P L D 1956 (W (PLP)

YAQUB ALI, J.‑In March 1955, the petitioner M. Abdul Majid was elected a member of the Municipal Committee, Karor Pakka, District Multan. Subsequently, he was elected to the office of President, and a notification approving his election was published in the Punjab Gazette, dated the 14th of May 1955, under the order of the Commissioner, Multan Division. On the same date, a written complaint was made by some residents of Karor Pakka including Abdul Majid Qureshi, a local M. L. A., to the then Minister of Local Self Government, Syed Alamdar Hussain Shah Gilani, seeking that an enquiry should be held into the allegations mentioned therein against the petitioner and the notification of his election to the office of President be postponed in the mean time. It was, inter alia, alleged that although the petitioner was elected to the Municipal Committee on the Muslim League ticket, he had later on sided with' the anti‑Muslim League group in order to get himself elected to the office of the President; that the public of Karor Pakka had no confidence in him; that as a President of the Local Market Committee he had done no good for the residents of the town and all the remaining members of the Market Committee were displeased with him that he was not a peace‑loving citizen and will create friction between the different members of the Municipal Committee; that certain irregularities were com mitted in the elections; that the petitioner was responsible for creating a refugees versus locals spirit in every matter in order to serve his personal ends; that he had no property or ostensible means of living; he got some shares of income from the butchers by issuing licenses in the names of fictitious people; that he helped the dishonest employees of the Municipal Committee; and finally, that during his membership of the Municipal Committee in the past when ever any new taxation or welfare scheme was introduced, he always opposed it successfully. The Minister, without asking for a report by the local officers, marked this application to Mr. Masud‑ul‑Hasan, Inspector Local Bodies, for enquiry and report. On the 28th of June 1955, the Inspector Local Bodies, reached Karor Pakka and during his three hours' stay made a confidential enquiry as a result of which he felt convinced that the petitioner was not honest; that he lead made a ring of dishonest employees round hits to help him in his evil designs and that the municipal funds, in his opinion, could not be safe under such circumstances. He, therefore, suggested two alternatives to the Local Govern ment‑(a) The Committee should be superseded; (b) The President should be removed. If any action was to be taken as at (a), it was desirable to consult the local officers, but if the action was to be taken as at (b), two courses of action were possible, namely:‑ (i) The President be put to explanation under section 16 (The Punjab Municipal Act) and to take further action against him thereafter; (ii) The seat held by the President be vacated under section 14 (The Punjab Municipal Act) without putting him to explanation. Action under section 14 was recommended because in the opinion of the Inspector Local Bodies, all the witnesses who made statements in confidence were likely to be won over if the allegations against the petitioner were made the subject‑matter of a charge‑sheet. While forwarding this report to the Minister, Mr. Z. Azri, the then Deputy Secretary Local Self‑Government, made the following observa tions:‑ "As a matter of principle, I am opposed to taking action against the President, or for the matter of that against any Member of a duly elected Local Body, on the basis of evidence recorded in camera. It is only fair and just to allow the President to explain the allegations against him. If the witnesses are so shifty as to resile from their statements in an open Inquiry, they cannot be considered very reliable. I would, therefore, suggest that we should obtain the explanation of the President whether we want to take action under section 16 or under section 14 of the Municipal Act." On the 3rd f August 1955, the Minister overruled the recommendation of the Deputy Secretary, and acting on the report of the Inspector Local Bodies ordered that the seat of the petitioner be declared vacant under section 14 of the Municipal Act and he be further disqualified for election for a period of three years. A notification to this effect was published in the Punjab Gazette (Extraordinary) on the 12th of August 1935, and fresh election to the seat vacated by the petitioner was ordered. Aggrieved by the said order the petitioner bps applied for issue of a writ of prohibi tion, mandamus or any other appropriate writ directing the West Pakistan Government to treat the Notification, dated the 12th of August 1955, as invalid and to forbear from holding fresh election to the seat to which the petitioner had been duly elected. The grounds on which the aforesaid order has been attacked before us may be summarized as follows:‑ (1) that Abdul Majid Qureshi and Muhammad Amin Khan, M. L. As. of Karor Pakka, who were opposed to the petitioner and his party, belonged to Sir Feroze Khan Noon group which included Sayyed Alamdar Hussain Shah Gillani, the then Minister Local Self‑Government, while the petitioner and his party belonged to Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana group. At the relevant time, a great political tussle was going on between these groups as a result of which the petitioner was victimised. At the hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner amplified this "tussle" as efforts made by the rival groups for election to the Constituent Assembly which took place some time in June 1955. It was stated from the bar that the Minister Local Self‑Government was himself a candidate for election to the Constituent Assembly and the impugned order was passed in order to oblige the two local M. L. A's. of Karor Pakka who were the voters for the election to the Constituent Assembly. (2) that the manner in which the Inspector Local Bodies held the enquiry against the petitioner was unjust, unfair and opposed to the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was given no notice of the enquiry; the witnesses were supposed to have been examined in confidence and no opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed action, even his explanation was not called for. The so‑called enquiry and the order passed upon it were, therefore, mala fide and amounted to a fraud on the provisions of section 14 of the Municipal Act, which, in appropriate cases, authorises the Local Government, provided there are reasons to believe that it affects the public interest, to declare a seat field by a member of a Municipal Committee vacated. It was claimed that instead of public interest the impugned order was in fact passed in the interest of the Minister concerned. Some of these allegations are stated in the petition while others have been formulated at the hearing in the light of the statements made by Mr. Masud‑ul‑Hasan and Mr. Z. Azri before us. It may be noticed at this stage that although the averments made in the petition were sworn in the form of an affidavit by the petitioner, the respondent did not file any counter‑affidavit. The learned Assistant Advocate‑General, who appeared for the respondent, informed us that he had failed in his efforts to contact Sayyed Alamdar Hussain Shah Gillani, who is no longer the Minister, for obtaining his counter‑affidavit. Whatever be the reasons for this omission, the fact remains that the allegations made by the petitioner have not been traversed. The statements of Mr. Masud‑ul‑Hasan and Mr. Z. Azri further lend support to these allegations. It is a strange coincidence that on the very day when the election of the petitioner to the office of President was ordered to be notified by the Commissioner, Multan Division, Abdul Majid, M. L. A., presented to the Minister, Local Self‑Government, in person a complaint on which an enquiry was ordered against the petitioner. Normally, the complaint should have been sent to the Inspector Local Bodies through the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary, but it was taken personally by Abdul Majid to the official concerned. Mr. Masud‑ul‑Hasan has in vain tried to deny this fact. There is no receipt or despatch mark on the complaint showing that the office of the Minister handled it at any stage or sent it to the central circulation office in the secretariat for forwarding it to the Inspector Local Bodies. Similarly, the complaint does not appear to have been entered in the receipt diary maintained in the office of the Inspector Local Bodies which should have been done in case it was received in due course in the office and not delivered personally to the Inspector Local Bodies. The petitioner alleged that the Inspector Local Bodies was taken by Muhammad Amin Khan, M. L. A. in his own jeep to Karor Pakka to stage a mock inquiry whereas in fact no enquiry was held at all, Mr. Masud‑ul‑Hasan denied it but his statement on this point has left an impression on our minds that he has definitely departed from the truth. At first he said that he undertook the journey from Lahore to Karor Pakka by road. Then added that he travelled up to Multan by train and from there went to Karor Pakka by car. It was not a taxi car but a private jeep which a friend of his borrowed from an unknown friend and he paid Rs. 50 as fare for it. In reply to a question whether he travelled in the jeep of Mr. Muhammad Amin Khan, M. L. A., he claimed to be wholly ignorant as to who Muhammad Amin Khan was. Whether he travelled in his jeep or not is a different matter it seems difficult to believe that having paid a visit to Karor Pakka, Mr. Masud‑ul‑Hasan remained ignorant of the identity of a Local M. L. A., who, according to the petitioner, was one of the sponsors of the complaint against him. Again, he has been contradicted on a very material point by Mr. Z. Azri. There is no mention in the report made by Mr. Masud‑ul‑Hasan that he recorded the statements of any witnesses at Karor Pakka or that be had enclosed any such statements with his report while forwarding it to the Deputy Secretary. Similarly, there is no mention in the report of Mr. Z. Azri that he had seen any such statements. In his statement before us. Mr. Masud‑ul‑Hasan, however, claimed that he had recorded the statements of all the persons named in his report and submitted them along with his report to the Deputy Secretary. Since the state ments were not forthcoming, we thought it advisable to examine Mr. Z. Azri who stated that, so far as he recollected, there were no statements with the report received by him from the Inspector Local Bodies. The manner, in which Mr. Masud‑ul‑Hasan professed to have held the enquiry, was also very dubious. Firstly, he did not inform anyone including the petitioner that he was coming to Karor Pakka for holding an enquiry into the allegations made against the petitioner. He merely sent a telegram to the President that he was coming to inspect the Municipal Committee. He stayed at Karor Pakka for only three hours and wanted us to believe that during his brief stay a number of witnesses, drawn from different walks of life, appeared before him without issuing any notices to them. He said that the Secretary, who was on inimical terms with the petitioner, produced the witnesses before him in the Municipal Office. He further admitted that there was an acute party faction in Karor Pakka, but he did not care to enquire or even bear in mind if the persons, who appeared before him, belonged to the rival party of the petitioner. We are, therefore, inclined to accept the allegation made by the petitioner that in fact no enquiry was held by the Inspector Local Bodies at all. He merely visited Karor Pakka in the jeep of Mr. Muhammad Amin Khan, M. L. A., for a short while and made a report which was manifestly unjust and mala fide, firstly, because there was no record of the statements of witnesses examined by him in confidence, and, secondly, because the enquiry officer had himself confessed in the report that, if those witnesses were examined in an open enquiry, they were not likely to support the allegations made against the petitioner. An enquiry of this kind is not only opposed to the principles of natural justice but savours of ulterior motive. If, in spite of the note of the Deputy Secretary reproduced above, the Minister, Local Self‑Government, chose to act on the recom mendation of the Inspector Local Bodies and ordered action to be taken under section 14 of the Punjab Municipal Act, thereby depriving the petitioner of an opportunity to dis prove the allegations made against him, we, find considerable force in the contention that the said order was not passed in good faith. Mr. Masud‑ul‑Hasan also admitted that before he proceeded to hold the enquiry he was called by the Minister to discuss the case with him. Although, accord ing to Mr. Masud‑ul‑Hasan, what transpired at this meeting was that the Minister impressed upon him the desirability of finding out the true facts, there appears to be some force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the object of this interview was something quite different from what Mr. Masud‑ul‑Hasan deposed, because there was indeed no necessity for the Minister to call the Inspector Local Bodies to remind him of his duty to find out the truth which he was anyhow expected to do in each case. We now turn to the legal objections raised by the learned Assistant Advocate‑General to the competence of the petition for issue of a writ of certiorari and mandamus even if the allegations made by the petitioner were found to be true. He maintained that the order in question was of an adminis trative character which was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. According to his interpretation of section 14 of the Municipal Act, if the Minister, Local Self Government, was satisfied for whatever reason that the seat held by the petitioner should be declared vacated, this Court could not interfere with that order because the satisfaction of the minister was subjective and not objective. It was, however, conceded that if this Court came to the conclusion that the order of the Minister was not made in good faith, this Court had the jurisdiction to quash it by issuing a writ of certiorari. In support of their respective contentions counsel for both the parties relied upon Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani (AIR 1950 SC 222). The Assistant Advocate‑General relied upon the majority judgment (Kania C. J., Fazal Ali and Patanjali Sastri JJ.) in which it was held that when the ex ecutive authority has to form an opinion about an objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereon are alike matters of ‑an administrative character and are not amenable to the writ of certiorari. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the dissenting judgments of Mahajan and Mukherjea JJ. that when the law under which the authority is making a decision, itself requires a judicial approach, decision will be quasi‑judicial. Prescribed forms of procedure are not neces sary to make an enquiry judicial, provided in coming to the decision the well‑recognised principles of approach are required to be followed. Therefore, wherever any body of persons, having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, a writ of certiorari may issue. That was a case in which the petitioner had applied for quashing an order requisitioning certain premises under an Ordinance which authorised the Provincial Government, if in its opinion it was necessary or expedient to do so, to requisi tion any land for any public purpose. It was contended on behalf of the Provincial Government that under section 3 of the Ordinance the decision of the Provincial Government to requisition certain premises was clearly a matter of its opinion and, therefore, not liable to be tested by any objective standard. It was urged that the decision as to whether the premises were required for a public purpose was also a matter for the opinion of the Provincial Government, and not a matter for judicial investigation, and, therefore, the making of the order was in no sense a quasi‑judicial decision but an administrative or ministerial act. In arriving at the conclusion that the order requisitioning the premises in question was an administrative act Kania C. J. relied upon the following four conditions laid down by Atkin L. J. in The King v. London County Council (I) Wherever any body of persons ((1931)

2. K. B. 215) having legal authority (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects (3) having the duty to act judicially (4) act in excess of their legal authority. In the opinion of the learned Chief Justice the condition "having the duty to act judicially was not fulfilled in that case. Support for this proposition was further derived from the following passage in the judgment of Viscount Simon L. C. in the case the Rvots Gurabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (70 I A 129): "This writ does not issue to correct purely executive acts but, on the other hand, its application is not narrowly limited to inferior `Courts' in the strictest sense. Broadly speaking, it may be said that if the act done by the inferior body is a judicial act, as distinguished from being a ministerial act, certiorari will lie. The remedy, in point of principle, is derived from the superintending authority which the Sovereign's superior Courts and in particular the Court of King's Bench, possess and exercise over inferior jurisdic tions. This principle has been transplanted to other parts of King's Dominions and operates, within certain limits, in British India." In that case the Judicial Committee with reference to clause 8 of the Charter, dated the 26th of December 1800, establishing the Supreme Court of Madras found that the High Court of Madras, which, under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, was vested with the powers of the Supreme Court, had no jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari on anyone out side the Presidency Town of Madras. Dealing with the status of the Board of Revenue which had passed the impugned order, the Lord Chancellor observed that it had, at various times, discharged different functions, some of them judicial in character. In giving directions under section 172, Madras Estates Land Act, 1903, the Board of Revenue is to be considered not as a Court or the highest Court in the hierarchy of Revenue Courts, but an official body especially entrusted with particular duties of a judicial character. It may, therefore, be inferred that in case their Lordships of the Privy Council found that the High Court of Madras had the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the argument, that the Board of Revenue was not subordinate to the superior or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935, would not have prevailed. The earliest case noticed by Kania C. J. on this subject was In Regina (John M Evoy) v. Dublin Corporation ((1878) 2 L R Ir. 371) in which May C. J. at page 376 of the report after observ ing that the writ of certiorari does not lie to remove an order merely ministerial such as a warrant, but it lies to remove and adjudicate upon the validity of the acts judicial, defined judicial acts as follows:‑ "In this connection, the term 'judicial' does not necessarily mean acts of a judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for the purpose of this question a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of facts and circum stances, and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others." The learned Chief justice, then noticed the decision of Lord Atkinson in Frome United Breweries Co. Ltd. v. Bath Justices ((1926) A C 586) in which at page 602 of the report the definition of May, C. J. was approved and described as the best definition of a judicial act as distinguished from an administrative act, The definition of a judicial act was, however, held to have been more fully explained in The King v. The Electricity Commissioners ((1924) 1 K B 171) by Atkin L. J. who laid down the following test:-- "Wherever any 66dy of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling juris diction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs." The emphasis is on the words "having the duty to act judicially." Reliance was then placed on the following obser vations of Scrutton and Slesser L. L. J. in The King v, London County Council ((1931) 2 K B 215) at pp. 233 and 243 as providing slightly more detailed examination of the distinction between a judicial and ministerial or administrative act:-- Scrutton L. J. "It is not necessary that it should be a Court in the sense in which this Court is a Court; it is enough if it is exer cising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition; and it is not necessary to be strictly a Court; if it is a tribunal which has to decide rights after hearing evidence and opposition, it is amenable to the writ of certiorari." Slesser, L. J. "Wherever any body of persons (1) having legal authority (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and (3) having the duty to act judicially (4) act in excess of their legal authority a writ of certiorari may issue." Lastly, reliance was placed on Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning ((1948) A C 87) in which the question was whether the impugned order in respect of the town and country planning, undertaken under the relevant Statute on the order of the Minister following a public local inquiry tinder the provisions of the Act, was a quasi‑judicial act or a purely administrative one. Lord Thankerton pointed out that the duty was purely administrative but the act prescribed certain methods or steps in the discharge of that duty. The Minister was required to satisfy himself that it was a sound scheme before he took the serious step of issuing a draft order. For the purpose of inviting objections, and where they were not withdrawn, of having a public inquiry to be held by someone other than the respondent to whom that person reports, was for the further information of the respondent for the final consideration of the soundness of the scheme. On this analysis of the relevant provisions of the Statute the learned Lord observed:‑ "I am of opinion that no judicial duty is laid on the respondent in discharge of these statutory duties and that the only question is whether he has complied with the statutory directions to appoint a person to hold the public inquiry and to consider that person's report. Two authorities relied upon by the respondent to show that a writ will lie on the facts of that case viz., The King v. Postmaster General ((1928) 1 K B 291) and Rex v. Boycott ((1939) 2 K B 651) were dis tinguished on the ground that in the first case, a surgeon's certificate, which gave or deprived a person of right to com pensation, was considered a judicial act and, if a person had no jurisdiction to give such a certificate, a writ of certiorari was the proper remedy. A further point of distinction noticed was that in that case a procedure of inquiry was provided for and the case was under entirely different provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which, inter alia, gave a right of appeal against the I surgeon's decision. The relevant facts of that case have been set out by Mahajan J. in his dissenting judgment as follows:‑ "By the effect of section 1, sub‑section (1) (i), Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, and an order extending its pro visions to include telegraphists cramp, a post office workman obtaining the certificate of the certifying surgeon that he was suffering from that complaint and was thereby disabled, was entitled to compensation. By Section 44, sub section (3), a medical practitioner appointed by the Secretary of State was given the powers and duties of a certifying surgeon. An order made by the Secretary of State in pursuance of that sub‑section provided that so far as regards post office employees, the post office medical officer under whose charge the workman was placed shall, if authorised to act, be substituted for the certifying surgeon in cases on telegraphists' cramp. It was the practice of the post office to refer all cases of telegraphists' cramp to the Chief Medical Officer of the post office and this reference was relied on as constituting him the substitute for the certifying surgeon under the above sub‑section and order. The applicant in that case claimed compensation for telegraphists' cramp and the case was referred to the Chief Medical Officer in accordance with the usual practice. He certified that she was not suffering from telegraphists' cramp. It was the giving of this certificate that was treated in the nature of a judicial act." On the above facts Lord Hewart C. J. observed as follows :‑ "There was a moment in this case when it was argued that the document was of such a kind as not to be proper for the writ of certiorari. But I am satisfied, when I look at the part which a certificate of this nature must play in the making of any claim for compensation by a post office worker suffering from telegraphists' cramp, that the certificate of the certifying surgeon is of the nature of a judicial act, and is a fit subject for certiorari." The case Rex v. Boycott was distinguished on the ground that the opinion of the examining doctor, which had to be followed by a subsequent examination and inquiry, was con sidered subject to a writ of certiorari, because that decision directly related to the boy and was the starting point for proceeding under the Detention Act and the Mental Deficiency Act. In agreeing with Kania C. J., Fazl Ali J. laid down that an order will be a judicial or quasi‑judicial order if it was made by a Court or a judge, or by some person or authority who was legally bound or authorised to act as if he was a Court or a judge. To act as a Court or a judge necessarily involves giving an opportunity to the party who is to be affected by an order to make a representation, making some kind of enquiry, hearing and weighing evidence, if any, and considering all the facts and circumstances bearing on the merits of a controversy, before any decision affecting the rights of one or more parties is arrived at. The procedure to be followed may not be as elaborate as in a Court of Law and it may be very summary, but it must contain the essential elements of judicial procedure. Among other authorities, the learned judge relied upon the following dictum of Lord Halsbury in Mayor, etc., of Westminster v. London and North Western Ry. Co. (1905 A C. 426). "Where the Legislature has confined the power to a particular body with a discretion how it is to be used, it is beyond the power of any Court to contest that discretion. Of course, this assumes that the thing done is the thing which the Legislature has authorised." Patanjali Sastri J. merely agreed with the reasons given by Kania C. J. To the contrary, Mahajan J. found that the determination of the questions‑(1) whether the land is re quired for a public purpose ; (2) whether the land, the subject -matter of the requisition, is being used for public religious worship ; (3) whether the land which it is intended to requisi tion is being used for a purpose which the Provincial Government has specified by a notification ; and (4) whether the premises are vacant premises‑will be a judicial process. The Provincial Government will consider a proposition and an opposition; both sides of the question will have to be con sidered, i.e., the Governments point of view as well as the point of view of the person affected and the determination would only be reached on a consideration of facts and circum stances. In the opinion of Mahajan J., these were questions of fact and law which have to be determined before Govern ment forms an opinion as to the expediency or necessity of requisitioning certain premises. If the determination of these questions has to be in the infinite mind of the Government, that is, to be determined subjectively, it would amount to an administrative act but if the decision was to be based on the truth of the facts concerned, the decision was quasi‑judicial. The learned Judge then posed the question "Are these questions to be determined by the mental operations or the idiosyncrasy of the officers of Government or does their determination depend on existence of material facts?" If these questions of fact and law are to be determined objectively, then the inference was irresistible that the determina tion will be of a judicial nature. The method and manner of reaching it will be a judicial process. For the definition of the words "judicial act" Mahajan J. relied upon the definition of May C. J. in The Queen v. The Corporation of Dublin approved by Atkin L. J. in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, The King v. Postmaster General, and Rex v. Boycott After referring to the observations of Slesser L. J. in The King v. London County Council and Franklin v: Minister of Town and Country Planning Mahajan J. observed that all that can be said is that there is an indefinable, yet an appreciable, difference between the doing of an executive or administrative act and a judicial or a quasi‑judicial act. The question, however, whether an act is a purely ministerial or a judicial one depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In delivering separate judgment, Mukherjea J. dealt with the definition of a judicial act much more exhaustively and surveyed almost the entire English case law on the subject. As a result of it, he came to the conclusion that an act is not necessarily judicial because it affects the rights of subjects. Every judicial act presupposed the application of judicial process and there was well‑marked distinction between forming a personal or private opinion and determining it judicially. In the performance of an executive act a i authority has certainly to apply his mind to the materials before him; but the opinion he forms is a purely subjective matter which depends entirely on his state of mind, this being of course necessary that he acts in good faith. In a judicial proceeding, on the other hand, the process or method of application was, however, different. The learned Judge then referred to a passage at page 33 of Robson's Justice and Administrative Law defining judicial process as involving the application of a body of rules or principles by the technique of a particular psychological method and to a similar definition in Rex v. London County Council ((1931)2 KB 215.) at p. 233, as involving a proposal and an opposition, and arriving at a decision upon the same on consideration of facts and circumstances according to the rules of reason and justice. The essence of a judicial function, in the opinion of Mukherjea J., was that the decision, which the authority arrives at must not be his 'subjective'. 'personal' or 'private' opinion. It must be some thing which conforms to an objective standard or criterion laid down or recognised by law, and the soundness or other wise of the determination must be capable of being tested by the same external standard. Thus where the language of a statute indicated with sufficient clearness that the personal satisfaction of the authority on certain matters about which, he has to form an opinion founds his jurisdiction to do certain acts or make certain orders, the function should be regarded as an executive function. The decision of the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Anderson ((1942) A C 206) was considered to be the leading illustration of this type of cases. A number of cases which followed the decision in Liversidge's case were then noticed in which the decision taken or the order made by the appropriate authority was held to be of executive character. In Point of Ayr Collieries, Ltd. v. Lloyd‑George ((1943) 2 All E R 546) the order which was held immune from a writ, was made under the following ‑ provisions of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, Reg. 55(4):‑ "If it appears to the competent authority that in the interest of the public safety, the defence of the realm or the efficient prosecution of the war or for maintaining of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, it is necessary to take control on behalf of His Majesty of the whole or any part of an existing undertaking .... the competent authority may by order authorises .. In Carltona Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works ((1943) 2 All E R 560) the words used in the appropriate regulation were. "If it appears to the competent authority to be necessary or expedient so to do . " In Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country Planning ((1947) 1 All. E R 851) the Court of Appeal held that the impugned order was made by the Minister as an executive authority and he was at liberty to base his opinion on whatever he thought proper. The words "requisite" and "satisfactory" used in section 1 (1) of the Town and Country Planning Act, under which the order was made, in the opinion of the learned judges, indicated that the question was one of opinion and policy which were peculiarly for the Minister himself to decide. In Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning ((1948) A C 87), it was held by the House of Lords that in considering the report of a person who held a public enquiry after objections have been made to an order under section (1) New Towns Act, the Minister has no judicial or quasi‑judicial duty imposed on him, so that consideration of bias in the execution of such duties was altogether irrelevant, In Nakudda Ali v. M. F. De S. javaratne, (54 C W N 883 P C=PL D 1950 P C 102.) Lord Radcliffe at page 88 of the report observed that if the question whether the condition has been satisfied is to be conclusively decided by the man who wields the power the value of the intended restraint is in fact nothing In concluding the decision on this point, Mukherjea J referred to the following distinction illustrated by Lord Atkin in Liversidge's case between executive and judicial functions of an authority:‑ "If it is a condition to the exercise of powers by A that X has a right of way or Y has a broken ankle, the authority is charged with determining these facts and it must ascertain judicially whether the conditions are fulfilled or not. If, on the other hand, the condition is that the authority thinks or is of opinion that X has a right of way or Y has a broken ankle, the condition is a purely subjective condition and the act cannot be a judicial act, as the existence of the condition is incapable of being determined by a third party by application of any rule of law or procedure." Keeping in view this distinction the learned judge then proceeded to examine the language of section 3 of the relevant Ordinance under which the Province of Bombay had made the order of requisitioning certain property belonging to the respondent. Section 3 reads as follows:‑ "If in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is necessary or expedient to do so, the Provincial Government may by order in writing requisition any land for any public purpose." The language of this section was interpreted to mean that whereas the act of requisitioning land is left to the executive discretion of the Provincial Government and the latter can requisition land whenever it considers necessary or expedient to do so, certain conditions have been laid down which are conditions precedent to the exercise of the powers. The first condition is specified in the section itself and it postulates the existence of a public purpose as an essential pre‑requisite to the taking of steps by the Provincial Govern ment in the matter of requisitioning any property. Even where this condition is satisfied, there is another condition imposed by the proviso which is in the nature of an exception engrafted upon the entire section and which prevents the Provincial Government from exercising its powers at all if the land sought to be requisitioned is used for public religious worship or for any other purpose which the Provincial Government has specified in the official gazette. In the opinion of Mukherjea J. the existence of public purpose was an objective fact and not the subjective opinion of the Provincial Government because the words "public purpose" had been placed at the end of the sentence indicating that it is a thing collateral to, and not included in, the act which has been described before and which has been left to the discretion of the executive. A large number of other authorities were cited by counsel for both the parties but it is not necessary to advert to all of them except the following which have a more direct bearing on the subject under consideration. In Dipa Pal v, University of Calcutta, (A I R 1952 Cal. 594) the petitioner appeared at the examination for the degree of Bachelor of Arts of the University of Calcutta in 1951. She was satisfied with her answers to the questions on which she was examined and had reasons to believe that she would come out success fully, but when the results of the examination were published she was surprised to find that her name was not included in the list of successful candidates. The petitioner then made enquiry, which revealed that the Examination Board of the University had cancelled her examination on the ground that the petitioner could not be completely exonerated from the charge of connivance in respect of her allowing her answers to be copied. The petitioner felt aggrieved that before the decision to cancel her examination was taken she was not given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. On these facts, Bose J. held that although the Board of Examiners, brought into existence under Chapter XXV of the Regulations framed under the Indian Universities Act, was an Administrative Body but when they conducted enquiries or investigations into cases of misconduct of the candidates, they exercised quasi‑judicial functions, for they were a "body of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil conse quences to individuals." Wood v. Wood ((1853) 9 Ex. 190 at p. 196). Reliance was also placed on the following observations of Lord Radcliffe in Nakkuda Ali v. javratne (P L D 1950 P C 102) "But even in the cases of certiorari and Prohibition, the English law does not recognise any distinction for this purpose between the regularly constituted judicial tribunals and bodies which while not existing primarily for the discharge of judicial functions, yet have to act analogously to a Judge in respect of certain of their duties. The writ of certiorari has been issued to the latter since such ancient times that the power to do so has long been an integral part of the Court's jurisdiction. In truth, the only relevant criterion by English law is not the general status of the person or body of persons by whom the impugned decision is made but the nature of the process by which he or they are empowered to arrive at their decision. When it is a judicial process or a process analogous to the judicial, certiorari can be granted." Franklin v Minister of Town and country Planning was distinguished on the ground turned on the construction of the provisions of the particular Statutes which were the subject‑matter of consideration before the House of Lords and could not form a guide to the construction‑of the Regulation which was before the learned Judge or for determination of the question whether the Examination Board in deciding about the cases of malpractices adopted by the candidates concerned was under any duty to act judicially. The relevant provisions under the Regulations authorised the Board to consider all cases of breaches of discipline arising in connection with the exami nation but no detailed procedure was laid down as to how the Board will discharge this function. The learned judge then referred to Maxwell on Interpretation of statutes in which it is laid down that a Statute, conferring powers (judicial) to affect prejudicially the rights of person or property, is understood as silently implying when it does not expressly provide, the condition or qualification that before the power is exercised the person sought to be prejudi cially affected shall have an opportunity of defending himself. The following authorities in which this principle was laid down were then noticed:‑ Reg. v. Chancellor and Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge, (1 Strange 557: 93 E R 698), Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, ((1863) 143 E R 414), Dawkins v. Antrobus, ((1881) 17 Ch. 615), Hopkins v. Smethwick Local Board ((1890) 24 Q B D 712 at p. 716), Ambalal Sarabhai v. Phiroz H, Antia, (A I R 1939 Bom. 35), M. S. Ezra v. Mahendra Banerjee (51 C W N 612) and Fisher v. Keane ((1879) 11 Ch. D 353.). Some passages, which were reproduced by Bose J. from the judgments in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, Dawkins v. Antrobus and Fisher v. Keane may be set out here with advantage:‑ Byres J. in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works: "It seems to me that the Board are wrong whether they acted judicially or ministerially. I conceive they acted judicially because they had to determine the offence, and they had to apportion the punishment as well as the remedy. That being so, a long course of decisions beginning with Dr. Bentley's case and ending with some very recent cases establish that, although there are no positive words in a Statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the Legislature. The judgment of Mr. Justice Fortescue in Dr. Bentley's case, is somewhat quaint but it is very applicable, and has been the law from that time to the present, He says, `The objection for want of notice can never be got over. The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man, upon such an occasion, that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. Adam (says God) `Where art thou? Has thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? And the same question was put to Eve also . . . . There has been neither notice of the one sort nor of the other; and it seems to me, therefore, that whether the Board acted judicially or ministerially they have acted against the whole current of authorities, and have omitted to do that which justice requires and contra vened the words of the Statute." Brett L. J. in Dawkins v. Antrobus: "In my opinion there is some danger that the Courts will undertake to act as courts of appeal against the decisions of members of clubs whereas the Court has no right to sit in appeal upon them at all. The only question which a court can properly consider is whether the members of the club, under such circumstances have acted ultra vires or not and it seems to me the only questions which a cour can properly entertain for that purpose are whether anything has been done which is contrary to natural justice, although it is within the rules of a club in other words whether the rules of the club are contrary to natural justice; etc . . .(at page 631) . . . . The first thing then is whether there was anything contrary to natural justice. If a decision was come to depriving a gentleman of his position on such a charge as must be made out here, namely that he has been guilty of conduct injurious to the character and interests of the club, in my opinion there would be a denial of natural justice if a decision was come to without his having an opportunity of being heard." Master of the Rolls Jessel M R. in Fisher v. Keane: "They ought not, as I understand it, according to the ordinary rules by which justice should be administered by Committees of Clubs or by any other body of persons who decide upon the conduct of others, to blast a man's reputa tion for ever perhaps to ruin his prospects for life, without giving him an opportunity of either defending or palliating his conduct. In my opinion upon this ground also the Committee has not acted properly or fairly." The counsel for the University of Calcutta also raised a point that whatever may be said with regard to the decision of the Board of Examiners the confirmation of their decision by the Syndicate was at any rate an executive act and so no certiorari would lie to quash the order of the Syndicate. In discarding this argument, Bose J. observed that assuming that the act of confirmation of the Syndicate was in the nature of an executive act the mere confirmation could not legalise the proceedings of the Board of Examiners which were conducted in violation of the requirements of the Statute or in other words in breach of their duty to follow the principles of natural justice. Both the decision and its confirmation remained tainted with illegality. In Dr. Mukand Lai v. The Municipal Committee, Simla (A I R 1953 Ph. 88) the applicant was appointed in 1941 on a permanent post of a Medical Officer of the Simla Municipality. In 1952 his services were terminated on payment of one month's wages in lieu of notice. The action taken against him was for the alleged misconduct but no charge was framed against the applicant and he was not given an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken. Dealing with the argument that under section 45 (1) of the Municipal Act it was not necessary to issue any notice to the petitioner before he was discharged from service and there was no rule to that effect, Kapur J. observed that even in the absence of any rules, the principal of natural justice should come into play i.e., the maxim 'audi alteram partem‑no man shall be condemned unheard‑would be applicable. Reliance was placed on Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works and a long line of cases which followed it wherein it was held that although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the Legislature. If the petitioner was to be discharged which in that case really meant removal from service for an alleged misconduct, he should in all fairness have been given an opportunity to clear his character. In Bhikulal Balbhadrasao v. The State of Madhya Paradesh and another, (A I R 1953 Nagpur 125) it was held that although there was no provision in the Act, a member of the Municipal Committee should be given hearing before passing final order of his removal; merely asking for explanation was considered not the same thing as giving him opportunity to show cause. The contention raised on behalf of the State that the impugned order was administrative and had been given finality by sub- clause (2) of section 22 of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act and the Court could not interfere under section 226 of the Constitution of India was negative on the ground that the mere fact that the order was administrative or that it was given finality should not stand in the way of the petitioner because the powers conferred on that Court by Article 226 were wide enough to enable interference in proper cases. In M. S. Avadhani v. State of Mysore and others (A I R 1954 Mysore 18), the petitioner who was elected to the Town Municipal Council, Hiriyur, and was duly elected as President of that Council was removed from the office by the Minister of Public Health and Local Self‑Government holding that the petitioner being less than 25 years of age stood disqualified from being elected. That order purported to have been passed under section 14 (1) (A) (e), Mysore Town Municipalities Act. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the order could not be quashed because the Government or its Minister in making that order did not act in judicial or quasi‑judicial capacity. The contention was repelled by placing reliance on an earlier Full Bench authority of that Court Sampu Gowda v. State of Mysore (A I R 1953 Mysore 156) in which it was held that the High Court had power to interfere in the cases of even sc called administrative orders which were made in defiance of the articles of Constitution or the mandatory provisions of law and without any jurisdiction. It was observed that where orders are passed or action is taken under a statute or an Act of the Legislature by a Court or tribunal which is vested with the power to take and enforce decisions regarding the rights between rival parties who appear before the tribunal or between them and the State, then proceedings, orders and action cannot be said to be executive. In Rameshwar Prasad Kedarnath v. The District Magistrate and others (A I R 1954 All. 144) the Licensing Authorities without hearing the applicant refused to issue a licence under clause 11 of the U. P. Controlled Cotton Cloth and Yarn Dealers Licensing Order (1948) to do business, without giving him an opportunity to be heard. It was held that a man must not be deprived of his property without being given an opportunity of being heard. The loss of a man's right to carry on his business may be no less serious in its consequences than the loss of his property; and under the Constitution the right to hold property and the right to carry on a business are equally fundamental rights possessed by every citizen. If there be authority founded upon the plainest principles of justice that (in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary) a man be not deprived of his property without being heard there is no reason why that principle should not be applied to the protection of another fundamental right, namely, the right to carry on business. The learned Assistant Advocate‑General tried to distinguish this case on the ground that the right to the issue of writ was based upon Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India, but on what ground the right was founded is wholly immaterial. The question that fell for decision in that case was whether the order was amenable to a writ of certiorari or not. The learned judges found that irrespective of the question whether the order could be classed as falling within the category of certiorari or not if the order had been influenced by extraneous consideration that Court had ample authority under Article 226 of the Constituti6n to interfere with it by a proper order or direction. The words of Article 226 of the Constitution were wide enough to cover an order of that description. It may be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution of India is couched in the same language as Article 170 of the Constitution of Pakistan. In coming to this conclusion, Sapru J. relied upon the following observation, in Manohar Ramkrishna v. G. G. Desai (A I R 1951 Nag. 33). "It is difficult to appreciate Shri Naik's argument that 'Directions, orders or writs' can issue only in the circum stances in which the writs named specifically can issue because that argument, if accepted, would so restrict the meaning of the words 'directions, orders or writs' as to render them otiose. It is commonplace that effect must be given to every provision of a statute and that no word should be regarded as a surplusage unless that would lead to an absurdity. No absurdity results because of the con struction we place on this article." "It would, therefore, not, in our opinion, be right to read limitations in the wide powers conferred by the general words used therein merely because these words are followed by some specific words which cannot a restricted power, more so when the article provides that the power conferred by the specific words is included in that conferred by the general words. The contention, therefore, that our powers are limited to the issuing of the specific writs only must fail." In Hari Vishnu Kamath v, Ahmad Ishaque and others (AIR1955SC 233: PLD1956SC (Ind.)1) Venkatarama Ayyar J. relying on some earlier decisions of that Court viz Parry & Co. v. Commercial Employees Associa tion, Madras (AIR 1952SC179) Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. (AIR1952 SC 192) Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi (A I R 1952 S C 319) and T. C. Basappa v. 2'. Nagappa, (A I R 1954 S C 440) laid down the following propositions as established:‑ (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the principal that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject‑matter has jurisdic tion to decide wrong as well as right. The remaining authorities on which the learned Assistant Advocate‑General relied are distinguishable on the ground that the decision in each one of these cases proceeded on the finding that under the relevant provision of law the doing of an act was left entirely to the discretion of the authority concerned as a purely subjective matter so that the act was entirely discretionary and facultative and if that authority acting in good faith applied its mind to the matter and formed its opinion and acted on such opinion it was not for the Courts to enquire into the validity of such actor opinion or the sufficiency or otherwise of the material on which it was based. In Wijeyesekara v. Festing (AIR 1919 PC 155) sections 4 and 6 of the Ceylon Ordinance No. 3 of 1876 provided that whenever it shall appear to the Governor that land in any locality is likely to be needed for any public purpose, it shall be lawful for the Governor to direct the Surveyor General .to examine such land and report whether the same is fitted for such purpose .And upon the receipt of such report it shall be lawful for the Governor to take order for the acquisition of the land. The relevant words are "whenever it shall appear to the Governor." In Muhammad Hayat v. The Crown (PLD 1951 FC15) the learned judges of the Federal Court dealt with the provisions of section 3 (1) of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, which authorised the Government, the District Magistrate or any servant of the ..Crown " if satisfied" with respect to any particular person .to arrest such person without warrant. While interpreting this provision of the Punjab Public Safety Act, Sir Abdul Rashid C. J. observed: ".... ....that the words 'if satisfied' are not preceded by any qualifying adverb, such as, 'reasonably'. It is the satisfaction of the arresting officer that forms the basis of the arrest of the detenue. The legislature has omitted the words 'reasonably' which would have enabled Courts of law to examine the sufficiency of the reasons for the satisfaction of the arresting authority." The decision in The Queen on the prosecution of George May, Clerk v. The Governors of the Darlington Free Grammar School ((1845)33 L J R Q B 67) is rested on the Letters Patent which expressly gave the governors of the school the power of nominating from time to time, a master of the said school, so often as to them or their successors, or the major part, occasion them moving thereto, should appear meet and of the removing of the same master from the said school, according to their sound discretion. In Kona Thimma Reedi v. The Secretary of State (781 C91) the plaintiff appellant contended that the order of the Government canceling his election to the Gooty Taluk Bard was ultra vices and illegal on the ground that the rules under which the Government purported to act were ultra vires and that he was not given an opportunity of showing cause against the allegations made by the rival candidate. After finding that the relevant rules were antra vices of the Madras Local Board Act, it was held that no enquiry was necessary before making the order of cancellation of the plaintiff's election. The question whether the Government in making the impugned order was acting judicially and therefore should have given an opportunity to the plaintiff to show cause against the proposed action, was not raised in that case. In re: Banwarilal Roy and others, (5 1 Rule 51 F (6) of the Defence of India Rules was interpreted as not involving the doing of any judicial or quasi‑judicial act as distinguished from an administrative or executive act. The relevant words used in the Rule are: "If the. appropriate Government is of opinion that any local authority has failed to comply, or has delayed in complying with any order made under sub‑rule (3) the appropriate Government may by order supersede the local authority . . . ." The decision in New Goal Cloth Market Union Layallpur v. Municipal Committee Layallpur (P L D 1955 Lah.149) which concerned itself with the interpretation of old section 223‑A of the Govern ment of India Act has no bearing on the facts of this case, because much wider powers have now been conferred on this Court under section 170 of the Constitution Act to issue directions, orders and various writs enumerated therein. In Haji Mehrban Ahmad v. Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division and others (P L D 1955 Lah. 263), a writ of prohibition was refused on the ground that the approval, which the Commissioner had to accord to an election of a member under the Punjab Municipal Act, did not partake of the nature of a judicial or a quasi‑judicial act, The claim of the petitioner in that case was founded on the objection that under rule 5 of the Municipal Election Rules, 1952, it was for the Deputy Com missioner of the district or any gazetted officer appointed by him in this behalf, to fix, at 48 hours' notice a date for the first meeting of the newly constituted committee so that the members elected may take the oath of al legiance and the president and the vice‑president or vice -presidents of the committee may be elected. The Deputy Commissioner, Jhelum, nominated the Additional District Magistrate, Jhelum, to perform the functions contemplated in that rule. Accordingly, the Additional District Magistrate fixed the 22nd of October 1954 as the date for the first meeting of the committee and this fact was duly notified to all concerned. It was alleged that the Provincial Govern ment quite illegally interfered twice with the discretion vesting in the Additional District Magistrate and ordered him to postpone the meeting at first to a date to be fixed after a fortnight from the 22nd of October and then to accelerate it to the 26th of October 1954. The petitioner claimed that the action of the Government had prejudiced his chances of success in the election as president of the committee. In the opinion of the learned judges, section 237 of the Punjab Municipal Act which provided that the Provincial Government shall have the power of reversing or modifying any order of any officer of the Provincial Government passed or purporting to have been passed under the Act, was a complete answer to the objection raised by the petitioner. We will now turn to a recent authority of this Court Diavan Ziaul Haq and others v. the Government of West Pakistan (P L D 1956 (W. P.) Lah. 358) in which it was held that a writ of certiorari will lie to quash an order of supersession of a Municipal Com mittee under section 238 of the Municipal Act Section 238 reads as follows:‑ "(1) Should a committee be incompetent to perform, or persistently make default in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under this or any other Act, or exceed or abuse its powers the local Government may, by notifica tion, in which the reasons for so doing shall be stated, declare the committee to be superseded. (2) * * * * * * (3) * * * * * * Although one of the objections raised to the validity of the impugned order made by the Divisional Commissioner was that the West Pakistan (Adaptation of Laws) Order, 1955, where by the words "Provincial Government" in section 238 were replaced by the word "Commissioner" was ultra vices, our learned brother Kayani J. at first proceeded to ascertain whether the matter before the Bench was amenable to the writ jurisdiction. After referring to the definition of "judicial act" by May C. J. in Queen v. Corporation of Dublin reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment and the following passage from the judgment of Lord Fletcher Moulton L. J. in Rex v. Woodhouse. ((1906) 2 K B 501) "The term 'judicial act' is used in contrast with purely ministerial acts. To these letters the process of certiorari does not apply, as for instance to the issue of a warrant to enforce a rate, even though the rate is one which could itself be questioned by certiorari. In short, there must be the exercise of some right or duty in order to provide scope for a writ of certiorari at common law." the learned Judge observed as follows:‑ "English cases abundantly show that the judges have 'provided scope' in all possible matters requiring adjudica tion of some sort, where rights and duties are affected, and that they have narrowed down the ample girth of adminis trative functions to purely ministerial acts. In the words of Mahajan J. Province of Bombay v. Advani (A I R 1950) S. C. 621 at p. 658 ) the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari 'varies according to the foot of the Chancellor'. We would say with respect that it varies with the foot of the High Court which grows in length with the growing conferment of quasi‑judicial functions on administrative bodies". Some instances of the exercise of the power to issue writs mentioned in Halsbury's laws of England (III Edition, Vol II page 58) were then noticed and it was held that when a Commissioner or Provincial Government consider the evidence of in competency or mal administration against a Committee and decide that it is not fit to function, that it should cease to exist for the time being, that the members thereof should vacate their seats, that the elected representatives of the municipal area concerned should be superseded by an administration of the Government's choice, they perform judicial acts to which the writ of certiorari extends. The principles enunciated in all the authorities noted above may be stated thus (1) A writ will not lie to remove a ministerial or adminis trative act provided always that it has been made in good faith. Enactments which confer powers are so construed as to meet all attempts to abuse them, either by exercis ing them in cases not intended by statute, or by refus ing to exercise them when the occasion for their exercise has arisen. Though the act done was ostensibly in execution of the statutory power and within its letter, it would nevertheless be held not to come within the power if done otherwise than honestly and in the spirit of the enactment. Where, as in a multitude of Acts, something is left to be done according to the discretion of authority on whom the power of doing it is conferred, the discretion must be exercised honestly and in the spirit of the statute, otherwise the act done would not fall within the statute. 'According to his discretion' means, it has been said, according to the rules of reason and justice, not private opinion; according to law and not humour; it is to be, not arbitrary vague and fanciful, but legal and regular; to be exercised, not cap riciously, but on judicial grounds and for substantial reasons. And it must be exercised within the limits to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself, that is, within the limit and for the objections intended by Legislature. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Ninth Edition, pages 129‑130). (2) A writ of certiorari will lie to remove a judicial or quasi‑judicial act if in making an order or arriving at a decision the principles of natural justice or other well recognised principles governing judicial functions are disregarded. In determining whether an act is purely administrative or judicial the proper test is whether the relevant provisions of law authorise the authority concerned to form a subjective opinion as to the existence of certain facts and conditions as pre‑requisite to the making of an order or that the existence of those conditions and facts is a pre‑requisite to the making of an order by the authority concerned. In the former case, the act will be administra tive or ministerial and in the latter case, judicial or quasi judicial. (3) In giving judicial powers to affect prejudicially the rights of person or property, a statute is understood as silently implying, when it does not expressly provide, the condition or qualification that the power is to be exercised in accordance with the fundamental rules of judicial procedure, such, for instance, as that which requires that, before its exercise the person sought to be prejudicially affected shall have an opportunity of defending himself. (Maxwell on Interpretation of statutes, Ninth Edition, page 368). (4) In the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it under section 170 of the Constitution, this Court does not act as a Court of appeal against findings of factor law arrived at by a competent authority for if a competent authority acts within the limits of its jurisdiction, it cant decide right as well as wrong. (5) The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 170 of the Constitution is not confined to the issue of writs enumerated therein. It has much wider powers to issue directions' and 'orders' in appropriate cases to any authority, person or Government if the ends of justice so require. In the light of the principles and rules stated above, we will now proceed to examine the language of section 14 of the Punjab Municipal Act to determine the true character of the order made by Minister, Local Self‑Government, whereby the petitioner has been removed from the office of the President, his seat as a Member of the Karor Pakka Municipal Committee has been declared vacated and he ha,, been further disqualified for election for a period of three years. Section 14 reads as follows: "Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing sections of this chapter, the Provincial Government may, at any time, for any reason which it may deem to affect the public interests, or at the request of a majority of the electors, by notification, direct: (a) that the number of seats on any committee shall be increased or reduced; (b) that, any places on a committee which are required to be filled by election shall be filled by appointment, it a sufficient number of members has not been elected; (c) that a seat on any committee which is then filled by election shall thence forth, when vacant, be filled by appointment; (d) that a seat‑on any committee then filled by appoint ment shall thenceforth, when vacant, be filled by election. (e) that the seat, of any specified member, whether elected or appointed, shall be vacated on a given date, and in such case, such seat shall be vacated accordingly, not withstanding anything in this Act or in the rules made thereunder. The words which require consideration are "for any reason which it may deem to affect the public interest". It is obvious that the sufficiency of reasons has been left to the subjective opinion of the Government. The words it may deem" vouchsafe this result. But the question that arises for determination is whether the determination of reasons for that belief is also a subjective process which need not satisfy he test of an external standard. In our opinion, the word "any" is used to express the intention that Government alone is the final judge of the sufficiency of reasons but the insertion of the word "reason" in this clause enjoins on the Govern ment that no order can be made tinder this section unless I' it is supported by reasons. On that view, the Courts of law will have the jurisdiction to look into the reasonableness of such an order and the act of the authority concerned in making that order will be quasi‑judicial in nature. If that were not so, the Government may order the seat of a duly elected member to be vacated on the ground that ever since his election it has not rained within the limits of the Munici pality concerned and that it is in public interest to remove him from his office. Such indeed could not have been the intention of the Legislature, otherwise the word "reason" would not have been used at all in section

14. It could have been said for instance "whenever it appears to the Govern ment to affect the public interests" or "if in the opinion of the Government it affects the public interests" or "if the Govern ment is satisfied that it affects the public interests" so on and so forth. Having come to the conclusion that an order made by the Government under section 14 of the Punjab Municipal Act is liable to be removed by this Court by a writ of certiorari, the next question that falls for decision is whether on the facts reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment the petitioner has made out a good case for invoking our jurisdiction under Article 170 of the Constitution. It has been noticed that apart from the dubious nature of the so‑called enquiry held by the Inspector Local Bodies, the petitioner was given no opportunity to disprove the allegations on the basis of which the impugned order was made; witnesses were examined in confidence the record of their depositions was not forthcoming, indeed for all that we know no such record was ever prepared, the witnesses were not prepared to support the allegations against the petitioner in an open enquiry and last but not the least the petitioner was neither informed about the charges nor asked to give an explanation in his defence. It is true that no rules of procedure are provided in section 14 nor there is any mention of an enquiry in it but this omission is made up by the principles of natural justice and the maxim audi alteram partem and implied duty to act judicially in cases of this nature; Reg v. Chancellor and Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge, Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, Dawkins v. Antrobus. Hopkins v. Smethwick Local Board, Amball Sarabhai v. Phiroz H. Antia M. S. Ezra v. Mahendra Banerjee and Fisher v. Keane. Viewed in the light of our interpretation of section 14 of the Punjab Municipal Act and the various principles discussed above., we have no hesitation in quashing the impugned order as unwarranted by law and direct the issue of following writs to the respondent:‑ (1) A writ of certiorari quashing the order dated the 3rd of August ' 1955 by the Minister Local Self‑Government declaring the petitioner's seat as member of the Municipal Committee, Karor Pakka, vacated from the date specified in Notification No. 7259‑B &C‑55/47842 dated the 12th of August 1955, Gazette (Extraordinary) Punjab Government. (2) A writ of mandamus directing the respondent to forbear from holding fresh election to the seat to which the petitioner has already been duly elected vide Punjab Government Notification No. 725‑85/147 dated the 3rd of March 1955. We further direct that the respondent shall pay Rs. 500 as costs of the proceedings to the petitioner. Before parting with the facts of this case, we would like to point out to the Government that it augurs ill for the future of democracy in this country and all attempts to purify the system of elections to the Provincial and National Assemblies are bound to remain infructuous if the Provincial Governments under the cloak of its statutory autho rity frequently interfere with elections to Municipal Committees and District Boards. It cannot be denied that since partition there has been too frequent interference by the Provincial Governments in these elections and more often than not at the instance of aggrieved rival parties, Law has conferred on every candidate and elector a right to con test an election by means of an election petition, which is a judicial process. Therefore, except in very rare and few cases, exercise of executive authority by the Provincial Government to come to the help of an aggrieved party is bound to create suspicion and lack of faith in the whole system of elections and parliamentary form of Government. A. H. Writs issued.