P L D 1988 Lahore 191 (PLP)

This judgment will dispose of hereinafter enumerated bunch of writ petitions since there is commonality of the impugned orders and the legal propositions emanating therefrom:‑ Writ Petitions Nos: 1230, 1081, 1136, 1174, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1189, 1190, 1195, 1196, 1197, 1198, 11S9, 1200, 1203, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1210, 1218, 1223, 1228, 1233, 1241, 1244, 1253, 1255, 1256, 1288, 1299, 1304, 1320, 1208, 1213, 1215, 1217, 1220, 1225, 1231, 1232, 1278, 1279, 1295, 1704, 1644, 1194, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1393, 1426 and 1818 of 1987.

2. To epitomise succinctly the facts, out of which these writ petitions have emerged, are that the University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore (hereinafter referred to as the University) under the signatures of its Deputy Registrar (S & S) flashed pregnantly prominent advertisements in various national dailies, both English and Urdu, including The Pakistan Times, Nawa‑i‑Waqt and Jang, Lahore, in their issues of 7th January, 1987, 6th January, 1987 and 8th January, 1987 respectively, inviting applications for admission in different departments of the University for its academic session 1986‑87, for three categories, viz. Industrial seats (for the nominees of approved Industries), Overseas Pakistanis seats and Special seats. The advertisement concerning Industrial seats, inter alia in its para. 7 stipulated the following relevant factors to be considered for inter se merit of the nominating industries:‑ (a) impact of the nominating industry on the national economy, (b) coordination between the nominating industry and the University on training, joint research and employment opportunities, (c) absorption of nominee in the employment of the nominating industry, (d) contributions, grants and scholarships and other financial issues of assistance rendered by the nominating industry in the Faculty or Department of the University. On the above basis, though. initially the number of industrial seats advertised were 9, but the candidates approved for admission were 36 and were accordingly admitted. Likewise, in the Overseas Pakistanis category, though the initial number of seats advertised were 9 but the number of candidates approved for admission were 12, out of which actually only five joined the University; whereas in the category of special seats 12 persons were admitted. It is an uncontroverted and admitted fact that petitioners in adherence to the prescribed procedure, submitted applications, through proper channel and, accordingly were admitted to the rolls of the University, provisionally. Admissions were granted subject to the condition embodied in the Provisional admission granting letter, (apart from financial obligations) viz. verification of original degrees/certificates/diplomas from the awarding authorities. It was specified that in case documents submitted by a candidate were found to be false/fake or fabricated, he shall be expelled from the University and all the dues paid by him shall be forfeited, in addition to certain other actions which he may render himself liable to. Upon payment of all the prescribed dues, formal admission certificates were issued by the Deputy Registrar (S & S) on behalf of the University eventually precipitating into issuance of roll numbers; consequently, all the petitioners joined the classes; save, for petitioners in writ petitions Nos. 1644, 1393 and 1426 of 1987 to whom despite the fact that admission was granted provisionally, but were not allowed to deposit their fees, resultantly were precluded from joining the classes.

3. At this juncture, without going into factual controversy, lest the matter be politicised, it suffices to mention that certain section of the student community demonstrated resentment towards these admissions, which is manifested from some of the newspaper cuttings appended with the writ petition.

4. The Vice‑Chancellor of the University, without taking into confidence reason thereof, vide office order No.37, dated 4‑3‑1987, in the purported exercise of powers envisaged in section 14(3) of the University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore Act 1974 (Punjab Act V of 1974) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) cancelled admissions of industrial seats, Overseas Pakistanis seats and nominees of all categories of Punjab (with marks below 60%). This order also included an inscription that the action of the Vice‑Chancellor would be placed before the Syndicate for approval/ modification in its special meeting convened for 11‑3‑1987. Subsequently, the Vice‑Chancellor by virtue of office order No.39, dated 5‑3‑1987 (though styled as clarification to the afore-referred office order) also cancelled all admissions made by him under section 14(3) of the Act. It was further stated therein that this order shall also be put up to the Syndicate for perusal and decision. The Syndicate meeting was held on 11‑3‑1987, under the chairmanship of the Vice‑Chancellor, wherein the action taken by the Vice‑Chancellor was approved. This approval was notified vide notification No.ST/DE/1409 dated 14‑3‑1987, the relevant extract from the text thereof is reproduced here in below:‑ The Vice‑Chancellor placed before the Syndicate his Office orders relating to the cancellation of admissions of students against industrial, overseas Pakistanis seats and admissions made by him.

3. These admissions made by the University, therefore, remain cancelled. " The petitioners feeling aggrieved, have questioned vires of the office orders Nos. 37 and 39 of the Vice‑Chancellor and their subsequent approval by the Syndicate in these proceedings.

5. During the course of pre‑admission hearing report and parawise comments were called for from the respondents; and, for the interregnum ad interim injunction was granted allowing petitioners to continue their classes; save, for three petitioners mentioned above. Respondents submitted their reports and parawise comments, which were bare skeleton, sketchy and telegraphic both in form and substance. Not a solitary averment was iterated pertaining to the admissions or powers pursuant to which the same were granted or the authority under whose sanction and approval these were made. However, concerning cancellation the stance adopted by the respondents was that the impugned orders were passed in pursuance to and in exercise of powers under section 14(3) of the Act. Thereafter writ petitions were admitted to regular hearing. Mr. Sajjad Hussain, learned counsel for the respondents despite of the option available to him, stated at the Bar that parawise comments referred to above, be treated as written statements. Thus, pleadings between the parties were concluded.

6. In pursuance of a direction from the Bench, learned Advocate -General and learned Additional Advocate‑General, had put in appearance to put forth the Chancellor's and the Government's point of view, if any.

7. All the learned counsel for the petitioners addressed their arguments; and, save, for any insignificant point, the consensus of submissions advanced were: (i) that the impugned orders could not have beep passed in the purported exercise of powers under section 14(3) of the Act, because of non‑existence of the condition precedent, viz. emergency. (ii) That power to recall, rescind or cancel, admission under the principle of locus poenitentiae or by invocation of section 20 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956, was not available to the Vice‑Chancellor, since a decisive step had already been taken, action stood completed, thus it was a past and closed transaction whereby vested rights had accrued to the petitioners. (iii) That the impugned orders have been passed in colourable exercise of power for extraneous considerations. (iv) That the power of the Syndicate, as enshrined in section 24 of the Act, does not contemplate power to pass the impugned order. ' (v) That the Syndicate while approving the impugned orders of the Vice‑Chancellor was not competently constituted under the law, in that the Vice‑Chancellor whose orders were sought to be approved of not only participated in the meeting as a member but also acted as its Chairman. (vi) That the grant of admissions to the University is the concern of the Academic Council and the Syndicate is wholly an alien body; thus, the impugned orders and their subsequent approval suffers from lack of jurisdiction, hence is coram non judice. (vii) That the petitioners have been condemned unheard.

8. Whereas the learned counsel for respondents raised the following contentions: Firstly, that the petitioners were granted admission by the Vice‑Chancellor in exercise of powers conferred under section 14(3) of the Act, which lacked approval of the Syndicate, hence was a void order, thus, did not confer any right on the petitioners. Secondly, since the admission granting order was void ab initio, therefore, it has been lawfully cancelled within the meaning of the principle of locus poenitentiae. Thirdly, since, petitioners did not object to the validity of exercise of emergency powers by the Vice‑Chancellor at the time of grant of the admissions; therefore, they cannot now object to the exercise of the same power whereby their admissions have been cancelled.

9. The learned Advocate‑General made the following submissions in support of the impugned orders: (i) That the admissions granted to the petitioners by the Vice- Chancellor were in contravention of the Government policy requiring admissions to 'the academic institutions strictly on merits, thus, had caused injustice and unfairness. (ii) That the power to grant admission is only vested in the Academic Council, and the Vice‑Chancellor had no jurisdiction in this matter; therefore, order of the Vice‑Chancellor granting admission to the petitioners in pursuance to powers conferred under section 14(3) of the Act was, ab initio void and a nullity iri the eye of law, due to inherent lack of jurisdiction, therefore, it did not create any rights in favour of the petitioners, and has lawfully been recalled under the principles of locus poenitentiae. (iii) That power exercised by the Vice‑Chancellor under section 14(3) of the Act, granting admission, required two conditions to be complied with, one in the form of condition precedent i.e. emergency, and the second in the form of condition subsequent, i.e. approval of the Academic Council, and both were lacking. (iv) Lastly, since the admissions were granted illegally, therefore, no writ merits to be issued to perpetuate the illegality.

10. Before adverting to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to examine the relevant provisions of the Act, with a view to ascertaining the competency and sphere of activity of the respective authorities within the framework of the scheme of the Act. Section 2 of the Act is the definition section, and inter alia defines the relevant authorities:‑ (a) "Academic Council" means the Academic Council of the University (e) "Chancellor" means the Chancellor of the University;' (u) "Syndicate" means the Syndicate of the University; (z) "Vice‑Chancellor" means the Vice‑Chancellor of the University. Section 3(2), defines University, which shall consist of the Chancellor, the Pro‑Chancellor, the Vice‑Chancellor and the Members of the Senate, the Syndicate and the Academic Council; and section 3(3) lays down that the University shall be a body corporate. Section 10 deals with the Chancellor, in particular section 10(3) and section 10‑A prescribe Chancellor's overriding powers of annulment and revisional jurisdiction, which read as under:‑ "10(3) If the Chancellor is satisfied that the proceedings of any authority are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the Statutes, the Regulations, or the Rules, he may, after calling upon such Authority to show cause why such proceedings should not be annulled, by order in writing, annul the proceedings." "10‑A. The Chancellor may, of his own motion or otherwise, call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an order has been passed by any Authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding or order and may pass such orders as he may deem fit." Section 14 deals with the powers and duties of the Vice‑Chancellor and is set out herein below: "14(1). The Vice‑Chancellor shall be the principal executive and academic officer of the University and shall ensure that the provisions of this Act, the Statutes, the Regulations and the Rules are faithfully observed in order to promote teaching, research, publication, administration and the general efficiency and good order of the University. He shall have all powers necessary for this purpose including administrative control over all officers, teachers and other employees of the University. (2) The Vice‑Chancellor shall preside at the meetings of the Authorities of which he is the Chairman and be entitled to attend and preside at any meeting of any other Authority or body of the University. (3) The Vice‑ Chancellor may, in any emergency which in his opinion requires immediate action, take such action as he may consider necessary and shall, as soon thereafter as possible, report his action for approval to the officer, Authority or other body which in the ordinary course would have dealt with the matter. The Vice‑Chancellor shall also have the powers:‑ (i)to create and fill temporary posts for a period not exceeding six months; (ii)to sanction all expenditure provided for in the funds within the same major head of expenditure; (iii)to sanction by re‑appropriation an amount not exceeding Rs.3,000 for an unforeseen item not provided for in the budget, and report it to the Syndicate at the next meeting; (iv)to appoint paper setters and examiners for all examinations of the University after receiving panels of names from the relevant Authorities; (v)to ensure and make arrangements for secrecy and scrutiny of papers and results; (vi)to direct teachers, officers and other employees of the University to take up such assignments in connection with teaching, research, examination, administration and such other activities in the University as he may consider necessary for the purpose of the University; (vii)to delegate, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be prescribed, any of his powers under this Act to an officer or officers of the University: (viii)to appoint employees below the initial monthly pay of Rs.450;and (ix)to exercise and prefer such other powers and functions as may be prescribed." Sections 23(1) and 24 respectively envisage composition and powers of the Syndicate, which read as under:‑ "23(1). The Syndicate shall consist of‑‑ (i) The Vice‑Chancellor, who shall be its Chairman; (ii) the Pro‑Vice‑Chancellor, if any; (iii) one member of the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab to be nominated by the Speaker of the Assembly; (iv) two members of the Senate to be elected by the Senate; (v) the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, Lahore or his nominee from amongst the Judges of the Lahore High Court; (vi) Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Education Department; (vii) one nominee of the University Grants Commission; (viii) one Dean to be nominated by the Chancellor on the recommendation of the Vice‑Chancellor; (ix) one Professor, one Associate Professor, one Assistant Professor and one such Lecturer as has completed a minimum of two years service in the University to be elected respectively by and from amongst themselves; (x) three persons of eminence including one scholar of Islamic Jurisprudence and one woman not serving in any educational institution to be nominated by the Chancellor; (xi) One Principal of the affiliated Colleges to be nominated by the Chancellor; and (xii) the President of the University Students Union." "24(1). The Syndicate shall be the executive body of the University and shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, and the Statutes, take effective measures to raise the standards of teaching, research and publication and other academic pursuits and exercise general supervision over the affairs and management of the property of the University. "24(2). Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, and subject to the provisions of this Act and the Statutes, the Syndicate shall have the powers:‑ (a) to take effective measures to raise the standards of teaching, research and publication in the light of national needs; (b) to hold control and administer the property and funds of the University; (c) to govern and regulate, with due regard to the‑advice of the Finance and Planning Committee in this behalf, the finances, accounts and investments of the University and for that purpose, to appoint such agents as it may think fit; (d) to consider the annual report, the annual and revised budget estimates and to advise the Senate thereon, and to re‑appropriate funds from one major head of expenditure to another; (e) to transfer and accept transfer of movable or immovable property on behalf of the University; (f) to enter into, vary, carry out and cancel contracts on behalf of the University; ( g) to cause proper books of account to be kept for all sums of money received and expended by the University and for the assets and liabilities of the University; (h) to invest any money belonging to the University including any unapplied income in any of the securities described in section 20 of the Trusts Act, 1882, or in the purchase of immovable property or in such other manner, as it may determine, with the like power of varying such investments; (i) to receive and manage any property transferred and grants, bequests, trusts, gifts, donations, endowments and other contributions made to the University; (j)to administer any funds placed at the disposal of the University for specified purposes; (k)to determine the form, provide for the custody and regulate the use of the Common seal f the University; (1) to provide the buildings, libraries, premises, furniture, apparatus, equipment and other means required for carrying out the work of the University; (m) to establish and maintain halls of residence and hostels or approve or licence hostels or lodgings. for the residence of students; (n)to affiliate and disaffiliate colleges; (o) to admit educational institutions to the privileges of the University and withdraw such privileges; (p) to arrange for the inspection of colleges and the Teaching Departments; (q) to institute Professorship, Associate Professorship, Assistant Professorship, Lecturer ship and other teaching posts or to suspend or to abolish such posts; (r) to create, suspend or abolish such administrative, research, extension or other posts as may be necessary; (s) to appoint University Teachers and other Officers on the recommendation of the selection Board for Teaching and other posts in the initial monthly pay of Rs.450 or above; (t) to appoint Professors Emeritus on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed; (u) to confer Honorary Degrees in accordance with the conditions prescribed; (v) to prescribe the duties of Officers, Teachers and other employees t the University; (w) to suspend, punish and remove from service in the prescribed manner such Officers, Teachers and other' employees as are appointed by the Syndicate; (x) to report to the Senate on matters on which it has been asked to report; (y) to appoint members to the various Authorities in accordance with the provisions of this act; (z) to propose drafts for Statutes for submission to the Senate; (aa) to consider and deal in the manner prescribed in subsection (2) of section 30 the Regulations made by the Academic Council; provided that the Syndicate may frame a Regulation at its own initiative and approve it after calling for the advice of the Academic Council; (bb) to regulate, determine and administer all other matters concerning the University and to exercise all other powers in this behalf mentioned in this Act and the Statutes; (cc) to delegate any of its powers to an Authority or Officer or a Committee or Sub Committee; and (dd) to perform such other functions as have been assigned to it by the other provisions of this Act or by the Statutes. Similarly, section 25(l) enshrines constitution of the Academic Council while section 26 caters for its functions, the relevant text whereof is reproduced hereinafter: 25(l) The Academic Council shall consist of: (i) (i) the Vice Chancellor; (Chairman) (ii) (ii) the Deans; , (iii) the Directors of Institutions; (iv) the University Professors including Professors Emeritus; (v) the Chairmen of the Teaching Departments; (vi) Education Secretary, the Director Public Instruction, Punjab and the Director of Technical Education, Punjab; (vii) all Professors, Associate Professors and equal number of Assistant Professors or Lecturers to be elected by the teachers of the University from amongst themselves; provided that at least one Associate Professor or once Assistant Professor or one Lecturer is represented in the Academic Council from each Teaching Department of the University; (viii) three persons eminent in the arts, the sciences and the Professions, of whom one shall be from each category to be nominated by the Chancellor; (ix) the Registrar; (x) the Librarian; and (xi) the Controller of Examinations." 26(1). The Academic Council shall be the academic body of the University and shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and the Statutes have the power to lay down proper standard of instruction, research, publication and examinations and to regulate and promote the Academic life of the University and the Colleges. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, and subject to the provisions of this Act and the Statutes, the Academic Council shall have the powers: (a) to advise the Syndicate on academic matters; (b) to regulate the conduct of teaching, research, publication and examinations; (c)to regulate the admission of students to the courses of studies and examinations in the University; (d) to regulate the conduct and discipline of the students of the University; (e) to propose to the Syndicate schemes for the constitution and Organisation of Faculties, Teaching Departments and Boards of Studies; (f) to consider or formulate proposals for the planning and development of teaching and research in the University; (g) to make Regulations, an the recommendations of the Boards of Faculties and the Boards of Studies, prescribing the courses of studies, the syllabi and the outlines of tests for all University Examinations; provided that if the recommendations of the Board of a Faculty or a Board of Studies are not received by the prescribed date, the Academic Council may, subject to the approval of the Syndicate, continue for the next year the courses of studies already prescribed for an examination; (h) to recognise the examinations of other Universities or examining bodies as equivalent to the corresponding examinations of the University; (i) to regulate the award of studentships, scholarships, exhibitions, medals and prizes; (j) to frame Regulations for submission to the Syndicate; (k) to appoint members to the various Authorities in accordance with the provisions of this Act; and (l) to perform such other functions as may be prescribed by Statutes. The premier argument of the learned counsel for the respondents and that of the learned Advocate General is that the very grant of admissions by the Vice Chancellor in exercise of powers under section 14(3) of the Act was an illicitly conceived embryo, a still bone baby, due to lack of the requisite approval of the competent authority, and being ab initio void order no rights could have ensued therefrom; consequently none were conferred on the petitioners. And, since, it was a void order, therefore, has been lawfully recalled. I may hasten to add that though there is commonality of effect of this argument but the premise of both the learned counsel are at variance, vis vis the requisite approval of the concerned authority to the admissions allegedly granted by the Vice Chancellor in exercise of his powers vested in him under section 14(3) of the Act. According to the learned Advocate General, the required approval was to be that of the Academic Council, whereas on the contrary, according to the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents, it had to be that of the Syndicate.

12. Before I express my opinion as to who granted the admission in the first place, it would be appropriate first to resolve the controversy, that, out of which of the two organs, i.e. the Academic Council or the Syndicate, the contemplated approval is to emanate from by having a recourse to the provisions of sections 25(l), 26(2); and 23(l) and 24 of the Act, which embody the composition and powers/functions of the two bodies respectively. A comparative examination of the sections, text whereof has been set out above, reveals that the Academic Council is the academic organ of the University, it is comprised of academicians, e.g. Vice Chancellor, the Deans and Directors of Institutions, Professors, Professors Emeritus, Associate Professors, Assistant Professors, etc. and its powers and functions, likewise have their gravitational pull concentrated towards the academic activities of the University; and, clause (c) of section 26(2) specifically, provides its domain in the field of admissions to the courses of studies at the University. Whereas, on the other hand, the Syndicate has been styled as and equipped to be the executive body of the University. By virtue of section 23(1) ibid, it is composed of Vice Chancellor, Pro Chancellor, Member of Provincial Assembly, two members of the Senate, Judge of the Lahore High Court, Secretary Education of Govt. of the Punjab, nominee of the University Grants Commission etc. and the powers/functions thereof have been spelt out in section 24(2) ibid, which deals with and circumscribes its sphere of potent activity to a wide variety of administrative affairs; however, I would like to observe in unambiguous terms that by no stretch of imaginations, its tentacles have been made to engulf matters pertaining to admissions to the University which is beyond its known place of authorization. Thus in the matter of admissions to the University as perceived by the framers of the Act, the competent authority is the Academic Council and not the Syndicate.

13. Now the next question of predominant significance would b as to who granted the admissions in the first place. Before Analysing this aspect of the matter, it is pertinent to mention that there i unanimity, in the arguments of learned counsel for all the parties, to the extent that the admissions were granted by the Vice Chancellor in exercise of his powers contemplated by section 14(3) of the Act; however, from thenceforth there is trichotomic divergence of views; according to the learned Advocate General the competent authority, viz. the Academic Council did not bless it with the approval, on the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for respondents adopted the posture that the Syndicate, who was the competent organ did no confer its approval; whereas the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is irrelevant as to whether or not the admission granted by the Vice Chancellor received the requisite approval because it is a matter of internal management of the University t which the petitioners had neither access nor means to discover of otherwise apprise themselves of, and the presumption is that before the advertisements inviting applications were published in the newspapers, all the formalities and related requirements must have been complied with and adhered to.

14. I Have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, and have also examined the material document in this behalf and I am of the view that these submissions are base upon fundamental misconception as to the source of admission grant in authority. In my opinion the admissions were not granted by the Vice Chancellor in exercise of his powers under section 14(3) of the Act (therefore, the question of its subsequent approval by the competent authority is abortive) but were in fact granted by and o behalf of the University as a body corporate. This view is extract from and substantiated by the following official documents of the respondents: (i) The admission process vis-a- vis the outside world in genera and petitioners in particular was unraveled with the issuance of advertisements flashed in different National dailies, (Th Pakistan Times 7th January 1987; Nawa-i-Waqt 6th January 1987 and Jang 8th January 1987, all Lahore issues) which were in the name and on behalf of the University under the signatures of one of its functionaries, namely Aftab Ahma Khan, Deputy Registrar (SS). (ii) The University letter No.STIDE/86 87/1039 dated 3 2-1987, addressed to the Managing Director of the nominating Industry, bearing an endorsement of its copy to the petitioner, confirming grant of provisional admission, subject to the conditions specified overleaf, was issued on behalf of the University under the signatures of the above referred Aftab Ahmad Khan, Deputy Registrar S.S. (iii) The enrolment slip was issued by the University under the signatures of its Admn. officer 1, acting for Deputy Registrar (SS), certifying the admission, vouching receipt of all dues and the requisite documents. (iv) A Circular/Notice (submitted alongwith the comments on behalf of the respondents) setting out criteria for admission against seats reserved for Industries for the session 1986 87 was issued by the University under the signatures of its Deputy Registrar S. S. , inter alia, stating the following: "The University of Engineering and Technology Lahore has decided to admit 9 students against the seats reserved for Industries for the session 1986 87 one each in all the degree awarding departments as detailed below: (v) Admission notice (submitted in the Court on behalf of respondents was issued by the University for seats reserved for Overseas Pakistanis (session 1986 87) under the authority of its Deputy Registrar (SS), relevant text of which is reproduced below: "As the number of seats reserved for Overseas Pakistanis under category IS' of the University prospectus 1986 87 has been increased from four to nine and the policy for the admission against these seats has been revised in consultation with the Ministry of Education, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad, that seats (detailed below) are readvertised for the benefit of all concerned." (vi) "Office Order No.37 dated 4 The Vice Chancellor while exercising the authority vested in him under section 140) of the University Act, 1974 is pleased to order that (1) Admissions to all industrial seats stand cancelled. The amounts received from candidates in lieu of the same are to be refunded by the Treasurer forthwith. (2) Admissions to all Overseas seats also stand cancelled. The amounts received from candidates in lieu of the same are to be refunded by the Treasurer forthwith. (3) Admission of nominees of all categories of Punjab with marks below 60% are also cancelled forthwith. 2 A special meeting of the Syndicate has already been announced for the purpose on 11 1987 when the action taken by the Vice Chancellor under section 14(3) above shall be reported for approval/ modification. The Syndicate is/shall be requested to take a suitable action/decision for an absolute end to all such seats." (vii) "Office Order No.39 dated 5 ,1987. CLARIFICATION Further to office order No 37 dated 4 1987, it is hereby clarified for the information of all concerned that all admissions made by the Vice Chancellor under section 14(3) of the University Act, 1974 have also been cancelled by him forthwith.

2. The above orders shall also be put up to the Syndicate for perusal and decision." (viii) Notification No.ST/DE/1409, dated 14 ,1987. (its text has been reproduced in para. 4 supra).

15. A perusal of the aforementioned documents, in unambiguous terms reveals that the admission policy was made by the University, which even preceded,, consultation with the Ministry of. education, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. The advertisements, admission notices, communication of provisional admissions, enrolments slips certifying admission after due compliance with the desired formalities were issued for and on behalf of the University under the authority of its Deputy Registrar. A juxtaposition study of the office orders permanently demonstrates that office order No. 37 deals with cancellation of admissions granted to the nominees of the industrial seats, Overseas Pakistanis seats and to nominees of all the Punjab, whereas office order No.39 though it is styled as clarification of office order No.37 but in fact the phraseology deployed therein shows that it is dealing with a different specie of admissions altogether i.e. admissions granted by the Vice Chancellor in his capacity as the Vice Chancellor because the expression used therein is 'also' which impels one to believe that there are other seats to which the Vice Chancellor has not granted the admission. Specific insertion of the rubric also presupposes the fact that it is in addition to, and not by way of substitution or a repetition thereof. This impression is fortified by the approval granted by the Syndicate. In para 2 of the approval granting notification, it has been expressly stated that the Vice Chancellor has placed before the Syndicate his office orders relating to cancellation of admissions of students against Industrial, Overseas Pakistanis seats and admissions made by him. The Syndicate in its decision expressed in the notification dated 14 ,1987 has dispelled room for any argument or ambiguity to the contrary by explicitly making the following observation in para 3 of the order. These admissions made by the University therefore remain cancelled.

16. I am further strengthened in my belief in this behalf, by looking at the proposition from yet another angle i.e. assuming for the sake of arguments, though without conceding, that these admissions were granted by the Vice Chancellor, and not by the University then the logical recourse which the Vice Chancellor should have first resorted to, was to recall, rescind and cancel the alleged order of granting admissions rather than canceling the admissions themselves. This is not a case of recalling of the alleged admission granting order but in fact is a case of canceling the admissions; it without saying that there is irreconcilably marked distinction between the two. Furthermore, with a view to dispelling even the rudimentary basis of this hypothesis the learned counsel for the respondents was specifically asked to place on the record the alleged order passed by the Vice Chancellor granting admissions, if there is any, available on the record of the University to which he frankly replied in the negative. If one is to work on the assumption, that there was such an order passed by the Vice Chancellor, then there was nothing in the way of the respondents to place it on the record of these proceedings, which was not done, despite the fact that a special opportunity was granted in this behalf. Therefore, I am of the firm view, that there was no order passed by the Vice Chancellor granting admissions in exercise of powers under section 14(3) of the Act, and a lawful presumption is drawn within the meanings of Article 129(g) of the Qanun Shahadat Order, 1984. 11(g) that evidence which could be and is not produced, if produced, shall be unfavorable to the person who withholds it;" This view is further supported by the fact that respondents have not raised this point in their pleadings, but for the first time, out of human ingenuity it has been conceived during the course of arguments, as a last minute afterthought.

17. Furthermore, the facts tend to suggest that the Vice Chancellor, was not operating on a secret and hideous mission, in a surreptitious fashion, in isolation under hybernation conditioning, while granting the admissions. It was a widely publicised affair, policy decision whereof must have preceded the flashing of the advertisement in the Press. Had it been An exclusive and a sole over-enthusiastic frolic of the Vice Chancellor alone, to the exclusion of all others, then, objectively speaking, the Senate, the Syndicate and the Academic Council, component limbs of the University would have not confined themselves to be dumbfounded creatures, as wholly indifferent spectators. I am sure, in their prudence and propriety they would have hotly debated the matter authoritatively, at their respective levels, manifesting their peaceful dissent of the same, to say the least. It is significant to note that even the Chancellor of the University did not deem it appropriate to intervene in. this matter, which he could have done, if so minded, in his supervening authority, in exercise of powers vested in him by virtue of section 10(3) or by invoking his revisional jurisdiction, under section 10-A of the Act, to amend or cancel or rectify the alleged illegal and or improper orders of the Vice Chancellor.

18. Therefore, I have no doubt, in my mind, that the admissions were actually granted by the University as a body corporate; which by virtue of section 3(2) of the Act is comprised of the Chancellor, Members of the Senate, the Syndicate and the Academic Council. And it goes without saying, that the matter of grant of admissions to the University is intra vires and within the competent domain of the University under the Act.

19. However, the preceding argument of the learned counsel for the respondents, at its best, may be attracted towards the admissions, being the subject matter of office order No.39 dated 5 1987, and, that too, unsuccessfully, for the simple reason that the outside world in general and petitioners in particular, on the premise of the doctrine of indoor management (which as yet, has not been deleted from the legal fabric of the prevalent system) could not be assumed to know what formalities have been complied with and what have not been adhered to by the University in this regard. It would be legitimate, on the part of the persons, dealing with such an august and responsible body, to presume, that they have done their homework well before time i.e. before they had embarked upon inviting people to seek admissions, and, inter alia, the requisite approval must have been sought from the competent authority being a matter of their internal management. Any notion. to the contrary would tantamount to ascribing absurdity to such a prestigious institution; and speaking for myself, I am not inclined to subscribe to such a hypothesis. To fortify my view, reliance is placed on the following cases: Royal British Bank v. Turguand (1855) 5 E. & B. 248, there the company issued a bond under its common seal, signed by two directors. Registered deed of settlement (corresponding to the Memorandum of Articles of Association) provided that the directors might borrow (m bond such sums as they should be authorised by a general resolution of the company. No such resolution was passed. Controversy on this count led to the parties to litigation where it was held that "the bond was binding on the company as the lenders were entitled to assume that a resolution authorising the borrowing had been passed. Reason for the rule is that persons dealing with the company are not concerned to inquire whether all matters of internal management have been complied with if everything is apparently regular and that the Memorandum and Articles of Association are registered and accessible to all who care to consult them, everyone is presumed to know them. They are therefore, bound to see that externally everything is in order, but are not concerned with the indoor management. They cannot check matters of internal administration and are entitled to assume that they have been properly carried out. ' Likewise, in Messrs P.K. Basak & Co. Ltd. v. Messrs Gossen and Co. Ltd. P L D 1957 Dacca 233 controversy between the parties, inter alia, involved the question of effect of non production of resolution of the companies showing authority for the act in question. The learned Division Bench was pleased to observe that there is abundant authority for the proposition that persons dealing with Directors or Managing Directors of a Company are not called upon to enquire whether the Directors have been validly appointed or whether there is a specific resolution authorising them to do a particular act, if it is clear from the Articles of Association of the Company that they could have been authorised to do the said act." Similarly, in Re: Asiatic Banking Corporation 1869, 4 Chancery Appeal Cases 252 it was held that "a third person dealing with the Directors of a Company could not be affected by the bye laws of the Company framed under powers given by the Articles of Association, unless it was proved that such person knew of the existence of the said bye-laws." Also in the case of Ram Buran Singh v. Mufassil Bank Ltd. A I R 1925 All. 206, it was observed that "all persons dealing with a Company must ascertain the limitations imposed by the Articles of Association, but they are not bound to draw any direct or obvious inferences from the provisions they find there, nor is there any obligation cast upon them to see that such Directors are properly appointed or that they have acted exactly in accordance with the manner prescribed therein a third party who deals with the Directors or with the Managers acting under those powers, however, irregularly, is protected if he acts in good faith in his dealing with them. Therefore, in the present case the petitioners were legally justified in assuming that the sought for approval must have been granted.

20. Independent of the above, this argument of the respondents stands equally repelled in the light of the legal maxim nullus commodum capere potest deinjuria sua propria (no man shall take advantage of his own wrong). The respondents, in the instant case, cannot take refuge under their self assumed alleged shortcoming in the shape of lack of approval of the competent, authority. In this context; it is conducive to place reliance on the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Mian Muhammad Saeed and another v. The Province of West Pakistan and others P L D 1964 S C 572 wherein brief facts were that the predecessor-in- interest of the appellants got their caste changed in revenue papers from "Rajput Minhas" to "Sheikh" then having mortgaged their land to certain Sikh non-agriculturists, sold it out to the mortgagee, later on got their caste restored as "Rajput Minhas" and consequent upon partition of the sub continent, the vendees having become evacuees, the appellants proceeded to recover their land from the rehabilitation authorities on the plea that their predecessor interest being "Rajput Minhas", sales made ' by them took effect as mortgages for 20 years, under section 14 of Punjab Alienation of Land Act (XIII of 1900) and that that period having been elapsed, the land should be restored to them. They succeeded in getting such a declaration from the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, which was set aside in appeal by the Custodian, against which they came before the High Court and having failed, appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court. It was held that "the appellants in trying to undo the transactions of sale and to get back their property were in fact attempting to take advantage of their own fraud. This conduct on their part would 'contravene the well known principle embodied in the legal Maxim: nullus commodum copere potest de injuria sua propria (Co. Litt. 148 (b) (No man shall take advantage of his own wrong). Therefore, it is not befitting the respondents to say that since the requisite approval was not sought or was not granted: therefore, the admissions made by the Vice Chancellor are void. They E cannot be allowed to reap undue premium out of their own misfeasance or nonfeasance.

21. Now adverting to the argument of the learned Advocate General, that, the admissions were made by the Vice Chancellor, in contravention of the Government's education policy of admission on merits, resulting into injustice and unfairness; it may be observed that the admissions were made by the University as held supra, which is an independent statutory body. Nothing has been brought on the record to show that the University had adopted that policy. The logical inference would be that it was not applicable to the University; (and being a statutory body corporate has independently prescribed its own admission policy); and the Government seems to have not agitated against that. Not only that, but also a perusal of the Admission Notice issued by the University, vis a vis, admissions to seats reserved for Overseas Pakistanis with particularity reveals that the admission policy was revised in consultation with the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan; therefore, one can say without any diffidence that the policy decision was taken by the University in concurrence with the Federal Government, Ministry of Education; wisdom whereof seems to have not been. questioned by all the concerned. Furthermore, since the admissions were competently and legally made by the University, therefore, question of perpetuation of any illegality is abortive and misconceived.

22. Having arrived at the above conclusion, one is confronted with the most crucial question, in this controversy, as to whether these admissions have been lawfully cancelled? On this point there is mutuality of perception and submissions between the learned Advocate General and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents, working on the hypothesis that due to coram non judice, the Admissions were ab initio void, therefore, no rights were conferred upon the petitioners, consequently, the admissions have been rightly recalled by the competent authority in view of the principle enshrined in the Maxim of locus poenitentiae ,and section 20 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956. To substantiate this proposition, reference was made to the case of The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others P L D 1975 S C 331 wherein it was held that an order is 'void ab initiol if made by a Court, tribunal, or other authority, which had no jurisdiction either as regards the subject matter, the pecuniary value or the territorial limits where the dispute arose and such an order would amount to usurpation of power unwarranted by law and accordingly it would be a nullity. Further by citing The Chairman, District Screening Committee, Lahore v. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi P L D 1976 S C 258, an argument was canvassed that a void order is a nullity and incapable of rectification. Reference was also made to the case of Narayan Das v. Deputy Commissioner of Darrang Tezpur and others A I R 1970 Assam and Nagaland 57 wherein it was held that "if a person is appointed to a Government post by a competent authority, and removed therefrom it may attract the provisions of Article 311 in appropriate cases. But if a person is found to have been appointed in Government service by an authority who had no power or jurisdiction to make such an appointment and on whom the Government has not delegated any such power of appointment, the person so appointed cannot be said to have held a post under the State Government which might attract the provisions of Article 311, even though that person might be functioning for the period from his appointment till he is removed, his initial appointment being without jurisdiction and without any authority." Likewise reference was made to the case of Ghulam Jafar and 48 others v. The S.S.P. Multan and another 1982 S C M R 630 to show that operation of the principle of locus poenitentiae is not precluded by the mere fact that a void order stood implemented. I have gone through those judgments, but I am afraid those have no bearing on the fate of the present case in view of my finding that the admissions were competently made, by the University and not by the Vice Chancellor.

23. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that consequent upon finalization of the admissions, decisive step was taken,' whereby vested rights were conferred upon the petitioners, of which they could not be stripped off under the garb of principle of locus poenitentiae. This argument has enormous inertia and impelling juridical momentum embodied in it. It is a settled law that the power to rescind, annul, cancel, recall or withdraw an order is available under the law to the competent authority before a decisive step is taken; however, once that stage or terminus has reached, the order has taken legal effect, and in pursuance thereto certain rights have been created in favour of an individual then, the decisive step will be deemed to have been occasioned whereafter even the competent authority is rendered devoid and destitute, of such a competence. This view has been consistently upheld in a whole chain of authorities and following important cases may be cited in this behalf: (i) Shahbaz v. Crown P L D 1956 F.C.

46. In this case Shahbaz was convicted and sentenced to death. The sentence was reduced to transportation for life by the High Court. On an application of his brother the Government unconditionally remitted his sentence and directed that he should be released on the Independence Day i.e. 14th August, 1954. On 13th August, 1954 the order was cancelled. Hebeas corpus petition was filed in the High Court which was dismissed. His appeal before the Federal Court also met the same fate on the ground that the power to recede what is otherwise known as 'locus poenitentiae had been exercised by the competent authority before the taking of the decisive step. (ii) Pakistan through the 'Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi P L D 1969 S C

407. On 1-10-1959 an order was made by the President of Pakistan fixing basic salary of Himayatullah Farrukhi at Rs.1,000 per mensem with effect from 8-6-1948. This order was duly communicated to the Ministry of Communication and the concerned officer; however, subsequently, on 26-8-1962, it was withdrawn. This was successfully challenged before the High Court being without lawful authority. In appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that: "There can hardly be any dispute with the rule that apart from the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, "locus poenitentiae i.e. the power of receding till a decisive step is taken, is available to the Government or the relevant authorities. In fact, the existence of such a power is necessary in the case of all authorities empowered to pass orders to retrace the wrong steps taken by them. The authority that has the power to make an order has also the power to undo it. But this is subject to the exception that where the order has taken legal effect, and in pursuance thereof certain rights have been created in FAVOUR of any individual, such an order cannot be withdrawn or rescinded to the detriment of those rights. (iii) Dr. Mahboob Rabbani v. Government of West Pakistan P L D 1963 Lah.

63. The petitioner in this case, a Professor of Pharmacology in the King Edward Medical College, Lahore, on 13-9-1957 a day earlier than his retirement, applied to the Director of Health Services for the grant of earned leave to be enjoyed by him after his retirement. The leave was sanctioned and duly notified in the official Gazette. On 7-8-1958, the Government cancelled the leave.. , .. . which was challenged in writ jurisdiction. It was held that "Government had no power to cancel, under section 21 of the General Clauses Act, its order which had already come into operation. (iv) Muhammad Aslam Khaki v. Vice Chancellor Gomal University D.I. Khan and 2 others P L D 1980 Pesh.

128. Petitioner in this case, applied for admission in LL.M. in the Faculty of Shariah Azam University, Islamabad and for Ph.D, to the Institute of Education and Research, University of Punjab, Both these applications were recommended by the Vice Chancellor, Gomal University. He was selected for admission in the said courses, but before he joined the course the recommendations were withdrawn. The petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court seeking declaration that withdrawal of recommendations by the Vice Chancellor was without lawful authority and of no legal effect. It was held that: "Thus, necessity and existence of the power to vary or recall the wrong steps taken in case of all authorities empowered to pass orders is recognised by all. There also seems to be a consensus of judicial opinion that apart from the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, the power of receding i.e. "locus poenitentiae is available to such authorities till the order (being rescinded) has taken legal effect. But where the order has taken legal effect, and in pursuance thereof certain rights have been created in any individual, "decisive step" will be deemed to have been taken and thereafter the order cannot be withdrawn or rescinded to the detriment of those rights. Then the authority issuing such order would be precluded from doing so." (v) Syed Muneeb Nazir Shah v. Azad Kashmir Government and another P L D 1985 A. J & K

17. Petitioner in this case was the only candidate for admission in M. B. , B.S. Class against a seat reserved for doctors' children ......After fulfilling necessary formalities he got admission in Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad, on receipt of ' a telegram sent to him by Secretary of the Nomination Board of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Later on, it appears, that the name of the petitioner was substituted with the name of one Muhammad Anwar, on the direction of Secretary Kashmir affairs. Petitioner challenged his withdrawal in a writ petition. It was held that: "So the law is very clear that an authority which passes an order is competent to vary, rescind or cancel the order passed by it and that power vests in it by virtue of section 21 of the General Clauses Act. But this power is not absolute and it is subject to certain limitations. The most important limitation is that when the order sought to be varied, rescinded, or cancelled, is communicated to the her party and or subsequent to that communication, that party acts upon it, a very valuable right accrues to that party and therefore, the authority under such circumstances becomes incompetent to vary, rescind or cancel its previous order because the law does not allow vote face to the authority.

24. Independent of the aforegoing, it may be observed that power to recall, rescind or cancel an order also has the in-built correlation and nexus with the competency of the authority, 'and, the phenomenon presupposes that only that authority which can law fully make an 14 order, can cancel, rescind or recall the same; otherwise it would be a naked case of usurpation of power and coram non judice by itself, and a nullity in the eye of law. I am fortified in this behalf by the will of the framers of section 20 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 which reads as under: "

20. Power to make to include power to add to amend, vary or rescind orders, rules or bye laws. Where, by any West Pakistan Act, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, scheme, form or bye laws is conferred then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any) to add to, amend, vary or rescind, any notifications, orders, rules, scheme, form, bye laws so issued." A bare reading of text shows that "power to issue. . . . includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to like sanction and conditions to.... rescind.... which mutatis mutandis, means that cancellation of admissions if at all was necessitated, then it could only have been caused by the competent authority i.e. the University as a body or the Academic Council, and not by the Vice Chancellor or the Syndicate, which has not been the case, therefore, the impugned order suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction.

25. Next it may be observed that section 14(3) of the Act is not designed by the law-giver to cater for passing of the impugned orders. From the scheme of section 14 ibid, it is revealed that it[ sets out powers of the Vice Chancellor as the principal executive and academic officer of the University, which inter alia, includes subsection (3) enabling him to take certain actions warranting immediate, intervention on priority basis in an emergent situation, which thereafter! should be submitted, as soon as possible for approval of the authority competent under the Act to deal with the matter. Deployment of the expressions "in an emergency" and "requiring immediate orders" is' demonstrative of the intendment of the legislature in unambiguous, terms, that, this power has been conferred, upon the Vice Chancellor, only as an interim stopgap arrangement to suitably suit (objectively speaking) the given situation necessitating immediate, urgent and emergent attention as a first aid measure, which otherwise should have been dealt with by the competent authority, in the ordinary course of events, implying a body other than the Vice Chancellor. The word "emergency" is not subjective state of mind. It has a necessary interwoven relationship with the prevalent physical condition; around at a given point of time, judged on the barometer of objection. No material has been brought on the record to justify recourse to such a drastic measure under the purported exercise of emergency powers. I have neither any doubt in mind nor any hesitation in saying that it is a usurpation of jurisdiction whereby a statutory provision has been invoked only as a cloak, with a view to achieving an objective pertaining to which the statute concerned is wholly an alien notion. This is a nullity in the eye of law. In this behalf, reference is made with advantage to the case of Hamid and others v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and others P L D 1982 S C

135. There the appellant and others were temporarily allotted some evacuee land. Tehsildar Chishtian issued notices to them to have their claim forms transferred to some other area on the ground of non entitlement. The appellants challenged these notices in the High Court, but the writ petition was dismissed. Later on, the appellants filed a revision petition before the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The land in the meanwhile had been allotted to the respondents who were not made party in the revision petition . The Chief Settlement Commissioner ordered that the land in dispute be confirmed in the name of the appellants and also held the land to be not an urban area. The order was challenged in writ petition, but the successor Chief Settlement Commissioner suo motu set aside the orders of his predecessor office. This order was also challenged in the High Court where both the writ petitions were dismissed. The matter ultimately went to the Supreme Court, where it was held that "the impugned order of Pir Ahsanuddin was wholly without jurisdiction. It was performed in such a way that the law regards it as a mere colourable exercise of jurisdiction or unlawful usurpation of jurisdiction. The act being non existent in the eye of law amounted to a nullity."

26. The impugned orders were next assailed on the ground that the petitioners have been condemned unheard, to which, the learned. Standing Counsel for the respondents did not join issue on the factual plane. I am afraid right to be heard before one is subjected to any, action adversely affecting one s interest, the most ancient ground norm of every civilized legal system known to the mankind from times K immemorial, and is the inherent inbuilt constituent of the fundamental principle of natural justice, so much so that even ADAM was not condemned unheard for his, having eaten The forbidden fruit: one of the conceivable exceptions to when this principle is considered to be amenable is where the language of a statue in unambiguous terms has ,expressly provided to the contrary. Following cases may be cited on this point. In the case of Commissioner of income tax East Pakistan V Fazlur Rehman P L D 1964 S C 410, the respondent moved an application before the Commissioner Income tax against the assessment but the same was dismissed without nearing him, It was successfully challenged in the, High Court. The Commissioner of Income tax preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court, wherein it was held that "the fact that the proceedings are judicial or quasi judicial in nature is sufficient to entitle a party to a hearing in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary. At the same time It should be pointed out that the right to be heard is not confined to proceeding which are judicial in form. As has been held by this court of the Chief Commissioner Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak P L D 1959 S C Pak. 45 the maxim "no man shall be condemned unheard" is not confined to Court but extends to all proceedings, by whomsoever held which may affect the person or property or other right of the. parties concerned in the dispute, and the maxim will apply with no less force to proceedings which affect liability to pay a tax.." In the case of The University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmad P L D 1965 S C 90, it was held that "in all proceedings by whomsoever held, whether judicial or administrative, the principles of natural justice have to be observed if the proceedings might result in consequence affecting "the person or property or other right of the parties concerned". This rule applies even though there may be no positive words in the statute or legal document whereby the power is vested to take such proceedings, for, in such cases, this requirement is to be implied into it as the minimum requirement of fairness." Likewise, in the case of Abdus Saboor Khan v. Karachi University and another P L D 1966 S C 536, it was held "No one can be condemned unheard", is one of the settled principles of law, and such a principle will be read into the relevant law, unless its application is excluded by express words. A duty is cast on every administrative Tribunal to act fairly and justly and with due regard to the principle of natural justice, unless specifically exempted from such a limitation . Similar view was held in the case of Mst. Jamshed Begum v. Chief Land Commissioner etc. P L D 1983 S C 183 that "The proposition of law that the rule of natural justice shall be read into the provisions of every enactment unless the contrary is expressly provided is by now well established ....

27. Before parting with the question of audi alteram partem, it will not be out of the context to mention that the Bench was not taken into confidence as to the extraordinary reasons which impelled the Vice Chancellor to contravene and act in contempt of this time honoured principle vis-a- vis the petitioners.

28. Lastly, apart from the fact that the Vice Chancellor and 0e Syndicate had no lawful jurisdiction to pass the impugned orders, it is highly significant to note, that the Syndicate, by virtue of the very presence and participation of the Vice Chancellor, what to talk,, of as a member, but as Chairman, during the course of the approval granting meeting, legally speaking, was rendered disqualified due to inherent bias. The insertion of the last sentence, in office order N 3"; stating "The Syndicate is/shall be requested to take suitable action decision for an absolute end to all such seats", vouches the immutable predisposed disposition of the Vice Chancellor, the impelling vigour hereof seemingly had overpowered 'the will of the Syndicate; which was required to put a rubber stamp as a prearranged and foregone conclusion, and the exercise undertaken was merely a sham formality, wholly devoid and oblivious of the degree of sanctity attached to the institution, contrary to the well founded rule of natural justice; I manifesting its discretion only mechanically which rendered the alleged' approval a nullity in the eye of law. Therefore, on this count alone the meeting of the Syndicate which was participated by and presided over by Vice Chancellor tending to approve the latter's order, invalidated the whole proceedings, making out an exceptional exemplary case of bias. To illustrate this inerasible and deeply imbedded legal proposition, a useful reference is made to the following cases: "Hannam v Bradford Corporation (1970) 1 W.L.R 937 C.A.). Here school governors resolved to dismiss a teacher. The local education authority had power to prohibit such a dismissal without their consent, and the teacher had an opportunity to be heard before a sub committee of the authority. The sub committee decided not to prohibit teacher's dismissal. It was held, that decision could not stand because three members of the sub committee including the Chairman were governors of the school and although they had not been present at the meeting of the governors which decided to dismiss the teacher, there was a real likelihood or a reasonable suspicion of their being biased of the original decision. "Frame United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices (1926) A.C.

586. The licensing justices of Bath referred an application for renewal of a liquor licence to another body of justices called the Compensation Authority and took steps to oppose the renewal at the hearing before the Compensation Authority. But three of the licensing justices were also members of the Compensation Authority and took part to refuse the renewal. House of Lords held that this invalidated the decision for the fundamental rule that persons who had taken part in a dispute were disqualified from judging it. The Lord Chancellor observed that not only in the case of Courts of justice and other judicial tribunals but in the case of authorities which though in no sense to be called Courts, have to act as judges of the rights of others. "Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 K.B.

309. In this case a police sergeant had been dismissed by the Chief Constable of Liverpool. His appeal against dismissal was rejected by the Watch Committee. The Chief Constable was himself present in the Watch Committee which decided the appeal. It was held that the presence of the Chief Constable whose mind was made up in advance and who was in fact respondent to the appeal, was fatal to the validity of the Watch Committees decision. It was observed that the respondent may. influence the Court is so abhorrent to English notions of justice that the possibility of it or even the appearance of such a possibility is ................... . sufficient to deprive the decision of all judicial force, and to render it a nullity. "The King v. Hendon Rural District Council (1933) 2 K.B.

606. In this case the Rural District Council allowed a property to be converted into a garage and restaurant and the Council had power to permit this development and the owners had a right to compensation if their intentions were frustrated by a planning scheme. On of the councilors who was estate agent and was acting for the owners was present at the meeting which approved the application. A controversy arose out of it; wherein it was held that the agent's interest in the business disqualified him from taking part in the council's consideration of it even though the evidence was that he took no active part. In the case of Mian Muhammad Abdullah, District Manager, Government Transport Service, Lyallpur v. The Road Transport Corporation, Lahore and others P L D 1964 (W.P.) Lahore 743, a show cause notice was issued to an employee by a member of the Corporation who participated in the proceedings of the Corporation meeting, where the proposed punishment to the employee was being considered. It was held that the decision of the Corporation was against law, without lawful authority and against natural justice. In the case of Hafizur Rahman v. Principal Government College Sylhet and another P L D 1967 Dacca 800, the governing body of the College passing resolution tending to expel student under the presidentship of the Deputy Commissioner, who had previously ordered for such an expulsion, it was held that the resolution of the college was without lawful authority. In the case of Zahid lqbai Raza v. The Controller of Examinations, University of the Punjab, Lahore P L D t975 Lahore 1385, upon having been found guilty of unfair means at the examination, an appeal was filed, The Appeal Committee instead of hearing the appeal referred the matter to the Disciplinary Committee for reconsideration. It was held that the authority finding a person guilty cannot hear appeal against its own orders. In the case of Mubarik Ali Bhatti v. Mr. Fiayaz Ali Khar 'District Manager etc. P L D 1963 (W.P.) Lahore (8), it was held that hearing of an appeal by an authority who had himself participate(i in the original proceedings is contrary to the rules of natural justice and thus illegal.

29. In view of the above discussion, these writ petitions are allowed, Office ; orders No.37 and 39 issued by the Vice Chancellor which were subsequently approved of by the Syndicate in its meeting held or, 111987, and Notified wide notification No.ST/ DE/1409 dated 14-1987 are hereby set aside being without lawful authority and of no legal consequence. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. M.B.A./M-516/L Petitions allowed