P L D 1961 Supreme Court 537 (PLP)

CORNELIUS, C. J.‑The facts of the cases out of which these appeals arise have been stated with fulness in the judgments of my learned brothers S. A. Rahman, J., and Hamoodur Rahman, J., which I have had the advantage of reading. It is therefore not necessary that they should be repeated in my judgment or that I should reproduce here the relevant sections from the main instrument under consideration, namely, the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952. The situation which was sought by the appellant Companies to be corrected by the issue of the writs which they sought had been created by actions of the Chief Controller of Imports and Ex‑ports, taken under the above mentioned legal provisions, the result of which was that the two Companies were, at a stroke, prevented from continuing their principal business, by no means of small magni tude, namely, that of engaging in the export and import trade of Pakistan. They had previously been provided with licenses to enable them to engage in this trade, and these license were rendered ineffective by means of several orders whose details are not of importance for the purposes of this judgment. The Companies protested. One of the grounds of their protest was that they had not been told what was the exact misconduct of which they had been held guilty. The word `misconduct' can be correctly used in this context. The provisions of sub-clause (1) of clause 4 of the Order, enumerate eight grounds upon which a license may be cancelled, and each of them involves either moral turpitude by way of evasion or false representation, or adoption of detrimental trade practices, or contravention of provisions of the Order or other regulations applicable to the trade. I stress this point because it is accepted as a rule of natural justice that where under forms of law, a subject is penalised upon a finding of misconduct, it is necessary that he should first have been asked for an explanation of his conduct before that conclusion is reached. It has been argued that the orders cancelling the licenses are bad for vagueness. This will be sufficiently clear from the wording of the order withdrawing the license of Messrs Friederike Ltd. viz. "I write to inform you that your Registration Number K. O. 3970 has been suspended under clause 4 (1) and sub- clauses (b), (c) and (g) of Registration (Importers and Expor ters) Order, 1952, as amended on 17‑4‑1956." Sub-clause (b) refers to contravention or failure of compliance with "any regulation relating to import, export or foreign exchange con trol". Subclause (c) relates to "under‑invoicing or over‑invoicing the value of the imports or exports". Subclause (g) involves committing a trade practice which in the opinion of the Chief Controller is detrimental to the public interest. It is evident that under sub clause (b), the fault may have been placed in relation to any single regulation under any one of six alterna tives, under subclause (c) in one of four possible alternatives in respect of a single transaction ; while for subclause (g) it would be necessary to specify the particular trade practice, and at least to state that in the opinion of the Chief Controller, such trade practice was detrimental to the public interest. The orders made were appealable and appeals were filed. The terms of the appeals clearly indicate the embarrassment from which the injured party suffered in presenting an appeal at all, through ignorance of the exact fault or misconduct which had been found against it. Nevertheless the argument was raised before us in bar of the issue of a writ, that an alternative remedy was A possible by way of appeal, and that an appeal had been filed. An appeal was actually filed four years ago in each case, and no action has yet been taken on either of them. There is a limit to the patience the subject must exercise before he seeks alter native relief. But taking the terms of the appeals as they stand, it is very much to be feared that, as was done by the Chief Controller and apparently also by the High Court, the appellate authority might well have contended itself with looking at certain secret documents in a sealed envelope which had been produced by the Chief Controller by way of explanation for this action. In the judgment of the High Court by which both writ petitions were dismissed there is the following reference regarding those secret documents :‑ "The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports has allowed access to us to the report of the Special Police Establishment, a copy of which we have placed in a sealed cover. The report is based on the disclosures made by the documents seized from the possession of the petitioners, and it reveals that parts of their earnings of the foreign exchange remained in foreign countries, parts were utilised for other purposes, and parts were made available to certain high officials of the Government and public dignitaries for their use abroad." What the High Court regarded as a "revelation" of glaring mis conduct would without doubt be found convincing by the appel late authority in the Department of Imports and Exports. That would be no consolation to the injured party who knows nothing of the contents of those documents. The question comes up at once in an acute form‑was the occasion one, as it presented itself to the Chief Controller, upon which justice had to be done, and not only this but it had to be seen had to be done ? The person most interested in seeing that justitce was done was naturally the injured party, and the record clearly proves that he was prevented from seeing the material upon which his case had been decided to his detriment. Under the law, the Chief Controller when refusing or cancelling registration is required to record his reasons for his action in writing. This requirement is clearly of direct importance to the possibility of an appeal. Where the reasons given are wholly vague, the appellate authority would necessarily be hampered in discharging its function. In fact the Chief Controller appears to have acted upon secret information of a nature which he apparently considered could not be made public, for which reason he refrained altogether from giving any reasons. The reasons by which he was moved may or may not be a good, but one result is plain, namely, that by not expressing, them the appellate provision was rendered futile fur the purposes of a proper appeal and a valuable right of a vested. nature way taken away from the injured party. The defect lies in the failure of a statutory authority to act in the manner required by the statute. The ground is thus laid for the issue of a writ of mandamus to that authority to comply with its duty in the relevant respect, declaring the order already made to be void for non‑conformity with the statute. Although no express prayer for issuing of mandamus to the Chief Controller to make a proper order in the petitioners' case had been sought, I do not see that the jurisdiction .of the Court to issue a writ of mandamus as indicated above was barred. The petitioners ‑had sought quashment of the orders, and in their place, issue of orders granting licenses to them to continue their trade. The question whether a writ of certiorari to quash the pro ceedings of the Chief Controller could issue has been discussed at length in the judgments of my learned brothers. I am in general agreement with their conclusions and the argument by which they are supported, but would like to add some observations of my own. It is plain that in cases certain essential elements of a judicial proceeding were present. For instance, it was a case of sequestration of an individual's right to valuable property, namely, a licence under which the individual was enabled to engage in foreign trade. Protection of an indivi dual's rights in person and property is a matter belonging peculiarly to the jurisdiction of Judges. Secondly, it is a charac teristic of a normal judicial proceeding that it operates ex post facto. The incident or the action which comes under judicial enquiry must ordinarily be one which has been completed in the past so that its outlines and its content are capable of exact ascertainment on the basis of evidence, and a judgment can be pronounced thereon in the light of the relevant law. The actions enumerated in subclause (1) of clause 4 of the Order are all pieces of conduct in the past, whose particulars are capable of exact ascertainment by the method of evidence ex post facto. The Chief Controller cannot withdraw the franchise in his discretion. He must first find `misconduct' of one of the specified kinds. The statute also specifies the materials upon which he may act viz., evidence or information. A striking similarity to the true judicial function clearly appears. The Chief Controller is not concerned with anything in the future, i.e., as to the expansion or the diminution of the trade, or as to the execution of any policy of the Government, in the public interest, with respect to that trade. Such con siderations bear upon future operation of the trade, but the Chief Controller is not required to consider such matters. On the other hand, he is required to find misconduct ex post facto, and that is a proceeding which belongs essentially within the judicial function. The position would be wholly different if the Chief Controller were required by the law, in withdrawing the franchise from a particular individual, to bear in mind matters related to the larger public interest, or the future development or restriction of the trade, or considerations affecting the general regulation of m the trade. The point may be illustrated by reference to three cases which have also been considered by my learned brethern. The Tariq Transport Company's case (P L D 1958 S C (Par.) 437) was one where the need before the Road Transport Authority was to make proper provi sions for public transport upon a certain route, conformably to the public interest and to the other general conditions e.g., the intensity of traffic which the road surface could bear, the need or otherwise for restricting competition upon the road and so forth. Although individual rights might have been advanced or injured by the eventual decision of the Authority favouring some of the applicants and not the others, yet the main duty upon the Authority was not the ascertainment of any individual rights, or the satisfaction of any individual claims, but the fulfilment of a large public purpose. That is not a judicial function in the ordinary sense and can rightly be described as an administrative act taken after evaluation of all interests, public and private, that were involved, with the object of adapting the action to future requirements and eventualities, as estimated by the executive authorities. The case of Nakhuda Ali (P L D 1951 P C 102) before the Privy .Council was one in which the licencee whose license had been cancelled by the Controller had been given an opportunity to explain points appearing against him and to examine the documents upon which suspicion as to his misconduct had been raised. The indicia of a judicial act would seem to have been present in the case. The observations in the judgment of the Judicial Committee to the effect that the cancellation of the licence was an executive action and not judicial in its nature, and therefore not amenable to the writ of certiorari are in the nature of obiter of which the persuasive effect in the circumstances of the present case, can be but slight. Here, the Chief Controller gave the appellant Companies no opportunity to explain anything done by them, and did not allow them to see the documents upon which he based his conclusion of misconduct. But on the general question, I agree with my learned brother S. A. Rahman, J., that the view of the Judicial Committee (I say so with great respect) goes too far in restricting the power of the superior Courts to control actions of the executive under statutes which plainly import the perform ance of a quasi‑judicial act. The case of Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning ((1948) A C 87) affords another instance of a power of a general nature being exercised in the public interest after examination of a wide range of circumstances, not only such as are existing, but also such as are desired to be brought about. The question was whether in a certain area, a new town should be created under the Town and Country Planning Act of 1932. The law required that there should be a local enquiry held publicly, where objectors should be heard, and a full report should be made of the enquiry, for the information of the Minister, before be took the step of issuing the statutory order. Such an enquiry was made, and a report was submitted to the Minister in October 1946, which he duly considered, but six months earlier in April 1946, the Minister, at a public meeting held in the locality had allowed himself to be provoked, by being jeered at when he said that he was proposing a "daring exercise in town planning", into making a declaration in the following terms: "It is no use your jeering; it is going to be done." The decision, being one relating to future development, in the larger public interest, overriding small individual interests e.g., those of local owners and occupier of dwelling‑houses, was clearly not within the concept of an act of justice or judicial act, and therefore certiorari could scarcely have been invoked. The speech of Lord Thankerton, with which the other two noble Lords who constituted the Bench, concurred, clearly shows that the statutory requirements, as to an enquiry etc. had been satisfied. The Minister's decision was challenged as having been affected by bias, and the House of Lords had no difficulty in finding that the declaration, on which the attack was founded, was made in the course' of a political speech, and was "not incon sistent with an intention to carry out any statutory duty imposed on him by Parliament". In avoidance of bias, it was found as a fact that this duty had been performed by the Minister. With respect, the decision could equally strongly have been based on the consideration that the Minister's act was not, in any relevant sense, a judicial act, capable of being controlled by certiorari, on the footing of bias or any other tenable ground. I do not propose in this judgment to attempt an exhaustive enumeration of the factors which, while arising out of the circumstances of an executive or administrative act, will be sufficient to constitute such act a judicial or quasi‑judicial act and thus amenable to the writ of certiorari. In this case however it is clear that individual rights in valuable property have been sequestrated by an action in the exercise of public power, and that action was taken under a statute which requires that there should be a finding of misconduct falling under one of eight enumerated and defined categories. The misconduct, in the terms of the definition, must be by a completed act of conduct in the past, as is clear from clause 4‑ of the Order read with clause

7. It must be found on "evidence or information" falling under two heads viz., such as may be available to the Chief Controller, or "such as may be called for by him under clause 5". Clause 5 enables the Chief Controller to require a registered trader to furnish such "evidence or information as the Chief Controller may deem necessary for the purposes of this Order" including material relating to "the organisation and conduct of the business, the financial transactions made and trade practices adopted . . . and the class and nature of the goods" to which the trade relates. Similar information submitted prior to the making of the main Order of 1952, to the Chief Controller in response to a public notice issued by him was, by sub‑clause (2) of clause 5, to be deemed to have been furnished under the Order. Clause 6 empowers the Chief Controller to appoint an officer to inspect the documents, books and accounts of traders applying for registration. (It is an open question whether this power can be exercised after registration has once been granted but that does not concern us here). It is an arguable question whether the expression "such evidence or information as may be available to him" can possibly relate to any "evidence or information" obtained otherwise than under clause

5. By employing the same expres sion "evidence or information", the legislating authority may well have intended to refer in clause 7 to the "evidence or informa tion", for the procurement of which clause 5 was intended. The information upon which the Chief Controller withdrew the franchise from the appellant Companies was made available to him from an outside source, namely, the Special Police Estab lishment. That point has not been canvassed before us in this form and is of no substantial importance. What was found to be of importance in clause 7 by the learned Judges in the High Court was the fact that there was no direct injunction to the Chief Con troller to grant to the affected party an opportunity of being heard in opposition or defence. In a careful judgment illustrated by reference to a number of important authorities the learned Judges of the Division Bench have found that three of the ordinary elements of a judicial proceeding are present in the case, namely, that there was a dispute or Its, that the decision was required to be based on evidence, and that it affected the legal rights of the parties. But they found that the parties were not entitled by the law to adduce evidence or to be heard before an adverse order could be made against them. On the point of evidence, the learned Judges have pointed out that although the Chief Controller is empowered to demand evidence or information from the trader concerned, yet he is not obliged to do so, and he may act and in the promises, had acted upon information available to him from other sources as well. They thought that if the condition were that the Chief Controller should not cancel a license unless he had first obtained information from the trader, "no license could have been liable to cancellation or suspension, because no Importer or Exporter would supply evidence against himself." Having thus disposed of the question as to what evidence was required for a proper order under the law by the Chief Controller, the learned Judges proceeded to consider whether the Chief Controller was bound to give the trader a hearing. The follow ing passage from their judgment will show very clearly the principle which the learned Judges had laid before themselves :‑ "If the manner of approach is judicial, proceedings will be judicial, otherwise these will remain executive in character. It depends in all cases on the provisions of law under which the authority is acting. If it is under a legal duty to deal with that matter judicially, i.e., to come to a decision after allowing to the parties to the dispute opportunity to adduce evidence, or to be heard, the approach is judicial . . . . If the manner of ascertaining conditions is not judicial, the approach is not judicial, and the authority will not be deemed to be acting judicially but administratively." As to the admissibility of certiorari, they observed as follows :‑ "There is in our view no warrant for the proposition that whenever approach to a matter is objective, certiorari lies. It will lie when the approach is by law enjoined to be judicial in character." Next, the learned Judges made certain general observations as to the necessity which frequently arises for the purpose of good administration that quick decisions should be taken, and that then the Legislature invests the authorities with powers to ascertain facts and to act thereon: "without resort to enquiry . . . . . after notice to the opposite party, or after any opportunity to it to adduce evidence." They then remarked as under :‑ "If the Legislature has, in the language selected by it, clearly declared its intention to exclude the person upon whom the burden of a decision is to fall from being heard, it is, we are afraid, not open to us to confer that right upon him, and impose any obligation upon the authorities to conduct itself as a Court of law. We shall in doing that, be out of the limits of our own field, be ourselves acting in excess of our jurisdiction, and be usurping the functions of the Legislature." They went on to say that observations regarding rules of natural justice appearing in the judgments of the English Courts where it is part of the Common Law, are not valid where the Legisla ture has declared its will. Finally, as to the necessity of a hearing, the learned Judges observed as follows:- " . . . . as the Controller of Exports and Imports, in suspending a license under section 4 read with section 7 of the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, is not required to act in a judicial manner, he is not amenable to a writ of certiorari. His orders are purely administrative even if they affect the rights of the subjects. He, in suspending or cancelling the licence, is not bound by law to observe the rules of natural justice. The proceedings cannot be quashed only on the ground that the Importer was not allowed an opportunity to produce evidence in defence, and has been condemned unheard. There was a clear provision in the language of law to condemn him unheard. If the Legislature had intended to prevent that, there was nothing to prevent the Legislature from inserting provisions to that effect and convert the Chief Controller's enquiry into a judicial enquiry. If that has not been done by the Legislature, we fear that there is no justification in a Court of justice to impose those limitations upon the powers of the Chief Controller." (The italicised are mine). I said earlier in this judgment that the question before the Court is whether the occasion before the Controller was one which required that justice should be done and further that it should also be seen to be done, and that here the injured party had clearly not been allowed to see how and why its valuable rights had been taken away, although the Chief Controller purported to act upon a finding of specific misconduct in the past, as to which he should at least have asked whether the Companies admitted it or not. If it was an act of justice, or judicial act, then clearly justice was not seen to be done. But was it a matter of justice at all? In so far as the case involved the imposition of a penalty for misconduct, the power of imposition being vested in the State, the elements of justice would seem to appear at least as clearly as in the case of a cognizable criminal offence. If the act be one in the dispensation of jutice then surely the superior Courts are entitled to draw it within the scope of the writ of certiorari. It is clear that the Chief Controller was not to act in a purely discretionary manner. As has been explained in the judgment of my learned brother Hamoodur Rahman, J., the scheme of the Order was to draw within its scope all persons who were operating already in the field, of Foreign trade and to make it applicable also to new‑comers. Quite clearly the intention was that traders who were already operating were not to be deprived of their source of livelihood unless they had been found guilty of one or more of certain specified pieces of mis conduct. To that extent at least, discretion was withdrawn from the Chief Controller. He had to find misconduct, and more over he had to give reasons why he was withdrawing the franchise. Ire was to do this after considering evidence or information, which he had been equipped with power to enable him to procure. The law does not provide any indication of a precise procedure to be followed, although it indicates how the franchise is to be allowed, and how it is to be withdrawn, and invests the authority with powers to enable him to procure necessary evidence or information upon which he may act. The question is thus reduced to this bearing all these circum stances in mind, is the mere omission of a direction that the affected trader should be heard, sufficient for coming to the conclusion in the direct terms adopted by the Division Bench that "there was a clear provision in the language of the law to condemn him unheard"? I am clearly of the opinion that in this particular the learned Judges of the Division Bench have not directed themselves correctly. From a mere omission to specify the procedure it can never be inferred, where the function is to a very great extent governed by express or implied judicial con siderations, to assume that it can be performed to the detriment of the rights of a party‑without hearing that party. Here, I may diverge a little from the main discussion to express regret that in our country there is no procedure similar to that of French Administrative Law which with variations appears to be in operation over the whole of Europe with the exception of the United Kingdom, on to a system of Adminis trative Courts whim prevails in the United States. Under each of these systems, there is a quasi‑judicial Tribunal provided to which a person injured by any action of a public servant performed in the exercise of public powers may have instant recourse, and these Tribunals are invested with powers to bring all the underlying processes into the light of day, and apply neces sary correction to the executive action by issuing appropriate directions to the executive authorities. In our law, apart from departmental appeals on the executive side, the judicial remedy lies only with the prerogative writs, which the superior Courts are empowered to issue: The procedure, as these cases illustrate, is cumbersome and lengthy. Four years of waiting have been imposed upon the injured party in this case, to gain redress in regard to a trading license which was its main source of livelihood. Moreover, in the exercise of the prerogative jurisdiction, the Courts are eventually reduced to the task of construction of the relevant statute, and may only interfere either by mandamus where there has been a clear violation of mandatory provisions be omission or commission or by certiorari where they find that the statutory act was essentially judicial in nature and not a purely executive act. They cannot consider the merits. Where, by expression, the act is within the discretionary field, the Courts are ordinarily powerless to interfere. In the present case, the authority could not, at will, withdraw the license. There are certain specific requirements, which have the effect of narrowing down the discretion in that respect. What has been found by the Division Bench is that the authority could, at its discretion, hold adversely to the affected party without giving that party a hearing. In my opinion, the learned Judges of the Division Bench have placed too much reliance upon the fact that the relevant law is not equipped with any directions as to procedure. That is not a requirement in every case where the law lays down a judicial process. A remarkable instance of this will be found in Chapter XXVII of the Criminal Procedure Code, dealing mainly with orders having peculiarly injurious effect on the subjects thereof, viz. with sentences of death and their confirmation by the High Courts. The whole procedure as to confirmation is contained in six sections. Section 374 prescribes that a Court passing a death sentence shall refer the case to the High Court and the sentence shall require confirmation. Section 375 empowers the High Court to obtain further evidence) in the case bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the convicted person. The next section, namely, 376 immediately proceeds to enable the High Court to confirm the sentence or pass any other legal sentence or to annul the conviction and convict the accused of any other offence of which he might have been convicted or to order a new trial or to acquit. Nothing is said as to a hearing in this section. Section 377 makes a peculiar provision, viz. that the final order of the High Court when made by two or more Judges shall be passed and signed by at least two of them. Then' in section 378 there is a provision as to the resolution of a difference of opinion in a Bench of Judges who are equally divided, in which case the case is laid with the opinions already passed before another Judge whose opinion shall be definitive. In this section for the first and only time in the Chapter, there is reference to a hearing. It speaks of such a case being "heard before a Bench of Judges and such Judges are equally divided in opinion"; and it says that the referee Judge may "order such hearing as he thinks fit." Section 379 makes con sequential provision for execution of the order made by the High Court. In section 380, there is provision made, with the utmost brevity, for action by a Magistrate of the First Class or a Sub‑Divisional Magistrate upon a case submitted to him by a Magistrate of the Third Class or the Second Class under section 562 i.e., with a recommendation that the accused person may be released on probation of good conduct. The result of the case is of the utmost importance to the accused person, but all that section 380 provides is that the referee Magistrate shall pass such sentence or order as he might think best, as if the case had originally been heard by him, and while giving him power to make further enquiry or to take additional evidence himself or through some other Magistrate say s nothing about hearing the accused person. Yet it would be obnoxious to all judicial canons and certainly contrary to the established practice that any order should be made either by the High Court or by the referee Magistrate under Chapter XXVII without hearing the accused person. The reason why there is absence of express provision for the accused to be given a hearing under Chapter XXVII is clearly that the rule of natural justice is too well‑established to require mention viz. that no person shall be condemned unheard. The purpose is stated, the powers are given, and as to procedure, the E Court knows its duty. The learned Judges of the Division Bench have drawn the opposite conclusion from their examination of the similar provision in the main order under 'examination in this case, namely, that because it contains no express mention of a hearing to be given to the affected trader, therefore, it must be understood that there is "a clear provision in the language of the law to condemn him unheard." With respect, that con clusion in direct and positive terms, is not one which the words the statute can, by a mere omission, suffice to sustain. The indicia of a true judicial act appear in those words very clearly. In my opinion, upon a true construction of the relevant instruments, and bearing in mind the established principle of natural justice that no person shall be condemned unheard, this was a case in which action taken by the Chief Controller against the appellant Companies could not validly have been taken without giving those Companies an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, I agree that in this case the writ of certiorari should issue to quash the proceedings of the Chief Controller whereby the franchise was withdrawn from these two Companies, and there should also in my opinion issue a mandamus requiring that the Chief Controller should make a fresh order after giving the affected Companies a hearing strictly in accordance with the relevant law. I would leave the parties to bear their own costs. S. A. RAHMAN, J.‑This order will deal with Civil Appeals Nos. 141 and 142 of 1960, which have come before us by special leave. In Civil Appeal No. 141, the appellants are Messrs Faridsons Ltd., Karachi, and in Appeal No. 142 they are Messrs Friederike Ltd., Karachi. The respondents to both the appeals are the Government of Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Karachi, and the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Government of Pakistan, Karachi. The appellants had sought a writ of certiorari or some other appropriate writ from the High Court of West Pakistan, to call in question the orders of the Chief Controller, by which the Import Registration Certificates of the two 'companies and the Provisional Export Registration Certificate of Messrs Faridsons Ltd., were suspended while Messrs Friederike Ltd. were held debarred from getting any Export Registration Certificate. The appellants were unsuccessful in the High Court which disposed of the two writ petitions by a consolidated order and leave was granted to appeal as several questions of general importance were raised on behalf of the two appellants. The suspension of Messrs Faridsons' Registration as Importers was communicated to them by letter, dated the 12th of August 1957, printed as Exhibit 'B' at page 95 of the Paper Book. It mentioned that Registration Certificate Number K. O. 3943 had been suspended under Clause 4 (1) (b) (c) & (g) of Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, as amended on the 17th April 1956. A request was made for return of the Registra tion Certificate. The suspension of the Provisional Export Registration was intimated by a letter Annexure `C' at the same page which bears the date, the 29th August 1957 Apparently because it was a. Provisional Export Registration Certificate, no reasons were given for the suspension order. In the Registration Order, there is no provision authorising such provisional arrange ments. In this very letter, it was intimated that Messrs Friederike Limited would be debarred from getting an Export Registration Certificate. The Managing Director of the two companies happens to be the same. The Import Registration Certificate of Messrs Friederike Ltd. was suspended by letter, dated the 8th of August 1957, printed at p. 106 of the Paper Book for reasons identical to those in the case of Messrs Faridsons. It appears that representations were made to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports against the action taken and it was pointed out that no information had been called for from the companies concerned, nor were their books or premises inspected prior to the suspension order and that reasons for the adverse orders .had not been communicated as required by law. An appeal was also sent to the Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, complaining of the procedure adopted by the Chief Controller. The writs were only filed after waiting for about eight or nine months during which no decision was taken by the Government. The High Court has held that the Chief Controller in this matter was not required by law to act judicially, that the reference to items (b) (c) and (g) of sub‑clause (1) of Clause 4 of the Registration Order was sufficient compliance with the law, that the appellants were not prejudiced by the omission to give more specific reasons justifying the action taken, that the appellants were not entitled to a show‑cause notice before the suspension of the licence and that they had no right to claim an opportunity for rebutting the opinion formed by the Chief Controller, by adducing evidence. The learned Judges further expressed the view that the rule of natural justice on the basis of which certain English decisions had proceeded to, hold that even when the authority concerned is acting in a purely administrative capacity, a fair hearing must precede the adverse decision affecting the rights of the party concerned, was not applicable to this country which was wholly governed by statute law. The conclusion was, therefore, reached that the orders passed by the Chief Controller were not subject to judicial review. As was laid down by this Court in Tariq Transport Company, Lahore v. Sargodha, Bhera Bus Service (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 437), "the true question in the case of judicial or administrative tribunals always is whether the act which is complained of is a judicial act and not whether the procedure adopted by the tribunal is judicial or quasi judicial or whether the dominant or general aspect of the tribunal is that of a judicial, quasi judicial or administrative body. A tribunal is not always furnished with the trappings of a Court, nor will such trappings make its action judicial. The character of the action taken in a given case and the nature of the right on which it operates must determine whether that action is judicial, ministerial or legislative or whether it is simply the act of a public agent". For the purposes of certiorari, one test laid down in that case for holding that the order of a public functionary would be subject to judicial review was whether that functionary had acted in the exercise of a statutory authority and was under an obligation to find the facts in a judicial or a specially prescribed manner. In that case, it was ruled : "a material departure from the procedure which has adversely affected the rights of a party would render his action liable to judicial review, even if, on the facts to be so found, the action to be taken depended on his discretion." The High Court has relied on the authority of the Tariq Transport case besides some English decisions in support of its view. The question, however, is whether the learned Judges have correctly appreciated the principles propounded in those cases and properly applied them to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. It is necessary at this stage to examine the relevant provisions of the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, in order to place the legal questions that arise for decision in their proper perspective. Clause 3 of the Order provides that "no importer or exporter who has not been granted registration by the Chief Controller shall import or export any goods into or out of Pakistan". Registration under the Order, therefore, would be sine qua non before an importer or exporter can obtain licences for the profitable business of import and export. Its denial would mean in effect the driving out of the person concerned from the import and export market. Clause 4 of the Order is in the following terms :‑ "4 (1) No importer or exporter shall be entitled to registra tion as of right, and registration may be refused, or, if granted, may be suspended or cancelled, for any of the following reasons :‑ (a) for contravening or failing to comply with any provi sion of this order ; (b) for contravening or failing to comply with any regula tion relating to import, export or foreign exchange control ; (c) for under‑invoicing or over‑invoicing the value of imports or exports (d) for selling, transferring or violating the conditions of an import or export licence issued to him by the Chief Controller or any officer authorised in this behalf ; (e) for obtaining or attempting to obtain any such licence by fraud ; (f) for evading payment of dues to the Government in connection with import and export; (g) for committing any trade practice which in the opinion of the Chief Controller is detrimental to the public interest. (2) If registration is refused, suspended or cancelled the reasons for refusal, suspension or cancellation shall be com municated by the Chief Controller to the importer or exporter concerned, who may appeal to the Central Government from the refusal or cancellation and the order of the Central Government shall be final." Clause 5 of the Order empowers the Chief Controller at any time "to require a registered importer or exporter or an importer or exporter applying for registration to furnish, in the manner prescribed such evidence or information as the Chief Controller may deem necessary for the purposes of the Order, including evidence and information relating to the organisation and conduct of the business, the financial transactions made and trade practices adopted by the importer or exporter for importing or exporting goods and the class and nature of the goods imported or exported or intended to be imported or exported". It appears that by virtue of a Public Notice No. 29 (51) 1, dated the 20th April 1951, some information had already been furnished by the importers and exporters to the Chief Controller and sub‑clause (2) of Clause 5 of the Order provides that such a firm who has already forwarded this information may supplement or correct that information by an additional communication. Clause 6 authorises the Chief Controller to direct a gazetted officer authorised by him in this behalf to inspect all documents, books and accounts relating to the import or export of goods and the premises of any importer or exporter applying for registration. Clause 7 enacts that "after the Chief Controller has examined such evidence or information as may be available to him or a, may have been called for by him under Clause 5, he may grant registration and issue a certificate in the prescribed form, or for reasons to be recorded in writing, may refuse registration or suspend or cancel registration if the importer or exporter is already registered". If the evidence or information supplied by any importer or exporter under Clause 5 is found to be incorrect in any material respect the Chief Controller by virtue of Clause 8 of the Order, would be authorised to refuse registration or where registration has already been granted to suspend or cancel it after recording his reasons which shall be communicated to the importer or exporter concerned. Similar action can be taken under this Clause against a registered importer or exporter or one applying for registration if he does not permit any officer authorised in this behalf by the Chief Controller to inspect documents, books and accounts relating to the import or export of goods and his premises. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the order of the Chief Controller was in conformity with the provisions of Clauses 4 and 7 of the Order. It will be noticed that Clause 7 prescribes that if an order adverse 'to the interest of the registered importer or exporter is passed reasons for the action have to be recorded in writing. Sub‑clause (2) of clause 4 then requires that these reasons shall be communicated to the importer or expor ter concerned, ostensibly with the object of enabling him to appeal to the Central Government. In the present case, the so‑called reasons mentioned in the impugned orders amount to a bald statement that the appellants had been guilty of contravening items.(b), (c) and (g) of sub‑clause (1) of Clause 4 of the Order. Item (b) of sub‑clause (1) of clause 4 talks of contravening or failing to comply with any regulation relating to import or export or foreign exchange control. A mere reference to this item cannot apprise the importer or exporter, of the precise charge against him. Similarly, item (c) pertains to under‑invoicing or over‑invoicing the value of imports or exports and unless it is specifically mentioned as to which part of this item has been transgressed by the person concerned, he would be left completely in the dark as regards the accusation against him. The position of item (g) is not in any way different. There is no specification of any trade practice in the impugned orders which might have been adopted by the appellants and which in the opinion of the Chief Controller was detrimental to the public interest. In these circumstances, it seems plain that the impugned orders suffer from the initial defect that they communicated no "reason" to the person concerned, leaving him to conjecture why the adverse order had been passed against him. No effective appeal could be lodged to the Central Government against such an order. The observation of the learned Judges of the High Court to the effect that no‑ elaborate statement was necessary because in appeal, the Central Government would examine the record of the Chief Controller to test his decision, seems to me, with all respect, to over simplify the situation. Without knowing the real grounds of the decision, how could the appellants con trovert them before the appellate authority? The point does not seem to have been raised in the High Court but presumably if the reasons mentioned in the original order consisted in a reference to items (b) (c) and (g) of sub‑clause (1) of clause 4 alone, that would amount to failure to support the order with legal reasons and that order would itself be bad. The object of mentioning reasons clearly was to inform the delinquent importer or exporter of the allegations against him so that if possible he might attempt to rebut them. The material collected by the Chief Controller may be partial or may come from a source inimical to the person concerned. The facts may assume a wholly different complexion in the light of explanations to be furnished by the accused party. A safeguard would thus be provided against carelessness or ignorance, though the authority may, according to its own lights be acting in good faith. It would be a poor solace to the aggrieved party to learn that the officer acting to his detriment had not done so mala fide. The formula adopted in this case by the Chief Controller, of making a reference to some of the items of sub‑clause (1) of Clause 4 was peculiarly empty of all significant content. I am disposed to hold therefore, that there has been no compliance with the provisions of sub clause (2) of clause 4 of this Order. This may, however, merely amount to saying that the communication made to the person concerned was defective but that the original order of the Chief Controller in his own file may not be open to exception and, therefore, the whole proceedings could not be declared to be invalid. In the absence of the original order of the Chief Controller, we cannot really predicate anything about its true character though perhaps the ordinary inference would not be far‑fetched that that order also contained no more "reasons" than were communicated. In that case the very foundation of the whole proceedings would disappear as it could not be said that such an order was within the four corners of the Registration Order and therefore immune from attack. The mere important question that calls for determination, however, is whether the Chief Controller was under a duty to give a show‑cause notice to the appellants before taking action against them and to give them an opportunity for offering objections. It appears that the Chief Controller perported to act on certain information which he had received against the two appellants from the Special Police Establishment. At no stage of the proceedings that information was brought to the notice of the appellants and even in the High Court the information was conveyed in a sealed cover to the learned Judges hearing the writ petitions and was not available for inspection by the appellants and their counsel. The proceedings, therefore, were entirely ex parte against the appellants so far as the Chief Controller's action was concerned. A plain reading of the provisions of the Order clearly leads to the inference that the Chief Controller had to certain facts objectively, before he could take action adverse to the appellants in respect of their registration. Clause 7 makes this clear and it then becomes incumbent on the Chief Controller to put down the reasons for the action in writing. There may be no right in a person to obtain registration as an importer or exporter. Once having been registered however, he is enabled to run a profitable business and he cannot be deprived of it unless he can be found to have committed some specific act against the provisions of clause 4 or is found guilty of supplying incorrect information under clause

5. The suspension or cancellation of a registration would be a serious matter for the importer or the exporter concerned. No licence could be granted to him for import or export hence forward and the action taken would further cause loss of prestige and reputation to him in the commercial world. This Court laid it down as rule in Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak (P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 45), that the maxim : audi alteram partem‑"No man shall be condemned unheard", applies to judicial as well as administrative bodies, specially where the proceedings taken may affect the person or property or other rights of the parties concerned in the dispute. Even if therefore the proceedings before the Chief Controller were neither strictly judicial nor even quasi‑judicial in character, the principle of natural justice embodied in the above maxim could be called in aid by the appellants. The High Court was in error in holding that this principle. was a peculiarity of English Law and could not be invoked in this country where statute law covers the relevant field of litigation. This principle is of universal application where the statute itself prescribes no specific procedure for ascertaining the necessary facts and no express exclusion of the principle can be spelt out of the words of the statute. As Byles, J. observed in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (143 E R 414) : "Although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the Common Law, will supply the omission of the Legislature". In Patterson v. District Commis sioner of Accra (1948 A C 341, 349), the Privy Council held against the application of the principle because the power was to be exercised by the relevant authority in that case after inquiry, if necessary, implying in consequence that inquiry was not essential in every case. No words of similar import occur in the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952. Indeed clauses 5, 6 and 7 of the Order would tend to support the opposite inference. In Russel v. Russel (14 Ch. D 471 at p. 478), Jessel M.R. quoted with approval from an earlier decision, the following passage :‑ "They are bound in the exercise of their functions, by the rule expressed in the maxim, audi alteram partem, that no man shall be condemned to consequences resulting from alleged misconduct unheard and without having the opportunity of making his defence." This rule, according to the learned Judge, was not confined to the conduct of strictly legal tribunals but was applicable to every Tribunal or body of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences to individuals. Similar principles were laid down in Stofford v. Minister of Health ((1946) 1 K B 621), and the Board of Education v. Rice (1911 A C 179 at p. 182). In the last‑mentioned case, Lord Loreburn L. C. remarked that " `They' (that is, those who are to make orders) `can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving‑a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view'." In the instant case there was no question of a mere exercise of discretion to grant a privilege like a licence to the appellants. The action savoured of inquisition and a determination of guilt and clearly the requirements of a notice coupled with an oppor tunity of hearing in advance were attracted to the case. Such a procedure was not followed by the Chief Controller. In my opinion therefore the orders passed by him were vitiated by his failure to follow the principles of natural justice. The question then is whether the remedy of certiorari is available in a case of this kind or not. It is argued (and this was the view that found favour with the High Court) that the act of the Chief Controller could not be described as of judicial or quasi‑judicial character, being a purely administrative act and therefore certiorari would not lie. The High Court relied in this connection mainly on Nakhuda Ali v. Javratne (P L D 1951 P C 102), and the decision of this Court in the Tariq Transport Co. v. Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 437). The Tariq Transport case was decided on the footing that no private rights were involved in matters coming up for decision before the Regional Transport Authority who must‑ decide in accordance with what they conceive to be larger public interests. The present case has distinguishing features in this respect, as has been shown above. In Nakhuda Ali's case, the Controller of Textiles in Ceylon had cancelled a licence granted by him under the Defence (Control of Textiles) Regulation, 1945. That enact ment provided for the infliction of the penalty of cancellation on "reasonable grounds" within the belief of the Controller. The Judicial Committee held that the English Common Law would apply to the case, that reasonable grounds must exist in fact and not merely in the mind of the Controller, that the cancellation of the licence was executive and not judicial action and that even if this were not so, the Controller had acted in accordance with natural justice in so far as an opportunity to explain the material available against the licensee and to inspect the docu ments which had given rise to suspicion, had been accorded to him. In view of this last finding, it was not perhaps necessary to consider the other points raised in that case. Be that as it may, the dictum of the Privy Council laid down therein that it was not enough that a body should have legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and that there must be superadded to it a duty "to act judicially", seems to run counter to a long line of decisions in the English Courts, extending back for more than a century, in which administrative decisions affecting individuals' rights and liberties were quashed if the party concerned had not been given a fair opportunity to make objection. Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Words (143 E R 414), Bruthen v. Vestry of St. George's Hanover Square (1871 L R 13 Eq. 339), Smith v. R. (3 A C 624) and Hopkins v. Smithwick Local Board of Health ((1890) 24 Q B D 712) are representative of this class of cases. Perhaps in some of those cases the term `judicial' was somewhat loosely used. In fact it was not the power exercised by the Bodies in question that was judicial but the procedure which the Courts held, must be followed, before the power could be legitimately exercised. The special meaning that the term "Judicial" had acquired is exemplified by the observation of Wills J, in Hopkins v. Smitwhich Local Board of Health, when the case was in the Queen's Bench Division, expressed in these signi ficant words : "In condemning a man to have his house pulled down, a judicial act is as much implied as in fining him 5". The principle was accepted by the Court of Appeal in that case. Again, there was the dictum of the House of Lords Per Lord Loreburn L. C. in the Board of Education v. Rice (1911 A C 182), that an administrative authority "must act in good faith and listen fairly to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every one who decides anything". This line was consistently followed in later cases arising under the Housing Acts, till the House of Lords decided the case of Franklin v. Minster of Town and Country Planning (1948 A C 87) in 1947. That and Nakhuda Ali's case appear to mark a depar ture from the previously established judicial tradition. In the course of evolution of precedent law, the prefix "quasi" was added to the word "judicial" to distinguish cases in which the substance rather than the forms of an impartial fact‑finding was insisted upon. Even as late as 1924, the principle was armed in R. v. Electricity Commissioners ((1924) 1 K B 171 at p. 205), that certiorari extends to control the proceedings of bodies which do not claim to be and would not be recognised as 'Courts' but have to act "judicially" though the order be administrative in character. The remedy by way of certiorari in several cases was apparently regarded as co‑extensive with the subject's right not to be condemned unheard. With all respect, it seems to me that the judicial pendulum has swung to the other in extreme Franklin and Nakhudd Ali's cases. It is pertinent to note that the Privy Council itself in a previous case reported as Smith v. The Queen ((1878) 3 A C 614), rested their decision to relieve against the order of forfeiture of a land‑lease (apparently an administrative Act) on what they described as "broader grounds" embodied in the following observations at p. 625 of the report :‑ "It appears to them that the Defendant has not been heard in the sense in which `a hearing' has been used in the cases which have been quoted in (sic) many others, and ‑in the sense required by the elementary principles of natural justice. The Commissioner doubtless acted with perfect good faith, but apparently without being aware that he was performing a judicial function, or even a function of a judicial nature." Opportunity to ‑answer charges, the evidence in support of which was withheld was characterised by their Lordships as "illusory". In comparing this case with Nakhuda Ali's case, the question may well be posed whether the act of the Commissioner of Crown Lands was any more judicial than that of the Ceylon Controller of Textiles in revoking a licence to deal in Textiles? Loss of one's business would be as good or as bad an expropriation as loss of one's land. However, the point need not be laboured further and I would be inclined to say that the present case fails within the second category of cases envisaged by the Judicial Committee in Smith's case as it involved a "function of a judicial nature" in not a strictly "judicial" act. In my humble judgment, therefore, the order of the Chief Controller could be brought up for being dealt with, in certiorari. In the alternative, if that writ is strictly not available, I would be disposed to treat the orders of the Chief Controller as inoperative in law and would issue a mandamus to him to give the appellants a chance to object and rebut the material which has been used against them and then dispose of the matters in accordance with law. I would, therefore, allow the appeal and quash the orders passed by the Chief Controller in these two cases but would leave the parties to bear their own costs. FAZLE‑AKBAR, J.‑I also agree with the order proposed by may Lord the Chief Justice, but would like to add a few words of my own. The facts leading up to the present appeal have been fully set out in the judgment of my learned brother Rahman, J., and it is not necessary to repeat the same. The Administrative authorities, may be classified into two groups : first those that may be called Tribunals or quasi‑judicial bodies and secondly, those that are mere administrators. As regards the first category, apart from particular statutory requirements, the Courts have insisted upon their conforming to certain legal principles. As regards the second category, the control of the Court is generally confined to compelling them to do or to abstain from doing any specific act which any statute positively requires them to do or to abstain from doing. The criteria to ascertain. whether a particular act is a judicial act or an administrative one has been laid down with clarity in Rex v. Electricity Commissioner ((1924)1 KB171), Rex v. London County Council Ex‑Parte Entertainments Protection Association Ltd. ((1931)2KB215) and authoritatively restated by this Court in the case of Tariq Transport Company v. Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service and others (1958 (2) (Pak.) S C R 71 =P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 437). In the above, case, this Court observed at page 95 :‑ "A Tribunal acts judicially in the full sense of the term if ; (1) It has to determine a dispute ; (2) The dispute relates to a right or liability which, whatever, its immediate aspects, is ultimately referable to some right or liability, recognised by the Constitution or Statute or by custom or equity which by the domestic law is declared to be the rule of decision ; (3) Since every right or liability depends upon facts, the Tribunal is under an obligation to discover relevant facts ; (4) The ascertainment of the facts in the presence of the parties either of whom is entitled to produce evidence in support of its respective case and to question the truth of the evidence produced by his opponent ; and (5) After an investigation of the facts and hearing legal arguments the Tribunal renders a judgment which so far as the Tribunal is concerned terminates the dispute. In the case of an administrative tribunal, however, the emphasis is on policy, expediency and discretion to enable it to achieve the object with which it was set up. In the case of such a Tribunal the approach in determining the relevant facts is, therefore, often subjective and not objective, there being generally no lis before it in which the parties are arrayed against each other for the enforcement of a private right or liability and who for that purpose are entitled to produce evidence and adduce legal argument. The word "quasi" as prefixed to the word "judicial" may either indicate that the Tribunal is not acting purely administratively or that it is acting in a manner in which a judicial Tribunal is expected to act." Dealing with the same subject Halsbury in his Laws of England, Vol. 11, 3rd Edition at pages 56 and 57 says‑ "Moreover an administrative body, whose decision is actuated in whole or in part by questions of policy, may be under a duty to act judicially in the course of arriving at that decision. Thus if in order to arrive at the decision, the‑body concerned had to consider proposals and objections and consider evidence, if at some stage of the proceedings leading up to the decision there was something, in the nature of a lis before it, then in the course of such consideration and at that stage the body would be under a duty to act judicially. If, on the other band, an administrative body in arriving at its decision had before it at no stage any form of lis and throughout has to consider the question from the point of view of policy and expediency, it cannot be said that it is under a duty at any time to act judicially." Applying the aforesaid test let us scrutinise the relevant pro visions of the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952 as amended in 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Order). Section 3 lays down that‑ "No importer or exporter who has not been granted regis tration by the Chief Controller shall import or export any goods into or out of Pakistan." Section 4 (1) says that the registration if granted may be suspended or cancelled, for any of the following reasons (a) For contravening or failing to comply with any provision of this Order; (b) for contravening or failing to comply with any regulation relating to import, export or foreign control ; (c) for under‑invoicing or over‑invoicing the value of imports or exports ; (d) for selling, transferring or violating the 'conditions of an import or export licence issued to him by the Chief Controller or any officer authorised in this behalf ; (e) for obtaining or attempting to obtain any such licence by fraud ; (f) for evading payment of dues to the Government in con nection with import and export; (g) for committing any trade practice which in the opinion of the Chief Controller is detrimental to the public interest ; (h) for committing breach of any order of the Central or Provincial Government regarding price or distribution of imported goods, or quality standards and prices of imported goods ; (i) for conviction in a Court of law for an offence relating to trade, commerce or industry; (j) for non‑possession of real assets in Pakistan to the extent considered adequate by the Central Government." Section 4 (2) provides for appeal against an order of the Chief Controller in these terms":‑ "If registration is refused, suspended or cancelled the reasons for refusal, suspension or cancellation shall be communicated by the Chief Controller to the importer or exporter concerned, who may appeal to the Central Government from the refusal, suspension or cancellation and the order of the Central Govern ment shall be final." Section 5 (1) empowers the Chief Controller to call for evidence and information relating to the organization of a registered importer or exporter in these terms :‑ "The Chief Controller may at any time require a registered importer or exporter of an importer or exporter applying for registration to furnish in the manner prescribed by the Chief Controller, such evidence or information as the Chief Controller may deem necessary for the purpose of this Order, including evidence and information relating to the organization and con duct of the business, the financial transactions made and trade practices adopted by the importer or exporter for importing or exporting goods and the class and nature of the goods imported or exported or intended to be imported or exported." Under section 6; the Chief Controller‑ "may direct a Gazetted Officer authorised by him in this behalf to inspect all documents, books and accounts relating to the import or export of goods and the premises of any importer or exporter applying for registration." Section 7 runs thus :, "After the Chief Controller has examined such evidence or information as may be available to him or as may have been called for by him under clause 5, he may grant registration and issue certificate in the prescribed form, or for reasons to be recorded in writing, may refuse registration or suspend or cancel registration of the importer or exporter if already registered." Sections 4 to 7 may be divided into four parts, namely, (i) the Chief Controller before cancelling or suspending the regis tration should form an opinion that one of the reasons mentioned in section 4 (l) exists ; (ii) with a view to form the said opinion he may call for evidence and information relating to the organi zation of the firm concerned ; (iii) after forming opinion he should give reasoned order in writing ; and (iv) his order shall be appeal able to the Central Government. By cancelling a registration the Chief Controller is depriving a registered firm of some legal right. Therefore the dispute between the authority and the aggrieved firm comprehends an objection in vindication of a private right. Hence in my opinion the order imposes a duty on the Chief Controller to act at least in a quasi judicial manner in the course of arriving at his decision. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned Attorney‑General that the function of the Chief Controller under the Order is purely administrative. In support of his contention the learned Attorney‑General has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Tariq Transport Company. At first sight the facts of the above case may appear to have some analogy to those in the present case, but a closer scrutiny will disclose essential difference in fundamentals. In Tariq Transport Company's case the question was whether the applicants had a legal right to the grant of the permits whereas in the instant case the question is not of grant of permit, or registration but that of cancellation and suspension of registration. In other words, the question is whether the Chief Controller has deprived them of a legal right in accord ance with the procedure laid down in the Order. Furthermore, the proceedural steps under the two statutes are also not similar. Therefore the decision in Tariq Transport Company's case is not of any help to decide the present case which turns upon the cons truction of the provisions of a different order. For the reasons stated above, I hold that an order of the Chief Controller suspending a registration under the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952 is a quasi‑judicial order. The next question is whether the Chief Controller suspended the registration judicially in the manner prescribed by the Order On the 8th August 1957, he sent the following letter to the appellants Messrs Friederike Ltd.:‑ "I write to inform you that your Registration No. K. O. 3970 has been suspended under clause 4 (1) (b), (c) and (g) of the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952 as amended on 17‑4‑

56. Kindly return the Registration Certificate." On the 12th August 1957, he addressed a similar letter to the appellant Messrs Faridsons Ltd. This was hardly a satisfactory way of dealing with the matter. He should have by all means given in his order reasonings for suspending the registration. It will I think be absurd to suggest that mere mention of the clauses (b), (c) and (g) will be sufficient compliance with the Order. If the power of suspension had rested solely in the hands of only one authority like the Chief Controller without his order being amenable to an appeal the position might have been different but section 4 (2) of the Order gives a right of appeal against his order to the Central Government. Further, section 7 says that the Chief Controller may "for reasons recorded in writing may cancel or suspend registration". Where there is a right vested in an authority created by a statute, be it administrative or quasi- judicial, to give reasoned orders in writing it becomes his duty his decide the case in an objective manner. The provisions of section 5 also clearly impose such a duty on the Chief Controller. In these circumstances, I think that the Chief Controller should have given an opportunity to the appellants to represent their case. From the above, it is clear that not only the Chief Controller did not conform to norms of judicial procedure in suspending the registrations, but also failed to observe the steps and methods pres cribed by the Order. The procedure adopted by the Chief Controller was to say the least, unfair and unreasonable. If it is assumed that his order was a purely administrative one, even then it will be difficult to support his order. It is well recog nised that a statutory functionary exercising administrative power must conform to the steps and methods prescribed in the Act. As pointed out by the House of Lords in Board of Education v. Rice (1911 A C 179 at p.181,), that a functionary who has to decide an adminis trative matter, of the nature involved in this case, can obtain the material on which he is to act in such manner as may be feasible and convenient provided that the affected party had a fair opportunity "of correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view", The appellants were, how ever, not given any such opportunity in the present case. Nor did the Chief Controller state clearly the reasons for his opinion. It is thus clear that he his not determined the question which he is required by the Order to determine. I, therefore, hold that the order in this case was also not in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Order. For the reasons stated above, I would allow this appeal with costs. B. Z. KAIKAUS, J.‑Two main questions arise in this case. The first is whether the failure to communicate reasons to the appel lants vitiates the order of the Chief Controller. The second is whether the appellants were entitled to an opportunity to show cause. So far as the first point is concerned, the contention on behalf of the respondents is that it was sufficient to state in the order the sub‑clauses of clause 4 of the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, on account of which the registration was being cancelled, and it was not necessary to state the facts. I am unable to agree that this will be sufficient compliance with clause 4 (2) wherein it is provided that the Chief Controller shall communicate to the importer or exporter concerned the reasons for the refusal, etc. The obvious intention of communicating the grounds to the person concerned is that he may file an appeal because clause 4 (2) is primarily concerned with the right of appeal. If the person concerned is simply told that the licence has been cancelled in accordance with clause 4 (1) (b) (c) and (g) of the said Order, as has been done in the present case, he receives no information as to the case against him and will not be in a position to file an appeal. It is pertinent to observe here that clause 4 (1) (b) speaks of contravening or failing to comply with any regulation relating to import, export, or foreign exchange control and the order which was sent to the appellants does not even mention what particular regulation had been contravened. Clause (c) simi larly refers to under‑invoicing or over‑invoicing and the order of the Chief Controller does not say whether they have been guilty of under‑invoicing or over‑invoicing. Clause (g) refers to any trade practice which, in the opinion of the Chief Controller, is detrimental to the public interest and the order does not state what trade practice is being objected to. I am of the opinion that it is necessary to communicate to the person concerned the subs tance of the findings of the Chief Controller on the basis of which the order of concellation etc., has been passed, and it is not suf ficient compliance with the section to refer only to a particular sub-clause under which the case falls. As regards the question whether the appellants were entitled to an opportunity to show cause, it is true that there is in the relevant sections no express provision as to the right of the person proceeded against to be heard. But there is, at the same time, nothing in the section militating against the grant of an oppor tunity to show cause and, considering the nature of the proceed ings, it is not difficult to presume an intention, to give the person concerned a proper opportunity of defending himself, unless we are to hold that the legislature intended to violate principles of natural justice. The proceedings with which we are concerned are in the nature of penal proceedings. The Controller has to find under clause 4 whether the person concerned has been guilty P of the various acts referred to in clause 4 (1) of the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952. It is impossible to assume that the legislature intended the decision of such questions behind the back of the person concerned and without an opportunity to him of meeting the allegations against him. The finding of the Controller may be of grave consequence to a person who depends for his living only on import and export business. A finding once given may debar the person concerned for ever from secur ing 'an import or export licence. The consequence may be far more serious than in a criminal case where only fine can be impos ed. The right of appeal would not by itself provide sufficient opportunity of showing cause, for evidence has to be adduced and explanations submitted before the officer who originally deals with the matter, and there is a good deal of difference between the approach of an Appellate Authority and an Original Autho rity. If there is no proper opportunity of hearing before the original Authority, the right of being heard by the Appellate Authority may be altogether illusory. The question as to what are the elements which will makeup a judicial proceeding so as to subject it to certiorari jurisdiction is one on which not much help can be derived from authority, and as to which there is apparent conflict between decisions which it is difficult to resolve. I went into this question thoroughly in Muhammad Hussain Khan v. Federation of Pakistan and another (P L D 1956 Kar. 538). I found that proceedings are judicial if the matter has to be decided on evidence produced and after opportunity to the person concerned to meet the case against him, and the determination can form the basis of an order entailing civil consequences to a party. To the view which I took in that judgment I stick. In the present case, the Chief Controller had to act only on evidence by which I mean, as I explained in that judgment, all the material before him, though it does not come to him in formal manner there has to be an opportunity to show‑cause against all such material; and there are serious civil consequences to the party, and therefore all the elements constituting a judicial proceeding are present. Admittedly, there had been no opportunity to the appellant to show cause in the present case and the order of the Chief Con troller should be quashed on that ground. As the order is being quashed, it is not necessary to consider what would be the effect and what would be the order which could be passed, if the appel lants had succeeded on the first ground alone, namely, that clause 4 of the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, had not been complied with inasmuch as that reasons bad not been communicated to the appellants. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.‑These two appeals, by special leave, arise out of the judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, disposing of two writ petitions filed by the appellants herein for the issuance of writs of certiorari for quashing certain orders passed by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Government of Pakistan, whereby the import and export registration certificates issued in favour of the first named appellant and the import registration certificate issued in favour of the second named appellant were suspended and the latter was also debarred from getting any export registration certificate. It appears that after the promulgation of the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, the appellant Faridsons Limited was granted, in terms of Clause 3 of the said Order, an import registration certificate No. K. O.‑ 3943 sometime in the year 1952, and the appellant Friederike Limited was granted a similar import certificate No. K. O. 3970. Subsequently in 1953 Faridsons Limited were also granted, under the same provisions, an export registration certificate being No. Export/W/006399. The appellant Friederike Limited was not, however, granted any separate export registration certificate. Both the appellants were carrying on business of import and export and under the certificates Messrs Faridsons Limited held categories for some nine times of the aggregate value of Rs. 10,35,800 and the other appellant had categories of four items of the aggregate value of Rs. 8,60,

000. It is alleged that whilst these appellants were carrying on their aforesaid business as such registered importers and exporters, the respondent No. 2 herein without any previous notice purported to cancel the import registration certificates of Messrs Friederike Limited and Messrs Faridsons Limited by two letters dated the 8th of August 1957 and the 12th of August 1957, respectively. Sub sequently on the 29th of August 1957 the said respondent also purported to cancel the export registration certificate of Messrs Faridsons Limited and to debar the other appellant from getting any export registration certificate. The appellants promptly protested against, what they called, the high‑handed action of the respondent and called upon him to cancel the said orders, but received no replies whatsoever. Their representations to the appropriate Ministry also remained unanswered. They then preferred appeals to the Government but the appeals also remained un-disposed of, in spite of their repeated requests for the early hearing thereof, even up to the year 1958. In these circumstances, the appellants who had as a result of the aforesaid suspension orders been completely dislodged from the trade market, were compelled to move the High Court of West Pakistan on the 18th of November 1958 for the issuance of an appropriate writ for the quashing of the aforesaid orders and for consequential directions for the grant of certificates for the relevant shipping periods. It will be convenient at this stage to set out the communica tions by which the said certificates were purported to be suspended :‑ "Registered No. Reg. (A‑G) KO 3970/746/57 Government of Pakistan Office of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Karachi. the 8th August 1957. To Messrs Friederike Ltd., Garden Road, Karachi. Gentlemen, Sub:‑REGISTRATION AS IMPORTERS. I write to inform you that your Registration Number K. O. 3970 has been suspended under Clause 4 (1) (b), (c) and (g) of Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, as amended on 17‑4‑1956. Kindly return the Registration Certificate. Yours faithfully, (Sd.) S. A. S. ZAIDI, for Chief Controller of Imports and Exports." "No. Regn. (A‑G) K. O. 3943/746/57 Government of Pakistan Office of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Karachi. the 12th August 1957. To Messrs Faridsons Ltd., 5‑Bandukwala Building, McLeod Road, KARACHI. Gentlemen, Sub:‑REGISTRATION AS IMPORTER. I write to inform you that your Registration Certificate Number KO 3943 has been suspended under Clause 4 (1) (b), (c) and (g) of Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952 as amended on 17‑4‑

56. Kindly return the Registration Certificate. Yours faithfully, (Sd.) S. A. S. ZAIDI, for Chief Controller of Imports and Exports." "No. 295/576‑Ex. 1/57 Government of Pakistan Office of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (Export Wing) Custom House, Karachi, the 29th August 1957. Provisional Export Registration Certificate bearing No. Export/W/006399 dated 30‑1‑1957, issued in favour of Messrs Farid Sons Ltd. 5, Bundukwala Building, McLeod Road, Karachi, is hereby suspended, and they are requested to return immediately the same to the undersigned. Messrs Friederike Ltd., Garden Road, Karachi, is also hereby debarred from getting Export Registration Certificate. (Sd.) B. HUSSAIN, Assistant Controller of Imports and Export: for the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. To Messrs Faridsons Ltd., 5, Bandukwala Building, McLeod Road, Karachi. Messrs Friederike Ltd., Garden Road, Karachi." It will be noticed from the above that the orders relating to the suspension of the import registration certificates merely stated that they bad been suspended under paragraphs (b), (c) and (g) of Clause 4 (1) of the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, as amended on 17‑4‑1956, but in the case of the suspension of the export registration certificate the communication concerned did not even indicate under what provision of the law action was taken. The appellants sought ‑to challenge the validity of these orders on the ground that under the provisions of the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, as amended on 17‑4‑1956, the refusal of the certificate or its cancellation or suspension could only be made in accordance with the procedure therein prescribed, and maintained that thereunder a duty was cast upon the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports to decide in a judicial manner, after giving to the appellants an opportunity to show cause, whether in fact any of the grounds, upon which such cancellation or suspension could be made, existed or not. If the Chief Con troller came to the finding, after examining the evidence produced by the appellants that grounds did exist for such cancellation or suspension, then he could only order such cancellation or suspen sion, as the case may be, for reasons to be recorded in writing, and had thereafter to communicate the said reasons to the appel lants in order to enable them to prefer an appeal if they so desired. They complained, therefore, that in so far as the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports had not done any of these things, he bad acted in an arbitrary and high‑handed manner in violation of the principles of natural justice and, therefore, his order should be quashed. The High Court of West Pakistan, after an exhaustive exami nation of the provisions of the said Order and a large number of decisions both of this Court and of Courts in England, came to the conclusion that as the relevant provisions of the Order in question did not confer any right upon the appellants to be heard, there was no duty cast upon the Chief Controller to act in a judicial manner and, as such, the appellants could not question the validity of the impugned orders on either the ground that no notice to show cause had been issued to them or that they had not been given any opportunity of adducing evidence or of being heard. Nor were the appellants, according to the High Court, entitled to make a grievance of the fact that no detailed reasons for the suspension orders had been communicated to them, as the reference in the orders to three of the paragraphs of Clause 4 (1) was a sufficient compliance with the letter of the law, under which the Chief Controller bad acted. For these reasons the writ petitions were dismissed with cost. The appellants now complain that the High Court had totally misconceived the scope of the functions of the Chief Controller under the said Order of 1952 and misapplied the principles laid down by this Court in several cases for the ascertainment of the true nature and scope of proceedings before such authorities empowered to take decisions affecting the rights of subjects. Before I take up for consideration the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants in support of these appeals it will be appro priate to set out first the relevant provisions of the Registration (Importers and Exporters) Order, 1952, as amended in 1956, for, upon their proper construction alone can the questions raised, be answered: "3 (1) No Importer or Exporter who has not been granted registration by the Chief Controller shall Import or Export any goods into or out of Pakistan. (2) In the case of a firm established in Pakistan and having branches in Pakistan :‑ (a) in East Bengal, registration shall be granted. (i) in East Bengal only to the parent firm, and (ii) outside East Bengal, only to one of such branches. (b) if the firm is established outside East Bengal, registra tion shall be granted‑ (i) outside East Bengal, only to the parent firm, and (ii) in East Bengal, only to one of such branches. (3) No registered firm or branch shall be eligible to apply for import or export licences to an office of a licensing authority other than that indicated in the public notices issued by the Chief Controller inviting applications for such licences from time to time. 4 (1) No importer or exporter shall be entitled to registra tion as of right, and registration may be refused, or if gran ted may be suspended or cancelled, for any of the following reasons :‑ (a) for contravening or failing to comply with any pro vision of this Order ; (b) for contravening or failing to comply with any regu lation relating to import, export or foreign exchange control; (c) for under‑invoicing or over‑invoicing the value of imports or exports ; (d) for selling, transferring or violating the conditions of an import or export licence issued to him by the Chief Con troller or any officer authorised in this behalf ; (e) for obtaining or attempting to obtain any such licence by fraud ; (f) for evading payment of dues to the Government in con nection with import and export; (g) for committing any trade practice which in the opinion of the Chief Controller is detrimental to the public interest ; (h) for committing breach of any Order of the Central of Provincial Government regarding price or distribution of imported goods; or quality, standards and prices of exported goods; (i) for conviction in a Court of law for an offence relating to trade, commerce or industry; (j) for non‑possession of real assets in Pakistan to the extent considered adequate by the Central Government ; and (2) If registration (s .refused, suspended or cancelled the reasons for refusal, suspension or cancellation shall be communi cated by the Chief Controller to the importer or exporter con cerned, who may appeal to the Central Government from the refusal, suspension or cancellation and the order of the Central Government shall be final. 5. (1) the Chief Controller may at any time require a regis tered importer or exporter or an importer or exporter applying for registration to furnish, in the manner prescribed by the Chief Controller, such evidence or information as the Chief Controller may deem necessary for the purpose of this Order, including evidence and information relating to the organization and conduct of the business, the financial transactions made and trade practices adopted by the importer or exporter for importing or exporting goods and the class and nature of the goods imported or exported or .intended to be imported or exported. (2) Information already furnished in response to the Chief Controller's Public Notice No. 29‑ (51) 1, dated the 20th April 1951 shall be deemed to have been furnished in the manner prescribed under this Order provided that such firm may, by a date to be fixed by the Chief Controller in this behalf, submit any additional information with a view to completing or correcting such information, and the Chief' Controller in fixing a date as aforesaid may fix different dates for different areas.

6. The Chief Controller may direct a gazetted officer autho rised by him in this behalf to inspect all documents, books and accounts relating to the import or export of goods and the premises of any importer or exporter applying for regis tration.

7. After the Chief Controller has examined such evidence or information as may be available to him as or as may have been called for by him under clause 5, he may grant registration and issue a certificate in the prescribed form, or for reasons to be recorded in writing, may refuse registration or suspend or cancel registration if the importer or exporter is already registered." It will be observed that under the terms of the said Order the rights of traders to carry on the business of import and export were seriously curtailed, for, after the promulgation of the Order no one, who did not possess a certificate of registration under clause 3, could carry on such business. But since this Order came to be promulgated at a stage when a large number of persons were already engaged in the foresaid business, care appears to have been taken to lay down some kind of a scheme to prevent any arbitrary weeding out of traders. The provisions set out above thus treat the refusal of registration and its cancellation or sus pension in the same manner and provide a common procedure for the taking of the aforesaid actions. Sub‑clause (1) of Clause 4 specifically categorises the grounds upon which registration may be refused, suspended or cancelled, sub‑clause (2) thereof expressly gives a right of appeal to the person who is refused registration or whose registration is cancelled or suspended and prescribes that the reason for the refusal, cancellation or suspension shall be communicated to the importer or exporter concerned, Clause 5 empowers the Chief Controller, for the purposes of such refusal, cancellation or suspension to call for such evidence or information as he may deem necessary from the persons concerned in respect of a variety of things including the conduct of business, financial transactions and trade practices observed and this he may do at any time and in any manner he may choose to prescribe. By Clause 6 the Chief Controller is authorised to have the books, documents, accounts and premises of any importer or exporter inspected by a gazetted officer in the case of persons applying for registration. Thereafter, under Clause 7 the Chief Controller has been given the power after examining "such evidence or informa tion as may be available to‑him or as may have been called for by him under Clause 5" to refuse registration or suspend or cancel registration but in this case a further duty is cast upon him to record in writing the reasons for such refusal, suspension or cancellation. This scheme, to my mind, was designed to assure bona fide importers and exporters that their right to carry on their business will not be adversely affected unless they indulge in any of the forms of malpractices enumerated in Clause 4 of the Order and that too after due inquiry has been made into the allegations of such malpractices by a responsible officer upon the basis of credible information or reliable evidence. In order further to safeguard such a person from any risk of any arbitrary action it has been expressly provided that the reason for the adverse action, if any, taken must be recorded in writing and communicated to the person concerned in order to enable him to avail of the right given to prefer an appeal to the Central Government from the order of the Chief Controller. The question that now arises for consideration is whether in view of this scheme the Chief Controller can be said, as contended on behalf of the appellants, to have been charged with a duty to act in the manner of a judicial Tribunal and to come to a judicial decision. The Order has, of course, prescribed no qualifications for the Chief Controller who may, therefore, well be a executive officer untrained in the procedure of judicial proceedings. Apart from this, the learned Attorney‑General contends, that since under the terms of the Order no right of being heard has been conferred and there is no lis in the strict sense of the term between the importer or exporter and any other person, the Order has done no more than vest the Chief Controller with a discretion to grant or refuse registration or to suspend or cancel registration, if already granted. He further contends that the grant and refusal of registration stands on the same footing as the grant or refusal of a licence, which is in the nature of a privilege. This, he points out, has also been expressly emphasized in the Order itself by clearly stating in Clause 4 that no importer or exporter is entitled, as of right, to registration. In so far, at any rate, as the grant or refusal of registration is concerned, reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Tariq Transport Company, Lahore v. The Sargodha Bhera Bus Service and others (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 437) and S. S. Mirana Ltd. v. The Chief Commissioner, Karachi ( P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 134), to show that the registering authority acts in an administrative capacity and not in any judicial or quasi judicial capacity. Furthermore, it is argued, since the suspension and cancellation of registration have, under the Order, been lumped together with the grant or refusal of registration and treated in the same manner, the intention of the Order appears to be clearly to clothe them also with the same characteristics as an order refusing registration. It is true that under the terms of the Order there is no right to registration nor any specific right of an oral hearing and it cannot be said that a party applying for registration comes with a lis before the registering authority, for, there is in such cases no party who is intended to oppose the grant of the registration nor is the registering authority called upon to decide upon the com peting claims of the applicant and the person seeking to resist the registration. This however, does not mean that in no case can an adminis trative body be under a duty to act judicially if the proceedings before it do not partake of the characteristics of legal proceedings and if there is no lis inter partes before it. The decisions relied upon by the learned Attorney‑General do not, in my humble opinion, lay down any such wide principle. In the case of Tariq Transport Company, Munir, C. J., pointed out that:‑ "A tribunal is not always furnished with the trappings of a Court, nor will such trappings make its action judicial. The character of the action taken in a given case and the nature of the right on which it operates must determine whether that action is judicial, ministerial or legislative or whether it is simply the act of a public agent," and indicated the criterion to be adopted in determining the true nature of the functions of such an official thus:‑ "In certiorari the initial question is whether the official whose action is called in question was acting under a law. If he was not, the act was that of a mere public agent and action at law and not certiorari is the remedy. If, however, public func tionary has acted in exercise of a statutory authority, then the question to be determined is whether he was the sole judge of facts and of the necessity, expediency, advisability or reason ableness of the action to be taken. If the reply be in the affirmative, he was not acting judicially and his discretion is not liable to judicial review. But if he was under an obligation to find the facts in a judicial or specially prescribed manner, a material departure from the procedure which has adversely affected the rights of a party would render his acting liable to judicial review, even if, on the facts to be so found, the action to be taken depended on his discretion." If this be the test, then a body or official may be under a duty to act judicially even though there is no form of lis before it but it or he has to determine a question solely on the facts of a particular case and on the evidence before it apart from questions of policy, expediency or other extraneous matters. It is unnecessary to multiply authorities on this question, for, they have been exhaustively reviewed in the decision referred to earlier but what can be gathered from them is that the duty to ' act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances which cannot be defined either exhaustively or with any degree of preci sion. The consensus of judicial opinion, however, is in favour of the view that if upon an administrative body has been cast the duty to decide rights after ascertaining facts concerning specified matters and not merely on consideration of policy or expediency, then it is under an obligation to act judicially even though there is not, in the strict sense, any lis before it and even though it is not called upon to administer oath or examine witnesses or grant an oral hearing as if it were holding, a trial. In other words, the view generally accepted is that whenever an executive authority is given the power by some law to decide upon and affect the rights of subjects for specified reasons and in a specified manner then there is a duty cast upon it to decide objectively as to whether those reasons exist or not in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice, unless that law leaves the decision to the absolute discretion of the authority concerned or permits it to be based on considera tions of policy or expediency or other extraneous circumstances. The question whether or not there is such a duty in a given case must depend upon the circumstances of that case and the construction of the statute under which the authority purports to act. In the present case, as already indicated, the statutory pro visions under consideration provide that the registration can be is refused, cancelled or suspended only upon the grounds, specified in paragraphs (a) to (h) of clause 4 after the examining of the evidence or information available to the authority or collected by it from the person concerned and for reasons to be recorded in writing. Power to call for such evidence or information and to discover same by inspection and export examination is also given. Finally a right of appeal to the Central Government is given and the authority is required to communicate the reasons for the adverse order. These provisions, in my view, clearly indicate that the Chief Controller was under a duty to decide after ascertaining facts upon evidence or information in his possession whether the importer or exporter had been guilty of any and, if so, which of s the acts of misconduct specified in the Order and give reasons for his decision in such adequate manner as to enable the appellate authority to judge whether or not the decision had been correctly arrived at. It is difficult to imagine how he could possibly arrive at a correct decision without giving the importer or exporter concerned an adequate opportunity of presenting his own case or meeting the case sought to be set up against him. I have, there fore, no doubt in my mind that these provisions clearly cast a duty upon the Chief Controller to act judicially and intended that be should follow the procedure which is necessary to enable him to discharge that duty efficiently, namely, by acting in good faith without any bias and by giving to the party sought to be adversely affected a fair opportunity of presenting his case. In my reading of the provisions of the Order the power given to the Chief Controller was coupled with the duty to exercise that discretion or power in the manner prescribed and upon the condi tions therein mentioned or implied. Such authorities are bound, in my view, by the rule expressed in the maxim audi alteram partam and cannot condemn any person with consequences resulting from alleged misconduct unheard and without giving him the opportunity of making any defence. In this connection reference may also be made to another decision of this Court in the case of Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak (P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 45) where this rule of justice was not held not to be confined merely to judicial proceedings but to extend to "all proceedings, by whomsoever held, when may affect the person or property or other right of the parties concerned in the dispute." Now in the present case, as already pointed out, the appel lants were not called upon to show any cause nor given any opportunity to defend themselves before the issuance of the orders of suspension, nor did the orders which have been set out earlier give any reasons for the purported suspensions. The mere specification of three paragraphs of clause 4 in the orders of suspension communicated to the appellants was, in my view, no compliance at all with the provisions of the Order requiring the reason to be recorded and the communication of those reasons. Reference to the paragraphs mentioned in the said orders will by itself indicate that if they were intended to furnish the reasons for the suspension, then they could not possibly be the reasons for the making of the orders complained of. Thus under para graph (b) it was necessary to specify as to which, if any, of the provisions of the Order had been contravened. Under para graph (c) the appellants should have been told as to whether they had been charged with under‑invoicing or over‑invoicing and under paragraph (g) the Chief Controller should have specified the particular practice which he considered to be detrimental to the public interest. In the absence of these minimum details the appellants were in no position to know as to what were the allegations against them and on what grounds they should avail of the right of appeal given by sub‑clause (2) of clause 4 of the said Order. For these reasons I am clearly of the opinion that the orders complained of in these cases were not made in accordance with law and were manifestly arbitrary and should, therefore, be quashed. The argument that since the appellants had availed of the alternative remedy by way of appeal provided under the Order itself, they could not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court at the same time, does not appear to me to be a valid argument in the circumstances of the present case, although it is true that when an alternative remedy is available the writ juris diction should not be normally allowed to be invoked. In 'the present case, however, since the appellate authorities have failed to dispose of the appeals filed as along ago as the 17th of August 1957, in spite of repeated reminders from the appellants, even up to this day, it cannot be now contended that the right of appeal given by the Order gave the appellants an equally expedi tious alternative remedy so as to disentitle them form applying for the issuance of an appropriate writ in the High Court. As I have already held that the Chief Controller was autho rity exercising judicial functions, it is clear that a writ of certiorari can issue in this matter. I would, therefore, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order of suspension but would make it clear that this will not have the effect of automatically restoring the registration of the appellants, for, it would still is be open to the Chief Controller to deal with the matter in accordance with law and in the manner indicated hereinbefore. In these circumstances, I would allow these appeals with one set of costs and set aside the order of the High Court. We allow these appeals and direct that a writ of certiorari should issue to quash the proceedings of the Chief Controller whereby the franchise was withdrawn from the two appellant Companies. We further direct that a writ of mandamus should also issue requiring that the Chief Controller should make a fresh order after giving the affected Companies a hearing strictly in accordance with the relevant law. We leave the parties to bear their own costs. A. H. Appeals allowed.