P L D 1969 Dacca 1 (PLP)

HASAN, J.‑The case before us came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court and as in its opinion the case involved a complicated question of law and that it should be heard by a larger Bench, the same has been placed before this Special Bench for disposal. According to its statements in the petition under Arti cle 98 (2) of our Constitution the petitioner is the Dacca picture Palace Limited having its registered office at 52, Johson Road, Dacca and has been carrying on the business of screening cine matograph films in its two cinema halls, namely, 'Mukul' and 'Rupmahal' in the Dacca city and exhibiting both foreign (including Indian) and Pakistani films. In the month of August 1963, an Act, namely, the Censorship of Films Act (Act XVIII of 1963) was passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan purporting to act under paragraphs (b) and (c) of clause (2) Article 131 of the Constitution. Thereafter the Central Government framed certain rules in exercise of powers given under section 10 of the said Act (hereinafter will be called the Act) on 11th January 1964. The Deputy Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education and Information (Information and Broadcasting Division) addressed a memorandum to the Chief Secretary, Government of East Pakistan intimating him about the coming Into force of the said Act and the Rules and giving him various other directions. Copies of the said memorandum were forwarded to the Managers of 'Mukul' and 'Rupmahal' by the Deputy Commissioner, Dacca, vide his Memo. No. 140 (Gen)./A. T. dated 9‑1‑64 directing them to submit returns in the enclosed form on or before the seventh of each month. Apprehending that the petitioner's business maybe bit hard by the enforcement of the Act and the Rules thereunder it approached the High Court and obtained the above Rule in the following terms on 25‑2‑64 :‑ "Let a Rule nisi issue calling upon the respondents to show cause why the Memo. dated 11‑12‑63 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education and Information (Information and Broadcasting Division) addressed to the Chief Secretary of East Pakistan intimating him about the coming in force of the Censorship of Films Act, 1963, a copy of which was forwarded to the Manager of the petitioners' hall vide his Memo. No. 140 (Gen)./A. T. dated 9‑1‑64 requiring him to submit the returns, and rule 30 of the Rules framed under the Act on the basis of which the said Memo. is said to have been issued should not be declared as having been made without lawful authority and as of no legal effect and why they should not be directed to withdraw, recall or rescind the said memo. or such other or further order or orders passed as to this Court may deem fit and proper. The Rule is made returnable within two week, as prayed for." The impugned order which has been marked as Annexure "A" runs "No. 1698/63‑Films Government of Pakistan. Ministry of Education and Information (Information & Broadcasting Division) Rawalpindi, December 11‑1963. From: ‑M. Ihsanul Haq, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of Pakistan. To: ‑(1) The Chief Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Lahore. (2) The Chief Secretary to the Government of East Pakistan, Dacca. Sub: ‑Returns of playing time required under rule 30 of the Censorship of Films Rules, 1963. Sir, I am directed to enclose a copy of Censorship of Films Act and a copy of the Censorship of Films Rules, 1963, and to refer to rule 30 relating to the playing time fixed for the exhibition of Pakistani and foreign films on the cinema houses. The Rules have come into operation with effect from the 14th November 1963, and, therefore, the playing Time Clause is also operative from the same date. It is presumed that the owners of cinema houses have applied for classification to the District Magistrates within the period indicated in the Rules and a decision has been taken by the District Magistrates classifying a licensed place as one exhibiting foreign films or otherwise. It is requested that the District Magistrates may be asked to furnish the requisite returns after collecting them from the owners of the cinema houses. A pro forma suggested for this purpose is enclosed. These returns will need to be obtained on a quarterly basis as has been indicated in the pro forma, and may be forwarded to the Chairman, Central Board of Film Censors by the end of each month following the quarter to which the return relates. It is further suggested that the first report may relate to the period from 14th November 1963, to 31st December 1963 and thereafter the calendar year may be divided into regular quarters. A copy of this letter together with a copy of each of the Act, the Rules and the pro forma is being endorsed to all District Magistrates for the sake of convenience. Your obedient servant, (Sd.) M. Ihsanul Haq. Deputy Secretary. Copy to: ‑ (1) All District Magistrates (with enclosures). (Sd.) M. Ihsanul Haq. Deputy Secretary. Memo. No. 140 (3) (Gen)./A. T. Dated 9‑1‑

64. Copy with a copy of enclosure forwarded to the Manager, Mukul Cinema Hall, Dacca with request to submit the return in the enclosed pro forma on or before the 7th of each month to this office positively. (Sd.) Illegible. For Dy. Commissioner, Dacca. Section 6 of the Censorship of Films Act, 1963 runs as follows: ‑ "Exhibition of certified films, etc.‑(1) Notwithstanding any thing in the Cinematograph Act, 1918 (II of 1918), or in any other law for the time being in force, the Central Government shall prescribe the places or class of places licensed for the exhi bition of cinematograph films where, and the period or periods for which any certified film or class of certified films may be exhibited. (2) In respect of places prescribed under subsection (1) the Central Government may by rules provide for the regulation of proper seating, sanitary, booking and other arrangements. Rule 30 runs as follows: ‑ "Playing time‑(1) The owner or proprietor of a licensed, place which, during the year preceding the commencement of these rules, was exhibiting foreign films for not less than fifty per cent. of its playing time shall, within thirty days of such commencement, apply to the District Magistrate within whose local Jurisdiction the licensed place is situate for the grant of a certificate to the effect that the licensed place is a place so exhibiting foreign films. (2) The owner or proprietor of a licensed place in respect of which a certificate such as is mentioned in sub‑rule (1) is granted shall exhibit in such place Pakistani films for at least fifteen percent of its playing time, and may, during the rest of the playing time, exhibit foreign films other than sucks foreign films as are in any of the Pakistani or Indian language$ and depict the Pakistani or Indian way of life. (3) The owner or proprietor of a licensed place in respect of which no certificate as aforesaid is granted shall exhibit in such place Pakistani films for not less than eighty‑five percent of its playing time, and may, during the rest of the playing time, exhibit foreign films, including such foreign films as are in any of the Pakistani or Indian languages and depict the Pakistani or Indian way of life. (4) The decision of the Central Government as to whether a particular certified film, is or is not a Pakistani film, or a foreign film which is in any of the Pakistani or Indian languages and depicts the Pakistani or Indian way of life shall be final. (5) Every owner or proprietor of a licensed place shall submit to the District Magistrate such returns relating to the utilization of the playing time in that place and at such intervals as the District Magistrate may determine. (6) The District Magistrate shall forward the returns received by him to the Central Government. Explanation.‑For the purposes of this rule :‑ (a) "foreign film" means a film not being a Pakistani film (b) "playing time" means the total time spent in the exhibition of cinematograph films in a licensed place during a period of three hundred and sixty‑five days ; and (c) "Pakistani film" means a film produced in Pakistan by an individual, or a company registered or domiciled in Pakistan, with the assistance of artistic and technical staff of whom the majority are Pakistani." It has been contended that section 6 of the Act is ultra vires of the constitution as by this section the Central Legis lature has abdicated its legislative power and vested the same on the Central Government. This argument has been based on the well known principle that the Legislature cannot divest itself of its legislative function. In support, various authorities have been placed before us for our consideration. In the case of Haji Ghulam Zamin and Abul Hossain v. A. B. Khondkar and others (P L D 1965 Dacca 156) a special Bench of this Court, after referring to the various decisions, some of which have been placed before us, observed: ‑ "Manifestly, therefore the Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative function with which it alone is vested by the Constitution. This is clear from the requirement of the Constitution itself and as such, this proposition is undeniable and it cannot be contested. It is thus established that essential legislative function cannot be delegated or assigned to any extraneous authority for example, the executive. It is also undeniable that legislation must also be adapted to the complex conditions involving a host of details with which the Legislature cannot deal directly. The Legislature, therefore, having formulated the forms of its main legislative policy, must of necessity, leave the working of details, with which it cannot deal directly to other agencies, in the proper fulfilment of its legislative duty, that is to perform its essential law‑making function. In this background the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Legislature the necessary resources, flexibility and feasibility in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving it to selected functionaries the making of incidental and auxiliary provisions within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply. Without such power of assignment the Legislature would face the anomaly of being called upon to exercise a legislative power, which under various circumstances would be but a futility. The Legislature is not allowed to become impotent, but the necessity and validity of such delegated legislation, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed thereby cannot obscure the limitations of authority to delegate. Delegation by the Legislature is permitted within prescribed limits in order to execute the legislative norms and provisions that have been enacted. Thus a restricted delegation in aid of the proper functioning of legislative power has been regarded as unconstitutional. There are innumerable decisions to support the aforesaid proposition and before we discuss some of them, we would like to observe that the principles we have discussed above resolved themselves thus :‑ (1) Legislation being the exclusive function of the Legislature, it cannot abdicate such function. (2) The Legislature, after having enunciated the essential legislative principles and standards is, however, entitled to delegate to outside agencies such functions which are essential to an effective exercise of the legislative power with which it has been endowed by the Constitution. (3) The Legislature however, cannot efface itself and delegate all its functions to an extraneous agency." The above proposition of law has not been disputed before us. Article 131 of our Constitution has conferred upon the Central Legislature to make law by providing:‑ "(1) The Central Legislature shall have exclusive power to make laws (including laws having extra‑territorial operation) for the whole or any part of Pakistan with respect to any matter enumerated in the third Schedule." and there is no provision in the Constitution authorising the Central Legislature to delegate the said power to any subordinate body. As the sovereign power of the state has entrusted the Central Legislature with the authority to legislate without giving it any power to delegate the said authority to any subordinate body, it must remain with it and accordingly any delegation of such power by the Central Legislature and thereafter any legis lation by a delegated authority on such authority will be null and void. The above principle applies to the essential legislative function i.e. laying down of policies in respect of a measure and formulation as a rule of conduct or in other words a standard to guide the officials or the body in power to execute the laws, after that the Legislature may leave the making of necessary incidental and auxiliary provisions within that limit, working of the details, determination of fact with which it cannot deal with directly to outside agencies in order to give effect to the legislation. The underlying principle is that it is not possible for the Legislature to legislate on every aspect of the matter in the complex condition. This principle has been also laid down in all the authorities cited before us. Having in view the above principle we are to see whether the delegation as per section 6 of the Act is an effacement of the Legislature or a delegation for proper functioning of the policy within the framework of the policy laid down by the Central Legislature. Preamble to the Censorship of Films Act, 1963 runs: ‑ "An act to provide for the censorship of cinematograph films and for the decertification of certified films on certain grounds. Whereas it is expedient to provide for the censorship of cinematograph films and for the decertification of certified films in the interest of law and order, or in the interest of local film industry or in any other national interest, and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith ; And whereas the national interest of Pakistan in relation to planning and co‑ordination and the achievement of uniformity as are referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c) of clause (2) of Article 131 of the Constitution required Central legislation in the matter It is hereby enacted as follows: ‑ "

6. Exhibition of certified films, etc.‑(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Cinematograph Act, 1918 (I1 of 1918), or in any other law for the time being in force, the Central Govern ment shall prescribe the places or class of places licensed for the exhibition of cinematograph films where, and the periods for which, any certified film or class of certified film may be exhibited. (2) In respect of places prescribed under subsection (1) the Central Government may by rules provide for the regulation of proper seating, sanitary, booking and other arrangements.

7. Power to decertified films. ‑ Where the Central Government is of the opinion that a certified film, or class of certified films, should, in the interest of law and order, or in the interest of local film industry, or any other national interest, be decertified in respect of the whole or any part of Pakistan, it may, of its own motion, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that such film or class of films shall be deemed to be uncertified film or films in respect of the whole of Pakistan, or such area or areas as may be specified in the notification.

10. Power to make rules.‑(I) the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, rules made under this section may provide for: ‑ (a) The manner in which films in respect of which certifi cates are granted shall be marked; (b) the manner in which appeals shall be disposed of ; (c) the procedure of the authorities, and all matters ancillary thereto, and the fees to be charged by them ; (d) the appointment of officers subordinate to the author ities and the regulation of the powers and duties of such officers ; and (e) any other matter which by this Act is to be prescribed." It has been argued by Mr. Haque that no policy has been laid down by the Legislature and if there has been any policy that is censorship of cinematograph films and decertification only as indicated by the preamble but section 6 shows that Central Government has been given power to prescribe the places or class of places licensed for the exhibition of cinemato graph films where, and the period or periods for which, any certified films or class of certified films may be exhibited which is beyond the policy as laid down by the Act. Section 6 has given unlimited, uncontrolled power to the Central Government to legislate on a new sphere. This power has nothing to do with certification or decertification of cinematograph films. While on the other hand it has been argued on behalf of the respondent that a definite policy has been laid down by the Act and that policy is to regulate, control, censor cinematograph films in the national interest or in the interest of local film industry. Some arguments have also been advanced on the meaning of the words 'censor' and `censorship,' In my opinion, the word `censorship' should not be given a limited meaning; that is excisions on the ground of morals only as argued by Mr. Haque but liberal or liberal meaning i.e. excision, stop, regulation, control etc. as the case may be. Now coming to the Act, after going through, the preamble and provisions of the Act XVIII of 1963, I find that a general policy has been formulated by the Legislature; that policy is to promote and/or safeguard the interest of the local film industry or any other national interest by regulating, controlling, censoring certifying and or decertifying cinematograph films. Section 6 provides for one of the modes or further guidance how that policy will be carried out by the Central Government. The prescription of the places or class of places licensed for the exhibition of cinematograph films where, and of the period or periods for which, any certified films or class of certified films may be exhibited as per section 6 is for the purpose of carrying out this policy and the discretion given to the Central Government by section 6 of the Act is to be exercised is such a way as to give effect to the policy. It has been argued by Mr. Haque that the provision of section 6 is vague. No guidance has been given to the Central Government how the places or class of places are to be chosen and the period or periods fixed. There is no check or limit to the selection of places or class of places or to fixation of period or periods so the Central Government can do whatever it intends. In other words as observed by Cardozo, J. in the case of Schechter v. United States (79 Law Ed. 1570) "The delegated power of Legislation which ‑has found expression in the code is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant." It has been further contended that there is every chance of this unguided discretion being misused. In my opinion this conferment of such discretion cannot be invalid on this ground as if there be any abuse of power the Courts have ample power to give necessary relief. No case of misuse of the power by the Central Government has been made out in the instant case. As to prescribe places or class of places and the period or periods it is no doubt true that as to prescribe, discretion has been given to the Central Government. Can it be any ground for holding the section 6 of the Act ultra vires the Legislature. In my opinion not. The Legislature has formulated the policy to safeguard or develop the interest of the local film industry and for carrying out that policy guidance has been given namely the Central Government is to effectuate the policy, by amongst others prescribing places or class of places and period or periods. It will be possible only on the part of the Central Government and was not possible before hand on the part of Central Legislature to pick and choose places or class of places and fix the period or periods in order to give effect to the policy laid down by the Legislature. In order to give effect to the policy it will require previous enquiry to find which places or class of places and period or periods will answer to the purpose. That was not possible on the part of the Legislature at the time of laying down the policy. In my opinion having regard to the nature of the policy as formulated by the Legislature no further direction could have been provided for. The necessary and possible guidance has been given. As to the above observation of Cardozo, J. it may be pointed out that at present many complica ted legislations are being passed. It may not be always possible to follow that principle in each and every legislation ; but wherever it is not possible it should be followed and when it is not possible it will be sufficient compliance when possible standard in a given case is laid down to guide the officials or the body in power to execute the law. In the instant case that possible standard has been laid down to guide the Central Government to execute the policy. In the case of Harishankar Bagla and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (A I R 1954 S C 465) sections 3 and 4 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 were challenged on the grounds of ultra vires the Legislature. Sections 3 and 4 run: ‑ "Section 3.‑(1) The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or uncreasing supplies of any essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, may by order provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein . . . . . . (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (1), an order made thereunder may provide: ‑ (a) For regulating by licences, permits or otherwise the production or manufacture of any essential commodity; . .. . . (b) for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consump tion of any essential commodity ; . . . . . "Section 4.‑The Central Government may by notified order direct that the power to make orders under section 3 shall in relation to `such matters' and subject to `such conditions', if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercisable also by‑ (a) such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government, or (b) such state Government or such officer or authority subordinate to a State Government as may be specified in the, direction." The above contention on ultra vires was repelled by the Indian Supreme Court observing:‑ "The policy underlying the order is to regulate the Transport of cotton textile in a manner that will ensure an even distribu tion of the commodity in the country and make it available at a fair price to all. The grant or refusal of a permit is thus to be governed by this policy and the discretion given to the Textile Commissioner is to be exercised in such a way as to effectuate this policy." From the above, it appears that the Indian Legislature laid down a policy to regulate the transport of cotton textile for even distribution at a fair price and the working out of that policy was left to the Central Government without specifying the banks, even in that case it was found that the legislation was valid. Similarly special Criminal Court Ordinance (II of 1942) left to the local Government or to some officer of the local Government empowered by it in that behalf, to direct what offences or classes of offences, and moreover what cases or classes of cases, should be tried by the Special Courts and came up for consideration before the Privy Council in the case of Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma and others (A I R 1945 PC 48) it was observed: ‑ "There is not, of course, the slightest doubt that the parlia ment of Westminster could validly enact that the choice of Courts should rest with an executive Authority, and their Lordships are unable to discover any valid reason why the same discretion should not be conferred in India by the law making authority, whether that authority is the Legislature or the Governor‑General, as an exercise of the discretion conferred on the authority to make laws for the peace, order, and a good Government of India." Considering all the aspects of the matter I am of opinion that section 6 of the Act is not ultra vires the Legislature nor the E Rule 30 made under section 10 of the Act. Next attack of Mr. Haque is that the Central Legislature had no authority to legislate on the subject in dispute as the same is not included in the 3rd Schedule to the Constitution. It is of course, true that the film industry of its kind has not been included in the 3rd Schedule, over which the Central Legislature has absolute legislative power by virtue of sub‑Article (1) of Article 131, but in view of provision in sub‑Article (2) the Central Government, in the national interest, may also legislate on any matter outside the 3rd Schedule in order to plan, co‑ordinate and achieve uniformity in respect of any matter in different parts of Pakistan. The Censorship of Films Act has been passed for the above purpose. Hence I do not find any substance in this contention. Next ground of attack is that section 6 is in conflict with the Fundamental Rights Nos. 8, 13, 14 and 15 of the Article 6 of the Constitution. This contention has no substance. By clause (ii) of sub‑Article (3) of Article 6 of the Constitution the provisions of Article 6 have been excluded from being applied to any of the laws specified in the Fourth Schedule one of which is the Censorship of Films Act, 1963 (XVIII) of 1963). On the merits, the Rule has become infructuous. Paragraph 11 of the petition runs: ‑ "That it is stated that the petitioners have entered into agreement with their distributors under which the petitioner company have appointed the said Distributors as their sole supplier of films (and the Company cannot exhibit films supplied by third parties without prior consent of the said distributors). Further, most of the films which are of box office value and likely to earn maximum profits are Indian films. In the circumstances, the petitioner‑Company's maximum income used to come from exhibiting Indian films. And since the coming into force of the said Rules the petitioner company has already exhibited Indian films for about 7 weeks and if the said Rules are enforced it will not be able to exhibit Indian films for the rest of the year. As a result the petitioner Company will be deprived of its right to exhibit Indian films which have been hired at a huge price and its entire business will be ruined." The year is already over. The document filed some time after the argument does not also help the petitioner, that being the subject‑matter of the Rule. I do not express any opinion of mine on the contents of this document. I would accordingly discharge the Rule without any order as to cost. A. S. CHOWDHURY, J.‑The Dacca Picture Palace Limited hereinafter called the "petitioner" challenges the validity of Memo. dated 11‑12‑63 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Education and Information addressed to the Chief Secretary to the Government of East Pakistan a copy of which was forwarded to the petitioner vide Memo. No. 140 (Gen) A. T. dated 9‑1‑64 requiring the Manager of the petitioner to submit a return in pursuance of Rule 30 of the Rules framed under the Censorship of Films Act, 1963. It is alleged that the petitioner since its incorporation as a Public limited Company has been exhibiting films in this city in two cinema halls known as "Mukul" and "Rupmahal". Mr. Baquer Ali Murad is the constituted Attorney of the Managing Agents of the petitioner‑company and he holds a cinematograph licence for the purpose and on the basis of the same, foreign (including Indian) and Pakistani films were being exhibited. It is stated that an Act known as Censorship of Films Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the "Act") came into force on the 2nd September 1963. The Central Government purporting to act under section 10 of the Act framed Rules called "Censorship of Films Rules, 1963" (hereinafter called "the Rules"). The rules came into force on the 14th November 1963. These Rules impose certain restrictions on the playing time of the foreign films including Indian films and the Act also provides for punish ment for its non‑observance. The impugned Memo. was addressed to the Chief Secretary to the Government of East Pakistan bringing to his notice the relevant provisions of law and asking him to obtain return from the company to ensure its observance of the relevant Rules which have the effect of prohibiting exhibition of Indian films in these halls as before. It is stated that this would mean great financial loss to the petitioner and that the Memo. in question constitutes interference with the lawful trade of the petitioner as the provisions of the Act and the rules on the basis of which the impugned Memo. has been issued are illegal and without jurisdiction. It is stated in an affidavit‑in‑opposition, filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1, Government of Pakistan, that the restrictions on exhibition of Indian films have been imposed under the provisions of the said Act in order to give protection to the National Film Industry of the country. The petitioner would still be able to exhibit Indian films for about 15 % of the time spent on exhibition of films in certain circumstances. It is further stated that the petitioner did not apply at all for getting the said cinema houses certified as halls authorised to exhibit foreign films. It is further claimed that the Rule 30 of the Rules has been framed 9n exercise of the powers conferred by section 6 of the Act. Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury appearing for the petitioner submits that the National Assembly cannot make law in respect of cinematograph films and as such the Act and the Rules are void. Article 131 provides that the Central Legislature shall have power to make laws for whole or any part of Pakistan with respect to a matter enumerated in the 3rd Schedule. Article 132 lays down that the Provincial Legislature shall have power to make laws for the province or a part thereof with respect to a matter not enumerated in the 3rd Schedule or in other words residue is left to the Provincial Legislature. It is true that cinematograph film has not been mentioned in the 3rd Schedule and ordinarily the Provincial Legislature shall make laws in this behalf. The Central Legislature can, however, make laws in respect to a matter not enumerated in the 3rd Schedule .if it is necessary to do so in the national interest of Pakistan for any of the purposes as set out in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of clause (2) of Article 131 of the Constitution. On a reference to the Act it is found that it is specifically stated therein that "the national interest of Pakistan in relation to planning and co‑ordination and the achievement of uniformity as are referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c) of clause 2 of Article 131 of the Constitution requires Central Legislation in the matter;" This declaration of the Central Legislature is to the effect that the legislation in question was being made in order to serve the purposes enumerated in paragraphs (b) and (c) of clause (2) of the said Article

131. On an analysis of the provisions of the act it appears that they have been framed for planning and co‑ordination and also to achieve uniformity in all parts of Pakistan. Films are being exhibited all over Pakistan and it cannot be denied that legislation in this behalf should be uniform. The Central Legislature must therefore be held to be competent to make the legislation in question. This contention of Mr. Chowdhury is therefore of no substance. As I am taking the view as indicated above on a consideration of the provisions of the Act, it is not necessary for me to express any opinion in this case as to whether or not such a question can be raised in a Court of law regard being had to Article 133 of the Constitution which provides that legislative competence or otherwise is to be decided by the Legislature itself and the validity, of a law shall not be called in question on this ground. It has next been urged that section 6 of the Act was a complete abdication of legislative power for, the Central Govern ment has been given unfettered and unguided legislative function in this behalf. Section 6 is, therefore, attacked and claimed to be bad on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative authority. It has already been noticed that our Constitution has clearly assigned legislative function to the Legislatures concerned. A Legislature has therefore to carry on this burden and cannot "abdicate" its duties and powers to others without giving clear guidance and laying down well understood policy. It is necessary to set out here section 6 of the Cinematograph! Act. It is in the following terms:‑ "(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Cinematograph Act, 1918 (1I of 1918), or in any other law for the time being in, force, the Central Government shall prescribe the places or class of places licensed for the exhibition of cinematograph films where, and the period or periods for which, any certified films or class of certified films may be exhibited. (2) In respect of places prescribed under subsection (1), the Central Government may by rules provide for the regulation of proper seating, sanitary, booking and other arrangements." We are, in this case, concerned with subsection (1) of section

6. It is pointed out that the Central Government as distinguished from the Central Legislature has been assigned the function of prescribing the place or places to be used for the purposes of exhibition of cinematograph films and the period of exhibition of such films. This is attacked on the ground that no guidance whatsoever has been given in regard to the period or periods for which the exhibition of certain films or class of films should be permitted. It has already been stated above that the Central Govern ment has made, inter alia, provisions regarding the period of exhibition of films in rule 30 of the Rules. It is necessary to closely examine and find out if the provisions of section 6 can be said to be bad in law on the ground that the Legislature abdicated its authority in favour of the Central Government. Section 6 authorises the Central. Government to fix place or places and to fix the period during which foreign films can be exhibited. There are cinema houses throughout the country and the Legislature in its discretion felt that the function of fixing place as well as deciding the period during which films of various kinds can be exhibited should be left to the Central Government. A Legislature can make law and leave it to a delegate, to complete the legislation by supplying the details keeping in view the limits laid down by a particular statute. It, therefore, presupposes that the limits and guidance must be indicated in the statute. It is not necessary for me to repeat that the legislative function has been left to the Legislature. But section 6 is also legislation. The limitation, however, is that the function exclusively conferred on the Legislature cannot be thrown away by it and transferred to some other agency. It may do so by laying down the essential principles for guidance and asking the delegates to carry out the purposes of the legislation by framing such rules or giving such directions as may be necessary for implementing the provisions of the statute. The delegate cannot, therefore, be authorised to formulate regulation without due regard to or in. excess of the guidance given in the statute itself. The object of the Act is "to provide for the censorship of cinematograph films and for the decertification of certified films in the interest of law and order, or in the interest of local films Industry, or in any other national interest, and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith." The intention, therefore, is to take steps for censorship and decertification of films in the interest of local film Industry or in the interest of law and order. Mr. Chowdhury contends that the Act is merely for the purpose of censorship and decertification of the films already certified. But there can be no provision regulating the period during which a certified film can be shown. That, according to him, is beyond the scope of the Act. Censorship, to my mind does not mean absolute prohibition. Censorship involves decision in regard to certified films as to whether or not the whole or part of it should be exhibited and the period during which it should be exhibited regard being had to the interest of local films Industry as clearly outlined in the statute. After having declared that policy, the Legislature left it to the Central Government to supply the details within the framework of the Act itself. The expression "the Central Government shall prescribe" occurring in section 6 of the Act appears to mean that the Central Govern ment shall make rules for the purposes visualised in section 10 of the Act. Definition of the word "prescribed" as set out in clause (f) of section 2 of the Act lends support to this view. Clause (f ) of the section 2 is as follows: ‑ " `Prescribed' " means prescribed by rules framed under section 10." Therefore, the Central Government in prescribing the place or class of places licensed for exhibition of cinematograph films and the period or periods for which any such film may be exhibited shall have due regard to the provisions of section 10 of the Act. Section 10 is as follows: ‑ "The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act." Regard being had to the definition of the word "prescribed" it is clear that the rules are to be framed for the purposes of the Act. Clause (e) of subsection (2) of section 10 provides that rules may be made for any other matter which by this Act is to be prescribed. This apparently contemplates a provision similar to that of section 6 of the Act. Section 4 of the Act makes provision for the certification of the films. Section 7 confers power on the Central Government to decertify certain films and in doing so it has to consider if it is necessary in the interest of local film Industry. Therefore, it can rightly be said the policy of the legislation is to encourage and foster local film Industry. The policy laid down for the guidance of the Central Government in prescribing the place or class of places and the period or periods during which a film can be permitted to be exhibited, is, inter alia, promotion of local film Industry. A plain reading of the rule 30 of the Rules quoted in extenso by my learned brother Hasan, J makes it clear that the Central Government in making provision for playing time of the films permitted to be exhibited has proceeded on the guide lines as set out by the Legislature itself. The rules as framed have placed the foreign films at a disadvantage and given local films adequate opportunity of exhibition. This would go to a great extent in promoting this Industry. Rule 30 read as a whole clearly indicates that it has been framed with a view to giving encouragement to local film Industry. The question of delegation of legislative function fell to be considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Waris Meah v. The State and the State Bank of Pakistan (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 157). In that case Munir, C. J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed as follows: The objection on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative authority need not detain us long because it must be decided in favour of the State on the principle of the Privy Council decision in King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma. In that case, the question was whether those provisions of Ordinance II of 1942 which left it to the local Government or to some officer of the local Government empowered by it in that behalf, to direct what offences or class of offences or cases or class of cases should be tried by the special Courts set up under that Ordinance, amounted to unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. The Federal Court from whose Judgment the appeal had been taken to the Privy Council had ruled that because the Act permitted the local Government or some officer empowered by it to take a case or cases or offence or offences out of the jurisdic tion of ordinary Courts and to have them tried in accordance with the special procedure prescribed by the Ordinance, those provisions of the Acts which conferred such wide and unqualified powers constituted illegal delegation of legislative authority. In differing from that view, Viscount Simon L. C. who delivered the judgment of the Board said:‑ "With the greatest respect to these eminent Judges their Lordships feel bound to point out that the question whether the Ordinance is intra vires or ultra vires does not depend on considerations of jurisprudence or of policy. It depends simply on examining the language of the Government of India Act and of comparing the legislative authority conferred on the Governor‑General with the provisions of the Ordinance by which he is purporting to exercise that authority. It may be that as a matter of wise and well‑framed legislation it is better, if circum stances permit, to frame a statute in such a way that the offender may know in advance before what Court he will be brought if he is charged with a given crime; but that is a question of policy, not of law. There is nothing of which their Lordships are aware in the Indian Constitution to render invalid a statute, whether passed by the Central Legislature orundertheGovernorw0eneral's emergency powers, which does not accord with this principle. Rowland J. at the beginning of his dissenting judgment, collects a number of striking quotations from previous judgments delivered in the Privy Council as to the proper rule of construc tion. Again and again, this Board has insisted that in construing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. The learned Judges who were in the majority in the Federal Court would presumably not contest this proposition, and their Lordships rather understand their view to be based on the conception that there is something underlying the written constitution of India which debars the executive authority, though specially authorised by the statute or Ordinance to do so, from giving directions after the accused has been arrested and charged with crime as to the choice of Court which is to try him. Their Lordships are unable to find that any such constitutional limitation is imposed. This decision was given under the Government of India Act, 1935 and if the objection to the present Act had merely been founded on the ground of unauthorised delegation of legislative authority, we would have been bound to repel it, not merely by reason of the aforesaid judgment of the Privy Council, but because our own view of the extent to which legislative function may rightly be delegated and of what amounts to unconstitutional delegation of such functions completely accords with that of the Privy Council." In the case of East and West Steamship Company v. Pakistan and others (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 41) the question of excessive delegation of legislative authority also came to be considered. In that case an Act which was designed to give to the Government complete control over the movement of a Pakistani ship was challenged on the ground inter alia, that it was hit by the doctrine of abdication of legislative authority by the Legislature. Dealing with the question, Munir, C. J. observed as follows:‑ "In the present case, the Legislature thought that the control of shipping was necessary in the interest of public welfare and from the very nature of the trade to be regulated it was neces sary that the shipping authority should have abundant discretion if the policy and purpose of the Act were to be carried out. The Act is not, therefore, ex facie bad either on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative authority or on the ground that the shipping authority if it were so minded could administer it in a discriminatory manner. Objection on the first ground must fail because the Act lays down a policy which the shipping authority has to implement by the exercise of powers given to him, while objection on the second ground must be repelled because the petition does not allege any discrimination in practice." In the statute with which we are concerned, I have found that the Legislature has clearly declared its policy to be the promotion of local film Industry. Section 6 gives opportunity to the Central Government to implement the policy so declared and the making of the impugned provision is, therefore, within the legislative competence of the Legislature. In the case of Harishanker Bagla and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, sections 3 and 4 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1.946 were claimed to be void on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power. In that case section 3 authorised the Central Government of India to make provisions for regulating or prohibiting the produc tion, supplies and distribution of essential commodity and trade and commerce thereof. This section was challenged on the ground that it did not lay any specific standard or policy for making the provisions in question. That argument was found to be devoid of substance, for, in the section itself it was found that the power was given for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing equitable distribution and availability of fair price. This generalised statement of the reasons for conferring power as visualised under the section was considered to be sufficient standard and policy for making the order in question. In the case before us section 6 itself did not contain any express provision to that effect. But the expression "the Central Government shall prescribe" itself, according to me, indicates that rules framed under this section must be for carrying out the purpose of the Act as already discussed above and the policy of the Legislature is to be gathered therefrom. Learned Deputy Attorney‑General has rightly contended that the object of the present Act is different from that of the Cinematograph Act, 1918, and that the present Act is for the purpose of giving encourage ment to national film industry. Mahajan, C. J. dealing with the question of excessive delega tion of legislative function in the case of Harishankar Bagla referred to above expressed himself in the following terms:‑ "The next contention of Mr. Umrigar that section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 amounts to delegation of legislative power outside the permissible limits is again without any merit. It was settled by the majority judgment in the `Constitution of India and Delhi Act, 1912 etc.' A I R 1951 S C (B) that essential powers of legislation cannot be delegated. In other words the Legislature cannot delegate its function of . . . . . laying down legislative policy in respect of a measure and its formulation as a Rule of conduct. The Legislature must declare the policy of the law and the legal principles, which are to control any given cases and must provide a standard to guide the officials or the body in power to execute the law. The essential legislative function consists in the determination or choice of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct." The learned Chief Justice is therefore of opinion that the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and in the case before us the policy has been declared to be, inter alia, promotion of local film industry, whatever law or regulation is made must conform to this policy. It must be seen that prohibition is against the delegation of "essential" legislative function and it has been observed that the essential legislative function consists in considering and selecting a policy for the making of the law in question. In the present case the policy is to effect censorship and decertification and certify films in the interest of law and order or in the interest of local film industry or in any other national interest. In answer to the contention that these terms are vague, the learned Advocate‑General has rightly pointed out that the provision of section 3 of the Essential Supplies Act had no more guidance than the object laid down in the case before us. There is only this difference that in the case before us, section 6 does not contain within itself a guidance in this behalf. It has also been noticed that other provision of the statute inevitably ‑direct attention to the object of this legislation: The law relating to delegation of legislative function was also reviewed in a recent judgment of a Special Bench of this Court in the case of Haji Ghulam Zamin and another v. A. B. Khoondkar and others (14 P L R Dacca 989). In that case Murshed, C. J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed as follows: ‑ "Delegation by the Legislature is permitted within prescri bed limits in order to execute the legislative norms and provisions that have been enacted. Thus a restricted delega tion in aid of the proper functioning of legislative power has not been regarded as unconstitutional. There are innumerable decisions to support of the aforesaid proposition and before we discuss some of them. We would like to observe that the principles we have discussed above resolve themselves thus: (1) Legislation being the exclusive function of the Legislature, it cannot abdicate such function. (2) The Legislature, after having enunciated the essential (legislative principles and standards, is, however, entitled to delegate to outside agencies such functions which are essential to an effective exercise of the legislative power with which it has been endowed by the Constitution. (3) The Legislature, however, cannot efface itself and delegate all its functions to an extraneous agency." In that case the Central Government issued notification whereby it took the responsibilities of controlling inter regional trade in betel leaves between the two wings of Pakistan and established a committee for making allocation of quotas for transportation of pan from one wing to the other. An Ordinance (No. IV of 1964) was promulgated subsequent to the issue of the notification in question empowering the Central Government to regulate by licences, permits or otherwise of inter wing trade. The legality of the aforesaid legislation was questioned on the ground that it indicates abdication of legislative function by the Legislature and transferring to an extraneous agency inasmuch as no standard or policy was laid down. On a consideration of the various provisions of the Ordi nance the learned Chief Justice observed as follows:‑ "We may add that in the present case the impugned Ordinance does not declare any principle and has given no standard for guidance of its delegate." It was also observed that "the Ordinance is an undisguised transfer of all the functions of the Central Legislature to the executive. The Legislature has completely effaced itself,". The impugned Ordinance was therefore declared to be void by the said Special Bench of which two of us were members. From what I have stated above it Is difficult for me to say that "the Legislature has completely effaced itself" while enacting section 6 of the Act nor can it be said in this case that there has been "an undisguised transfer of all the functions of the Central Legislature to the executive". Section 7 which closely follows section 6 has also reiterated the policy of giving encouragement to the local film industry. In another decision of the Supreme Court of India, the question of excessive delegation of legislative function was considered. That was the case of In re: Article 143, Constitution of India and Delhi Laws Act (1912) (A I R 1951 S C 332.) In that case Fazle Ali, J. after considering a large number of decisions laid down the principle involved in the question in the following terms: "The Legislature must normally discharge its primary legisla tive function itself and not through others. (2) Once it is established that it has sovereign powers within a certain sphere it must follow as a corollary that it is free to legislate within that sphere in any way which appears to it to be the best way to give effect to its intention and policy in making a particular law, and that it may utilise any outside agency to any extent it finds necessary for doing things which it is unable to do itself or finds it inconvenient to do. In other words, it can do everything which is ancillary to and necessary for the full and effective exercise of its power of legislation. (3) It cannot abdicate its legislative functions and therefore while entrusting power to an outside agency,. it must see that such agency acts as a subordinate authority and does not become a parallel Legislature. (4) The doctrine of separation of powers and the judicial interpretation it has received in America ever since the American Constitution was framed, enables the American Courts to check undue and: excessive delegation but the Courts of this country are not committed to that doctrine and cannot apply it in the same way as it has been applied in America. Therefore, there are only two main checks in this country on the power of the Legislature to delegate these being its good sense and the principle that it should not cross the line beyond which delega tion amounts to abdication and self‑effacement " The learned Judge appears to have laid down that abdication and self‑effacement in the name of delegation are prohibited and I am unable to say that in the case before us the Legislature has gone to the extent of abdication and self‑effacement in view of its stated policy of the legislation. Mukherjee, J. also laid stress on the question of laying down a policy in the following terms in the same case. "The Court can interfere if no policy is discernable at all or the delegation is of such an indefinite character as to amount to abdication but as the discretion vests with the Legislature in determining whether there is necessity for delegation or not, the exercise of such discretion is not to be disturbed by the Court except in clear cases of abuse." Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury invites us to hold that section 6, involves making of a classification amongst all films already certified for exhibition and this leaves the Central Government to discharge a legislative function. I find myself unable to accept this contention. The object of the legislation is to promote local film industry. No encouragement can be given to the local film industry unless local films are separated from foreign films and in doing so the Central Government has to take due notice of such foreign films as are in display in large number in this country. The Legislature in order to avoid making the law being cumbersome had to leave the requirement of classification of the films to the Central Government. This classification cannot be said to be capable of overflowing. This classification in the present case has not overflowed "the well defined banks of the canal" Mukherjee, J. is also of opinion that so long as a policy is discernible there ought to be no interference with the delegation except in clear cases of abuse. It is difficult in this case to say that no policy is discernible in the impugned legislation nor can it be said, that it is a clear case of abuse inasmuch as rule 30 framed under the power so given is in accordance with the object and policy laid down in the Act. The learned Advocate‑General has also made a reference to the case of Queen v. Burah (5 I A 178). In that case the impugned legisla tion was complete in itself and it was left to the executive as to when and where the legislation should be brought into operation. This, their Lordship of the Privy Council held, is not an instance of delegation of a legislative function but of conditional legislation. It is true the case with which we are concerned is not a case of conditional legislation but delegation of legislative authority. The distinction between the conditional legislation and delegated legislation is that in the former it depends as to when an absolute legislation is to be made effective in a particular area n and in the case of the latter it involves delegation of rule‑malting power itself. That was the view expressed in Hamdard Dawakhana and others v. Union of India and others (A I R 1960 S C 554). In the case of State of Bihar v. Kameswar Singh (A I R 1952 S C 252), point raised was that section 32(2) of the Act was void, as in it the legislative function has been abdicated by the Legislature in favour of the executive. It was contended that the Legislature left the determination of the proportion of compensation to be paid in cash or in bonds and the period of redemptian of these bonds as well as the period of interval between the several instalments and this was urged to be essential legislative function. The Supreme Court of India referring to Queen v. Burah however repelled the contention and observed as follows:‑ "It is obvious that the time of redemption of the bonds will be co‑terminus with the period of the instalments. It has further enacted that the bonds will carry interest at the rate of two and half per cent. What has been left to the exe cutive is the question of the determination of the proportion in which compensation is to be paid in cash or in bonds and the fixation of the interval of the instalments. It seems to me that the delegation to this extent is permissible in view of the decision of this Court in State of Bombay v. Narotamdas Jetha Bhai A I R 1951 S C 69 and the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council ‑ in Queen v. Burah 5 Ind. App. 178 (P C).‑ The case of Queen v. Burah as I have already said dealt with what is called conditional legislation. In that case a central Act authorised the Lt. Governor of Bengal to apply the Act or part of it in some areas as and when necessary. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed therein as follows: ‑ "The proper Legislature has exercised its Judgment as to place. person, laws, powers ; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things. The condition having been fulfilled the legislation is now absolute. Where plenary powers of legislation exist as to particular subjects, whether in all imperial or in a provincial Legislature they may (in their Lordships' judgment) be well exercised, either absolutely or conditionally. Legislation conditional on the use of particular powers, or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the Legislature to persons in whom it places confidence is no uncommon thing; and, in many circumstances, it may be highly convenient, the British Statute Book abounds with examples of it; and it cannot be supposed that the Imperial parliament did not when constituting the Indian Legislature, contemplate this kind of conditional legislation as within the scope of the legislative powers which it from time to time conferred." Their Lordships directly considered the question of conditional legislation. But it has also to be remembered that they have observed to the effect that the Legislature may authorise persons in whom it has confidence to exercise limited discretion. The limitation is as already indicated above, that it must conform to the policy laid down by the Legislature. In the case of the Gujrat‑Punjab Bus Ltd. v. The Province of The Punjab and others (P L D 1957 Lah. 345) Kaikaus, J. laid‑down the principle of delegation of legislative function in the following terms: ‑ "The limitations on the delegation of legislative power to the executive are well known. If the policy and framework are provided in an Act by the Legislature and the details are to be filled in by the executive, there is no defect in the delegation of legislative power. It is only in a case where the Legislature abdicates or effaces itself that the delegation is ultra vires. The tendency of modern legislation is to leave more and more to the executive for the process of legislation by the Legislature is cumbersome. The rule‑making power granted by the Motor Vehicles Act to the Provincial Government with respect to the Punjab Road Transport Board does not conflict with the principles of delegation of legislative power." In the case before us the Legislature has, as pointed out above, laid down the framework and also the policy of the legislation. It cannot, therefore, be said that delegation in the case is defective. I am of the view that the policy of the legislation was the promotion of the local film industry and section 6 leaves it to the executive to implement that policy of the enactment. The con tention of Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury that the Legislature has acted in excess of the power of delegation of legislative function, does not appear to me to be of substance. Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury has also made an attack on the Act on the ground of its interference with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. According to the learned Advocate it infringes some of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution in Articles 13, 14 and

15. This argument is not entertainable as the impugned Act has been protected by the Constitution itself. Article 6 of the Constitution provides that the laws which are inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental rights are void. Clause (3) of the said Article provides that the provisions of Article 6 shall not apply to any of the laws specified in the 4th Schedule in force immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution (First Amend ment) 1963 which made these rights justiciable. The Censorship Act of 1963 has been specifically mentioned in the said 4th Schedule and has therefore been protected against any attack on the basis of what are called fundamental rights. Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury ‑has thereafter argued that Rule 30 framed under the Act not having been mentioned in the 4th Schedule they are not immune from attack on the basis of the fundamental right. This argument of Mr. Chowdhury is of no substance. The learned Advocate‑General has rightly submitted that the rules once framed form part of the Act and are therefore entitled to the protection due to the Act. As soon as a rule is framed if it is intra vires it becomes a part of the Act itself. I am therefore of opinion, it will enjoy the protection for it will have the same status of the Act. I have already found that section 6 is not void. That being so Rule 30 of the Rules clearly come within the scope of section 6 of the Act. Rule 30, therefore, in this case should be considered to be a part of the Act and should have the ‑similar protection. This view finds support in the case of Mulchand Gulabchand Mukund Shivram Bhide and another (A I R 1952 Bom. 296) In that case Chagla, C. J. delivering the judgment in the case observed as follows :‑ "Parliament or Legislature instead of incorporating the rules into the statute itself, ordinarily authorises Government to carry out the details of the policy laid down by the Legislature by framing the rules under the statute, and once the rules are framed, they are incorporated in the statute itself and become part of the statute and the rules must be governed by the same principles .as the statute itself. And therefore,; although a by‑law may be challenged on the ground that it is unreasonable a statutory rule cannot be so challenged." For the reasons stated above I agree with the order proposed to be made by learned brother Hasan, J. I am of opinion that there is no substance in this petition. I would therefore discharge the rule without any order as to costs. ABDULLA, J.‑This petition under Article 98 of the Constitu tion has been referred to the Special Bench as the main question raised in it was deemed to be a complicated question by the Division Bench before which it was first placed for hearing. The petitioner, Dacca Picture Palace Limited has been carrying on business of exhibiting cinematograph films in two Cinema‑halls belonging to the petitioner. They were exhibiting the films on the basis of a licence and had been exhibiting foreign (including Indian) and Pakistani films. The petitioner received a notice which was annexed as Annexure `A' to the petition requiring the petitioner to submit; returns of playing time as prescribed by Rule 30 of the Censorship of Films Rules, 1963. The said Rules were framed by the Central Government under section 10 of the Censorship of Films Act, 1963 (Act XVIII of 1963) which was passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan purporting to act under paragraphs (b) and (c) of clause (2) of Article 131 of the Constitution. The Act as stated in the preamble provides for the censorship of Cinematographs Films and for the decertification of certified films in the interest of law and order, or in the interest of local films industry, or in any other national interest, and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith. Rule 30 purports to have been framed with particular reference to section 6 of the Act. The rest of the act provides for certifying and decertifying of cinematograph films. Section 6 of the act reads as follows: ‑ "

6. Exhibition of certified films, etc.‑(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Cinematograph Act, 1918 (II of 19)8) or in any other law for the time being in force, the Central Government shall prescribe the places or class of places licensed for the exhibition of cinematograph films where, and the period or periods for which, any certified films or class of certified films may be exhibited. (2) In respect of places prescribed under section 1 the Central Government may by rules provide for the regulation of proper seating, sanitary, booking and other arrangements." Purporting to provide the rules to carry on the object specified in section 6, the Central Government framed Rule 30 which reads as follows :‑ "

30. Playing time.‑(1) The owner or proprietor of a licensed place which, during the year preceding the commence ment of these rules, was exhibiting foreign films for not less than fifty per cent. of its playing time shall, within thirty days of such commencement, apply to the District Magistrate within whose local jurisdiction the licensed place is situate for the grant of a certificate to the effect that the licensed place is a place so exhibiting foreign films. (2) The owner or proprietor of a licensed place in respect of which a certificate such as is mentioned in sub‑rule (1) is granted shall exhibit in such place Pakistani films for at least fifteen per cent. of its playing time and may, during the rest of the playing time, exhibit foreign films other than such foreign films as are in any of the Pakistani or Indian languages and depict the Pakistani or Indian way of life. (3) The owner or proprietor of a licensed place in respect of which no certificate, as aforesaid is granted shall exhibit in such place Pakistani films for not less than eighty‑five per cent. of its playing time, and may during the rest of the playing time, exhibit foreign films, including such foreign films as are in any of the Pakistani or Indian languages and depict the Pakistani or Indian way of life. (4) The decision of the Central Government as to whether a particular certified film, is or is not a Pakistani film, or a foreign film which is any of the Pakistani or Indian languages or depict the Pakistani way of life, shall be final. (5) Every owner or proprietor of a licensed place shall submit to the District Magistrate such returns relating to the utilization of the playing time in that place and such intervals as the District Magistrate may determine. (6) The District Magistrate shall forward the returns received by him to the Central Government." It was urged by the petitioner that section 6 ,did not provide any guidance to the delegated authority, namely, the Central Government and the provisions of section 6 amounted to naked abdication of the power in favour of the Central Government by the Legislature and in fact it amounted to the creation of a parallel legislative authority having legislation of the subject matter covered by the section to the Central Government. It is urged further by the petitioner that Rule 30 was beyond the scheme of the Act even accepting that the provision of section 6 did not amount to delegated legislation. The petitioner urges in its application that it did not apply for any certificate as mentioned in Rule 30 (1) of the said Mules and that it bad already incurred the penalties provided in section 8 of the Act. The petitioner further urged that its main business was exhibition of Indian films which had already been certified for exhibition in Pakistan which it has hired at a huge cost and the petitioner contract subsists till 31‑5‑

66. As a result of the provisions of Rule 30, sub‑rule (3), the petitioner has been forced to reduce the exhibition time of the said Indian Films to 15 % only of the total exhibition time available to the petitioner and as such the petitioner's business would be ruined. In those circumstances the petitioner obtained Rule nisi from this Court upon the respon dent to show cause why the Memo. No. 140 (Gen.)/A. T. dated 9‑1‑64 requiring him to submit the returns under Rule 30 of the Rules framed under the Act, should not be declared as having been made without lawful authority and as of no legal effect and why the respondent should not be directed to withdraw, recall or rescind the said memorandum. The respondent filed an affidavit‑in‑opposition and the main contention of the respondent was that the petitioner had not been deprived of carrying on its lawful trade or business and its business in the manner it intends to continue came in conflict with the laws of the land namely, the Censorship of Films Act, 1963. It was further urged that the Government bad banned Indian Films by notification dated 18th January 1962 in the interest of the: national films industry. It was further urged that before the enactment of the Censorship Act the Government had already banned the import of Indian films in the interest of national films industry. In regard to the films imported prior to the ban the Government had a right to impose any restriction if the continued exhibition of foreign films affected the national Industry. It was further submitted that a lenient view had been taken in allowing restricted exhibition of Indian films so that the importers were assured of continued resources of revenue. It was further urged in the said affidavit‑in‑opposition that the petitioner had no right to challenge the validity of the Act or the rules on the ground of their violating any of the fundamental right as the‑act was protected under the Constitution. So far as the contention of the petitioner regarding the rules being beyond the scope and intents of the Act, it was asserted that the Rules provided for fixation of playing time and was covered by the preamble of the act. Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury, who has appeared on behalf of the petitioner has argued, first, that the Act itself, although protected challenged on the ground of violation of any of the fundamental rules, was not immune from attack on other ground. He has stated that the subject was a provincial subject and before: the Central Legislature could legislate on the same the provisions of Article 131 of the Constitution had to be strictly complied with. He argued that the word "so require" in that article connotes a situation where it was felt as a compelling necessity that the Central Legislature should exercise the power with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Third Schedule. He argued that neither planning nor co‑ordination or the achievement of uniformity in respect of the subject‑matter in different parts of Pakistan was of such dire necessity which would call for the exercise of the Extraordinary power by the Central Legislature. He argued that the provincial Legislature was quite competent to legislate on the subject and there would not be any conflict as there was already a guidance in the Censorship Act,1918. When his attention was drawn to the provision of Article 133 which provides that the responsibility of deciding whether a Legislature has power under this Constitution to make a law is that of the Legislature itself and that the validity of a law shall not be called in question on the ground that the Legislature by which it was made had no power to make the law, he replied that Article 133 would apply provided that the Legislature had made laws within their legislative; power. Without entering into the controversy whether the Court can call into question the validity of a law in spite of the provisions of Article 133 of the Constitution I fail to understand why the impugned legislation could not have been made under Article 131, sub‑Article (2) of the Constitution. The purpose of the Act being to protect the infant industry of production of cinematograph films for exhibition, it goes without saying that it would be in the interest of the country as a whole that there should be uniformity in respect of this business in view of its special circumstances. It is well known that this industry is dependent on the import of the raw films as no cinematograph films is produced in the country as yet. National interest of Pakistan requires planning and co‑ordination on the subject so that the maximum utilization of the imported articles necessary for the business could be made. In view of the above circumstances, in my opinion, the Central Legislature was competent to enact the impugned law. The next argument of Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, which is actually his main contention, raises a very substantial question. It is well‑settled that the system of Government, which we have at present requires that its executive and legislative functions operate separately. This proposition necessarily connotes that the Legislature, which has been entrusted to make the law which the Executive will put into operation, cannot delegate its law‑making powers to the Executive. This would cause an upset in the system of checks and balances which has been evolved for the proper government of the country. Mr. Hamidul Haq has argued that by enacting section 6 of the Act, the Legislature has completely abdicated its powers in favour of the executive. He has argued that there is no guidance in section 6 to the executive which has been left a free hand frame rules purporting to work out the provision of section

6. He has further argued that the Legislature had given undue power by the impugned section 6 was evident from the fact that the executive has made complete new legislation divorced from the purpose of the section purporting to act under the powers granted by the said section. The topic raised by Mr. Hamidul Haq has been the subject‑matter of several decisions of our Courts which has incorporated the principle laid down in Rulings of the Privy Council as well as those of the Supreme Court of United States. Before adverting to these Rulings I would first like to examine the provisions of the Act in order to see the scope of the provisions of section

6. From the preamble it is clear that the purpose of the legislation is two‑fold, namely, (1) censorship (2) decertification of certified films. Either of these two acts are to be performed in the interest of law and order or in the interest of the local films industry or in any other national interest and the Legislature also proposes in the preamble to enact on matters incidental thereto or connected therewith, namely, censorship or decertification of certified films. These are the avowed objects of the Act as given in the preamble. "The preamble of a statute has been said to be a good means of finding out its meaning, and, as it were, a key to the understanding of it" (Maxwell 9th Edition, page 46). Of course it does not mean that if there are express provisions in the Act which go beyond what has been briefly stated in the preamble the express provision will not prevail. But the Provisions of the Act has to be read in conjunction with the preamble in order to arrive at a finding as to what was the purpose of the legislation, with this observation in mind, I would examine the provisions of the Act. Section 1 prescribed the title, extent and commencement of the Act. Section 2 is a definition clause which defines, `authority' certificate. certified film, film local area, prescribed, and uncertified film. Section 3 prescribes, that the Central Government may constitute as many authorities for the purpose of examining and certifying films for public exhibition for any particular area. Section 4 provides for certification of films by the authority created under section

3. Subsection (3) of section 4 provides that a certificate under subsection (2) shall be valid for the whole of Pakistan for the period of any, as may be specified in the certificate. The other subsections of section 4 provide for an appeal if the authority concerned does not certify a particular film. Section 5 provides for suspension of certificates already granted, giving the prescribed authority or the District Magistrate concerned the power to suspend the exhibition of any certified film within its local area subject to confirmation of the order by the Central Government. The Central Government has also power on its own motion or on reference to declare any certified film to be deemed to be uncertified for the whole of Pakistan under clause (7) of section

5. Section 7 provides for the power to decertify certified films and the power is given to the Central Government. Section 8 provides for penalty for viola tion and section 9 provides for the procedure for trial of the offence punishable under this Act. Section 10 is the rules making power. Section 11 is the power of the Central Government to exempt any film from any of the conditions or any of the provisions of the Act. Section 12 provides for delegation of powers by the Central Government. Section 13 provides for amendment of the original Act (Act 11 of 1918) and section 14 is the savings clause preserving the actions of the authorities constituted under the provisions of the Act, 1918. Therefore, we see that so far as certifying or decertifying or the exhibition or suspension of exhibition of certified films are concerned the provisions of the Act apart from section 6 make complete provisions. If the exhibition of a certified film is to be, restricted in any particular area the authority constituted under section 3 has been given the power by section 5 to suspend the certificate and that order is only subject to revision by the Central Government. The same power of suspension has also been given to the District Magistrate of the area. Then the power is also reserved in favour of the Central Government of declaring any certified film to be deemed to be an uncertified film and lastly of decertifying any certified film whenever it thinks fit in the interest of law and order or in the interest of the local film industry or in any other national interest by virtue of the provision of section 5 (7) and section 7 of the Act respectively. Therefore, in my opinion section 6 can only have the effect of regulating the exhibition of the certified films only with a view to the sanitary, safety or any other civil consideration. Section 6 provides for the Central Government, in my opinion, to prescribe what houses or class or classes of houses should exhibit cinema tograph films by granting licence therefore and as also the period or periods for which it will hold such exhibition. The intention of the Legislature, it appears to me, was to leave it to the Central Government framing of such rules with a view to sanitary and safety conditions only. But in giving this power to the Central Government it has also allowed them an option of prescribing the period or periods for which any certified film or class of films may be exhibited. So far as the Act, apart from section 6 is concerned, it has provided, as I have already pointed out full provisions by which the Central Government or the authority created by section 3 can regulate the exhibition of any film or class of film or films by the power of suspension or decertification. So regulation of the exhibition of a certified film has already been legislated upon by the Legislature itself. Having done this the Legislature could not create a parallel Legislature by delegating its power to the Central Government to prescribe by rules the period or periods for which any film or any class of films may be exhibited in place licensed for the exhibition of cinema tograph films. By leaving this option to the Central Government, without any guidance as to the purpose the Legislature has not only abdicated in favour of the Central Government but also has allowed the Central Government to take away the right granted by section 4, subsection (3) of the Act. Section 4 subsection (3) as already stated provides that a certificate granted shall be valid for the whole of Pakistan for such period, if any, as may be specified in the certificate. So, once the certificate is granted the owner or lessor of a certified film can exhibit it for the entire period of its validity. But this right, which the owner or lessor has got, the Legislature allows the Central Government to curb by making Rules under section 6 of the Act. By the provisions of section 6 by which the Central Government has been left to make rules for the period or periods for which any film or class of films can be exhibited the Legislature has clothed the Central Government with powers of Legislation. "Classification" as is well known to any student of logic is a mental grouping of facts and phenomena according to their resemblances and differences so as best to serve some purpose, "Mental grouping" involves a subjective element. If the Legisla ture had itself classified the films and also prescribed the proportion in which the period of exhibition would be distributed amongst the various units leaving out the working of the period to the Central Government it would have been good legislation. But in this case the Legislature has completely abdicated its powers by giving the Central Government the power to classify the films according to its own sweet will and to prescribe the periods in which any class or classes of films would be exhibited again according to its own sweet will. This, in my opinion, the Legislature could not do. The result shows that by taking advantage of the unguided power of legislation the Central Government has framed Rule 30 which has been quoted above in extenso. An analysis of this Rule will show that the Central Govern ment has classified the films arbitrarily into three classes. (1) Pakistani film (2) Foreign film (3) foreign film which is in any of the Pakistani or Indian languages and depicts the Pakistani or Indian way of life. This arbitrary classification is a clear legislative action which the Legislature itself was only empowered to exercise. The Central Government by virtue of the power derived from section 6 has legislated afresh and is by a dubious method, doing what the Legislature itself did not do or authorise. The effect of this Rule is to reduce the playing time of Indian films to a period of 15 % of the total exhibition time of any house which has been authorised to show these films. This in effect renders nugatory the privilege given by the granting of a certificate as embodied in subsection (3) of section

4. Thus it is clear that provisions of section 6 of the Act which authorise the Central Government to classify films and to prescribe the period for which a class or classes of films would be allowed to be exhibited amounts to delegated legislation and as such are void. So far as the said section 6 of the Act leaves to the Central Government the power to prescribe rules for the period or periods for which any class or classes of films should be exhibited without the Legislature itself having specified the classes of films or giving a guide to the authority of prescribing rules for exhibition or restriction of exhibition of various classes of films it amounts to delegation of legislation powers and is ultra vires of the Legislature and as such void. Therefore, I hold that the Rules framed under this section (namely, Rule 30 with all its subsections) are also void. This conclusion alone is sufficient for disposal of this Rule. But the question being of some importance, I shall also deal with some of the cases which have been cited from the Bar, which I think, is pertinent to the question. The leading case on this point, in my opinion, is that of the Queen v Burah This case has been referred to in nearly all the cases which deal with this topic. The facts of the case are well known. The Indian Legislature as it was then constituted under the Indian Council Act, 1961 passed an enactment, namely, Act XXII of 1969 by which the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and offices was excluded from specified districts and they were placed under new courts and offices. The Act itself was brought into force immediately by the Legislature with reference to certain areas described in the Act and named the Garo Hills, the commencement being left to be notified by the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. By the 9th section the Lieutenant Governor was also empowered 'from time to time' by notification in the Calcutta Gazette to extend mutatis mutandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills and such portion of the Khasia Hills as for the time being formed part of British India. The vires of this enactment was challenged by a convict belonging to the Khasia Hills who had been sentenced by a Chief Commissioner acting under the provisions of the Act. Although the jurisdiction of the High Court had been expressly taken away by the Act, the petitioner moved the High Court and the High Court by majority of the Judges in a Full Bench, decided that the case fell within its Appellate Jurisdiction and sent for the records of the proceedings with a view to an adjudication thereon. From that decision an appeal was taken to the Privy Council by special leave. So far as this case is concerned, we are concerned with the argument that the 9th section was not legislation but was delegation of legislative power. On the basis of the majority decision, the High Court held that this section was ultra vires and that the Indian Legislature being an agent or delegate acting within its limit under the Imperial parliament must in all cases legislate directly by itself. Although today we are not confronted with the same proposition, that is to say, our Legislature is a sovereign Legislature and the principle, "Delegature non Delegare posee" is not applicable yet as I have stated earlier the Legislature is no less restricted from delegating its functions to external bodies. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in that case, however, held that the Governor General‑in‑Council could not by any form of enactment, create in India and arm with general legislative authority, new legislative power, not created or authorised by the Councils Act. What had been done the Privy Council held, was that the Governor‑General‑in‑Council had determined in the due and ordinary course of legislation to remove the particular districts from the jurisdiction of the Ordinary Courts and offices and to place it under new Courts and offices, to be appointed by and responsible to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal; leaving it to the Lieutenant Governor to say at what time that change shall take place. Their Lordships also held that the Legislature determined that, so far, a certain change should take place; but that it was expedient to leave the time, and the manner of carrying it into effect to the discretion of the Lieutenant Governor. The proper Legislature had exercised its judgment as to place, person, laws, powers; and the result of that judgment had been to legislate conditionally as to all these things. The conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation was absolute and their Lordships held that where plenary powers of legislation exist as to a particular subject it may be well exercised either absolutely or conditionally. Legislation, conditional on the use of particular powers or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the Legislature to persons in whom it places confidence, is no uncommon thing and, in many circumstances it may be highly convenient. Therefore, the import of the decision is clear so far as legislative functions are concerned the Legislature could not delegate its functions to an external power but having completely legislated on the subject‑matter, the Legislature could entrust its coming into force or application to a certain portion of the whole area, over which the legislation has already been made, to an authority in which it had confidence. The next case which I will discuss is that of Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma and others cited by the Advocate‑General. In this case it vies contended that certain Criminal Courts Ordinance was ultra vires, the Legislative function of the Governor‑General as section 1, subsection (3) of the said Ordinance amounted to 'delegated legislation'. In that Ordinance a new set of Courts were created and complete legislation was made for such creation. But it was left to the local Government or to some officer of the local Government empowered by it in that behalf to direct what offences or class of offences, and moreover, what cases or class of cases should be tried by the Special Courts. The learned Judges of the High Court were of the opinion that the Ordinance had given to provincial Government (power to effectuate jurisdiction of Special Criminal Courts by making orders in individual cases or groups of cases). In the Federal Court, the Chief Justice considered the most serious defect in the impugned Ordinance, was the power conferred by it to discriminate between one case and another by directing trial in different Courts. Their Lordships of the Privy Council, however, held that the Courts were not concerned in construing enacted words with the policy involved or with the results injurious or otherwise which may follow from giving effect to the language used. So far as the question of delegated legislation is concerned I do not see how this case can be a guide. Here the Government were not given any power of legislation. The only discretion that the Legislature had given to them was a choice of Courts. Neither the Government were empowered to legislate regarding any courts nor were they given the power to make any new classification of Courts not were they given any power to make any classification as regards offences other than those already created by existing enactments. This piece of legislation might have been condemned on the basis of violation of the fundamental rights given by the equality clauses of a modern constitution. But that was 1 not available at the time the Ordinance was promulgated, nor is that ground available in the present case as the Act itself is protected by the proviso to Article 6 of our Constitution. Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury cited the case of Vick Wo v. Peter Hopkins (30 L E 356). There it was left to the Board of Supervisors a power to withhold granting of licence to carry on a laundry within the corporate limits of the city. The law on its face was impartial but it was capable of being administered by the public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand so that it amounted practically to enable the authorities to make illegal discrimina tions between persons in similar circumstances. This case is confined to investing of absolute power with the executive which would enable them to make illegal discrimination. The power of legislation is not there. The next case which I shall take up, which is also from America, is directly on the point. This is the case of Panama Refining Company v. A. D. Ryan S. D. Bennet and others (78 L E 293). In this case section 9 (c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act which authorised the President to prohibit under penalty of fine or imprisonment the transportation in inter state and foreign commerce of petroleum but contained no definition of the circumstances and conditions in which the transportation was to be allowed or prohibited was condemned. It was held that it amounted to delegation of legislative power. It was held that the Congress was precluded from delegating its essential legislative functions. The learned Judges condemned section 9 (c) as in their opinion the said section not having stated under what circumstances or under what conditions the President was to prohibit the transportation of petroleum nor having established any criterion to govern the President's course, nor requiring any finding by the President as a condition of his action amounted to abdication of legislative functions. The Congress had not declared any policy as to the transportation of the excess produc tion. The learned Judges held that so far as this section was concerned it had given to the President an unlimited authority to determine a policy and to lay it down, as he may see fit. It was held further that the Congress manifestly was not permitted to abdicate to others, the essential legislative function with which it was vested. While acknowledging that the attested Constitution could not be regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability, which will enable it to perform its function to laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits, the learned Judges held that it did not allow the Congress to delegate absolutely the power vested in it. The principle laid down in this case was upheld in another case of the Supreme Court of the United States, namely, A. L. A. Schehter Pountry Corporation v. United States of America. In that case also the power given to the President by the Legislature under the provision of section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 was characterised as unconstitutional delegation as the Legislature had failed to set up any standards apart from the statement of the general aim of rehabilitation, correction and development of trades and industries. It was clearly laid down in this case, that so long a policy is laid down and a standard established by a statute, no unconsti tutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply. The same principle was reiterated in the case of Albert Yakus v. U. S. A. (88 L E 834) where it was held that the essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a definite and binding rule of conduct. But in the circumstances of this case it was held by the Court that those essentials were preserved when congress had specified the basic conditions of fact upon Whose Existence of Occurrence? ascertained from relevant date a designated administrative agency had directed that the statutory commend shall be affection (sic). It was further laid down that it was not necessary for the legislative body to find for itself every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action, or that it make for itself detailed determination which it has declared to be prerequisite to the application of the legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances. The doctrine of separation of powers did not deny to the legislative body to direct that an Administrative Officer shall have ample latitute within which to ascertain conditions which the legislative body has made prerequisite to the operation of its legislative command. In this case the earlier cases were also referred to and discussed. Now taking up the cases decided by our Courts the first case relevant for our purpose is that of East and West Steamship Company v. Pakistan. In this case the power given to the shipping authority constituted under the Control of Shipping Act, 1847 was challenged on the ground that it was discriminatory and also that it amounted to excessive delegation of legislative authority. The Supreme Court has held that the Act proceeded on a definite policy and the power delegated was within the policy laid down by the Legislature. A Special Bench of the Dacca High Court, of which two of us were members has recently considered the same question in the case of Haji Golam Zamin and another v. A. B. Khondker and others. It was held in that case that section 2 of the Ordinance, namely, Inter Provincial Trade Ordinance (IV of 1964) was ultra vires of the Legislature as it constituted an undisguise self annihilation. The power was given in that section to the Central Government to regulate the movement and transport of any commodity by a general or special order but no policy was laid down. After a detailed discussion of all the relevant rulings the Special Bench came to the above conclusion. It also noticed that the Legislature, after having enunciated the legislative principles and standards was entitled to delegate to specific agencies such functions which are essential to an effective exercise of the legislative power with which it has been endowed by the Constitution. But legislation being the exclusive function of the Legislature it could not abdicate such function. Thus we see from a discussion of the relevant cases that it is not permissible for the Legislature to delegate its essential legislative function to an extraneous authority. It could lay down the policy or the standard and leave the details to be worked out by an extraneous authority as it is not possible for the Legislature itself to provide for all the details. The tendency of modern legislation is to leave more power to the executive to work out the details as it would be cumbersome for the members of the Legislature to do so but that does not mean that the Legislature can efface itself. If the policy and frame work is provided in the Act by the Legislature the details may be filled in by the executive. It is not necessary to refer to all the cases cited before us as the principle stated above is universally accepted by all Courts functioning in a modern democracy. Now coming back to the case before us I have shown above that no guidance or standard has been provided for in the impugned section 6 of the Act by which the Central Government would be guided. On the other hand, an essential legislative func tion, namely, classification has been left to the executive, and armed with such unguided and absolute legislative power the executive has prescribed rules which was never in the contempla tion of the Legislature itself. As such I hold that such section 6 of the Act is ultra vires of the Legislature so far as it authorises the Central Government to classify films and to prescribe the period for which a class or classes of films would be allowed to be exhibited and the rules framed thereunder namely, Rule 30 with all its subsections have no legal authority. The learned Advocate‑General has strenuously contended that the policy of the Act being protection of local Film Industry section 6 and the Rules thereunder could not be challenged as in fact, the two together advanced that policy. I have shown by an analysis of the sections of the Act that the Legislature has made sufficient provision for carrying out that purpose in the other sections of the Act excluding section

6. There is ample power under the other sections of the Act to effectively carry on the policy laid down by the Legislature. Section 6, therefore; in my opinion, was merely to provide for rules for regulating the exhibition of certified films irrespective of any classification. The power given to the Central Government under the guise of regulating the exhibition of certified films was in fact the power to legislate absolutely. The Central Government by making the rules armed with the absolute power has in fact done in a dubious manner what it could not have done if the Legislature had laid down the policy or the standard in the section itself. The Act having already provided for carrying into effect its declared policy could not leave to the Central Government the power to legislate on the same subject under the innocent provision of making rules for exhibi tion of certified films. In view of the conclusions to which I have arrived it is not necessary to advert to the other points raised by Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury. In view of what I have stated it is clear that the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed by it if it can otherwise establish that its application is maintainable. A point was raised on behalf of the respondents that the petition is not maintainable under Article 98 of the Constitution as the petitioner had no present grievance. The petitioner has filed a further affidavit with our leave and in it the petitioner has set for the contract with its distributors which could subsist till 31‑5‑

66. The petitioner had already given a list of 28 Indian films of which it had obtained screening right. It is contended by the petitioner that the petitioner will suffer heavily if it is not allowed to exhibit these films excepting 15 of the time available to them for exhibition under the impugned Rules. Besides this the petitioner has already incurred the penalty for violating the directions under the said Rules for which they have been asked to show cause. Considering the circumstances, I held that the petitioner has a present grievance and the application under Article 98 of the Constitution is an appropriate measure for removing the same. In the facts and circumstances stated above, I would make the Rule absolute, but make no order as to costs. By majority of the verdict, the Rule is discharged without any order as to costs. As the case involves substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, certificate as prayed for is granted under paragraph (a) of clause (2) of Article 58 of the Constitution. S. A. H. Rule discharged. Special Leave to Appeal granted.