P L D 1961 Supreme Court 479 (PLP)

CORNELIUS, C. J.-This Judgment will dispose of the follow ing Civil Appeals, viz.- No. 89 of 1 960 PAKISTAN PETROLEUM WORKERS' FEDERATION versus BURMAH-SHELL OIL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTING COMPANY AND 7 OTHERS No. 103 of 1960 PAKISTAN PETROLEUM LTD. versus PAKISTAN PETROLEUM WORKERS' FEDERATION, KARACHI AND 2 OTHERS No. 108 of 1960 STANDARD VACUUM OIL COMPANY versus STANDARD VACUUM EMPLOYEES' UNION AND 3 OTHERS No. 109 of 1960 CALTEX OIL (PAKISTAN) LTD versus CA LTEX EMPLOYEES' UNION AND 3 OTHERS No. 110 of 1960 THE ATTOCK OIL COMPANY LTD. versus PAKISTAN PETROLEUM WORKERS' FEDERATION, KARACHI AND 4 OTHERS No. 111 of 1960 BURMAH-SHELL OIL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTING COMPANY versus BURMAH-SHELL EMPLOYEES' UNION AND 3 OTHERS AND No. 112 of 1960 BURMAH-SHELL OIL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTING COMPANY AND 2 OTHER OIL COMPANIES Versus KARACHI PETROLEUM WORKERS' UNION AND 3 OTHERS These appeals have been brought to call in question decisions included in a single award given by an Industrial Tribunal on the 27th May 1959, in consequence of a reference made to him by the Central Government of Pakistan which related to disputes raised against their respective employers by the Pakistan Petroleum Workers' Federation, and the following Unions which are consti tuents of that Federation, namely, the Burmah-Shell Employees' Union, the Standard-Vacuum Employees' Union, the Caltex Employees' Union, the Pakistan Petroleum Employees' Union, the Sui Gas Workers' Union, the Attock Oil Company Union, and the Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union (which is composed of emp loyees of the different Oil Companies at the Kemari installations, at West Wharf and at Karachi Airport). It was found convenient by the Tribunal to deal with-these cases jointly as the Companies concerned were all engaged in the petroleum trade. It became apparent however in the course of the argument that in many respects it would have been better if the cases of the Attock Oil Company and the Pakistan Petroleum Ltd., had been separately dealt with. Both these Companies are prospecting and producing Companies. While the Attock Oil Company is by now thoroughly well-established, and is operating a number of successful oil wells, situated in the area of the Rawalpindi district in West Pakistan. Pakistan Petroleum Ltd., are of recent formation and apart from their success in discovering gas at Sui, they appear to have been unfortunate in each of their other borings. In all respects, it seems to me that the Tribunal would- have avoided the danger of applying false analogies if he had dealt with the case of the Attock Oil Company, and that of the Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. as two separate cases, while dealing with the cases of the remaining Oil Companies jointly since they are all distributing Companies. Before taking up the examination of the detailed provisions of the award, to the extent they have been challenged in the appeals, it is necessary to deal with a general argument, in avoidance of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which has been raised on behalf of one of the appellants only, namely, Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. On behalf of this Company, Mr. Fazlur Rehman first argued that there was a defect in the reference. The disputes were first referred on the 18th April 1958 to Mr. Akhtar Hussain Khan, who conducted hearings on a number of dates ending the 18th June 1958. The ordinary period pres cribed for the making of an award by a Tribunal is three months vide section 15 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 147 but this period may be extended by the appropriate Government "for good and sufficient reasons" by such further period or periods as may be thought necessary. The period of three months applicable to the reference to a Mr. Akhtar Hussain Khan ended on the 18th July 1958, but no order of extension was made, with the consequence that, as the reference had not been fruitful in producing an award it would be deemed in law to have become infructuous. That this was the intention of the Government is plain from the fact that on the 21st July 1958, a fresh notification was issued by which the dispute was referred "to an Industrial Tribunal consisting of Mr. W. B. L. Vellani." Mr. Fazlur Rahman raised the contention that the Tribunal was constituted by the Government under section 7 (1) of the Act, which confers necessary power of constitution, and he pointed out that no noti fication under this provision was issued in relation to Mr. Vellani, but only a notification under section 10 referring the dispute to him. The argument is of a technical nature. Even though section 7 was not mentioned, it is clear that the words of the notification under section 10 are words of constitution and have the effect of constituting a Tribunal composed of Mr. Vellani as a single member. Mr. Fazlur Rahman then put forward the contention that the award which was given on the 30th April 1959, and published on the 27th May 1959, was rendered void and of no effect by reason of the following facts. The last extension of time by the Government prior to the making of the award was on the 21st March 1959 for a period of a month. The next order of exten sion by the Government was made on the on May 1959, after the making of the award, and it was urged that by the fact of the award having been made during a period not covered by a prior order of extension, it must be deemed to have been made without jurisdiction, and therefore to be void. In my opinion the argument is of no avail. It is to be borne in mind that this was an enquiry of a most extensive kind, which had lasted for a period of about ten months. The record of the appeals in this Court are contained in 17 bound volumes, and includes a great volume of documentary and oral evidence. Throughout the period that the Tribunal functioned for the purpose of the adjudication, all parties thereto submitted to his jurisdiction. Of the five Companies involved, the point of jurisdiction is raised only by one, namely, Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. and even this Company has accepted the award on a number of points, a fact which appears clearly from their appeals being confined to some only of the decisions which imposed fresh burdens upon them. Therefore, there are a number of weighty reasons which must give pause to a Court in considering whether upon a technical grounds, the entire labours of the Tribunal, assisted by even greater labours by the contesting parties before him should all be brought to naught upon a technical ground. It appears to me that that ground is also not sustainable in law. My reasons for thinking so are as follows. Firstly under section 20, subsection (3) of the Act, it is provided that the proceedings before the Tribunal shall be deemed to conclude only when the award is published and not earlier, and it follows that the Tribunal remains seized of the dispute up to the time when the award is published. This has the effect that, whenever an order extending the period for the award is made, for a further period which ends prior to the date of the publication of the award, it will be effective to continue the jurisdiction of the Tribunal up to the terminal date of extended period. In this case, it is necessary only to extend the date upto the 30th April 1959, when the award was actually made, and an extension to produce that effect admittedly exists. Mr. Fazlur Rahman attempted to argue that time was of the essence of these matters, and he referred to the various provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act, which impose short periods for the performance of their duties by Conciliation Officers, Boards of Conciliation, Courts and finally Tribunals. A Conciliation Officer shall submit his report within 14 days, if the dispute relates to a public utility service, and within twenty eight days, if it relates to any other concern, and these periods may be shortened at the discretion of the appro priate Government. A Board of Conciliation is enjoined to take up a dispute without delay for investigation, and to submit its report within two months or such shorter period as the referring Government may fix, but there is a provision enabling the Government to extend time by one or more orders but not for a period exceeding two months in the aggregate. At the same time, there is a provision enabling the parties to the dispute to extend time for the submission of the report. The time limit for a Court acting under section 10, subsection (1) (b) is "ordi narily within a period of six months." On these premises, Mr. Fazlur Rahman argued that the provisions of section 15 (1) of the Act which limit the time for the making of an award by a Tribunal should be strictly construed, and that at any rateeif the making of the award takes place after expiry of the time limited, it must be assumed that this is illegal and the award has been made without jurisdiction. There is however another aspect of these provisions for limitation of time, and that is that they express the intention of the Legislature that industrial disputes shall be taken up for investigation and shall be enquired into and either reported upon or adjudicated upon with the greatest possible expedition. In employing the expression "shall submit its award within a period not exceeding three months from the date of the reference", the emphasis may well be upon expedition, without making the validity of the action depend upon the exact observance of the limit of time This interpretation is supportable by the consideration that the jurisdiction is given to a Tribunal, not in relation to any outside factor which imposes a time limit upon the necessity for that jurisdiction, but simply that the Tribunal should decide the matter. Instances of the other kind readily come to mind. During the Second World War, a great number of special jurisdictions were created under rules and other instruments, which came to an end with the War. In cases of emergency such as those brought about by distur bance in particular areas, special Courts are established whose jurisdiction ceases when the declaration of emergency expires. These are jurisdictions which essentially are temporary, the time being limited not by the necessity of the case or the cases, but by some extraneous consideration such as the duration of a war or of an emergency. Here, the assumption in the rele vant sense is that a disturbed state of affairs affecting the relations between the employers and the workers in an industry must be composed, and the task is entrusted to a Tribunal. No ex traneous considerations apply, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that considerations of mere time will not operate to take away the jurisdiction. The imposition of limits of time upon the successful conclusion of the adjudication must therefore be intend ed for purposes of securing expedition. It may be useful to refer to the provisions in the law of arbitra tion which, while they impose limits of time for the making of an award nevertheless give full validity to the award even when it is made out of time. Arbitration is resorted to for the sole and simple purpose of having a dispute resolved. No extraneous overriding considerations govern the reference. The English law on the point is stated in the latest addition of Russell on Arbitration (Sixteenth Edition) 1957, at page 236, in the follow ing words:- "The power (of enlargement of time for making the award) can be exercised although the award has in fact already been made after the period fixed for making it has expired. The effect of the order of enlargement is that the extended time is to be treated as if it had been originally given in the arbitration agreement. Consequently, the award and all else done in the arbitration during such extended time is rendered valid and effective." It stands to reason that a validation must have effect in relation to every proceeding taken before the Tribunal in the course of the enquiry, up to and including the making of the award. There are no words in section 15(1) of the Act, to prevent the referring Government from extending- time for the making of the award after the expiry of the previously extended period and it is not contended before us by Mr. Fazlur Rahman that any proceeding of the Tribunal except the making of the award, would be invalid, because it had taken place before the making of the extending order. In other words, intermediate proceedings of the Tribunal taken after the expiry of extended time are capable of being validated post facto, by an extending order of the referring Government, and there seems no good reason why this principle should not extend to the final proceeding, namely, the making of the award. Varying the word in the above quotation from Russell slightly, by the making of an order of extension after the award has been made during, a period not covered by an extension order, "the award and all else done in the adjudication proceedings during such extended time are rendered valid and effective." In our own law, namely, the Arbitration Act, 1940, the point has been placed beyond doubt by the provision in section 28 that time for making of the award by an arbitrator may be enlarged "whether the award has been made or not." It seems to me that every reason conduces to the belief that time may be extended to cover an award made by the Tribunal under section 15 (1) of the Act even though there was no order of extension to cover the period within which the award was made, and Mr. Fazlur Rahman's contention on this point accordingly must be overruled. In the award, demands by the different Unions are dealt with separately, and in the order in which they were contained in the catalogue presented by each Union. For the purposes of this judgment however, it will be more convenient to treat these demands and the awards thereon in a series of principal categories. The first category that I propose to take up is that of main emoluments, in which I propose to include basic wages, officiating allowance, overtime allowance, and dearness allowance. Each of the Unions had demanded increase in the basic wages, on a scale devised by themselves, and the Tribunal has refused the increase in every case The point is raised in the appeal by the Federation as well as in the Karachi Petroleum Workers Union appeal. The ground advanced by the Tribunal for declining to interfere with the basic structure of the wages of these workers are that they are getting as good and better salaries than those paid by any other industrial employers in Karachi, and secondly, that the reason put forward, namely, increase in the minimum living wage had not been established since there was no material upon which the minimum living wage could be determined in the enquiry. These grounds appear to me to be unanswerable, and I would accordingly uphold the Tribunal's decision on this point. The question of officiating allowances is raised only in three of the appeals, namely that by the Attock Oil Company, that by the Burmah-Shell Company, and that by the Federation. The Tribunal has adopted the following formula in the case of the Attock Oil Company, upon agreement of the parties, viz., that "officiating allowance should be half the difference between the basic pay and dearness allowance of the person officiating, and the pay and dearness allowance at the bottom grade of the person for whom he officiates, the calculation being per day." In the case of the Burmah-Shell Company also the same formula has been adopted in place of an existing rule by which fixed sums were paid as acting allowance in three special grades. Mr. Mansur Alam on behalf of the Attock Oil Company wished that this formula should be limited in its application to four weeks referred to an earlier rule known as the B. O. A. C. formula which was devised by himself as the Tribunal in a dispute affecting the B. O. A. C. On behalf of the Federation, Mr. Fazeel 'has urged that the Tribunal's formula in this case may not work very well, because of there being overlapping grades and because the Companies fix increments within certain limits at their discretion. He wished that in the case of Burmah-Shell the previously fixed acting allowance should be restored, and Mr. Mansur Alam for Burmah-Shell appeared to agree. I think however that the formula devised by the Tribunal should be given a trial, and that if the parties find it impracticable, they should agree among themselves and procure revision of the rules governing the subject under the conditions of service. No good reason appears why the award in this respect should be varied, and I would therefore allow it to stand. With reference to overtime allowances, there is an appeal by the Attock Oil Company which relates only to their Shift Engineers, another by the Federation asking that the overtime allowances fixed by the Tribunal should be added to basic wages for all purposes, and a third by the Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union seeking revision of the award to bring it into line with the provision fixing overtime at twice basic rates in the Factories Act. The main award on the point has been made in the Burmah-Shell case, namely, that for overtime work on week-days payments will be made by the hour at one and a half times the basic pay, and for such work done on Sundays and holidays at twice the basic hourly wage with the proviso that extra work for half an hour or less on week-days would not be counted. Burmah-Shell have not appealed against this decision nor has the Pakistan Petroleum Ltd., appealed against the similar award made in their case. I do not think that the plea based on the Factories Act, which has been raised by the Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union need be considered, since the award is binding irrespective of the provisions of that Act. The prayer of the Federation that this overtime allowance should be merged in basic pay was refused by the Tribunal without giving any reason. It will lead to as disturbance in the structure of basic wages if such ad hoc additions are allowed to be made, and I consider that there was good ground for disallowing this request. As for the appeal of the Attock Oil Company on this, the decision turns upon whether Shift Engineers are workmen or belong to the superior category of supervisors. The Tribunal examined the chart of duties performed by Shift Engineers and found that they were skilled manual workers, and consequently should be treated as workmen. It was pointed out to us by Mr. Fazeel for the Federation that in a document numbered Exhibit AEU-7, which was on the record, Shift Engineers in the Attock Oil Company had been included among workmen, and were being paid overtime on similar rates. The award by-the Tribunal is that as they are workmen "they will be paid overtime -at the rate of double their total earnings", and I can see no reason for upsetting this decision. The question of dearness allowance has been raised in these appeals only by the Federation and by the Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union. This affects employment only under Burmah -Shell, Standard-Vacuum, and Caltex, and what the Tribunal has done is to equalise the dearness allowance paid by all these Companies by bringing up the allowances of all three Companies to the level at present being paid by Standard-Vacuum. The differences were slight, being Rs. 2-8-0 at a minimum, and Rs. 7-8-0 in the maximum. The action of the Tribunal is calculated to bring about contentment in this respect, and the reason given for not providing the general increase of 40% asked for, namely, that no basis was laid upon which any such increase could be founded, is also sound. Accordingly the appeals on the point of dearness allowance also must be rejected, and the award of the Tribunal should stand. Three minor questions which were raised in the appeal of the Federation, and are connected with the basic structure of wages may also be dealt with here. In -the Burmah-Shell and Clatex cases, a demand was raised and rejected, that dearness allowance should be amalgamated with basic pay. This demand was not pressed before us and the decision of the Tribunal will accordingly stand. In the Standard-Vacuum case a demand was made for administration of pay scales in a certain manner in case the scales were revised. This too was not pressed and being consequential upon the award of the Tribunal maintaining the present scales, its rejection by the Tribunal will also stand. In the Burmah-Shell case, a demand was made for stabilization of conditions, i e., that there should be standstill agreement with regard to terms and conditions of service as they stood on the 31st December 1957 With regard to this, the Tribunal very appropriately observed that the Federation or the Unions were always at liberty to raise a dispute if there was a breach of the settled conditions. That decision, calls for no interference: The next category of demands with which propose to deal is that relating to supplementary money payments which fall under the heads of bonus, house allowance, on conveyance allowance, Installation or West Wharf allowance and Kemari lunch allowance. The bonus question has been raised as against each Company other than the Attock Oil Company. The last mentioned Company has been paying to its workers as bonus three months' basic salary plus dearness allowance, and with this it seems that its workers are for the present content. The other Companies concerned in these cases have all been paying two months' basic wages up till now. The Tribunal has ordered that for the future they will pay three months' basic wages plus dearness allowance, and overtime earnings, and against this the Companies have raised a rigorous protest. For Pakistan Petroleum Ltd., it is urged that in 7 years of operation, it has already spent some 81 crores of rupees in prospecting, and the total profits so far made is out of one particular concern and is about 52 lakhs of rupees. It undergoes enormous capital expenditure in its work of prospecting and the subsequent work of drilling which has been going on in a number of areas, and very largely without success. Thus, for instance in the year 1958 alone, in certain areas where prospecting had been going on and for lack of success was abandoned during that year, no less than 86 lakhs of rupees were spent, to no advantage whatsover. That is little short of double the amount of profits which has accrued from one of the activities of the Company. The argument put forward is that the operations of the Company all over the country should be regarded, at least at the present 'stage, as a single operation. The profits made at any one place or, location should be set against the result of the working of the whole Company, and so set it' will be found that the Company has been making no profit worth the name out of which it can afford to pay a bonus to any of its workers. The workers are also a part of the whole concern, and they should not ask that the work of the concern should be divided up into pockets so that those engaged in a particular location may be entitled to bonus from profits there earned, while the rest have to go without a bonus since not only is there no profit, but money is being spent in vast sums without result. The award of the Tribunal on this point is that the Company will pay the same bonus as for Burmah-Shell, i.e., three months' basic pay plus dearness allowance plus overtime, but the bonus will be payable only to those members of the staff who are engaged in production oil and gas and not to those engaged in exploration. The complaint is made that by thus dividing the Company's operation into sections, the Tribunal has gone beyond his sphere. In due time, when separate undertakings or Companies are pressed for the exploitation of successful borings the workers in such under takings could be treated differently from those who continue in the employment of Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. But so far, there has been no such division of enterprises. The profit which is derived through the exploitation of the Company's success at Sui is being shown on the credit side against the very much larger expenditure on the debit side which has so-far produced no results. The argument is unanswerable, and Mr. Fazeel was unable to present any strong contentions to the contrary. I consider that the grant of bonus in the case of Pakistan Petroleum Ltd., is not warranted in the present state of the working of the Company. 'This Company's condition is in no way comparable to that of, the other well-established prospecting and producing Company, namely, the Attock Oil Company, nor is it to be compared with the other three Oil Companies which are engaged in the distribution of oil which they either import from abroad or acquire locally. I would accordingly allow the appeal of this Company on the point of bonus and set aside the award made by the Tribunal. Mr. Mansur Alam for the other Oil Companies which have been ordered to pay bonus states that the increase is so great that it will send up the wages bill of each Company by between 40 and 45 per cent. The grounds put forward by the Tribunal in support of his decision were attacked in detail. It was pointed out that the Attock Oil Company is a prospecting and producing Company, and unlike the three distributing Companies it does not have to carry such enormous overheads all over the country as the distributing Companies do. Its operations are confined to its oil-wells and the refinery at Morgah, in Rawalpindi. It is situated in a different region from the distributing Companies, the distance between Karachi and Rawalpindi, being over 900 miles: The Attock Oil Company's wage scales are much lower than those paid to their employees at Karachi by the distributing Companies. Therefore.' it was urged that the Attock Oil Company is, no standard by which the liability of the distributing Companies should be measured and fixed. These companies had been unable to produce before the Tribunal their balance-sheets for the year 1958, which were not ready at that time, but they had admitted their capacity to pay. They had pleaded generally that their workers had forfeited any claim to bonus because they have gone on an illegal strike, but this point had been condoned by the Tribunal. The Tribunal had opined that bonus was paid to fill the gap between actual wages and the minimum living wage, as well as by way of sharing large profits to which labour had contributed. Although the Tribunal had not been able to ascertain the minimum living wage, he thought that the Companies were making "large profits" since there was nothing to show that the demand for petroleum and petroleum products was falling, but on the other hand, it seemed to be constantly rising, and labour had certainly contributed to this excellent result. In earlier disputes, the workers had accepted two months' basic wages as bonus, but that did not stand in the way of their making a fresh demand. A point taken into consideration by the Tribunal was whether there was any danger of unrest from the increase in the bonus, and he answered this question in the negative on the ground that in the Rawalpindi area there no unrest had resulted from the large bonus which was being paid by the Attock Oil Company. It was mentioned to him that in India, only basic pay was as a rule considered for the purposes of bonus, but he rejected the argument on the ground that it was not based on any valid principle, but only to secure uniformity. One cannot fail to be impressed by the fact of the very great increase in the bonus which has been ordered by the Tribunal. The chart of dearness allowances shows that over the lower grades of employees, it runs at about 100% of the basic wage. There is no standard by which average overtime workings can he gauged upon this record, but perhaps a modest figure such as 10% may safely be accepted. The amount received as wages by an employee whose basic wage is Rs. 100 would thus actually be about Rs. 210 per month. The Tribunal has now allowed him three times the latter amount, that is Rs. 630 as bonus. In the existing arrangements, he is entitled only to Rs.

200. It can at once be seen that the increase is of a startling nature, and to justify such an increase compelling reasons should have been sought and obtained. The most compulsive of these reasons would have been an enormous increase in the profits for distri bution. Such an increase cannot be assumed upon conjecture, but must necessarily be ascertained by the usual methods applicable to public Companies, namely, by reference to certified balance -sheets. No such balance-sheets were produced before the Tribunal. The mere fact that while pleading inability to produce the balance-sheets, these Companies admitted their capacity to pay is by no means to be regarded as a sufficient ground for tripling the bonus hitherto paid. The danger of unrest from paying too much to workmen seems clearly illusory. It cannot be denied that towards any profits that these Companies have been making, the labour which they employed has made a material contribution, and therefore a share in the final divisible profits, if they be large, can justly be claimed by them, but unless it is shown that the profits have increased enormously, to increase their bonus to over three times what it was before seems to me to be wholly unreasonable. The example of the Attock Oil Company whose wage scales are lower, and which is neither a distributing company nor in the same region as the three distributing Companies cannot form a guide in the case. At the same time, by their confession that they had the capacity to pay, the Companies impliedy admitted ability to pay a higher bonus than had been paid hitherto. In the Absence of any concrete proof regarding that capacity, the reasonable thing to do was obviously to grant a moderate increase, which could be revised in the future either by agreement between the parties, or by fresh reference, when the facts and figures of the financial position of these distributing Companies were available. In my opinion, there was no justification before the Tribunal for increasing the existing bonus rates by more than 200 %. I would say that on the facts as they appear, an increase of 50 % that is to say three months' basic wages was as high as could be reasonably allowed, and I would modify the award accordingly. A minor question connected with bonus was raised by the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company in their appeal. It relates to the payment of a proportionate bonus to employees who have only worked for a part of the year. The Company were paying proportionate bonus to those employees who had joined in the course of the year and had been confirmed by the end of the year, but the Tribunal on the analogy not of any oil distributing Company, or other Oil Companies, but basing on the example of two textile mills known as the Bawany Violin Textile Mills and the Gul Ahmad Textile Mill granted a similar concession "to all employees who have worked during a part of the year except those who have been dismissed for misconduct". The concession does not appear to be founded on any valid reason. It has, for example, been extended to workers who were merely probationary or whose work was under investigation as to their further, retention. The Company, it appears, confined the concession only to those workers whose service had gained their approval by actual confirmation during the year, and that it seems to me is eminently reasonable worker who leaves the service of the Company of his own accord or is discharged upon notice in the course of the year, or who has been dismissed for misbehaviour, becomes disentitled in my opinion to grant of a bonus at the end pf the year. I would therefore set aside the award given on this point by the Tribunal in the Standard-Vacuum case. With regard to bonus, in the appeal by the Federation, the point is taken that in making his award in the Standard-Vacuum case, the Tribunal had allowed only three months' basic pay plus dearness allowance; and had excluded overtime. In view of my conclusion that the bonus should be confined to three months' basic wages, this prayer should be rejected. The Tribunal has allowed a flat rate of 10% of the basic salary of each employee as house allowance. In most cases, the demand was primarily that residential accommodation should be provided the hire-purchase system, and that until such arrange ment was made the Company should pay each employee 25%. of his salary for house rent. It is in evidence that the Companies pay house allowance only to their labour at the rate of Rs. 7 at Kemari and Rs. 9 at Karachi Airport. A good deal of evidence was led on 'the point of the rents actually paid by members of the staff of these companies, and there was documentary evidence as' well. The Tribunal has referred very briefly to some of this evidence, but it appears to me that he has not evaluated this evidence, with the care that was required before so heavy a burden could reasonably be placed upon the Companies. As to the demand for residential accomodation, he decided and rightly that it was impracticable. On the point of assistance by money payment, the Companies had contended that the cost of house-rent had already been taken into consideration in fixing basic wages and the Karachi compensatory allowance and that the dearness allowance also took care of the rise in living costs. The Tribunal considered that the fact that Government was engaged in building accommodation for refugees showed that there was shortage of houses, and he has stated that in the Main, the staff of the Company are refugees. That is equivalent to saying that relief in the way of housing is being provided for these persons by the Government, although gradually. There is evidence of certain employees who are actually living in such rent-free quarters. The Tribunal has however chosen to rely on the evidence of a few witnesses, who have spoken of having to pay high rents. We have been taken through some of the evidence and I find that witnesses like Rafiq Ahmad, F. W. 6, who of his own choice pays Rs. 50 to have a full house when he was previously occupying half of it for five years at Rs. 25, Jamilar Rahman, F. W. 7, who pays Rs. 50 a month, but could produce no receipts in support, and Ibrahim Ali, F. W. 14, a clerk on Rs. 180 p.m. who pays Rs. 65 as house rent and has actually paid Rs. 585 in advance, are all cases which by no means establish that the workmen are unable to obtain accommodation within their real means. On the other hand, the Federation themselves have put in through their principal witness, Mr. Randeria, F. W. 44, a set of documents Exh. 44/37 to Exh. 44/41 from which the fact emerges that the Federations own survey shows that rents from Rs. 20 up to Rs. 27-14-0 are being paid by employees in the following salary grades, viz. in Rs. 200-300, Rs. 300-400 and Rs. 400 upwards. The complaint of counsel for the Companies that this proves that the Tribunal has actually awarded such persons a supplement to pay is not wholly unfounded. Another witness for the Federation, Ziaul Hassan Chowdhury, F. W. 35 has stated that in the budget of the average middle class worker house rent accounts for something like 55 per cent. of his expenditure. It is urged for the Companies that the figures themselves show that they are paying generous salaries and dearness allowance to their staff, and upon the evidence in the case there was no ground for the Tribunal to add to these emoluments by way of house rent allowance. It was overlooked that persons living in private houses are protected by a system of rent control. The Tribunal has made no attempt to ascertain what will be the expense to the various Companies resulting from this additional allowance which he has awarded, and as in the case of bonus, he has acted without reference to the balance-sheets. In my opinion, the grounds upon which so large an increase of ex-penditure as approximately 5 per cent. of the wages bill can reasonably be added to the burden of the Companies do not appear upon the record. It is clear also that the Tribunal has not taken C into account that on the Federation's own showing in typical cases which have been tabultated, the rents actually paid are less than 10% of the total emoluments, and are therefore within the emp loyee's budget upon which cost of living figures are based. I would therefore allow the appeal of the Companies with regard to house rent allowance and set aside the Tribunal's award in this respect. A minor case of the same kind is raised by the Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union, asking either for provision of houses or for Rs. 15 per member as house rent. (As has been seen, labour at Kemari is paid Rs. 7 per month towards house rent and the labour at the Airport Rs. 9). The Tribunal found no difficulty in rejecting this claim, and one of the grounds put forward is that the house allowance was fixed in 1955, and that there was no reliable evidence "that the quantum is still inadequate". He also found that until the minimum living wage, was ascertained it could not be determined whether the current rents being paid were beyond the means of the workmen. The Union seeks to have this decision reversed, and if the award made in favour of other workers, namely, 10% of basic salary were maintained, this claim would be irresistible at least in respect of clerical establishment, but as the demand for house rent is being found unjustifiable, this claim by the workers at Kemari and the Airport must also fall with it. The claim for conveyance allowance has been rejected by the Tribunal in each case, and in the Federation's appeal, it was sought to have this decision reversed. In the Burma-Shell case the demand was that transport should be provided or actual conveyance charges should be paid. The Tribunal found that it was impracticable to provide conveyance for all the employees who live in far-flung places, and that there would be no method of keeping a check on "actual conveyance charges". In the Standard-Vacuum case, the demand was either for free transport or actual conveyance charges or Rs. 25 per month. The latter claim was rejected on the .ground there was no justification for a minimum of Rs. 25 per month, and the other two, upon the grounds mentioned in the Burma-Shell case. A similar demand made by Caltex employees and for the same reasons, was rejected. In the case of Pakistan Petroleum Ltd., the demand was either for Company transport or for monthly- payments graduated according to the distance of the employee's house from his place of work. This Company was already paying a conveyance allowance, and the Tribunal could not see that it was inadequate. I do not consider that any case for the grant of conveyance allowance was in fact made out by the employees in these cases. It is clear that it is unreasonable to require these Companies to lift each one of their very large number of employees from his house to his place of work and back. Conveyance charge s are taken into account in fixing wages, dearness allowance and Karachi compensatory allowance, and in a modern city like Karachi, public transport is constantly being expanded and improved. I agree with the Tribunal that this demand was not established. An allowance which has been provided by the Tribunal is 8 % of the basic salary to all clerical workers at the installa tions, i.e., elsewhere than at the Headquarters office. This is based upon the consideration that the clerical staff at the installations works 39 hours a week as against 35 hours for clerks on the-same salaries at the head offices. The clerical, posts at the offices and at the installations are interchangeable. The argument was sought to be raised on behalf of the Companies that the quality of the work required at the installations is less difficult than that at the head offices, and reliance was also sought to be placed on the fact that in 1956 the employees accepted longer hours .of working at the installations. These arguments cannot be allowed any weight when considered against the fact that clerks are liable to transfer from the head offices to the installations. The extra hours of working require to be remunerated in proportion, and that is what the Tribunal has done. I would therefore uphold his finding on this point. The Federation had asked that this particular allowance should be added to the basic wages, and this was disallowed by the Tribunal on the ground that it was not in its nature a part of the basic wage. The reason is unchallengeable, and the claim was therefore rightly rejected. A minor allowance claimed in the Caltex case was to pay for an employee's lunch when he is required to work overtime on Sundays, 'Saturdays and holidays. The Tribunal disallowed the demand holding that the Company pays this allowance only when the employee is working at the installation in Kemari during the lunch hours. The rule is followed by Burmah-Shell and Standard-Vacuum also. Before us Mr. Mansur Alam for the Caltex Company- accepted- this demand, and accordingly, the appeal of the Federation on this point should be allowed, and the Caltex Company placed under obligation to pay its employees a lunch allowance whenever they work overtime on Sundays, Saturdays and holidays. Demands for medical relief forma distinct category, and were made under a number of heads in each case. One point that was raised in the Standard-Vacuum and Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. cases was whether the certificate of a registered medical practi tioner should not be accepted without countersignature by the Company's doctor in proof of an employee being unable through illness to attend at his work. In certain cases, countersignature is not being demanded by, the Companies. The Tribunal has decided. that countersignature by the Company's doctor shall not be demanded by these two Companies, anal the parties appeared to agree before us that for a short illness; and until the Company's doctor was able to- verify the complaint personally, a certificate of a registered medical practitioner would be accepted in proof. I consider that the Tribunal's point of view in this respect was reasonable. There is no ground for apprehen sion of general abuse by the Companies' employees if they were permitted to offer uncountersigned certificates of registered medical practitioners in proof of an illness when access to the Company's doctor is not readily possible. I would therefore allow the Tribunal's decision on this point to stand. A second -claim was for provision of maternity benefits for the entire staff, and in the alternative for an allowance for every child born to a member. It was shown to the Tribunal that the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation pays to its employees drawing less than Rs. 600 a sum of Rs. 150 for each child, And to a workman Rs. 50 and on this single ground the Tribunal awarded similar amounts in favour of clerks and workmen in the Standard-Vacuum cases as well as against Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. But in the case of Burmah-Shell where' also the claim was that "full and free medical treatment shall be given to members and their dependants including maternity" the Tribunal refused the demand on the ground that it amounted to requiring the Company to establish a "maternity home for which there is no precedent in Karachi" and that there was "no demand for a maternity allowance." Mr. Fazeel for the Federation has referred also to the facility given by the Attock Oil Company at its hospital in Rawalpindi, for maternity cases among the staff's families, but in my opinion the case of the Attock Oil Company is to be treated on a wholly different basis from that of recently established concerns operating in a modern city such as Karachi. When the Attock Oil Company was established in the early years of this century the Rawalpindi area was generally very little developed, and it appears that as oil was being discovered in considerable quantity to the profit of the Company, the Government utilised the opportunity to induce the Company to provide a good. many welfare facilities, which they themselves were unable to afford including schools and hospitals. The Attock oil Company's hospital is admittedly open to the public, as are number of the schools which it has founded in the areas where its prospecting has been successful. In other words, the incursions of the Attock Oil Company into the welfare field are aimed at reaching the general public, and are not to be assimilated to the duty of an employer in relation to his employees. Therefore, I place no reliance on the example of the Attock Oil Company, and as for the P.I.D.C. it can hardly be treated on the same basis as a private Company operating for profit. It is a semi. governmental organisation, and the provision of welfare facilities for the citizens being a duty of the Government, this particular relief given by the P. I. D. C. to its employees, which is admittedly not available in the entire private sector of the industry, must be held relatable to the governmental side of the responsibility of P. I. D. C. I would therefore set aside the award of the Tribunal on this point. Another question which is raised in each of these cases is as to the provision of free and full medical treatment to the dependants of workmen, and the award of the Tribunal on this point is in favour of those dependants who are actually living with and dependant upon a workman. The Companies have protested against this widening of the relief beyond that which can be imposed upon them as a maximum, and complained that it is liable to gross misuse by the workmen. It is impossible for the Companies in each case to make the necessary enquiries to discover whether a patient who is represented as a dependant and living with a workman, is in fact at all connected with him, or is even living with him. The problem is a difficult one, and it is impossible to withhold sympathy from the Companies in their complaint. Mr. Fazeel for the Federation has however furnished a solution, which if acceptable to the Companies, namely, that the duty of they Companies to provide full and free medical treatment will be confined to a workman, and his wife and children, and I would amend the award accordingly. The Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union demanded that a woman doctor should be appointed to work at the dispensary in Kemari, and that a telephone and ambulance car should also be provided. The Tribunal rejected the demand for the telephone and ambulance car for lack of evidence. These facilities are undoubtedly useful for a busy dispensary, and no doubt the Companies will in; due course when the need is felt make the necessary provision. The Tribunal was right in refusing to make the provision upon demand by the employees. He has however awarded that the Companies will provide "the services of a lady doctor for the treatment of the wives of the employees", and the Companies have protested against this. This again is a matter which might have been better left to the good sense of the Companies providing the relief. It is admitted that the relief is intended to cover the families of the workmen, and that accommodation is provided at kemari for a large number of workmen. Therefore, knowing the prejudice of women against being treated by a male doctor it might have been thought that by this time the Companies would have provided a woman doctor upon their own initiative particularly when the supply of qualified lady doctors is now sufficient. The necessity for such a facility, cannot be denied. I consider that the award of the Tribunal on this point should be allowed to stand. The Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union has protested against the non-allowance of the telephone and ambulance car, but for the reasons given above, I would uphold the Tribunal's decision on the point. In the Burmah-Shell case, the Federation has raised a contention against the refusal of the Tribunal to allow their demand for the appointment by the Company of "a penal of doctors in agreement with the Union". He considered that the demand was not justified by "the small inconvenience involved as against the larger benefits of having a central dispensary with a competent doctor. No strong reason was urged by Mr. Fazeel against the acceptance of this point of view. He stated that at one time there used to be seven approved doctors in the different parts of the city of Karachi to whom the Companies' employees could go and this used to be very convenient. It has been replaced by a central dispensary to which the workers find it irksome to go: The point is one of balancing the merits and demerits of two different systems of providing reliefs, anti since the central dispensary method is the more normal, and provides a degree of uniformity coupled with the necessary degree of control by the employer, consider that the award or, this point should be upheld. There is, however, greater force in Mr. Fazeel's complaint that in making his award on the point of medical aid, the Tribunal has excluded reference to the labour employed at the head offices of the Companies. There is an oversight here, and learned counsel for the Companies do not resist an amendment by which the provision of medical aid as awarded by the Tribunal should in all cases be extended to include labour engaged by the Companies at their head offices in, Karachi. I would therefore allow this amendment. Demands affecting retirement benefits may next be considered. There were demands for gratuity made by the Burmah-Shell, Standard-Vacuum and Caltex Unions as well as by the Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union, and the Tribunal, made somewhat varied awards. For the Standard-Vacuum employees, the award was one month's, basic pay for each year of service up to a maximum of 15 months' salary" the rest of the demand was disallowed "as there is no evidence to support it": In the other three cases however, one month's basic pay for each year of service was awarded without limit, and in each case, as well as in the Standard-Vacuum case, it was said that this was being done on the same grounds as had been stated in respect of Burmah-Shell. In that case, the argument was based solely upon comparison with the Eastern Batik Ltd., which grants one month's basic pay for each completed year of service subject to a maximum of 15 months, but where the service exceeded 30 years the maximum could be increased by the addition of half a month's salary for each completed year of service in excess of 30 years: The scheme of Burmah-Shell provides for 2 months' salary payable as gratuity after five years of service increasing up to 15 months' salary at 15 years and above. It was explained that the object of restricting the gratuity to 15 months' salary is that if the worker stayed for another five years, he would earn a pension when he became 55 years of age. This is an induce ment to experienced staff to continue in- service, till they earn a pension. It was a settled scheme, and it had a purpose behind it, and the Tribunal had interfered with it without understand ing that purpose in the case of Burmah-Shell or in the other cases. It was pointed out that the Eastern Bank's extra gratuity would be payable only after the worker had exceeded 30 years of service half of which would be ignored for gratuity purposes and then he would only get in addition to 15 months' basic pay, a half month's pay for each year of service above 30 years which could only be a few months' pay at the most. On this analogy, the Tribunal could not have allowed one month's basic pay for each year of service, whatever the length of service. Moreover. Burmah-Shell as well as the other Companies pay a much larger contribution towards the workmen's provident fund than the Eastern Bank which contributes only 5%. Burmah-Shell pay 10% In my opinion, the argument of the Tribunal is wholly inade quate to justify interference in these cases with the settled system of gratuity observed by the Companies, and I would therefore set aside, his award on this point. A minor question relating to provident fund was raised in the Burmah-Shell case, viz. that the contributions as well as deductions for the Labour Provident Fund, were made at the rate of 9. 1/3% representing 1 annas in a rupee, and labour wished that it should be increased to 10%. The Company opposed the demand on the ground that it was difficult to calculate for daily-rated establishment, but the Tribunal awarded 10%, on the ground that this represented no great difficulty in calculation. As decimal coinage has now been introduced in the country, Mr. Mansur Alam dropped this ground of appeal, and accordingly the decision of the Tribunal should stand. In the case of Pakistan Petroleum Ltd., a demand had been made that the provident fund contribution should be 15% for all employees. This was rejected on the ground that no other Oil Company or similar concern granted so high a percentage. It amounted in fact to a demand for added emoluments at a deferred date. This Company's rule is 8.1/3% up to Rs. 200 and 5% above. The scheme of provident fund is, as required by law set out to a proper instrument, and is sell-contained: It cannot be lightly interfered with, and the Tribunal therefore in my mind properly refused to accede to the workers' request on this point. A more general question which is raised in the cases of Burmah-Shell, Standard-Vacuum and Caltex is as to a system under which deductions are made from a worker's, pension of sums varying from Company to Company which are a small percentage of the amount which represents the Company's con tribution to the suns standing to the credit of the worker in the pro vident fund. In the case of Burmah-Shell, it was 4%. The Tribunal thought that the Company could not be permitted "to deduct money indirectly from the Pension Scheme to compensate itself at the expense of the employees for what it regards quite incorrectly as disadvantage accruing to itself under Provident Fund Scheme". At first, it looks as if the Companies in this way are taking with the left hand what they are giving with the right, but the fact appears to be that this is a part of a system which is incorporated in the pension scheme of all these Companies, and has the effect of reducing what may be describe as a "double benefit". Contributory provident fund being on kind of retirement benefit, and pension being another, the effect of deducting from the pension a percentage of the money contributed by the Company to the Provident, Fund at the rate of say 4% is to leave, on an expectation of life of 10 years, 60% of the benefit to the employee, and take back the remaining 40% over a period of 10 years. To this there is a risk attached, namely, that the employee may not survive that period, and in that case the Company gets back only a portion of the extra benefit which the scheme is designed to withdraw. It saves, of course on the pension. The two schemes are thus carefully balanced, and this, it is said, is done on the basis of exact actuarial calculations the result of which is incorporated in the Regulations of each Provident Fund. In the case of each of these Companies, the Tribunal has directed that the Trustees of the Provident Fund will amend the Regulations of their Fund so as to discontinue this deduction. I do not consider that the question was examine from the correct point of view in this case. The entire scheme is carefully designed to balance out the two retirement benefits, taking into. account the large financial implications, as well. as considerations affecting expectation of life etc. All its terms have been examined expertly in advance, and each of them has a genuine purpose. The provision for the deduction complained of is not a mere addition to the scheme but forms an integral part of it, and to interfere with it by directing; its abolition is to upset the entire actuarial basis of the scheme of retirement benefits in respect of pension and contributory provident fund. The Tribunal did not have before himself full material to enable him to do so. He has acted as if the provision which he has ordered to be cancelled was a mere flaw or defect in the scheme, which it is not I would allow the appeal of the Companies on this point and set aside the award of the Tribunal in each of the three cases affected. In the Burmah-Shell and Caltex cases, the point is raised for the Companies that the Tribunal should not have imposed upon these Companies the duty of paying a minimum of 60 months' pension to a retired workman, or to his-family. The Tribunal found that such a provision was contained in the ruler of the Standard Vacuum Company, and on the basis of region-cum-industry he awarded it in the case of these two Companies as well. The occasion for the application of this provision does not arise in every case, and it is certainly not too much to ask that to the case of the premature death of a retired workman, the Company should pay balance of the pension which would have been payable if he had survived for five years. I would therefore reject the appeal against this demand. The Federation in their appeal raised the question of gratuity for labour as for clerks, i.e. that they should be given one month's' salary for each year of service irrespective of the length of the service. This point was raised in respect of. Burmah-Shell, Standard Vacuum and Caltex, and is consequential upon acceptance off the Tribunal's. decision. As in my opinion, the Tribunal's interference with the existing gratuity rules cannot be allowed to stand, this ground of appeal also falls with it. A further minor point connected with provident and was presented in the Federation's appeal, but it has not been pressed before us, viz., that the workers should be provided with representation on the Board of Trustees of the Provident Fund of Standard-Vacuum Caltex and Attock Oil Company. As these grounds are not pressed, the Tribunal's decision stands. Three points were raised in regard to leave benefits. Each of the Companies protested against the Tribunal's award in respect of Leave Fare Assistance, which may be described as a relief granted on occasions when an employee proceeds on leave. No. other Company except Burmah-Shell had up to now any scheme to this effect, and the Burmah-Shell scheme was confined to the stall i.e., clerks only. It provided that a new employee after completion of one year's service and up to the completion of seven years' service would be paid Rs. 50 a year as assistance towards travelling expenses. when going on leave. After com pletion of seven years of service he would receive Rs. 100 per year and it could be accumulated for two years. For old em ployees, the rule was that up to seven years' service, they would be paid every second year, second class railway fare for travell ing on the main line of the railway for an actual journey up to a direct there-and-back distance of 1500 miles. After completion of seven years' service, he could receive such a payment once every year and could accumulate it for two years, but after 20 years. of service, he would receive the assistance every year for himself as well as for his wife. The condition was that the journey should be without a break, 'and by the shortest route. This scheme has been completely altered by the Tribunal, and it is urged that in doing so he has misunderstood certain concessions made before him by counsel. The concessions are stated in the award in the following words.:- "It has been agreed by the Company that an employee will be entitled by way of Leave Fare Assistance, to be paid every year actual return railway fare incurred with liberty to break journey at any intermediate railway station where the company has a depot, and this is accordingly awarded in the case of new entrants as well as-the existing employees." Mr. Mansur Alam stated that what he had, agreed to was that there could be a break in the journey at the option, of the employee, and the rule of the direct non-stop journey could be so amended. He never agreed that the assistance would be paid every year, nor did he agree that the distinction between new and old employees should be wiped off. In fact the claim was that this relief should be paid "in cash to all members in lump sum equivalent to their one month's basic salary and dearness allowance", and this cut clean across the Company's scheme which distinguishes between old and new entrants 'and again, between the two categories in relation to their length of service. The Tribunal has then gone on to say that there is no reason why labour should be deprived of this relief, particularly as much of the labour comes from "upcountry" and mentioned that the Attock Oil Company grants Leave Fare Assistance to its labour. Then he observed that this scheme had been in force in the Company for a long time and could no longer be regarded as ex gratia. Accordingly, he granted this assistance, in the terms quoted above. In my opinion, this interference with the Company's settled scheme is totally without foundation and reason. The Attock Oil Company is a different kind of Company and it is not known from what areas it draws its personnel. It is on the record that the emoluments which the Attock Oil Company pays are lower than those paid by the Companies situated in Karachi. Moreover, it is not certain what exact scheme has been laid down by the Tribunal. He appears to have extinguished the distinction' between old and new employees, thereby granting an enormous advantage to the latter, who had come in on the less advantageous terms. He has made the grant an annual affair. The total of 1,500 miles round-trip railway fare as presently allowed to the old emlpoyees seems very generous, but even this has been exceeded, for no limit is mentioned in the Tribunal's award. It would seem that a workman can now travel any distance he pleases, at the Company's expense, receiving second class railway fare. Presumably the Tribunal intends that even labour should be paid fare at this high rate. The system of accrual of additional benefits with increasing length of service, which is a direct and healthy incentive to the rendering of long and faithful service has been destroyed by this award in a single sentence. It is doubtful whether he has abolished the concession for a workman's wife, or on the other hand, has extended it to clerks and labourers, how junior soever they maybe. I am of the opinion that the interference with this Company's scheme has been altogether unconsidered. If it is to be interfered with at all, it must be examined in proper detail. Moreover, what the workers were after, was money and that has not been allowed. I would allow the appeal of Burmah-Shell and set aside the Tribunal's award on this point. Having thus interfered with the Burmah-Shell scheme, without making clear what the scheme would be after the interference, the Tribunal with a stroke of the pen extended similar leave fare assistance to the workers of the other three Oil Companies, namely, Standard-Vacuum, Caltex, and Pakistan Petroleum Limited. In their case, it would be altogether a new provision, adding to the benefits derived by the workers in these Companies something which they had never received before. No ground whatsoever was put forward for this addition except that it was on the basis of the region-cum-industry. In my opinion, the imposition upon each of these other Companies of a scheme which had been devised by another employer, in relation to its own situation and that of its employees, cannot be allowed; In the case of each Company it is a- matter of individual examination of all the relevant conditions, and the assistance scheme would be best achieved by negotiations between the employers and the employees. In any case, it is not possible to maintain an order by which a benefit has been conferred without exactly defining its limits. I would therefore allow the appeals of these three Companies on this particular point. With reference to these three Companies, the Tribunal has made another award altering their present system in respect of leave, i.e., that he has allowed the workers to accumulate their privilege leave up to a total of 120 days. Each Company allowed accumulation to the extent only of two years' earned leave, and the explanation given is that the workers are to be encourage to go on leave as frequently as possible, anal in any case once in every two years. In making the award which is discussed at length in the Burmah-Shell case, the Tribunal has relied on the practice of such Companies as Spencers, who are engaged in the grocery and import-export trade, Mackinnon Mackenzie Ltd., shipping firm, and the Karachi Electric Corporation Ltd. None of these Companies operates in the same field as the Companies concerned here. The other reason given is that an employee may genuinely have planned to go outside Pakistan at the end of the three years and yet for unforeseen reasons be unable to do so and thus such an employee would forfeit one year's "Privilege Leave". These are wholly insufficient reasons for altering scheme which has a good reason behind it namely, that the efficiency of the workers should be maintained by inducing them to go on leave as frequently as possible, on full allowances would therefore allow the appeal against the awards made on the point in respect of, Burmah-Shell, Standard-Vacuum and Caltext respectively. Associated with this question is that of the extension of the provision for leave fare assistance, to be made accumulative, and to run currently with earned leave. This demand was made in the Burmah-Shell case, and it was allowed by the Tribunal, the benefit being extended, to the employees of the other Companies by means of awards in single sentences. As I hold that the Tribunal's award in relation to leave fare assistance should be set aside altogether, I would set aside the award on this point in the case of these Companies as well. In the Burmah-Shell case, the Tribunal had awarded to the employees the grant of one month's sick leave on full pay in cases of prolonged sickness, to be had in addition to the seven days' normal sick leave, with the proviso that where longer leave than, a month on account of illness was required, it would be in the Company's discretion whether or not to grant it and how much, if anything, would be paid for this period. This award was accepted by Burmah-Shell, but when the point was raised in the case of Standard-Vacuum, in a demand which reads that leave should be granted "for prolonged illness and epidemics till the duration of illness or epidemics on full pay", the Tribunal rejected the demand entirely on the ground that the Company had been giving adequate consideration to those employees who had suffered from long illness. Mr. Fazeel for the Federation argued that the Tribunal should have given the same relief as for Burmah-Shell, and Mr. Mansur Alam for Standard-Vacuum agreed to this. Accordingly, on this point, I would set aside the award of the Tribunal and in the case of Standard-Vacuum as well would grant the employees in addition to their normal sick leave for seven days, special sick leave in cases of prolonged sickness for one month on full pay, leaving it to the discretion of the Company to grant further leave if necessitated by the em ployee's condition. The Standard-Vacuum allows 14 days' sick leave on half pay to follow 7 days` s ck leave on full pay, and this period will be included in the extra months' sick leave indicated above, and not be allowed in addition. In the cases of Burmah-Shell, Standard-Vacuum and Caltex the Tribunal hat allowed to the employees public holidays and optional holidays as allowed by the Government in Karachi. Appeals have been brought against this award by these three Companies, but it seems that the Tribunal has been moved by the consideration that the Government's decision as to such holidays has been taken with due regard to the public necessity as well as the religious sentiments of different sections of the community and therefore there seems no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's award on this score. The question of grant of joining time to employees on, transfer was raised in the cases of Standard-Vacuum and Caltex. The Companies opposed this demand on the ground that such cases were very rare. The Tribunal allowed seven day's joining time on transfer, relying only on the single case of one Muhammad Ashfaq, an employee of Standard-Vacuum. This person admitted that he was a relieving clerk, whose business was be fill up a vacancy wherever it exists." In 1956, he received an order to go to Lahore on the 6th October, and he joined duty on the 8th October. He described it as a permanent transfer, but apparently the only ground for saying so was that he shifted his family from Karachi to Lahore. He was transferred back to Karachi on the 6th July 1957, and he joined duty on the 8th July suffering some inconvenience, as the 9th July was an Eid day and he had desired to spend it at Lahore. He admitted that on transfer to Lahore as well as on his transfer back, he received a "setting allowance" at the rate of 10 rupees a day for 14 days. The Tribunal thought that this was a case showing that shortage of joining time might lead to great inconvenience, and that "officers are apt to forget to take the convenience of the employees into consideration." The point which the Tribunal should have considered was that Muhammad Ashfaq was a relieving clerk, and that it was a condition of his service that he should be available immediately to fill up a vacancy wherever it appeared. The question of joining time did not arise at all in his case, and it was certainly a bad case upon which to award as much as seven days' joining time to all employees. I would set aside the award on this point. Also in the case of Standard-Vacuum, the question was raised of allowing "grace time" to late-comers. It appears that the Company allows only five minutes as grace time and this has been ordered by the Tribunal to be extended to 15 minutes, the ground being that transport difficulty was the main cause or lateness, and so long as this continued, "a measure of relief against disciplinary action for late attendance is called for." It seems to me that by increasing the grace time of 5 minutes to 15 minutes, no im provement in punctuality is likely to be produced. Although there appears to be a good deal of late attendance, action taken in consequence is very limited. If for the future the employees know that they can allow themselves 15 minutes instead of the present 5 minutes, the result probably will be that they will still be late, beyond the added period of 10 minutes. In my opinion, the Tribunal was ill-advised to interfere with the existing arrangements. on the point, and I would accordingly set aside his award to this particular. In the Pakistan Petroleum Ltd., case, a question was raised regarding the working hours of motor car driver. It seems that this Company was working its drivers 51 hours a week as against 48 hours a week required of their drivers by other Companies. The Tribunal reduced the hours of working to this case as well to 48, and the Company has appealed against this award. The award operates to produce uniformity, and I would therefore dismiss the appeal on this point. In the Burmah-Shell case, a demand had been put forward by the clerical employees to be permitted to smoke at their desks, and that ash-trays should be provided for them. The Company protested against the demand on the grounds of tradition and discipline, of nuisance to non-smokers, danger of fire etc. The Tribunal thought that it was an unnecessary hardship to compel habitual smokers not to smoke for considerable stretches of time, or to adopt the device of going to the toilet in order to smoke, which involves loss of working time and some degree of humiliation. Therefore he allowed the demand. In my opinion, the grant of such a facility by legal order has 'dangers and repercus sions which the Tribunal has not borne in mind. The example of officers is not in point, as they sit in isolation, not in crowded rooms cheek by jowl with other workers, as is the case with clerks, and what they do does not affect other workers, so as to, be a bad example or a physical nuisance. It seems strange also that on the one hand the Tribunal should be engaged in increasing the emoluments of workers and on the other hand indulging them in the practice of an expensive luxury during their working time would allow the appeal of the Company on this point, and set aside the award. In the case of the Attock Oil Company the workers had demanded free education for their children, mentioning that there vas a Company-managed school at Morgah, and Company-owned school buildings which had been handed over to the District Board at Khaur and Balkassar in which schools were being run by the District Board. The Company charges fees from the children of its employees attending its school at Morgah. The workers not only demanded that no fees should be charged at Morgah, but they went further and demanded that the school at Khaur should be taken back from the District Board and run by the Company itself, that at Balkassar a High School should be provided, and that in the case of these two schools as well, education should be free for employees' children. The Tribunal relying upon certain facilities of this kind provided by the Wah Cement Factory and somewhat more doubtfully by the Mardan Sugar Mills, directed that a boys' High School should be provided by the Company at Balkassar, and that free education should be provided by the Company for the children of all its employees up to the 8th standard, but the cost of books, stationery, pencils etc. should be borne by the employees themselves. The Company has appealed against this award, on the ground that it imposes a duty upon them which they are not bound to carry. They have provided school buildings at Morgah, Khaur and Balkassar as well as at other places, not by way of acceptance of any duty in this respect to their employees, but as an act of public charity for the reason which has already been mentioned earlier in this judgment. At Morgah they are actually running the school at their own expense, but it is open to all the children of the locality and is not confined to the employees' children. All pay fees equally. This too is an act of public charity and has nothing to do with the Company's obligation to its employees. The Company has protested against the imposition upon them of this burden not only of providing free education to a large number of children, but even of starting a High School, which is entirely outside their proper function, and all this has been done on the strength of one proved example of a company in a wholly different line of business, and a mere advertisement put out by another Company which is engaged in the manufacture of sugar. In my opinion, the demand of these workers of the Attock Oil Company for free education at the Company's expense was wholly out of' the way. What the Company is already doing is entirely outside its proper obligation, and is being done by way of public charity. What has been forced upon the Company in relation to their employees falls in a wholly different field, namely, that of legal obligation and it seems to me that they are right in resisting the demand. I would therefore allow the appeal of the Attock Oil Company against this award and direct that it should be set aside. Also in regard to education, a demand had been put forward by the Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union in the following form, viz. "A school should be started for the children of all workers where arrangements should be made for adult education." The Tribunal disallowed this demand on the ground that it was not shown how many school-going children were affected, and therefore it was not clear that there was a need to establish such a school. A better reason would have been that it is no part of the duty of any of the Companies concerned to establish schools at all. That is the function of the Government, and while such schools may be provided by large Companies ex gratia specially in isolated and remote localities where educational facilities are not available, the duty of providing in this respect cannot be forced upon a Company by a Tribunal. The demand for adult education was altogether out-of-the-way. The Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union has raised a ground of appeal in this respect, but there is no force in the claim, and in my opinion it was rightly dismissed. In the appeal of the Federation, as well as in the appeal of the Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union, the point was raised as to the disallowance of demands for uniforms. In the case of Caltex, the demand only was for two pairs of shoes to be provided every year for peons, which the Tribunal disallowed on the ground that there was no proof that the existing provision of a single pair of shoes was insufficient. The Federation has appealed against this decision, but in my opinion, the demand was rightly disallowed. In the Standard-Vacuum case, the Union had presented an elaborate list of equipment for summer and winter and for rainy weather wear for the service and security staff. The Tribunal found that the Company already provided their security staff with uniforms and the purpose of the demand was to obtain an equal provision for the service staff, for whom smaller provision was being made. Mr. Mansur Alam for Standard --Vacuum agreed to provide one pair of Peshawari sandals each year for the service staff, and this was accepted by Mr. Fazeel. The appeal of the Federation may therefore be accepted on this pint to the extent that in addition to whatever is provided to the service staff already, by way of uniform, they will also be given one pair of Peshawari sandals per year. The Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union raised a similar demand based on an elaborate list of equipment. It was disallowed by the Tribunal, on a somewhat curious ground, viz., that the Company did not desire their workers at Kemari to look neat and clean at their work. There is an appeal on the point. In the course of the argument. Mr. Mansur Alam agreed that in this case as well one pair of Peshawari sandals per year may be granted to the service staff only, and I would therefore allow this appeal to this extent, and amend the award by allowing to Service staff belonging to the establishments in question one pair of Peshawari sandals per year: Individual cases of certain actions sought and taken in respect of employees of the Companies may now be considered. In the Standard-Vacuum case, one of the Union's demand was for the transfer of two officials named, Samiullah Khan and Iftikhar Hussain, which the workers required should be done "in our mutual interests and for the sake of industrial peace and future good relations in the industry." Samiullah Khan is Employees Relations Officer, and Iftikhar Hussain is Assistant Accounting Manager. The Tribunal considered certain evidence which was led regarding the treatment by these two officers of a worker named Mushtaq Ahmad. Reliance was placed on a single incident when Mushtaq Ahmad attempted to enter Samiullah Khan's room and was told to get out. He apparently resented the order and there was an incident which resulted in Samiullah Khan charging Mushtaq Ahmad with gross mis-behaviour. The incident ended according to the Company in an apology after which the charge-sheet against Mushtaq Ahmad was torn up, and so was Mushtaq Ahmad's written defence. Two witnesses called by the Company to give evidence of this incident were at variance with each other, one of them appearing to support Mushtaq Ahmad and the other to support Samiullah Khan. Greater reliance appears however to have been placed by the Tribunal on the facial expressions of Samiullah Khan as he sat in Court listening to the evidence. The Tribunal found Mr. Samiullah Khan's reactions as "reactions in which just indignation of a truthful or innocent man were absent." The discussion indicates that Mushtaq Ahmad was a sick man, who, in his defence, went to the length of saying that, if his health further deteriorated, he would be compelled to hold three of the Company's officials including Iftikhar Hussain and Samiullah Khan directly responsible. Upon this kind of evidence, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that Samiullah Khan's behaviour in dealing with Mushtaq Ahmad "was so gravely wrong and oppressive, as to render him unfit to continue as an officer in the Employees Relations Department." Mr. Fazeel attempted to support the Tribunal's conclusion by reference to a report written by a Mr. Muhammad Shafi who had been asked to investigate the Employees Relations Department in the Standard-Vacuum Company. Mr. Shaft formed an adverse opinion of Samiullah Khan's activities as an agency for the preservation of good relations between the employees and the Company. In my opinion, the report of Mr. Shafi cannot be made use of in the present case for a general condemnation of the manner in which Samiullah Khan has been discharging his duties of Employees Relations Officer. A single incident had been made the foundation of the demand, and the discussion. of the incident in the Tribunal's award seems to indicate that the employee concerned was a man whose balance of mind had probably been affected by the state of health. He had been charged with offering violence to an officer and even going to the length of opening a knife and although the evidence on this point was not consistent, I find no reason to doubt that he did behave in an unbalanced manner so as to justify the action of the officer in requiring him to leave the room, and later placing him under a charge. I cannot see at all that there Was anything "gravely wrong and oppressive" about Mr. Samiullah Khan's treatment of Mushtaq Ahmad, and moreover, I would be inclined to think that by the dropping of the enquiry against Mushtaq Ahmad, the incident should have been regarded as closed. It cannot in my opinion, be made the foundation of a direction to the Company as to which officer it will employ and in what position. I would therefore allow the appeal of the Standard-Vacuum on this point and set aside the Tribunal's award. It may be noted that the Tribunal had rejected the demand for the transfer of Iftikhar Hussain. Again, in the Standard-Vacuum appeal, objection has been taken to the decision of the Tribunal in the cases of two of the workers, Yamin Khan and Amanullah whose increments had been withheld on the ground of habitual lateness. In the case of Yamin Khan he had also complained against a certain order of suspension as being improper, but the Tribunal declined to interfere with that order. In each of these cases, the Tribunal noted that it had been agreed in an earlier adjudication that the Company would be at liberty to vary annual increments upwards and downwards provided that where they reduce it, the employee would be advised in writing of the reasons for the reduction and if the increment was to be wholly withheld, this would only be after a written warning had been furnished to the employee of such intention. Now, in the case of each of the two men a letter had been issued in advance to them stating that the Company took a serious view of their habitual lateness and that they would take action in respect of this irregularity in attendance "when we are considering your annual increment." They went on to say that this might result "in suitably decreasing your scale increment." The Tribunal considered that these letters did not exhibit an intention of withholding the increment, and accordingly directed that the increment should be allowed in each case in my opinion, the reading by the Tribunal of the letter in question has been altogether too meticulous. There is a charge of habitual lateness of which a serious view is taken and there is a clear threat that this would be taken into account in considering the annual increment. The reference to "suitably decreasing" that Increment need not mean only that the increment would be partially reduced and in my opinion the Company were within their rights after having given this clear and serious warning to reduce the increment altogether to nothing by way of punishment. L. would therefore allow the appeal of the Standard-Vacuum in respect o these two awards, and would set them aside. Next, there is for consideration the award given in the Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. case whereby two motor drivers Rafi Ahmad and Maqsoodul Hassan whose services had been terminated by notice an 17th July 1958, were ordered to be taken into service from the date on which two other drivers, Ghulam Nabi and Habib Bux who had been discharged at the same time were later re-employed. It seems that during the pendency of the adjudication, there was a reorganization of the office transport service of the three Companies, namely. Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. Sui Gas Transmis sion Company and Burmah-Shell Oil Company whereby three permanent drivers and five temporary drivers became surplus to requirements and were discharged by notice. Later, the Company required the services of two more drivers, and they selected Ghulam Nabi and Hubib Bux, two of the temporary drivers who had been previously retrenched for re-employment. Rafi Ahmad and Maqsoodul Hassan were the Senior-most among the permanent drivers who had been retrenched at the same time. The Tribunal purported to apply the principle of "first out first in" to the case. He rejected the contention of the three permanent drivers who had been retrenched that their dismissal was illegal, as it had been made without the prior permission of the Tribunal during the pendency of the adjudication, and further that they had thus been victimised for having taken a prominent part in the strike which ended on the 14th June 1958. On the latter point, the Tribunal opined against the applicants, holding that the discharge was made in consequence of a bona fide re-organisation inside the three Companies by which the redundancy was brought about. But he thought that these two men being the senior-most among the permanent drivers should be thought to come within the descrip tion "first out" and therefore should be the first to be re-engaged when employment was again available. In my opinion, the case did not fall within the principle of "first out first in" at all. The redundancy was brought about by re-organisation of a permanent nature, which is said to be still in existence. The Tribunal has found that the re-organisation was not designed to affect any employee in particular, but was carried out bona fide. Yet, he found that the preferential re-engagement of Ghulam Nabi and Habib Bux constituted a breach by the Company of the Provision in section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act that no employer shall during the pendency of an adjudication `discharge, dismiss or otherwise punish any workman except for misconduct not connected with the dispute." Having found that the discharge was made bona fide, it is not easy to see how the Tribunal could find that there was such a contravention. The case is not one of operatives in factories. The running of motor transport is not the business of Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. The motor transport in question is utilised in connection with the offices of the three Companies, and the redundancy was caused by the offices being amalgamated. The principle of first out of first in might apply where operatives in factories are rendered surplus to requirements and thus placed in a condition of non-employment through some temporary change in. conditions; when conditions improve, and the need for further hands once again arises, those who were first discharged are entitled to be considered first for employment. But that is not the case here. The employment which was re-offered in these cases was not of the same character as the employment which is offered when a factory recovers full operation after passing through a lean, period. The two men Ghulam Nabi and Habib Bux were not engaged in their old jobs, but on the facts that appear, they were engaged for new jobs, which opened out at some stage after the amalgamation of the offices on account of a fresh need. Moreover, Ghulam Nabi and Habib Bux were discharged at the same time as Rafi Ahmad and Maqsoodul Hassan and it is difficult to see how the two latter persons can be said to be "first out" merely because they happened to be the senior-most permanent employees at the time when they were discharged. I find that the award of the Tribunal in this case is not based on sound reasoning and I would therefore set it aside. The last cases of this kind are raised in the appeal of the Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union and concern two persons Nasir Khan and Abdullah Baloch, Nasir Khan was dismissed on the 9th September 1958, from his post of driver in the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, and it was urged that this was in breach of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, because the dismissal was by way of victimisation for his having taken a prominent part in the strike ending on the 14th June 1958. The Tribunal found that as a result of an enquiry held by the Company, Nasir Khan was proved to have threatened an officer S. U. Kadri with death. This was on the 18th August 1958, that is after the termination of the strike. The evidence relied upon was that of Mr. Kadri and another official, by name Karimullah. Karimullah had actually joined in the strike, which gave added weight to his evidence. The Tribunal after consider ing the proceedings of the enquiry came to the conclusion that it could not be said that the finding that Nasir Khan was guilty was based on no evidence, that there had been no violation of any principle of natural justice, and observing that an Industrial Tribunal does not sit in appeal over or substitute its own judgment for that of an enquiry officer, he dismissed the application. They finding in the enquiry is enough to show that the dismissal was for misconduct not connected with the dispute, and therefore there was no violation of section 33 of the Act. The principle followed by the Tribunal of not sitting in appeal over the proceedings in the enquiry is perfectly correct. I would therefore dismiss the appeal of the Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union against this decision of the Tribunal. The other case of Abdullah Baloch also ended in rejection of his application complaining against the termination of his service by Burmah-Shell on payment of a month's wages in lieu of notice. This man, it seems, was the President of the Karachi Petroleum Workers' Union, and appears to have taken part in the strike, which ended on the 14th June 1958. The incident which led to his dismissal however occurred on the 7th November 1958. It may be briefly described as follows. The Company was introduc ing a new system under which tank-lorries were sent out for filling tanks at petrol stations without a helper or a general workman, as had been the case before. Under Police Regulations, two persons were required to be in attendance of a tank-lorry, but the Company had obtained exemption, and was carrying out the experiment, obviously with the intention of effecting economy, of sending out drivers without a helper. Abdullah Baloch was the driver of one such tank-lorry, and the case was that on the 7th November 1958, he refused to do the house-coupling, for delivery of oil, on the ground that this was the duty of a helper and not of the driver. He was charged with refusal to obey a reasonable order, and after an enquiry he was suspended for four days and was later discharged on payment of one month's wages. Evidence was led that Abdullah Baloch after his refusal to do the house coupling was asked to leave his lorry so that another driver should drive it, and that he replied insolently to Issa Khan, a Section Foreman, declaring "this is my lorry and you will have to pull me out." Evidence was led to this effect, and had been believed in the enquiry by the Company. The Tribunal holding that he had no jurisdiction to go into the merits, if there had been a fair enquiry, came finally to the conclusion that although the insubor dination by Abdullah Baloch may have been momentary or transient, such conduct on his part had in fact been established and he accordingly rejected the application. Abdullah Baloch had not been dismissed, but had been dis charged with a month's pay in lieu of notice. Under the Company's Standing Orders, insolence or wilful insubordina tion and disobedience to a reasonable order are grounds for, inter alia, termination of service after due notice or wages in lieu. While however rejecting the application, the Tribunal made some observations indicating that the Company might well consider the re-engagement of Abdullah Baloch. The argument on the case resolved itself into the question when the experimental survey was ordered of the system of making tank-lorry drivers do without a helper, had Abdullah Baloch been told of this? Issa Khan, the Section Foreman had Made a statement on the point, but had not said that he had apprised Abdullah Baloch of the nature of his new duties, or that these were merely experimental. The matter was also referred to an officer of the Company by the name of Alexander, but he too did not tell Abdullah Baloch that Vie new conditions were only a temporary experimental survey. On these grounds, it was urged in favour of Abdullah Baloch that his conduct was not inexplicable, but for the Company it was urged that this refusal to leave his lorry, declaring that it was his, and that he would have to be pulled out, and this following upon his refusal to do house-coupling, certainly constituted insubordination and the Company was certainly within its rights in dispensing with his services with a month's wages under the Standing Orders. The case is one deserving of some sympathy, but the Standing Orders are clear, and it seems clear enough that there was an act of insubordination and refusal to obey a reasonable order. The conditions which would justify interference do not exist, and consequently, the order of the Tribunal rejecting the application must be upheld. It remains to consider the order made by the Tribunal for retrospective operation of his award. The claim was that it should be made retrospective from the 1st January 1957. The Tribunal in the first instance directed that it should be retrospective from the 19th April 1957, but later a notification was issued giving effect to the award from the 19th April 1958. this is resisted, but only in the appeal by Burmah-Shell, who urged that the Tribunal had x ignored the fact that the strike which led to the reference had been held by himself to be illegal. On the same point, there is an appeal by the Federation, that the award should be made retrospec tive from the 1st January 1957, but this was not pressed by Mr. Fazeel. The ground put forward on behalf of Burmah-Shell for not making the award retrospective as it now stands to the 19th April 1958, does not carry any great weight. The Tribunal has himself held that for the period of the strike, the workmen affected in this Base are not entitled to wages or compensation. I would accordingly reject the appeal of Burmah-Shell on this point. Accordingly, the appeals should be disposed of as indicated in this judgment under the various demands. The modifications to be carried out in the award are set out conveniently in a schedule attached to this judgment, but except for those modifications, the award given by the Tribunal should stand. I would leave the parties to bear their own costs in these appeals. S. A. RAHMAN, J.-I agree. FAZLE-AKBAR, J.-I agree. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.-I agree. SCHEDULE I. THE BURMAH-SHELL EMPLOYEES UNION.

1. Leave (Demand No. 5 (f) (b)).-Earned leave shall be allowed to accumulate up to 120 days. The award of the Tribunal on this point is set aside.

2. Medical aid (Demand No. 8 (a)).-The award of the Tribunal on this point is amended so that medical treatment at the Company's expense will be confined to an employee, his wife and children and this relief shall also be available to the labour engaged by the Company at its head office at Karachi.

3. Smoking (Demand No. 16).-Smoking at Head Office and Divisional Offices shall be allowed at the seats of the members and ash-trays be provided. The award of the Tribunal is set aside.

4. Pension (Demand No. 17 (a)).-The award of the Tribunal directing the Trustees of the Provident Fund that they should amend the Regulations of their Fund so as to discontinue the deduction from a worker's pension of a sum equal to 4 per cent. of the amount standing to his credit in the Provident Fund, is set aside.

5. Gratuity (Demand No. 19 (a)).-The award of the Tribunal on the point is set aside.

6. House Allowance (Demand No. 25 (b)).-The award of the Tribunal allowing ten per cent. of basic salary of each employee as House allowance is set aside.

7. Leave Fare assistance (Demand No. 36). -The award of the Tribunal on the point is set aside.

8. Bonus (Demand No. 45).-The award of the Tribunal on the point is modified so that the Company is required to pay only three months' basic wages to its employees. II. THE STANDARD-VACUUM EMPLOYEES' UNION.

1. House allowance (Demand No. 3 (b)-Part III).-The award of the Tribunal is set aside:

2. Maternity allowance (Demand No. 7,--Part III).-The award of the Tribunal is set aside.

3. Leave fare assistance (Demand No. 1 (a)-Part IV).--The award of the Tribunal is set aside,

4. Leave (Demand No. 1 (a) -Part IV).-Earned, leave shall, be allowed to accumulate up to 120 days. The award of the Tribunal is set aside.

5. Special sick leave (Demand No. 4 (a)-Part IV).-The award of the Tribunal on the point is set aside, and the employees of the Company are granted in addition. to their normal sick leave for seven days, special sick leave in cases of prolonged sickness for one month on full pay. The period of 14 days' sick leave on half pay to follow 7 days' sick leave on full pay as at present being granted by the Company shall be included in the extra month's sick leave now being allowed in cases of prolonged illness.

6. Medical aid (Demand No. 1-Part V). -The award of the Tribunal on this point is amended so that medical treatment at the Company's expense will be confined to an employee, his wife and children, and this relief shall also be available to the labour engaged by the Company at its head office at Karachi.

7. Uniform (Demand No. 6-Part V). -The Company is required to provide to the service staff one pair of Peshawari sandals per -year in addition to whatever is provided to them already, by way of uniform. 8: Grace time (Demand No. 9-Part V).-The award of the Tribunal increasing 5 minutes' grace time to 15 minutes for late comers is set aside.

9. Joining time (Demand No. 10-Part V).-Employees when transferred from one place to another should be granted a mini mum of seven days of joining time. The award of the Tribunal is set aside.

10. Bonus (Demand No. 13-Part V).-The award of the Tribunal on the point is modified so that the Company is required to pay only three months' basic wages to the employees. 11. (Demand No. 14-Part V).-Proportionate bonus should be paid to those employees who join or leave the Company's service during the year. The award of the Tribunal is set aside. 12. (Demand No. 17-Part V).-The award of the Tribunal that the Company should transfer Samiullah Khan, Employees Relation Officer is set aside.

13. Pension (Demand No. 2 (b) -Part VI).-There should be no deduction from Provident Fund for the purpose of Pension. The award of the Tribunal is set aside.

14. Gratuity (Demand No. 3-Part VI).-The Company shall grant as gratuity one month's basic pay for each year of service up to a maximum of 15 months' salary. 15. (Annexures 7-and 9).-The award of the Tribunal direct ing the Company to restore increments of Yamin Khan and Amanullah is set aside.

1. Leave fare assistance (Demand No. I (i)).-The award of the Tribunal under this demand is set aside.

2. Leave (Demand No. 1 (h)).-Earned leave shall be allowed to accumulate up to 120 days. ,

3. Gratuity (Demand No. 2 (a)).-The Company shall grant ac gratuity one month's basic pay for each year of service up to a maximum of 15 months' salary. The award of the Tribunal is set aside

4. Pension (Demand No. 3 (c)).-There should be no deduc tion from Provident Fund for the purpose of pension. The award of the Tribunal is set aside.

5. Joining time (Demand No. 12).-Employees when trans ferred from one place to another should be granted a minimum of seven days of joining time. The award of the Tribunal is set aside.

6. Medical aid (Demand No. 13 (a)).-The award of the Tribunal on this point is amended so that medical treatment at the Company's expense will be confined to an employee, his wife and children, and this relief shall also be available to the labour engaged at the Company's head office in Karachi.

7. Lunch allowance (Demand No. 14 (b)).-The Company is required to pay its employees a lunch allowance whenever-they work overtime on Sundays, Saturdays and holidays.

8. Bonus (Demand No. 19).-The award of the Tribunal is modified so that Company is required to pay only three months' basic wages to the employees.

9. House allowance (Demand No. 22). -The award of the Tribunal is set aside. The award of the Tribunal is set aside.

2. Medical aid (Demand No. 4 (b)).-The award of the Tribunal on this point is amended so that medical treatment at the Company's expense will be confined to an employee, his wife and children, and this relief shall also be available to the labour engaged at the Company's head office in Karachi.

3. Maternity allowance (Demand No. 4 (e)).-The award of the Tribunal 1s set aside.

4. House allowance (Demand 7 (b)).--The award of the Tribunal is set aside.

5. Gratuity (Demand No. 18 (i)).-The Company shall grant as gratuity one month's basic pay for each of service up to a maximum of 15 months' salary. The award of the Tribunal is set aside.

6. Uniform (Demand No. 33).-The Company is required to provide to the service staff one pair of Peshawari sandals per year in addition to whatever is provided to them already, by way of uniform.

7. Bonus (Demand No. 38).-The award of the Tribunal granting bonus to those members of the staff who are engaged in production of oil is set aside.

8. Annexure 8.-The award of the Tribunal directing that the Company should re-employ Rafi Ahmad and Maqsoodul Hassan as drivers from the date on which the temporary drivers Ghulam Nabi and Habib Bux were taken into service is set aside.

1. Free Education (Demand No. 1).-The award of the Tri bunal that the Company should provide a boys High School at Balkassur and that free education should be imparted by the Company to the children of all its employees up to the 8th standard is set aside.

1. Bonus (Demand No. 2).-The award of the Tribunal on the point is modified so that the Companies are required to pay only three months' basic wages to the workmen.

2. Leave for assistance (Demand No. 6).-The award of the Tribunal is set aside.

3. Privilege leave (Demand No. 8 (d)).--Earned leave shall be allowed to accumulate. The award of the Tribunal is set aside.

4. Gratuity (Demand No. 25).-The Companies will pay gratuity at the rate of one month's basic pay for each year of service to all workmen in their respective installations. The award of the Tribunal is set aside. B. Z. KAIKAUS, J.-I am in agreement with my Lord the Chief Justice as to the merits of the various demands. On the question as to whether the award is valid in spite of the fact that it was delivered beyond time I have decided ultimately to agree to the view that it would be valid on account of an extension of time by the Government, though I was inclined to take a contrary view when the case was argued. My reasons, however, for the conclu sion are not quite the same as those of my Lord the Chief justice and I proceed to state them. It appears to me that two questions arise in this connection. The first is whether the provision as to time is mandatory or directory. The second is whether if it be mandatory time can be extended even after the award has been delivered. On the first question, I have never entertained any doubt. When the Legisla ture fixes a precise time for the doing of an act this is at least some indication that the provision. may be mandatory, but when not only a definite time is provided, but there is a further provision that time can be extended only for good and sufficient cause, the provision ought to be held to be mandatory. It would be a con tradiction in terms to say that time. can be extended only for good and sufficient cause. But the provision as to time is such that it may be ignored without affecting the validity of the act to which it relates. If the Government were to refuse to extend time on the ground that there was no good and sufficient cause the Tribunal would still have jurisdiction to deliver the award if we hold the provision to be directory. I do not see what would be the meaning in providing for good and sufficient cause if this interpretation is to be accepted. What is said above is the main argument in favour of the provision being mandatory, but there are some other considera tions too arising out of the wording of the different provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the general provisions relating to time as they exist in the Arbitration Act. An examination of the different sections of the Industrial Disputes Act would show that the provisions as to time are very carefully and precisely worded. In section 1 2, the provision is that report "shall be submitted within 14 days of the commencement of the conciliation proceed ings or within such shorter period as may be fixed by the appro priate government." In section 13 there is a provision in similar words for a report within 2 months, but there is, at the same time, a provision for extension of time by the appropriate Government for further periods not exceeding 2 months in the aggregate. In section 14 the provision is that the report shall be submitted "ordinarily within a period of 6 months." In section 15 with the interpretation of which we are now concerned the original provision was only this that the award shall be submitted to the Government expeditiously, and it is by an amendment that the words "within a period not exceeding 3 months" were added. The negative form of words is itself an indication and, not a weak indication, of the intention of the Legislature. It is not just a direction to submit the award within 3 months. It is almost in clear words that the award cannot be submitted after 3 months. A consideration of the provision as to time in the law of arbitration points in the same direction. In the Schedule to the Arbitration Act is provided that the arbitrators have to make the award within 4 months of the date when they enter on the reference and the umpire has to make the award within 2 months of such date. The question as to whether the provision as to time in the Schedule to the Arbitration Act is mandatory or direc tory has been the subject of discussion in a number of cases, and it has been held that the provision is mandatory. I may refer to the judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice himself in Sardar Abdul Halim Khan v. Chairman. Lahore Improvement Trust (P L D 1949 Lah. 278) where in the same view was expressed. I do not think there is any case in which a contrary view has been taken. I am not, with great respect, impressed by the argument that section 20 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. wherein it is provided that the dispute remains pending till the award is pub lished has any effect on the interpretation of the provisions as to time in section

15. The argument put forward is that as the dispute remains pending even after the expiry of the same fixed by the Government it should be held that the Tribunal continues to have power to give award in spite of the failure of the Government to extend time, and therefore the provision as to time should be regarded as directory. For an appreciation of this argument it would be proper to refer to the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act and the object of the provision as to pendency of proceedings. The reason for the provision in section 20 (3) is that as long as the dispute remains pending there are certain disabilities attaching to the parties with respect to strikes, lock-outs dismissals, etc. The intention of the Act is that once the Government finds a demand made by a party to be a fit one for decision by a Tribunal it becomes the duty- of the Government to have that demand adjudicated upon, and as long as it is not adjudicated upon parties as to maintain a status qua and to refrain from doing certain acts to the prejudice of the other party. Section 8 pro vides that if the services of a Tribunal cease to be available the Government shall appoint another person to fill the vacancy. So once' the Government reaches a conclusion that the demand is such as should be inquired into that matter becomes pending with the Government whose duty it is to have it decided by a Tribunal and it ends only when the award is finally published by the Gov ernment. The point to be kept in view is that the matter is pending out with any particular Tribunal, but with the Govern ment. It would be quite easy to illustrate this. Suppose the Tribunal dies, or resigns, or becomes of unsound mind, or for some reason or other the Government removes him and as yet a new Tribunal has not been, appointed, is the matter pending within the words of section 20 (3)? The answer is that it is pending, but with whom it is pending. It is certainly not pending with the particular Tribunal which was appointed, for that Tribunal is already dead or has resigned or has been removed. Pendency therefore must be regarded as with the Government. In this connection it is also to be noted that even after the award is made by the Tribunal the matter is pending till the award is published. The argument, therefore, that because the matter is pending there must be jurisdiction in the particular Tribunal which was appointed is not of any force. The matter may be pending and still a particular Tribunal which was appoin ted may have lost all jurisdiction to decide the matter. We can even refer to the case where the Government refuses to extend time' for making of the award. If the Government has refused to extend time the Tribunal cannot have any further jurisdiction in the matter and yet' section 20(3) is still applicable and the matter is pending. I would, therefore, hold that the -provision as to time in section 15 is mandatory and an award which was delivered after time and without an extension of time by the appropriate govern ment would be invalid. The next question to consider is whether the time for making the award can be extended even after the award has been delivered. There were two objections which I had at the time when the case was heard to the acceptance of the view that there could be ex post facto validation of the award. The first objection was that the award may on this interpretation be validated after a long period, say 20 years, and this certainly would not be within the intention of the Legislature. The second objection was that in view of the history of legislation on the subject of extension of time in relation to ordinary award section 15 had not been so worded as to include the power of ex post facto validation. For an appreciation of this argument it is necessary to refer to the amendments made in the provision relating to extension of time in the law of arbitration. In the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, it was provided by section 514 that "the Court may if it thinks fit either grant further time and, from time to time, enlarge the period for delivery of the award or make an order superseding the arbitration". On an interpretation of this provision, the Courts in British India held that time could not be extended after the expiry of the time already fixed by Court. In "the Code of 1908 this provision was amended and the power of the Court to extend time was stated in the following words (Para. 8 of the Second Schedule) :- "The Court may, if it thinks fit, either allow further time and from time to time before or after the expiration of the period fixed for making the award, enlarge such period or may make an order superseding the arbitration." After this amendment the Courts in British India still refused to accept as valid awards delivered at a time when the time for making them had not yet been extended. The result was that the Legislature again interfered and in the Arbitration Act of 1940 which consolidated the provision relating to arbitration pre viously contained in the Arbitration Act of 1899 and the Code of Civil Procedure. It was provided by section 28 that "the Court may, if it thinks fit, whether the time for making the award has expired or not and whether the award has been made or not, enlarge from time to time the time for making the award." Now if the Legislature that enacted section 15 of the Indus trial Disputes Act was cognizant of the amendments in the provisions relating to arbitration we will have to agree that it did not properly word section 15 so as to permit ex post facto validation of an award. Section 15 is in the following words:- "(1) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its proceedings expedi tiously and shall, as soon as practicable on the conclusion thereof, submit its award to the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months from the date of reference of but the appropriate Government may, for good and sufficient reasons extend the said period by such further period or periods as it may consider necessary. (2) On receipt of such award, the appropriate Government shall by order in writing declare the award to be binding: Provided that where the appropriate Government is a party to the dispute and in its opinion it would be inexpedient on public grounds to give effect to the whole or any part of the award, it shall on the first available opportunity lay the award together with the statement of its reasons for not making a declaration as aforesaid before the Legislative Assembly of the Province, or where the appropriate Government is the Central Government, before the Central Legislature, and shall, as soon as may be, cause to be moved therein a resolution for the consideration of the award ; and the Legislative Assembly or the Central Legislature, as the case may be, may, by its resolu tion, confirm, modify, or reject the award. (3) On the passing of a resolution under the proviso to sub section (2), unless the award is rejected thereby the appropriate Government shall by order in writing declare the award as con firmed or modified by the resolution; as the case may be, to be binding. (4) Save as provided in the proviso to subsection (3) of section 19, an award declared to be binding under this section shall not be called in question in any manner." It will be observed that this section does not even say that time can be enlarged after the time already fixed has expired. Therefore, if the Legislature had in view the previous amendments then the intention of the Legislature would be that time should not be extended even after the time already fixed for making the award has expired. But, fortunately, on a perusal of the sections of the Industrial Disputes Act, I find a definite indication that this could not have been the intention .of the Legislature. There is a provision for extension of the time of operation of an award in section 19 (6) which says, "Provided that before the expiry of the said period the appropriate Government may extend the period of operation of the award." It will be observed that as the intention was to permit an exercise of the power of extension only during the time already available words to that effect have been put in. So, there is a possible argument that if the inten tion in the case of an extension of time under section 15 was also that the power is to be exercised before the period already fixed expires there would have been in section 15 words to that effect, and the absence of such words can justify a conclusion that the power could be exercised even after the expiry of the period already fixed. Once we reach this conclusion we can safely hold that the Legislature which enacted the Industrial Disputes Act had not in mind the various amendments in the law of arbitation relating to extension of time; for in that case the provisions would have been differently worded. This view finds further support from the decision of the English Courts as to the effect of the provision as to time in the English Arbitration Acts. These decisions are reflected in the passage in Russell on Arbitration which has been reproduced by my Lord the Chief Justice and wherein it is stated that time can be extended even after the award has been delivered. On a reference to the English Arbitration Acts I find that even in the latest of those Acts, that is, the Arbitration Act of 1950, the provision as to extension of time is in the following words:- "(2) The time, if any, limited for making an award, whether under this Act or otherwise, may from time to time be enlarged by order of the High Court or a Judge thereof, whether that time has expired or not." It will be observed that there is no express provision as to the ex post facto validation of the award, and all that is said is that even after the expiry of the time fixed time may be extended. But the view taken by the Courts is that even though the award was delivered beyond time it could be validated. The objection therefore, that in accordance with the amend ments referred to above the interpretation of section 15 should be different disappears. The other objection, as I have already, stated, was that this interpretation would permit the Government to validate an award even after a very longtime. But this objection too loses its force when we consider that even the Court can ex post facto validate an award after a long time, there being no limitation for doing so provided in section 28 of the Arbitra tion Act. In practice, there is little apprehension of awards by Tribunals being validated after a considerable time because from their very nature the disputes between the workmen and the em ployers require expeditious solution. I agree in the orders proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice. A. H.