even where a contract, pure and simple, is involved, provided always that public element presents itself and the dispute does not entail evidentiary facts of a disputed nature, redress may be provided". In the case reported as Messrs Wakoient Power and Light Ltd. Gulberg‑III, Lahore v. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Water and Power through its Secretary 1998 CLC 1178 this Court inter alia observed as follows:‑‑ " ....after extensive review of the case law on the subject, a Full Bench of this Court came to the conclusion that the trend of authorities had undergone a change and the remedy of writ is permitted to be resorted to in cases, involving contract between private person and State/statutory functionaries as it is considered to be more efficacious and speedy remedy as compared to civil suit or arbitration proceedings." Finally, in Messrs Ittehad Cargo v. Syed Tasneem Hussain Naqvi PLD 2001 SC 116 at page 126 of the it was authoritatively laid down as follows:-- "The first contention urged in support of the petitions was that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's writ petition as the contracts challenged therein were concluded contracts. We are afraid the contention cannot prevail as it tends to curtail the scope of judicial review by placing an uncanny fetter on the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to test the validity of grant of a concluded contract on the touchstone of well‑settled and well‑known grounds of challenge. No doubt a concluded contract commands respect and its sanctity is to be preserved as a matter of public interest/public policy but this does not mean that the order in respect of its grant is sacrosanct and unassailable. The High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction is possessed of power to examine the validity of the order in regard to grant of a concluded contract and strike it down on the grounds of mala fide, arbitrary exercise of discretionary power, lack of transparency, discrimination and unfairness etc. provided the challenge is made promptly and contentious questions of fact are not involved." Therefore, the objection of the learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 that this petition is not maintainable is found to be without force.

14. As a final bid to the competence of this petition, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 1 to 3, as well as Ch. Muhammad Anwer Bhinder, Advocate, who appeared on behalf of the intervener (EOBI), contended that the writ petition with the relief, as prayed for therein, has become infructuous because of the intervening factors viz. i.e. inviting of fresh bids and consequently an offer given by EOBI which is more than the offer of the petitioner. The objection is not tenable for the simple reason that fresh tenders were invited by the respondents and offer was given by EOBI during the pendency of this petition; wherein a definite order had been passed on the 7th of October, 2003 to the effect: "The auction is going to take place tomorrow and that is not being stayed. However, it will be subject to decision rendered in the writ petition". Therefore, this petition cannot be thrown away on this ground.

15. Having thus cleared off the ground, now the question that requires determina tion is whether the acceptance and approval of the highest bid of the petitioner had, at any time, been communicated to the petitioner so as to bind the respondents not to go behind it. Learned counsel for respondents 1 to. 3 as well as learned counsel for the intervener contended that the offer of the petitioner was a mere bid and did not clothe him with any right and, therefore, he had no locus standi to have filed this petition. Reliance was placed on Munshi Muhammad and another v. Faizanul Haq and another 1971 SCMR

533. It was a case under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (NO.XXVIII) of 1958. The highest bid offered by the petitioner in that case was not accepted and, therefore, it was held that no right had vested in him. In the context, the following observations were made:‑‑ "The view formed by the High Court is unexceptionable. Since the auctions in favour of the petitioners were not finally approved, they did not acquire any right in the properties, and had, therefore, no locus standi to ask for their transfer. According to the terms and conditions of the auction itself, the highest bids offered in the auctions were, subject to the approval of the Additional Settlement Commissioner concerned, who may or may not accept the bids, without assigning any reasons for his action. The manner of the exercise of this discretion by the relevant authorities, as conferred by law, is not amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court, unless it be found to be arbitrary or fanciful." Reliance on Rehmat Ali and 2 others v. The Revenue Board, West Pakistan, Lahore 1973 SCMR 342 is also inapt inasmuch as the highest bid was not accepted as will be seen from the following observations:‑-- "Admittedly, the auction in favour of the petitioners was not confirmed: According to condition No.10 of the conditions of auction, it was within the discretion of the respondents to confirm or not to confirm the auction. The matter was considered at a higher level and the authorities concerned came to the conclusion that the auction in favour of the petitioners should not be confirmed. In our opinion, the petitioners, by giving highest bid have not acquired any legal title in the property in dispute and the mere fact that the auction in their favour has not been confirmed does not give them any right to file a writ petition". The next case relied upon viz: Babu Parvez Qureshi v. Settlement Commissioner, Multan and Bahawalpur Divisions 1974 SCMR 337 is also distinguishable on facts. In that case also the auction was not confirmed and, therefore, it was held that auction purchaser had no vested right. The following observations clearly distinguish the present case from the one cited by the learned counsel for the respondents:‑ "A mere bid at an auction if the bid is subject to confirmation, does not create any contractual right until the bid is confirmed. It is in the discretion of the auctioneer to confirm or not to confirm it. In the present case, the bid could not be confirmed, because the respondents 2 and 3 claimed that the auction was illegal, as the property concerned had already been transferred. The Departmental Authorities found as a fact that it had so been transferred to the said respondents and cancelled the auction. The petitioner who was a successful bidder, at the auction cannot claim to tie a person aggrieved by, this order of cancellation of the auction." There can be no cavil, with the legal proposition that if the offer of the petitioner had not been accepted by the competent authority, no vested right would have accrued in his favour and he would have no locus standi to approach this Court in Constitutional jurisdiction.

16. In the instant case, however, perusal of the Minutes of the Board's 43rd Meeting held on the 7th of June, 2003 make it abundantly clear that the Special I Committee for Negotiations had accepted the offer of the petitioner and the same had also been approved by the Board. In the circumstances, the question that arises for consideration is whether any right has accrued to the petitioner. In Ch. Muhammad Yunus v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1972 Lahore 847 D.B. it was held at page 850 as follows:‑ "The tenders were invited for the sale of the property. Both the petitioner and the respondent submitted the tenders. An advertisement inviting tenders for the sale of the property is not an offer but an invitation of an offer. The tender in law is only an offer for the purchase of the property and if the tender of a person, even if it is the highest, is not accepted, he cannot make a grievance of the fact. The offer for the sale of the property does not give right to the offerer for its purchase. A tender only when accepted constitutes a binding contract; and unless the contract comes into existence the mutual rights and obligations do not arise". (Emphasis added.) In Messrs Businet International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Aramex International (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 CLC 104 it was held that "the essentials of a binding and valid contract or offer are, acceptance and consideration." Thus, so far as acceptance of the petitioner's offer is concerned, there can be no doubt the same had been "accepted" by the Special Committee for Negotiations and was "approved" by, the Punjab Privatization Board, and the latter, as held above, was the competent authority.

17. Relying on certain observations at page 138 in Chapter B‑5 of Volume I under the title "Acceptance by Silence" in the publication called "Formation of Contracts (1968 Edition) by Scnelisnger, and those at page 1095 of Volume II of the same publications, as well as on Karachi Gas Co. Ltd. v. Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. PLD 1975 SC 193), Mian Nisar Ahmed, Advocate pressed into service the principle of "acceptance by silence" in support of his contention that since the highest bid of the petitioner had been accepted by the Special Committee for Negotiations and approved by the Board, as is borne out by the Minutes of the 43rd Meeting held on the 7th of June, 2003, even if the same had not been communicated, mere silence was tantamount to acceptance. Generally speaking, an offeree who does nothing in response to an offer is not bound by its terms. This is so even though the offer K provides that it can be accepted by silence. The reason is that no one can impose a contract on an unwilling person. In Felthouse v. Bindley (1862) 11 CB (n.s) 869 Felthouse offered by letter to buy his nephew's horse for 30.15s, adding "if I hear no more about him I shall consider the horse mine at 30.15s. " No answer was returned to this letter, but the nephew told Bindley, an auctioneer, to keep the. horse out of a sale of his farm stock, as he intended to reserve it for his uncle Felthouse. Bindley sold the horse by mistake, and Felthouse sued him for conversion of his property. The Court held that as the nephew had never signified to Felthouse his acceptance of the offer, there was no contract. But, the general rule that there can be no acceptance by silence, does not mean that an acceptance always has to be given in so many words. There is also one important exception thereto, the same being that the circumstances may arise where acceptance may more legitimately be presumed from conduct. Where the conduct takes the form of a positive act, it will not give rise to any difficulty. In any event, acceptance may be inferred where the offeree takes the benefit of an offered performance which he has had a reasonable opportunity to reject. But, in the instant case nothing has been brought on record to show that the respondents have taken any benefit from which it may reasonably be presumed that they have become contractually bound. Moreover, the case of petitioner himself is that the acceptance of his highest bid stood communicated to him when Civil Miscellaneous No.1147 of, 2003 was filed by the Board on the 14th of July, 2003. He cannot be allowed to take inconsistent pleas, on the one hand to contend that acceptance of his offer should be presumed because of silence of the Board and, on the other, to say that there was communication of acceptance by means of the said Miscellaneous Application. The contention, therefore, fails.

18. The next question is whether the "acceptance" and "approval" of the highest bid/offer of the petitioner as aforesaid had, at any stage, been communicated to the petitioner, thereby creating a vested right in him, and denuding the competent authority, i.e., the Board, in any manner, to retrieve therefrom. The sheet‑anchor of the petitioner's case is C. M. No. 1147 of 2003 filed in Writ Petition No.19555 of 2002. The precise argument is that having gained knowledge of the filing of the said application of the Board by the learned Advocate‑General, Punjab, wherein it was mentioned that "the highest bid received before the Special Committee for Negotiations amounting to Rs.235.00 Million was approved by the Punjab Privatization Board in its 43rd meeting held on the 7th of June, 2003" and that due to pendency of that Writ Petition No 19555 of 2002 filed by Muhammad Khalid Qureshi "the formal approval of the bid was not issued to the highest bidder", the petitioner had instructed his learned counsel to attend the proceedings in Court and to watch the interest of the petitioner. Accordingly, Mian Nisar Ahmed, Advocate, attended the proceedings in Court, with a watching brief. He was marked present on the 23rd of July, 2003 as well as on the final date of hearing of the said writ petition on the 10th of September, 2003, when the same was dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the said application was tantamount to "communication" of the acceptance and approval of the highest bid of the petitioner. In support of his submission, he has relied on section 4 of the Contract Act, 1872, to contend that the communication of acceptance of petitioner's offer was complete when filing of C.M.No.1147 of 2003, came to his "knowledge", in particular on the 23rd of July, 2003, when the presence of his learned counsel was shown in the order passed on that date by the Honourable Chief Justice. Section 4 of the Contract Act is reproduced for facility of reference:‑ "

4. Communication when complete:‑‑‑The communication of a proposal is complete when it comes to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made. The Communication of an acceptance is complete as against the proposer, "when it is put in a course of transmission to him, so as to be out of the power of the acceptor; as against the acceptor, when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer. The Communication of a revocation is complete as against the person who makes it, when it is put into a course of transmission to the person to whom it is made, so as to be out of the power of the person who makes it; as against the person to whom it is made, when it comes to his knowledge." Learned counsel for the Petitioner made reference to Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, New Edition, where the meaning of the word "communication" is stated thus "act of communicating, that which is communicated, intercourse, correspondence, a means of communi cating." Reliance has also been placed on the New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary where the word "communication" has been inter alia stated to mean "a sending, giving or exchanging (of information, ideas etc)." He has also relied on the New Law Lexicon Webster's Dictionary where the word "knowledge" has been assigned the meaning as: "The state of knowing, cognition, understanding". In Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary its meaning given is "that which is known, information, instruction, enlightenment, learning, practical stall, acquaintance". The ordinary meaning of the word "communication" as given at page 352 of Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Volume I, is "to impart, confer or transmit information." A plain reading of section 4 shows that as against the acceptor, communication of an acceptance is complete when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer. This provision is for the benefit of the proposer and if he says on the basis of some evidence, which may look to be tangible to a reasonable, person, that he got the knowledge of acceptance of his offer, the acceptor cannot be heard to say that the knowledge of the proposer about the acceptance of his offer was defective. Once it is established that the acceptor had divulged the information about acceptance of offer of the proposer, he cannot be allowed to plead that the proposer must gain knowledge in a particular manner, and not otherwise. To accept the plea of the acceptor in this behalf would result in absurdity. In American jurisprudence, Second Edition Volume 17, section 393 at pages 838‑839, it is stated as follows:‑‑ "As a general principle, the performance of conditions or of promises is dispensed with when it is waived by acceptance of performance differing from the performance required by the contract. Such acceptance may be expressed or it may be implied from conduct. If a party agrees to accept the thing to be delivered at a time or place other than that stipulated, a performance of this by the other party is equivalent to a performance of the original undertaking. It imposes no new duty or liability on the promisee; he merely accepts as performance by the promisor that which would not otherwise have been so." In Williston on Contracts Third Edition, the following statement of law appears at section 82‑A, page 271:‑‑ "Deeply rooted in the common law, however, is the principle that, where the parties expressly or impliedly authorized a particular channel of communication, acceptance is effective when and where it enters that channel of communication. "In Lahore Development Authority v. Fayyaz Ahmed Butt and others 1986 CLC 2119, the respondents offered the highest bid for certain plots put to auction by the Lahore Development Authority. Three bids were accepted and confirmed by the Director General, L.D.A. on the same day. No formal letters were, however, issued to the respondents and subsequently the Director‑General, who succeeded to the one who had approved the original auction, decided to recall the confirmation on a Note submitted by an Assistant Director, suggesting a fresh auction in the hope of fetching better price. The purchaser filed a suit which was decreed. LDA having failed in appeal, filed a revision petition in this Court. The revision petition was dismissed by observing inter alia as follows:‑ "It is correct that the confirmation of a bid depends on the discretion of the Director‑General and also that the actions taken by the L.D.A. under the Act of 1974 are not open to challenge in a civil Court. But similarly, it cannot be denied that if the action is colourable, discriminatory, arbitrary or mala fide it is not immune from scrutiny of the civil Court. In the present case there could have been no objection to the orders of the Director‑General if he had found the bid to be below the price, which he thought to be reasonable. But this was not so as on 16‑11‑1977 the bid was accepted: The mere fact, that, in the course of one year, that the L.D.A. took in issuing letters of acceptance, the price had appreciated upwards is no ground to rescind the original order of confirmation of the auction. As regards the principle of locus poenitentiae it is not attracted in the present case as the decisive steps had been taken by the Lahore Development Authority itself by issuing letters of. acceptance in respect of two of the plots in auction which was not divisible. The L.D.A., therefore, cannot press this principle in support of their cases." In Entores, Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corporation (1995) All E.R. 493 the following views were expressed at page 498 of the Report:‑‑ "Since, however, the requirement as to actual notification of the acceptance is for the benefit of the offeror, he may waive it and agree to the substitution for that requirement of some other conduct by the acceptor. He may do so expressly, as in the advertisement cases, by intimating that he is content with the performance of a condition. Again he may do so impliedly by indicating a contemplated method of acceptance, e.g., by post or telegram. In such a case he does not expressly dispense with actual notification, but he is held to have done so impliedly on grounds of expediency." Reference may also be made to Federation of Pakistan v. Ch. Muhammad Aslam 1986 SCMR 916 wherein at page 929 of the Report it was observed as follows:‑ "If these contracts had been bona fide and legally entered into and had given rise to rights and liabilities enforceable at law then certainly vested rights had come into existence which could not be overridden even in the matter of import and export, except on express words of an authority competent to legislate retrospectively, competent to override or impair such vested rights. " I am, therefore, clearly of the view that the offer of the petitioner, as accepted by the Special Committee for Negotiations and approved by the Board, is deemed, in p law, to have been communicated to the petitioner, consequently a valid concluded contract has come into existence, creating vested right in the petitioner.

19. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Respondents 1 to 3 had categorically stated in C.M. No. 1147 of 2003 filed through the learned Advocate General, who is the Principal Law Officer of the Province, that the offer of the S petitioner had been accepted by the Special Committee for Negotiations and approved by the Board. Again, in reply to paragraph 5 of the writ petition, containing similar averment of the petitioner, has been admitted as correct. In Muhammad Zahoor v. Lal Muhammad and others 1988 SCMR 332 inter alia the following passage from Law of Evidence by M. Munir was quoted:‑ "But an admission in a pleading is binding only in the proceedings in which it is made and may be shown to be wrong in subsequent proceedings." In Mst. Jannat Bibi v. Sher Muhammad 1988 SCMR 1696 it was held as follows:‑ "In civil proceedings a party is not permitted to deviate from his or her pleadings nor can the Court set up a different plea for a party and decide the suit on that basis, much less at the appellate stage" Recently, in Mst. Baswar Sultan v. Mst. Adeeba Alvi 2002 SCMR 326 after referring to Article 113 of Qanun‑e -Shahadat Order, 1984, and Muhammad Zahoor v. Lal Muhammad 1988 SCMR 322, it has been ruled as follows:‑ "The execution of agreements by the respondent/defendant stood proved because of her own admission in the first written statement and in the cross examination and the oral evidence adduced by the appellant/plaintiff. The admission in the first written statement of the respondent would be binding upon her under Article 113 of Qanun‑e‑Shahadat."

20. Mr. M. Saleem Sahgal, Advocate, attempted to argue that the decision of the Board taken in its 43rd Meeting held on the 7th of June, 2003 cannot be termed as acceptance and offer of the petitioner, because the terms having been varied from those contained in the Bid Documents, it would, at best, be treated as a counter offer. I have gone through the Bid Documents as well as decision of the Board, dated the 7th of June, 2003. None of the conditions mentioned in the said decision can be termed as disadvantageous to the petitioner, rather; the same appear to be beneficial to him. Perhaps, the terms mentioned in the Board's decision, dated the 7th of June, 2003 were settled for the petitioner's benefit, since he had agreed to raise his offer from Rs.55.25 Million to Rs.235.00 Million. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that any term was unfavourable to the petitioner, then too since he has always been ready and willing to accept the same, the Board cannot be permitted to say that it was a counter offer which had not been accepted by the petitioner.

21. Now, remains the last argument of the learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 which may be attended to. His precise submission is that the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution being discretionary, the Public Exchequer cannot be allowed to suffer loss inasmuch as against the petitioner's offer of Rs.235.00 Million, the Board has received an offer of Rs.311.10 Million from EOBI. In Messrs Ittehad Cargo Service v. Messrs Syed Tasneem Hussain Naqvi PLD 2001 SC 116 the Honourable Supreme Court has answered a similar question in the following terms:‑‑ "As regards the question of augmentation of public funds we tend to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondent had offered an exorbitant amount to defeat the auction, the benchmark of Rs.8 Crores fixed by High Court for the fresh auction was likely to keep other bidders at bay and thus create a situation of monopoly and that the Pakistan Railways is not a purely Commercial Organization in that it is not only required to protect its financial interest and generate funds but is also obliged to see the interest and welfare of the public. We would conclude the above discussion with the observations that the impugned judgment is not sustainable as the administrative decision challenged by the respondent neither lacks transparency nor is tainted with mala fide or is unfair, unjust or unreasonable or based on bias or favourtism and, the discretion vested in the Pakistan Railways having been properly structured by reference to objective standards cannot be said to have been exercised arbitrarily. The public interest would be best served if the concluded contracts in question are preserved." (Emphasis supplied.) On the one hand, if the relief is refused to the petitioner, Public Exchequer would be gaining an amount of Rs.76.10 Million in view of the offer of EOBI, and on the other, the credibility of the Special Committee for Negotiations as well as of the Punjab Privatization Board is at stake. In the Board's Meeting held on the 7th of June 2003 it was observed as follows‑ "The Board considered the Report of the Special Committee for Negotiations in this case ands appreciated the excellent work done by the Committee to get the highest bid of Rs.235.00 Million." It is nobody's case that there was anything behind the scene or that either the Members of the Committee or those of the Board had indulged in favourtism, nepotism or corruption. Indisputably, the Board was under no obligation to have accepted the highest offer, and no right would have accrued to the petitioner merely because he gave the highest offer. The power of the Board to reject or accept a bid cannot be confined to inadequacy of bid only. There may be variety of other good and sufficient reasons not to accept the same. If the petitioner's highest offer had been rejected by the Board he could have no valid grievance at all. No doubt, we have to draw a distinction between the disposal of a private property by its owner according to his own free will, for example, a private person may dole away his property worth lacs of rupees just in consideration of a good song and without demur, more particularly when the singer is also of his choice. On the other hand, Governmental agencies will have no such freedom while dealing with a public property, disposal of which partakes the character of a trust, in that in its disposal there should be nothing hanky panky and that it must be done at the best price so that larger revenue coming into kity of Public Exchequer would serve public purpose; the greater the revenue, the welfare activities will get a fillip and shot in the arm. At the same time, the Government (in this case the Board) cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will like a private individual. Its action must be in conformity with the standards and norms which are not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. Its power must be guided, confined and structured by rational, relevant and non‑discriminatory, standards and norms. If an instrumentality of the Government departs from such standards and norms, its action would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable, discriminatory or without valid reasons. The functionaries of the Government, as is the Board in the instant case, in their dealings with the citizens must act fairly, without discretion and without unfair procedure. Here, there is no allegation that the petitioner surreptitiously ingratiated himself by a back‑door entry, giving a minor raise in the bid, and in the process has attempted to usurp the most undeserved benefit. It is also not the case of the respondents that his highest offer was secretly made or that when it was made it did not represent the adequate market consideration. I am, therefore, of the view V that the petitioner, has suffered an unfair treatment by the governmental functionaries in discharging their functions, thereby violating the fundamental principle of fair play in action. The conduct of the respondents betrays a woeful lack of knowledge of auction process. Above all, an institution controlled by the State has been used to score a march over the petitioner and to outbid him. As held above, with the acceptance and approval of the petitioner's highest offer, knowledge of which was imparted to him by means of a written application filed by the Board through the Principal Law Officer of the Province, the contract was thus knocked down in his favour.

22. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is allowed, it is declared that the highest bid of Rs.235.00 Million of the petitioner stands accepted and approved, and respondent No.1 is directed to issue the requisite letter in terms of its decision dated 7th of June, 2003 within a period of one month from today, to enable the petitioner to comply with the terms and conditions settled in the said decision. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. S.A.K./M‑167/L Petition accepted.