P L D 1965 Dacca 122 (PLP)

SATTAR, J.‑The petitioner, who was at the relevant time a student of the second year M. A. Class in Economics at the University of Dacca, has obtained this rule on the respondents, namely, (1) the University of Dacca through its Vice‑Chancellor and (2) the Registrar of the University, to show cause why the notification dated the 3rd April 1964, issued under the signature of the said respondent No. 2, in so far as it relates to the expulsion of the petitioner from the University for a period of two years, should not be declared as having been made without lawful authority and as such of no legal effect, and/or why the respondent should not be directed to cancel, rescind and/or withdraw the said notification. The petitioner's case, in short, is that while a student of the University, as stated above, he received, on or about the 7th April 1964, a cyclostyled copy of a notification dated the 3rd April 1964, under the signature of the Registrar, informing him that he was expelled from the University with immediate effect for a period of two years as he had been "found guilty of serious breach of discipline". The petitioner has challenged the legality of this action on the grounds that the University had no power to make the impugned order and that he was not given any opportunity of showing cause and/or being heard before the decision to expel him was taken. The petition is resisted by the respondents on whose behalf an affidavit affirmed by the Registrar has been filed. In this affidavit it has been asserted that the University is in possession of evidence of serious breach of discipline by the petitioner on the 22nd March 1964, in connection with the Convocation held on that date. He took part in creating disturbance, and became violent, and started shouting slogans and asking students to leave the pandal which was set up in connection with the Convocation. The affidavit goes on to recite that when the Chancellor and the Professors came out in procession, the petitioner became aggressive and requested others to close the passage leading to the pandal so that the procession might not move. The petitioner was inciting the group to be violent and to demonstrate against the holding of the Convocation. Dr. M. Ahmad, Professor of Chemistry and Provost of the Salimullah Muslim Hall, who had been detailed on duty in connection with the Convocation, gave a full account of the happenings, including the part played by the petitioner, in the report called for from him amongst others. The deponent has further asserted that the actions of the petitioner were noticed by Dr. M. Ahmed, Provost of the S. M. Hall, and that he also recognised him, as the petitioner was a resident student of the said Hall. It is then said that the petitioner along with others shouted slogans asking the students to leave the pandal and boycott the Convocation and threw about folding chairs in a violent bid to let loose a reign of terror without paying any heed to the requests of the teachers for orderly behaviour appropriate to the solemn occasion. The deponent has then asserted that there was no necessity of serving any show‑cause notice as the petitioner was well aware of the breach of discipline committed by himself in presence of all and had thus no cause to show against the same. According to the deponent as affirmed by him in the affidavit, the University has power to take disciplinary action against students under sections 22 and 33 read with section 4 (m) of the Dacca University Ordinance, 1961, and the existing University statutes and Ordinance, which were continued in force by the said Ordinance of 1961. Reference has also been made to the Discipline Board of the University, vested with all powers to take disciplinary actions and award appropriate punishments. An affidavit‑in‑reply has been filed by the petitioner. In this affidavit the petitioner has asserted that he was a member of the Dacca University Central Students Union and was invited in that capacity to attend the Convocation by the University. The petitioner attended the Convocation in answer to that invitation and was allotted a seat in the portion of the Convocation pandai reserved for invitees who included many of the distinguished citizens of Dacca. The petitioner was far away from the students, who attended the Convocation to receive diplomas, and it is inconceivable for him to think that there could be any report against him, as alleged in the affidavit‑in‑opposition. The petitioner has denied that he took any direct action or shouted any slogan asking the students to leave the pandal or boycott the Convocation, as has been asserted in the affidavit‑in- opposition. This case came up for hearing before a Division Bench. Sometime after the conclusion of the hearing the Division Bench felt that as the petition raised certain points of great importance and as their decision is likely to have far‑reaching consequence, this case should be heard by a larger Bench, preferably of five Judges. The learned Chief Justice, therefore, constituted the present Bench of five Judges. To start with, Mr. Pal has raised a preliminary objection questioning the constitution of this Bench and its authority to hear this case. He has argued under the rules framed by the High Court, the Chief Justice has no power to constitute a Special Bench of five Judges to hear a matter as the present one. 1n this connection, he has drawn our attention to the rules framed by the Court to govern the procedure in applications for directions and orders under Article 170 of the 1956 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (page 253 of the Rules of the High Court for East Pakistan Volume I). He has pointed out that under these rules, applications such as the present one are to be heard by a Division Bench, which means a Bench consisting of two Judges, and under rule 12, it is only when there is a difference of opinion between the Judges composing tile Division Bench that the Chief Justice can have the point decided in accordance with the provisions of clause 36 of the Letters Patent. The learned Advocate's contention is that under these rules the Chief Justice has not been given any power to constitute a Bench of five Judges to hear an application, formerly under Article 170 of the late Constitution, and now under Article 98 (2) of tile present Constitution. In this connection, he has further referred to Chapter 11 of the Rules and contended that even if the rules relating to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court can be drawn upon in the absence of any rule to govern applications under Article 98 (2), then also under the 3rd proviso to rule 1 of Chapter 11 page 6, the Chief Justice may appoint a Special Bench consisting of three Judges only on the requisition of the Division Bench. We have no hesitation to observe at the very outset that this argument has emanated from a clear misreading of the relevant rules coupled with an omission to take into account the laws governing the power of the Chief Justice to constitute Benches for the hearing of particular cases. Clause 36 of the Letters Patent provides that any function, which is directed to be performed by the High Court by the Letters Patent in exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction, may be performed by any Judge or by any Division Bench thereof appointed or constituted for such purpose in pursuance of section. 108 of the Government of India Act. 1915. Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 reads:‑ "(1) Each High Court may by its own rules provide as it thinks fit for the exercise by one or more Judges or by Division Courts constituted by two or more Judges of the High Court of the Original and Appellate Jurisdiction vested in the Court; (2) The Chief Justice of each High Court shall determine what Judge in each case is to sit alone and what Judges of the Court, whether with or without idle Chief Justice, are to constitute the several Division Courts." The power of the Chief Justice under subsection (2) above to determine what Judge or Judges in each case will constitute a Bench has remained intact in spite of all the constitutional changes that have taken place during the last half‑a‑century in this sub continent. Reference in this connection may be made to section 223 of the Government of India, Act, 1935, Article 227 of the late (1956) Constitution, Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 (President's Post Proclamation Order No. 1 of 1958) and Article 234 of the present Constitution. The rule making power of the High Court under sections 122 and 129 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot affect this power of the f Chief Justice. It is, therefore, clear that the absence of a Rule in this regard or the existence of one contrary to the provisions of subsection (2) of section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, cannot affect the power of the Chief Justice to constitute a Bench of as many Judges as he thinks fit to hear a particular case. It thus appears to us to be indisputably clear that the Chief Justice of this Court has unfettered powers to constitute a Bench with as many Judges as he thinks necessary or proper to hear a particular case. We, therefore, find no substance in this contention of Mr. Pal. The first ground, on which the impugned order has been questioned, is that since the promulgation of the Dacca University Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance XXIII of 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance), the University of Dacca has no power to impose any punishment for any act of indiscipline. Learned Advocate has argued that it is true that under section 4(m) of the Ordinance, the University has the power to supervise and control the residence and discipline of the students of the University but since no University Ordinances have been framed under section 32 (ee), the power of punishment for indiscipline cannot be exercised. The learned Advocate seems to think that, in the absence of a University Ordinance relating to the conduct and discipline of the University and punishment for misconduct or indiscipline, the University cannot exercise the power under section 4(m). Alternatively, it has been submitted that the Syndicate, which came into being under the Ordinance in place of the Executive Council provided under the Dacca University Act of 1920, has not, at least, the power to impose the punishment, which has been awarded to the petitioner. In this connection, it has been pointed out that section 30 lays down that the Statutes framed under the Ordinance may provide for the powers and duties of the Syndicate and that as there has been no Statute framed so far after the promulgation of the Ordinance, the Syndicate could not make the impugned order. He has further contended that subsection (5) of section 13 of the Ordinance clearly indicates that the responsibility for the maintenance of discipline in the University rests with the Vice‑Chancellor, and that being so, the Syndicate was not competent to pass the order in question. In our opinion, absence of any University Ordinance or Statute, as contemplated by the Ordinance, cannot affect the power of the University to punish a student for indiscipline. Under the Ordinance, the University, is empowered to frame rules falling into three distinct categories, to wit, Statutes, University Ordinances and Regulations, and the authority to frame the same is to be found in three different provisions, namely, sections 30, B 32 and 34 respectively. We, however, fail to find any warrant in these provisions or elsewhere for the contention that the powers of the University under the Ordinance cannot be exercised unless and until rules as to their exercise are framed. On the other hand, under section 21 of the Ordinance, the Syndicate is the executive body of the University and under section 22(m) it has also been given such other powers of the University as have not been otherwise provided for by the Ordinance or the Statutes. Section 31(l) of the Ordinance lays down that the first, second and third Statutes shall be those set out in the Schedule. It would thus appear to follow clearly that in the absence of any provision in the Ordinance or in any of the said three Statutes, which were promulgated along with the Ordinance, the Syndicate is competent in terms of sections 21 and 22 to deal with, and award punishment for, acts of indiscipline on the part of students. This is not incompatible with subsection (5) of section 13 of the Ordinance, which provides that the Vice‑Chancellor shall be responsible for the discipline of the University in accordance with the Ordinance, the Statute and the University Ordinance. As, we read, it, is merely, makes the Vice‑Chancellor answerable or accountable for discipline in the University. It cannot, in our opinion, be construed as vesting in the Vice‑Chancellor to they exclusion of all other functionaries and Boards the sole authority for taking disciplinary action against the erring students) Nothing of any practical interest, however, turns on this as the impugned order appears to us to be fully justified by some other provisions, as shall be made clear presently. Section 25 of the East Pakistan General Clauses Act provides: "Where any enactment is, repealed and re‑enacted with or without modification, then unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, order, scheme, rule, bye‑law, notification or form made or issued under the repealed enactment shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re‑enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re‑enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, order, scheme, rule, bye‑law, notification or form made or issued under the provisions so re‑enacted." Moreover, section 54 of the Ordinance has expressly kept alive the power of the different punishing authorities under the Statutes and University Ordinances, framed under the authority of the Dacca University Act, 1920, so far as they are not inconsistent with the Ordinance, the Statutes and University Ordinances framed under the Ordinance. This section provides inter alia that notwithstanding the repeal of the Dacca University Act, 1920, jurisdiction or power conferred under any of the provisions under the said Act or Statutes, University Ordinances and Regulations made thereunder, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Ordinance or Statutes and University Ordinance made under the Ordinance, shall be continued, and so far as may be, deemed to have been conferred under the Ordinance or the Statutes and University Ordinances. It is, therefore, clear that in spite of the repeal of the Dacca University Act, 1920, the Statutes and University Ordinance framed thereunder, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Ordinance and the first three Statutes mentioned in the Schedule of the Ordinance, have remained in force and will be deemed to be Statutes and University Ordinances framed under the Ordinance. We are, therefore, to refer to all the relevant Statutes and Ordinances relating to discipline. Section 28 of the Ordinance provides that the University shall set up a Discipline Board. Under the old law there was a Board to supervise the residence, health and discipline of the students. The Discipline Board consists of the Vice‑Chancellor, the Provost, the Proctor, the Deans and two members of the Syndicate not receiving salaries from the University and elected annually by the Syndicate at the beginning of each academic session. Section 29 no doubt lays down that the constitution, powers and duties of the Discipline Board and of all other Boards of the University shall be prescribed by the University Ordinance, but in the absence of any University Ordinance framed in this regard, the powers of the Discipline Board will be the same as were enjoyed by the Board of residence, health and dis cipline to the extent they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Ordinance and the Statutes. It appears that as a matter of fact an Ordinance has been framed with regard to the constitution of the Discipline Board. The Syndicate has now come into being in place of the Executive Council and enjoys the powers of the latter under the Statute and University Ordinances framed under the Act of 1920. Another argument that has been advanced in this connection is that if the old Ordinances and Statutes are applicable in the absence of Statutes and University Ordinances framed under the Ordinance, then in the matter of disciple the University authorities cannot go beyond the powers that had been specifically given in Chapter XVI of the Calendar of the University Vol. I. Learned Advocate's contention is that even if the Dacca University had powers to punish the delinquencies ' of the students for acts not mentioned in the above chapter before the Ordinance came into force, those powers cannot be exercised now. We have not been able to appreciate this argument. It cannot be argued that the provisions of this chapter are exhaustive in relation to matters of discipline. Even a cursory reading will make it clear that the provisions are not exhaustive, and in the nature of things, could not be so. If is indeed inconceivable that there can be an exhaustive code of discipline for a University. The provisions of this chapter clearly indicate that some obvious acts of indiscipline have not been specifically mentioned. Absence of provision for punishing a student for assaulting a teacher in a class room may be cited as one of the numerous illustrations that strike us readily in this connection. Can it be argued that such an act is not an act of indiscipline within the meaning of the provisions of the Dacca University Act, 1920 and the Statutes and Ordinance framed thereunder? We have no hesitation to answer it in the negative, and that, we think, clinches the issue leaving no room for doubt that these provisions are not exhaustive in regard to discipline, and if that was the position before the Ordinance came into force, we fail to see why that should not be the position today, although no University Ordinances or Statutes have been framed under the Ordinance. The power of the University to deal with indiscipline is referable to section

4. The gap, caused by the absence of any University Ordinance under section 32 (ee) has been filled up by the previous University Ordinances and they will continue to hold the field so long as new University Ordinances are not framed. The provisions of the University Ordinances, which are attracted in the present case, are sections 1, 3, 6 and

8. The old section 1, which provided for a Board of residence, health and discipline, has now been replaced by the present section which deals with the composition of the Discipline Board to which reference has already been made above. Under section 3 the Discipline Board is to report to the Syndicate on' rules and regulations affecting the discipline of students elsewhere than within the compounds of Halls and Hostels. Section 6 runs as follows:‑ "Save , as provided for in section 8 below, whenever the Vice‑Chancellor is of opinion that there has been a case of breach of discipline which requires the expulsion of a student from the University for more than twelve months to be counted from the date of the order of expulsion, he shall refer the matter to the Board and place the recommendation of the Board before the Executive Council. (now Syndicate). There upon, the Executive Council (now Syndicate) shall either accept the recommendation of the Board or refer it back to the latter for reconsideration. In making this reference the Executive Council (now Syndicate) may recommend to the Board for consideration of such point or points as the Executive Council (now Syndicate) may think fit to suggest it. The Vice‑Chancellor shall lay before the Executive Council (now Syndicate) the recommendations of the Board after its reconsideration of its previous decision, in the light of the suggestion or suggestions, Y any, made it by the Executive Council (now Syndicate). The Executive Council shall then either accept the recommen dation, or pass such order thereon, as it may think fit." Section 8 is in the following terms: "If the Vice‑Chancellor is of opinion that an order of expulsion for a period not exceeding twelve months to be counted from the date of the order, will be sufficient in a case of breach of discipline, then he may personally take such action as he may think fit or delegate his power to take necessary action in this regard to the Proctor under Statute 15 (i) of the University." If, however, in any case of breach of discipline the Vice Chancellor imposes a punishment which may include an order of expulsion for a period not exceeding twelve months and is of opinion that a further punishment is necessary, he may report the case to the Executive Council (now Syndicate), through the Board as provided for in Ordinance VI above, for necessary action. The Executive Council (now Syndicate) shall then take such action on the recommendation of the Board as it may think fit, in conformity with the provisions of Ordinance VI above but it shall have no power to revise or modify any action already taken by the Vice‑Chancellor himself in the case under this Ordinance. Note.‑An order of expulsion by the Vice‑Chancellor for any period not exceeding twelve months to be counted from the date of the order, issued under any Ordinance in this Chapter, may involve the loss of more than one academic session to the student concerned. The above provisions clearly indicate that when the Vice -Chancellor comes to the conclusion that an act of indiscipline calls for expulsion of the delinquent student for a period of more than one year, he has to refer the case to the Discipline Board and then place the recommendation of the Board before the Syndicate. This is how in the present case the petitioner has been dealt with and therefore his grievance that the University had no power to take the action in question has no basis. The argument that the case of the petitioner does not fall within the mischief of section 25 of the University Ordinance is not acceptable in view of what we have found already. Moreover, the assertions in the affidavit‑in‑opposition clearly attract the provisions of section

25. Before we proceed to consider the second ground for attacking the impugned order, we feel that we should dispose of a preliminary objection that has been raised by Mr. Asrarul Hossain with regard to the maintainability of this application. Learned counsel has argued that, as the Dacca University, though a statutory Body, is not a local authority within the meaning of Article 98(2) of the Constitution, no application under this Article lies against it. It has been argued that, though the definition of "Local authority" in the General Clauses Act cannot be referred to for the purpose of interpretation of Article 98(2) of the Constitution, it is clear that the framers of the Constitution had in mind the import of that expression, as defined in the said Act Article 98(2) of the Constitution empowers the High Court to issue certain directions or grant declarations in regard to acts done by persons performing "functions in connection with the affairs of the Center, the Province or a local authority". The question that arises therefore is: What is meant by the expression "Local authority" as used in Article 98 (2) ? According to section 3 (28) of the General Clauses Act, "Local authority" means a Municipal Committee, District Board, port Commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund. The point to be determined therefore is whether the University of Dacca, which now functions under the Ordinance, can be called a `Local authority' within the meaning of Article 98 (2) of the Constitution. The definition of `local authority' in the General Clauses Act is more or less the same as the meaning of that expression appearing in Watson's Law Lexicon (page 604). The University of Dacca is a statutory Body and the Governor of the province is its Chancellor. If the provisions of the Ordinance are examined closely, it will be seen that the Chancellor is vested with substantial powers. Section 8 empowers the Provincial Govern ment to cause an inspection to be made by such person or persons as it may direct of the University, its building, laboratories and equipments. This section further provides that the Provincial Government shall communicate to the Syndicate its views with reference to the result of any such inspection or enquiry and shall after ascertaining the opinion of the Syndicate thereon advise the University upon the action to be taken. The annual report of the University to be placed before the Chancellor and its annual accounts and balance‑sheet, which are to be prepared under the direction of the Syndicate, have to be submitted to the Provincial Government for the purpose of audit. The control, that the Provincial Government has over the University, in our view, is not in any way less than the control exercised by it over municipal and other local bodies. Substantial portion of the finance also comes from the Government Regard being had to these, it is indeed difficult to see why the University cannot be called an authority which is legally entitled t‑o or has been entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a local fund. The University substantially carries on the duties of the Provincial Government in the field of higher education. In this connection, reference may be made to clause 5 of Article 98 according to which the term "person" occurring in that Article, includes any body politic or corporate, any authority of or under the control of the Central Government or of a Provincial Government. This article has been amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963 (Act No. I of 1964). Paragraph (c), which has been added to clause (2), is as follows:‑ "On the application any aggrieved person, make an order giving such directions to any person or authority, including any Government, exercising any power or performing any function in, or in relation to, any territory within the jurisdiction of that Court as may be appreciate for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Chapter I of Part 11 of this Constitution." If the argument of Mr. Asrarul Hossain is accepted, the position now will be that an application against the University will lie under Article 98(2) for enforcement of fundamental right but not for enforcement of the other laws of the country. We are of the view that that could not have been the intention. "Local authority" in this Article has been used only to point to an authority which functions within the jurisdiction of the High Court concerned and administers some public cause within specified territorial limits under a Statute. In our opinion, therefore, the University of Dacca falls within the ambit of Article 98(2). Mr. Pal has argued that since the impugned order has been passed ex parte without notice to the petitioner, it is violative of the principles of natural justice and as such void. Learned Advocate's contention is that the principle underlying the maxim audi alteram partem applies in the present case, and since the Syndicate took the decision without giving the petitioner an opportunity to place his case, the order made by it cannot be sustained. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, has contended that, since the impugned action of the University is of an administrative nature, the principle that "No man should be condemned unheard" has no application. It has further been argued that in matters of discipline the maxim audi alteram partem is not attracted. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on Ram Chunder Roy v. University of Allahabad and others (A I R 1956 All. 46) and Jogendra Raj Kishore v. University of Allahabad and others (A I R 1956 All. 503). It has been pointed out that in these cases the precise point convassed in the present instance, i.e., the question of application of the principles of natural justice in cases of punishment for indiscipline, was considered, and found to be inapplicable. In both the cases referred to above, the Division Benches concerned took the view that in matters of disciplinary action the principle of audi alteram partem has no application. These two decisions are persumably based on an observation of Lord Goddard, C. J. in the case of Ex parte : Fry ((1954) 2 All E R 118). That observation runs thus: "It seems to me impossible to say, where a Chief Officer of force which is governed by discipline, as is a fire brigade, is exercising disciplinary authority over a member of the force that he is acting judicially or quasi judicially than a School master who is exercising disciplinary powers over his pupils." In an earlier case, i.e. R. V. Metropolitan Police Commissioner Ex parte: Parker ((1953) 2 All E R 717) the learned Chief Justice had marked:‑ " where a person, whether he is a Military Officer, a police officer, or any other person whose duty it is to act in matters of discipline, is exercising disciplinary powers, it is most undesirable, in my opinion, that he should be fettered by threats of orders of certiorari and so forth, because that interferes with the free and proper exercise of the disciplinary powers which he has." These observations of Lord Goddard have not been directly considered in any case and dissented from or disapproved, and if we may say so with respect, the same, in so far as they relate to action taken for acts done in the presence of the punishing authorities, are unexceptionable. If, however, they are taken to refer also to action taken after the events on the basis of evidence collected, then we must record our respectful disagreement. In the latter class of cases, the opportunity given to the delinquent to have his say may put the authority concerned on guard and help in focussing attention on something which otherwise might have escaped notice. In the present case, the assertions on behalf of the respondents clearly indicate that the authorities, who decided this case, did not claim any direct knowledge about the acts, of which the petitioner has been found guilty. The affidavit‑in‑opposition only shows that, after the Registrar called for reports from the teachers who has been detailed on duty on the day of the Convocation, Dr. M. Ahmad, the Provost of the S. M. submitted a report in which he implicated the present petitioner. We are, therefore, to see whether in such circumstances it was necessary to follow the principles of natural justice. It has to be remembered that the principles of natural justice are nothing but principles of fair play. Mr. Pal, has strongly relied upon the case of Farid sons Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan (P L D 1961 S C 537) and contended that, as the University authorities under section 6 of the University Ordinance were called upon to determine the guilt of the petitioner objectively, it was their duty to allow the petitioner an opportunity to place his case. Learned Advocate General on the other hand, has contended that the rule of audi alteram partem has five exceptions or in his own words limitations, i.e. that it has no application (i) when the act is done in exercise of a discretionary power; (ii) where urgent or immediate action is necessary; (iii) where the act performed is administrative or ministerial in nature and the function discharged is not judicial or quasi judicial in character; (iv) when the act is done in exercise of disciplinary power; and (v) when the nature of the function rules out the principle. It is not permissible after the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Farid Sons Ltd. to argue that the principle of audi alteram partem is not applicable when the act in question is done by an Administrative Body. In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether the said principle could be invoked in relation to an order passed by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports in cancelling the Import Registration Certificate of the petitioner‑company granted under the provisions of the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1962. The petitioner‑company prayed for a writ of certiorari or some other appropriate writ from the High Court of West Pakistan on the ground inter alia that the order in question had been passed by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports without the petitioner being given an opportunity to show‑cause. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, it appears, acted on the basis of some reports which he got against the petitioner in regard to some malpractices in carrying on trade. He, therefore, cancelled the certificate of the petitioner company under clause (4) of the Order. The High Court, on a consideration of the provisions of the Order in question, came to the conclusion that there was no provision for giving a hearing under the order and therefore the petitioner could not claim that the order is bad for denying it the right of hearing. Supreme, Court, however, came to the conclusion that, regard being had to the legal provisions, the petitioner was entitled to a hearing before the impugned order was passed. It has . further been found that the nature of the act determines whether the principles of natural justice will apply and that this principle is not confined merely to judicial proceedings but extends to all proceedings by whosoever held which may affect the person or property or other right of the parties concerned in the dispute, if the act is judicial in nature. It is, therefore, clear that it cannot be argued nor has been argued by the learned Advocate‑General or Mr. Asrarul Hossain that, since the Syndicate is an Administrative Body, the action taken by it under section 6 of the University Ordinance cannot be called in question on the ground of non observance of the principles of natural justice. Their argument has been that the function performed by the Syndicate under section 6 of the University Ordinances is administrative in character. The judgment of the Supreme Court, in the case of Farid sons, makes in unambiguously clear that, if the act in question is judicial or quasi judicial in nature and not adminis trative, the principles of natural justice will apply irrespective of the character of the person or the Body performing the same. We propose to refer to this case in further details presently. While examining the various cases, to which our attention has been drawn in this connection we have found that the determination of the question, whether the act is judicial, quasi judicial or administrative, is beset with difficulties. This is more so because of the apparently conflicting decisions which have been brought to our notice in the course of the arguments advanced by the learned Advocates in this case, Munir, C. J. in the case of Tariq Transport Company (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 437) observed: "The question whether an act is judicial, quasi judicial or administrative is clouded by a confusion which it is extremely difficult to resolve and no clear‑cut distinction between these three functions can be discovered from the large number of reported cases and the divergent opinions expressed therein." Proceeding the learned Chief Justice added:‑ "In certiorari the initial question is whether the official whose action is called in question was acting under a law. If he was not, the act was that of a mere public agent and action at law and not certiorari is the remedy. If, however, a public functionary has acted in exercise of a statutory authority, then the question to be determined is whether he was the sole Judge of facts and of the necessity, expediency, advisability or reasonableness of the action to be taken. If the reply be in the affirmative, he was not acting judicially and his discretion is not liable to judicial review. But if he was under an obligation to find the facts in a judicial or specially prescribed manner, a material departure from the procedure which has adversely affected the rights of a party would render his action liable to judicial review, even if, on the facts to be so found, the action to be taken depended on his discretion." We are unable to hold that the action taken in the present case on the basis of sections 6 and 8 can be said to have been performed by the Syndicate in the exercise of its discretion. We are also not persuaded to say that the issuance of a notice upon the petitioner to show cause would have, either defeated the purpose for which action was going to be taken or jeopardised the interest of the University in any way. The next question that arises is whether the act of the Syndicate or the Discipline Board was administrative or ministerial in nature. There cannot be any doubt about the fact that the Syndicate has found the petitioner guilty of an act which is not commendable but condemnable. Cornelius, C. J. in the case of Faridsons Ltd. observed: "The incident or the action which comes under judicial enquiry must ordinarily be one which has been completed in the past so that its outlines and its content are capable of exact ascertainment on the basis of evidence, and a judgment can be pronounced thereon in the light of the relevant law." Learned Chief Justice also observed that the characteristics of a normal judicial proceeding is that it operates ex post facto. He then went on to observe that as the Chief Controller could withdraw the franchise of the petitioner‑company not in exercise of his discretion but on a finding of misconduct the act of the Chief Controller was judicial in nature. S. A. Rahman, J. on page 554 of the report has observed: "A plain reading of the provisions of the order clearly leads to the inference that the Chief Controller had to ascertain facts objectively, before he could take action adverse to the appellants in respect of their registration. Clause 7 makes this clear and it then becomes incumbent on the Chief Controller to put down the reasons for the action in writing. There may be no right in a person to obtain registration as an importer or exporter. Once having been registered however, he is enable to run a profitable business and he cannot be deprived of it unless he can be found to have committed some specific act against the provisions of clause 4 or is found guilty of supplying incorrect information under clause

5. The suspension or cancellation of a registration would be a serious matter for the importer or the exporter concerned. No licence could be granted to him for import or export henceforward and the action taken would further cause loss of prestige and reputation to him in the commercial world. This Court laid it down as rule in Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 45 that the maxim: audi alteram partem "No man shall be condemned unheard", applies to judicial as well as administrative bodies, specially where the proceedings taken may affect the person or property or other rights of the parties concerned in the dispute. Even if there fore the proceedings before the Chief Controller were neither strictly‑ judicial nor even quasi‑judicial in character, the principle of natural justice embodied in the above maxim could be called in aid by the appellants. The High Court was in error in holding that this principle was a peculiarity of English Law and could not be invoked in this country where statute Law covers the relevant field of litigation. This principle is of universal application where the statute itself prescribes no specific procedure for ascertaining the necessary facts and no express exclusion of the principle can be spelt out of the words of the statute. As Byles, J. observed in Cooper v. Wandswarth Board of Works 143 E R 414: "Although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the Common Law, will supply the omission of the Legislature." " Hamoodur Rahman, J. on page 572 of the report has observed: "In my reading of the provisions of the order the power given to the Chief Controller was coupled with the duty to exercise that discretion or power in the manner prescribed and upon the conditions therein mentioned or implied. Such authorities are bound, in my view, by the rule expressed in the maxim audi alteram partem and cannot condemn any person with consequences resulting from alleged misconduct unheard and without giving him the opportunity of making any defence. In this connection reference may also be made to another decision of this Court in the case of Chief Commis sioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 45 where this rule of justice was held not be confined merely to judicial proceedings but to extend to "all proceedings, be whomsoever held, which may affect the person or property or other right of the parties concerned in the dispute." We are of the view that the elements, which were found to be present in the exercise of the power by the Chief Controller under the Imports and Exports Controller order, are also present in the instant case. The finding of the University that the petitioner has been guilty of serious breach of discipline amounts to a finding of misconduct on the part of the petitioner, though not of the type with which the Supreme Court was concerned. This finding was arrived at ex post facto on the basis of evidence collected. In these circumstances, it is very difficult to appreciate the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents that the act in question was of an administrative or ministerial nature and therefore the principles of natural justice had no application. Learned Advocate‑General's argument that in case of disciplinary action the principles of natural justice are not attracted, is based on the two Allahabad decisions, to which reference has already been made above. On a close scrutiny of those decisions, we however have not been able to find any real reasons apart from the afore‑cited observations of Lord Goddard in support of that conclusion. The facts of the case of Ram Chandra Roy v. Allahabad University and others are that Ram Chander was rusticated from the University of Allahabad for four years for laving taken part in the disturbances committed in the Convocation Held on 3‑3‑

55. Before the order was passed the Vice‑Chancellor appointed an Enquiry Committee of which he was one of the members. The Enquiry Committee issued notice to Ram Chander to appear before the Committee. He appeared and denied the charge against him. Thereafter the Enquiry Committee recorded the evidence of a number of witnesses and then notices were issued to some students who were permitted to cross‑examine the witnesses. No such notice was sent to the petitioner and he was given no opportunity to cross‑examine the witnesses. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner claimed that he had been denied a hearing. In this connection the learned Judges observed: "We are also not convinced that there is any principle of natural justice under which a person sought to be dealt with in disciplinary proceedings can claim that he must be dealt with by the procedure applicable to judicial or quasi judicial pro ceedings. There is the further circumstance that, in this case, the petitioner's own commissions before the Enquiry Committee made it unnecessary that he should be given any opportunity to cross‑examine the witnesses. In fact, it appears that opportunity to cross‑examine the witnesses was given only to those students whose defence before the Enquiry Committee made it advisable that the evidence against them should be properly tested by cross -examination. The petitioner has himself admitted and in fact, made a grievance of the fact that the Enquiry Committee had confined itself solely to the enquiry about the disturbance and indiscipline that had taken place in the Convocation pandal of the Allahabad University. The petitioner wanted the scope of the Enquiry to be enlarged so as to include the incident which according to the petitioner, took place in the University Union building but the Enquiry Committee did not agree to it. When the petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Committee, he knew that the enquiry was confined to the incident in the convocation `panda!' and certain questions were put to him before the Enquiry Committee. The questions and the answers given, by the petitioner have been reproduced in the counter‑affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite‑parties." In the case of Jogendra Raj Kishore v. University of Allahabad and others the subject‑matter of challenge was the following order of the Vice‑Chancellor: ‑ "previous warning has had no effect. Disciplinary action is taken against him therefore; and he is hereby expelled from the University and not to be re‑admitted." In the affidavit‑in‑opposition filed on behalf of the University it was alleged that in the year 1955 it was noticed that the petitioner had joined certain students who had been rusticated on account of their activities which were considered subversive of the discipline of the University during the disturbances in September 1955, when one of them had started hunger strike. The petitioner is alleged to have been found delivering speeches against the University authorities and inciting other students by shouting indecent slogans in his speeches. The activities of the petitioner during that period made him liable for strong disciplinary action but the Vice‑Chancellor sent a letter to the father of the petitioner on 17‑10‑55 requesting him to convey to the petitioner a strong warning so that when he came back in November to the University he should show better behaviour in keeping good discipline in the University. It was further stated in the counter‑affidavit that the petitioner made a speech on the 10th November 1955, in the presence of Sri D. D. Khanna, Sri T. D. Tiwari and Sri B. M. Singh, Junior Proctors, in the course of which he made certain remarks and accusations against the Chancellor and the Vice‑Chancellor. It is in these circum stances that the Vice‑Chancellor passed the impugned order on the 11th November 1955. The learned Judges found that on the petitioner's own admission he was not, at the relevant time, a student of the University and as such had no right to maintain an application under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. Thereafter assuming that he was a student the learned Judges observed:‑ "Apart from the cases in which special provision of a Statute may obviate the necessity of hearing the aggrieved party, there is another exception to the general rule that no notice need be given when action is taken for the maintenance of discipline." Where a class teacher or the head of an educational institutions or a commander of an army in the field or an officer‑in‑charge of a fire brigade is faced with acts of indiscipline on the part of a student or examinee or a member of the force, for the purpose of maintaining order and discipline in the institution or force, his action is necessarily to be quick and immediate lest one bad example may corrupt others. In such cases, in the nature of things, immediate action may be necessary and if there is an obligation on the authority to give an opportunity to show cause, it may result in defeating the very object for which a power is given to the executive authority, and the Courts will be reluctant to interfere with the discretion, in such circumstances, exercised by the authority inflicting punishment, except in cases where it goes beyond its jurisdiction or when action has not been taken bona fide." It will thus be seen from the facts of the above two cases that it cannot be said that the students concerned did not get any opportunity to explain their position. In the instant case the assertion of the petitioner is that he had no knowledge at all of the proceedings against him and this assertion has not been controverted in the counter affidavit. In the case of Amolak Singh and others v. The Panjab University (A I R 1957 H P 31) on which the learned Advocate‑General has relied, the decision was founded more or less on the ground that as the regulations of the University did not provide for the issue of a show‑cause notice to a candidate before taking action against him in accordance with the rules of the University, it was not possible for the Court to read into the regulations something which was not there on the basis of what is called principles of natural justice. We may point out with respect that that is not a correct approach to the question. If the relevant provisions lay down any definite procedure, that undoubtedly has to be followed. In the absence of any prescribed procedure however, the principles of natural justice will apply to every judicial act unless the relevant provisions point to an exclusion or from such provisions an implied exclusion can be spelt out. During the course of the arguments in this case reference has been made to a class of cases in which also students were concerned. These cases relate to malpractices in examinations. Learned Advocate‑General has argued that these cases stand on a different footing and, therefore, the fact that in these cases the impugned orders cancelling results of examinations were held to be void for non‑observance of the principle of audi alterarn partem cannot be called in aid in the present case. According to him, since the consequences that follows the action taken in such a case are more serious in nature than in a case as the present and the decision in such a case amounts to a stigma on the character of the person concerned, such cases are different from those in which action is taken merely for breach of discipline by creating disorder during the course of a convocation or mixing with undesirable students or creating disturbance in the examination hall. Some distinction is no doubt there between cases of malpractices in examination and cases of indiscipline, pure and simple, but the question that arises is whether that distinction is such as may have any bearing on the applicability of the principle of audi alteram partem. This, as we have already observed above is a principle of fair play, and if the observance of the same leads to a better result, the mere fact that the consequences that follow from the two different kinds of actions are different cannot, we are afraid, afford a sufficient ground for its exclusion. We have given our serious considerations to the decisions, reported in A I R 1956 All. 46 and 503 as well as A I R 1957 H P 31, but could not feel convinced by the reasons given therein for holding that in cases of indiscipline the principles of natural justice can have no application. From the standpoint of urgency of action cases of indiscipline may be categorised under two heads. The first head will comprise those cases in which action is called for immediately, in the interest of maintenance of discipline and the act of indiscipline is committed in presence of the person empowered to take action. In this class of cases, issuance of a show -cause notice will be nothing more than a meaningless formality and may as such be dispensed with without any prejudice or violence to the principle of audi alteram partem. There is however the other class of cases where action is taken by the punishing authority on the basis of information or evidence collected after the offending act has ‑taken place. It is difficult to understand why in such cases notice to show cause should no be issued and how it can be said that observance of the afore mentioned principle would be subversive of discipline. In the instance case the petitioner has been expelled from the University for a period of two years and it cannot be disputed that some consequences adverse to him will automatically follow This is not one of the type of cases in which for the maintenance of discipline the school teacher just boxes the ear of a student or orders his detention for an hour or expels him from the class room for the day. In the case Ghansyam Das Gupta and others v. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P., Allahabad (A I R 1956 All. 539) the question that arose for consideration is whether the appellants were entitled to any notice before a sub‑committee of the Examination Committee, which went into the question as to the adoption of unfair means by them in the Intermediate Examination, submitted a report to the Committee, on the acceptance of which the results of the students concerned were cancelled. This matter came up before a Bench of two Judges who differed on this question though they agreed that the function of the Examination Committee was administrative in character. The case then went before Agarwala, J. who decided in favour of the appellants holding that the decision was bad as the appellants had not been heard before the order in question was passed. The learned Judge observed: "The question whether a power is judicial or quasi judicial or whether it is merely administrative has to be decided upon the language of the statute, upon the nature of the power and the consequences of its exercise upon the rights of others and the exigencies of the situation. What one has mainly to see is whether the authority con cerned has to decide a dispute between two parties one of whom may be the authority itself, or whether it has merely to take note of the dispute to inform its mind before it exercises the power conferred upon it in its discretion. If it be the former, it acts judicially or quasi judicially; if the latter, it acts merely administratively or ministerially." It may be mentioned in this connection that Agarwala, J. did not agree with the view that the function of the Examination Committee was administrative in character. He, however, proceeded on the basis of the finding arrived at by the two learned Judges who originally heard the appeal. In the course of his judgment he of course made a distinction between cases of corrupt practices in examinations and offences of indiscipline, pure and simple, and observed that in the latter class of cases no notice need be given, but this, we are inclined to think, is based on what Lord Goddard, C. J. said in the case of Ex parte: Fry, though there is no specific reference to that case. Against the decision of the Allahabad High Court in this case an appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court A I R 1962 S C 1110. The decision of the Supreme Court was not cited at the time of hearing and I am grateful to our brother Chowdhury, J. for bringing it later to our notice. In dismissing the appeal of the Board of High School and Intermediate Education. Wanchoo, J. quoted with approval the following observation of Das, J. from the decision in the case of Province of Bombay v. Khushal Das Advani (1950 S C R 621):‑ "Thus principles, as I apprehend them are: (i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi‑judicial act; and (ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially." The Rule under which action in the case of Ghanshyam Das and others was taken is worded thus:‑ "It shall be the duty of the Examination's Committee, subject to sanction and control of the Board. (1) to consider cases where examinees have concealed any fact or made a false statement in their application forms or a breach of rules and regulations to secure undue admission to an examination or used unfair means or committed fraud (including impersonation) at the examination or are guilty of a moral offence or indiscipline and to award penalty which may be one or more of the following: (1) Withdrawal of certificate of having passed the exami nation ; (2) cancellation of the examination; (3) exclusion from the examination;" In repelling the argument that the function of the Examination Committee was not judicial or quasi‑judicial, Wanchoo, J. observed:‑ "It is urged on behalf of the appellant that there are a large number of cases which come up before the Committee under rule l(1), and if the Committee is held to act judicially as a quasi judicial tribunal in the matter it will find it impossible to carry on its task. This in our opinion is no criterion for deciding whether a duty is cast to act judicially in view of all the circumstances of the case. There is no doubt in our mind that considering the totality of circumstances the Committee has to act judicially when taking action under rule 1(1). As to the manner in which it should give an opportunity to the examinee concerned to be heard, that is a matter which can be provided by ;regulations or bye‑laws if necessary. As was pointed out in Local Government Board v. Alridge 1915 A C 120 all that is required is that the other party should have an opportunity of adequately presenting his case. But what the procedure should be in detail will depend on the nature of the tribunal. There is no doubt that many of the powers of the Committee under Chapter VI are of administrative nature; but where quasi judicial duties are entrusted to an administra tive body like this it becomes a quasi judicial body for performing these duties and it can prescribe its own procedure so long as the principles of natural justice are followed and adequate opportunity of presenting his case is given to the examinee. It is not however necessary to pursue this matter further, for it is not in dispute that no opportunity whatsoever was given to the respondents in this case to give an explanation and present their case before the Committee. We are therefore of opinion that though the view of the High Court that the Committee was acting merely administratively when proceeding under rule 1 (1) is not correct, its final decision allowing the writ petition on the ground that no opportunity was given to the respondents to put forward their cases before the Committee is correct." In this case the Supreme Court approved the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in the cases of the Dipa Pal v. University of Calcutta (A I R 1952 Cal. 594) and C. Das Gupta v. Bijoyranjan Rakshit (A I R 1953 Cal. 212) where also orders passed cancelling examinations were set aside for want of notice. In the case of Ridge v. Baldwin and others (1963 W L R 935) on which the learned Advocate for the petitioner has very much relied, the House of Lords was concerned with the question whether Mr. Ridge, the Chief Constable of County Borough of Brighton, was entitled to a notice of the grounds on which the watch committee proposed to act against him and an opportunity of being heard before an order of dismissal was passed. The provision under which the watch committee acted is contained in section 191 (4) of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1882. It runs as follows:‑ "The watch Committee . . . . . may at any time suspend and . . . . . dismiss, any borough constable whom they think negligent in the discharge of his duty, or otherwise unfit for the same." Lord Reid in his speech observed:‑ "The authorities on the applicability of the principles of natural justice are in some confusion and so I find it necessary to examine this matter in some detail. The principle, audi alteram partem, goes back many centuries in out law and appears in a multitude of judgments of Judges of the highest authority. In modern times opinions have sometimes been expressed to the effect that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless. But I would regard these as tainted by the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried or nicely weighed or measured therefore it does not exist. The idea of negligence is equally insusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as fair procedure in particular circumstances and what he would regard as negligence in particular circumstances are equally capable of serving as tests in law, and natural justice as it had been interpreted in the Courts is much more definite than that. It appears to me that one reason why the authorities on natural justice have been found difficult to reconcile is that insufficient attention has been paid to the great difference between various kinds of cases in which it has been sought to apply the principle. What a minister ought to do in con sidering objections to a scheme may be very different from what a Watch Committee ought to do in considering whether to dismiss a chief constable." The case of University of Ceylon v. Fernando ((1960) 1 All E R 631) has also been cited before us. In this case Fernando, who was a student in the faculty of Science in the University, presented himself as an examinee for the final examination in Science, Section B, Zoology, for the degree of Bachelor of Science and completed the full examination in both theory and practical work. He sat for Zoology Paper V on the 4th April 1952. This paper had two sections consisting of (i) an essay, and (ii) a passage in German and a passage in French, one of which the candidate was required to translate into English with comments thereupon. Ten marks were allotted for the translation of and comments on the selected passage and ninety marks for the essay. Fernando chose the passage in German for his translation and comments, for which he was awarded eight marks. He did well in all his papers and was entitled to be placed in the first class. After the examination was over, a woman student Miss Balasingham, who had also been reading Zoology and had taken the examination at the same time as Fernando, made a report to a lecturer in the Engineering faculty, who happened to be her brother‑in‑law, alleging that the Fernando had acquired knowledge of the German passage in Zoology Paper V before the examination. The lecturer conveyed these allegations to the Vice‑Chancellor Sir Ivor Jennings. The Vice‑Chancellor took a serious view and decided that the matter called for action under clause 8 of the General Act No. 1, Chapter VIII, Part I. To assist him in satisfying himself as to the truth or falsity of the allegations the Vice‑Chancellor set up a commission of enquiry consisting of himself and a Dean of the faculty of Science and a member of the Council of the University. This body met on three occasions. Fernando attended on two of these occasions. In the course of their meetings the commission questioned in addition to Fernando himself Miss Balasingham and a number of other persons but neither Miss Balasingham nor the other persons were questioned in presence or within hearing of Fernando. The Committee found against him and thereafter the Board of Residence and Discipline accepting the report suspended him indefinitely from all University examinations. After some unsuc cessful attempts to have the order vacated Fernando filed a suit for declaration that the decision of the Board of Residence and Discipline of the University was null and void on the ground, inter alia, that the evidence of the various witnesses, who appeared before the Commission of Enquiry including the evidence of Miss Balasingham, was taken in the absence of the plaintiff and he was not aware of what evidence was led against him. The plaintiff was unsuccessful in the trial Court but his appeal before the Supreme Court of Colombo was allowed. University of Ceylon thereafter preferred an appeal to the Judicial Committee. The provisions of law, with which the Privy Council was concerned, are in the following terms: General Act No. 1, Chapter VIII, Part I, clause 8‑ "Where the Vice‑Chancellor is satisfied that any candidate for an examination has acquired knowledge of the nature or substance of any question or the content of any paper before the date and time of the examination or has attempted or conspired to obtain‑such knowledge, the Vice‑Chancellor may suspend the candidate from the examination or remove his name from any pass list, and shall report the matter to the Board of residence and Discipline for such further action as the Board may decide to take." By clause 14, "Where any matter is reported to the Board of Residence and Discipline under this Part, the Board may (i) remove the name of the candidate from any pass list; or (ii) suspend the candidate from any University examination for such period as the Board may decide or indefinitely; or (iii) order that the candidate be suspended from the University or such period as the Board may decide, or indefinitely; or (iv) do all or any of these acts." At the hearing before the Judicial Committee Mr. Dingle Foot, Q. C., who appeared for the appellant‑University, conceded that the Vice‑Chancellor's functions ‑ under clause 8 were quasi judicial and not administrative, as was found by the trial Court. He, however, submitted that even though functions of the Vice‑Chancellor were quasi judicial, the claim of natural justice in the case had been fully satisfied. In this view of the matter the Privy Council confined itself to the determination of the question whether the inquiry "was conducted with due regard to the rights accorded by the principles of natural justice to the plaintiff as the person against whom it was directed." Lord Jenkins, who delivered the opinion of the Board, observed:‑ "These rights have been defined in varying language in a large number of cases covering a wide field. Their Lordships do not propose to review these authorities at length, but would observe that the question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in any given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in point. As Tucker, L. J., said in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk: `There are, in my view, no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject‑matter that is being dealt with, and so forth': In the earlier case of General Medical Council v. Spackman Lord Atkin expressed a similar view in these words: `Some analogy exists no doubt between the various procedures of this and other not strictly judicial bodies; but I cannot think that the procedure which may be very just in deciding whether to close a school or an in sanitary house is necessarily right in deciding a charge of infamous conduct against a professional man. I would, therefore, demur to any suggestion that the words Lord Loreburn, L. C., in Board of Education v. Rice afford a complete guide to the General Medical Council in the exercise of their duties.' " With these reservations as to the utility of general definations in this branch of the Law, it appears to their Lordships that Lord Loreburn's much quoted statement in Board of Education v. Rice still affords as good a general definition as any of the nature of and limits on the requirements of natural justice in this kind of case. Its effect is conveniently stated in this passage from the speech of Viscount, Haldane, L. C. in Local Government Board v. Arlidge where he cites it with approval in the following words: "I agree with the view expressed in an analogous case by my noble and learned friend Lord Loreburn. In Board of Education v. Rice he laid down that, in disposing of a question which was the subject of an appeal to it, the Board of Education was under a duty to act in good faith, and to listen fairly to both sides, inasmuch as that was a duty which lay on every one who decided anything. But he went on to say that he did not think it was bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. The Board had no power to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses. It could, be thought, obtain, information in any way it thought best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who were parties in the controversy to correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view." From the many other citations which might be made, their Lordships would select the following succinct statement from the judgment of this Board in De Verteuil v. Knaggs: `Their Lordships are of opinion that in making such an inquiry there is, apart from special circumstances, a duty of giving to any person against whom the complaint is made a fair opportunity to make any relevant statement which he may desire to bring forward and a fair opportunity to correct or controvert any relevant statement brought forward to his prejudice.' The last general statement as to the requirements of natural justice to which their Lordships would refer is that of Harman, 1., in Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd. of which their Lordships would express their approval. The learned Judge said this: "What, then, are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind? First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly, that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and, thirdly, of course, that the Tribunal should act in good faith. I do not think that there really is anything more." Turning now to the actual terms in which the Vice‑Chancellor is invested with the quasi judicial function here in question, it is to be observed that all that clause 8 provides is that where the Vice‑Chancellor is satisfied that any candidate has acquired knowledge of the nature or substance of any question or the content of any paper before the date and time of the examination "the Vice‑Chancellor . . . shall report the matter to the Board of Residence and Discipline . . . ." The clause is silent as to the procedure to be followed by the Vice‑Chancellor in satisfying himself of the truth or falsity of a given allegation. If the clause contained any special directions in regard to the steps to be taken by the Vice‑Chancellor in the process of satisfying himself he would, of course, be bound to follow those directions. But as no special form of procedure is prescribed, it is for him to determine the procedure to be followed as he thinks best, but, to adapt to the present case the language of the judgment of this Board in De Verteuil v. Knaggs subject to the obvious implication that some form of inquiry must be made, such as will enable him fairly to determine whether he should hold himself satisfied that the charge in question has been made out. As was said by Lord Shaw of Dunformline in Local Government Boad v. Alridge of the authority there concerned it `. . . must do its best to act justly, and to reach just ends by just means. If a statute prescribes the means it must employ them. If it is left without express guidance it must still act honestly and by honest means.' In the present case, no shadow of doubt is cast on the honesty and bona fides of the Vice‑Chancellor or of those who sat with him in the Commission of Inquiry. So far as the plaintiff, is concerned, it appears to their Lordships that he must be taken to have agreed, when he became a member of the University, to be bound by the statutes of the University, including clause 8, and, in the event of clause 8 being put in operation against him, could not insist on the adoption by the Vice‑Chancellor of any particular procedure beyond what the clause expressly or by necessary implication requires. In the absence of any express requirement, he is thrown back on the necessary implication that the Vice Chancellor's procedure will be such as to satisfy the requirements indicated in the passages from De Verteuil v. Knaggs; Local Government Board v. Arlidge and Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society, Ltd. to which their Lordships have just referred, and thus to comply with those elementary and essential principles of "fairness" which must, as a matter of necessary implication, be treated as applicable in the discharge of the Vice‑Chancellor's admittedly quasi judicial functions under clause 8, or, in other words, with the principles of natural Justice." The observations of the Judicial Committee, in our view, furnish a complete guide not only as to whether in a circumstances as in the present case an aggrieved party can invoke the principles of natural justice but also .as to extent to the which it can go. This case read with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Faridsons Limited, in our view, completely establishes the claim of the petitioner that before he was found guilty of serious indiscipline he was entitled to be heard by the University authorities concerned. Learned Advocate‑General has tried to distinguish this case on two grounds. He has firstly pointed out that this case relates to misconduct in relation to examination, and, therefore, cannot be favourably compared with a case of indiscipline as the present. We have already pointed out that this distinction can have no bearing on the question of. applicability of the principles under lying the maxim audi alteram partem. Learned counsel has also tried to point out that the Privy Council did not decide the question whether the functions of the Vice‑Chancellor were quasi judicial but kept it open. It is evident that in view of the concession of the learned counsel for the University in this case it was not necessary for the Board to decide that question. Nevertheless the concession was made by no less than a lawyer of the eminence of Dingle Foot, Q. C., and accepted by a Judicial Tribunal whose decisions have always commanded universal respect. Even independently of that concession, however, we have already indicated our conclusion that having regard to the nature of the act that Dacca University was called upon to perform under section 8 of the University ordinances, it was a quasi judicial act and any inquiry that is conducted there‑into before action is taken must be conducted with due regard to the rights accorded by the principles of natural justice. Before we conclude we may again observe that cases where acts of indiscipline take place in the presence of the persons charged with maintenance of discipline and invested with powers for awarding punishment for the same stand on a footing different from that of the cases in which action is taken on the basis of evidence collected, whatever be the manner in which that may be done, as in regard to that the authorities concerned have absolute discretion. In the latter class of cases the alleged delinquents should be given an opportunity to put their version after being apprised of the accusations and the gist of the evidence in support of the same. The right of audi alteram partem in such cases, as has been pointed out by the Privy Council, does not go beyond that. It is undoubtedly for the authorities concerned to decide what further action should be taken and in what manner after the delinquents concerned are heard. In this; regard the latter have no say. The conclusion we thus arrive at is that as the petitioner was not given notice nor any oppor tunity to be heard the order is not sustainable. Mr. Asrarul Hussain has drawn our attention to the maxim nemo inauditus condemnari debet contumax (no one ought to be condemned without having heard unless he is contumacious) and has pointed out that this maxim rather than audi alteram partem applies mere appropriately to the present case. Learned counsel has further argued that as the petitioner was guilty of contempt or rather unruly behaviour during the convocation he cannot claim to be heard before the decision to expel him was taken. We are unable to accept this contention. The above mixim does not appear to have been applied in any decided case. After an anxious consideration as to import of the principle underlying the above maxim, we are inclined to construe the exception to mean that when a person does not appear, or is found to be otherwise defiant, in spite of notice issued upon him, the authority K concerned may proceed with the matter and make its decision in his absence. In this view of the matter, the above maxim has no application to the present case. Learned counsel has also referred to the decision in the case of Vice‑Chancellor, Utkal University and others v. S. K. Ghosh and others (A I R 1954 S C 217) and has submitted that in a matter like the present the Court should not interfere. We have pointed out that in view of the serious consequences that are likely to follow to the present petitioner as a result of the order of expulsion passed against him, we are unable to agree that the case does not call for this Court's intervention under Article 98 (2) of the Constitution. Reference was also made to the decisions reported in (1929) 2 K B 416 and (1954) 1 Q B 61 but the facts of those cases do not appear to have any resemblance to the facts of the present case and in that view of the matter those authorities are not relevant to the instant case before us. Regard being had to all these facts, we make the Rule absolute and declare that Notification dated the 3rd April 1964, (1) AIR 1954 SC217 issued under the signature of the Registrar of Dacca University in so far as it relates to the petitioner's expulsion from the University is void and as such is of no legal effect. We, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs. Mr. Asrarul Hossain has prayed for certificate Article 58 (2)(a) of the Constitution. The question whether the University of Dacca is a local authority is a question relating to the inter pretation of Article 98(2) of the Constitution. In that view of the matter we certify that this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. The learned counsel has further prayed for staying the operation of our order for a fortnight so that he may get an interim order from the Supreme Court. We have heard Mr. Pal in this regard and we feel that the operation of the order should be stayed till a fortnight from the receipt of the certified copy of our order. Mr. T. H. Khan who appears for the University also joins in the above prayers. SIDDIKY, J.‑I agree. SIKANDAR ALI, J-I agree. A. S. CHOWDHURY, J.‑I agree, ABU MUHAMMAD ABDULLA, J ‑I agree K. B. A. _ Petition accepted.