P L D 1973 Lahore 1 (PLP)

SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, C. J.‑These proceedings for con tempt of Court under Article 206 of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1972 were initiated on the basis of information conveyed by Mr. I. H. Shah, an Advocate, by a written communication dated the 11th of September 1972 address ed to my predecessor, Chief Justice S, Anwarul Haq, stating that many lawyers had, in a meeting presided over by Malik Muhammad Ashiq, Advocate, resolved to demand proceedings for contempt in respect of an article published by an Urdu Weekly "AZAN E‑HAQ" in its Issue of 13th of September 1972. The article was contributed by Mujibur Rahman Shami, Editor of the Weekly, of which Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi is the Managing Editor and Printer, and Khan Zaman Khan the Publisher. The present Bench was constituted by the then Chief Justice to deal with the matter and notices were issued to Shami, Qureshi and Khan Zaman Khan to show cause why they should not be committed for contempt.

2. It maybe mentioned that a few weeks before, to be exact on the 23rd of August 1972, I had dismissed Qureshi's petition for a writ against a communication by the Information Department of the Provincial Government intimating that the declaration of the "ZINDAGI", an Urdu Weekly of Lahore, of which Shami was the Editor and Qureshi the Printer and Publisher, and of the "URDU DIGEST", a Monthly of Lahore, had lapsed under section 9 of the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963 because the "ZINDAGI" and the "URDU DIGEST" had not been published for two consecutive weeks and two consecutive months, respectively, and no application to the District Magistrate had been made to condone the default in their publication or for revival of the declaration.

3. The proceedings relate to an article published under the heading "TOHINAY ADALAT" (Contempt of Court) of which the substance for the purposes of this case is as under .‑ Shami alleges that he had received from reliable sources the extremely disturbing information that I was being appointed as Chief Justice of the High Court of Lahore, that though nobody could question my legal ability, my character lacked the second element indispensable for that office, namely "PERHAIZ GARI" which he himself translates as "piety" and necessarily includes honesty and integrity, that leaving aside the high office of the Chief Justice, my continuance as a puisne Judge of the Court by reason of the allegations he levelled amounted to "TOHINAY ADALAT" (Contempt of Court) and was inconsistent with the dignity of the High Court and it was suggested that I should resign from my present office and if I did so, it would not only be better for me but also for the entire nation which was involved in a whirlpool of misfortunes and frustration. At the time of the publication I was the first puisne Judge of the Court and my appointment as Chief Justice was notified on 12th October 1972 during the pendency of the proceedings, a month after the publication of the article.

4. Objection has been taken to my sitting on the Bench on certain grounds which are not the first to be taken in this case and are to be found and have been repelled in a large number of reported cases on contempt. The Bench to hear the present matter was constituted by my predecessor, Chief Justice S. Anwarul Haq, who knew well whether I was disqualified to be a member of the Bench or whether it was proper for me to hear the same. In their written reply, respondents 1 and 3 have placed reliance on some provisions of the Code of Conduct issued by the Supreme Judicial Council for observance by the Judges of the Superior Courts of Pakistan, which say that‑ "(a) while dispensing justice "a Judge" should be strong without being rough, polite without being weak, awe‑inspiring in his warning and faithful to his cords, always preserving calmness, balance and complete detachment, for the formation of correct conclusions in all matters coming before him ; (b) to decline resolutely to act in a case involving his personal interest, howsoever slightly or that of a near relative, or a close friend is the duty of a Judge; and (c) to ensure that justice is not only done but is also seen to be done, a Judge must avoid all possibility of his opinion or action in any case being swayed by any consideration of personal advantage either direct or indirect." The objection could never have been taken if the position of the law of contempt in the legal system of a country like ours had been understood. As the object of proceedings for contempt is not the vindication of the character or conduct of a Judge but to protect the Court from attack and to maintain in it the confidence of the people, particularly the litigants, the true A ground for initiating such proceedings is the public interest in which all Judges, including the defamed Judge, are interested. It is for this reason that the jurisdiction to punish for contempt is considered to be a special jurisdiction governed by its own rules even where they come in conflict with some general principles of law. The jurisdiction is sui generis and has developed an independent corpus of rules which originating in the Common Law of England consists of a special set of principles. Reference in this connection may be made to In re: Amrita Bazar Patrika (45 I C 338), In re : Tarit Kanti (A I R 1918 Cal. 988), In re Madhava Singh (A I R 1923 Pat. 185), In re: An Advocate of Allahabad (A I R 1935 All. 1), In re K. L. Gauba (A I R 1942 Lah. 105), Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh (AIR 1954 S C 186) and Ashfaq Ahmad Sheikh v. State (P L D 1972 S C 39). The principle on which these cases proceed is obvious. A Judge who has been defamed cannot be a party to proceedings for defamation before a lower Court or before his own colleagues. Nor can he reply to such allegations in the Press. Since any proceedings taken under the ordinary law would bring the Court of which the Judge is a member into contempt and in certain cases truth can be am answer to defamation, a long series of cases is to be found in the law reports laying down that truth is no justification for I, contempt. As the proceedings are taken in the public interest, there is nothing wrong on the part of a Judge who has been scandalised taking part in the proceedings for contempt. (See In re: K. L. Gauba and Ashfaq Ahmad Sheikh v. State). In fact, some cases lay down that in the circumstances he is not only not disqualified from taking part in the proceedings but that it is his duty, as held in Gauba's case, to do so. (In re: K. L. Gauba). If the scandalised Judge cannot be a litigant before the lower Courts or before his own Court and cannot reply to the attacks made on him in Press, where the allegations made age inst him are false, and will cast a serious doubt on the purity of the administration of justice if not repelled, the only place for him to reply to these allegations is in his judgment where he can refer to such evidence as is unimpeachable and above all suspicion. It is for this reason that in a large number of cases Judges who had been scandalised sat on the Bench. (See In re: William Tayler (A I R 1918 Cal. 713), In re: Tarit Kanti, Emperor v. Murli Manohar (A I R 1929 Pat 72), In re: Subrahmanyan (A I R 1943 Lah. 329), In ret Karamatullah Khan (P L D 1970 S C 400) and Attorney General for Pakistan v. Yusuf Ali Khan (P L D 1972 S C 115). In the very case that we are hearing, I have been expressly accused of "judicial misconduct" which is nothing short of elf repetition of contempt. The cases of Karamatullah Khan and Yusuf Ali Khan were decided after the Code of Conduct came into force in the year 1967 and no "judicial misconduct" was attributed to the concerned Judges in the course of arguments. Where contempt is committed in the face of a Judge it is the duty of the Judge to take immediate action. In his so doing no principle of law has ever been considered to have been violated. If the rule were otherwise as alleged, and the whole Court was scandalised whether consisting of one or more Judges, the contemner. however scandalous the allegation, would escape all punishment, as on the argument advanced no Judge would be qualified to try and punish him without being guilty of "judicial misconduct". The argument is too preposterous to be taken notice of.

5. The question is whether the respondents have been guilty of the offence of contempt. The offence of "Contempt of Court" has been described in so many reported cases and law books in England, India and Pakistan that I consider it unnecessary to define it or to enumerate its different forms beyond saying that in general every form of interference with the due course of justice amounts to contempt. Actual interference is, of course, B not necessary and every act interfering, or calculated, or tending to interfere with the due course of justice is sufficient to bring it within the concept of contempt. Thus scandalising a Court or a Judge of the Court, obstructing, resisting or wilfully disobeying an order of the Court, or prejudicing a party before mankind, or attempting to influence a Judge, a member of a jury or a witness, will certainly amount to contempt and so will any abuse of the process of the Court. It is not necessary that diversion of the course of justice should have been intended or the Court or the Judge should have been actually influenced by the act. Our Constitution by Article 206 declares a person liable to punishment for contempt of the Supreme Court or a High Court if he‑‑ (a) abuses, interferes with or obstructs the process of the Court in any way or disobeys any order of the Court; or (b) scandalizes the Court or otherwise does anything which tends to bring the Court or a Judge of the Court Into hatred, ridicule or contempt; or (c) does anything which tends to prejudice the determination of a matter pending before the Court ; or (d) does any other thing which, by law, constitutes contempt of the Court. The power to punish is given to the Supreme Court and High Courts because these Courts are like the High Courts in England which have the power to punish brevi manu any person guilty of a contempt. There are four further matters to be noted in respect of the law of contempt, which to a certain extent conflict with the principles of general law. These are: First, that truth is no justification to an act of contempt; Second, that the Press has no special privilege when it commits an act of contempt, in this respect its liability being neither more nor less than that of an ordinary citizen; , Third, that there can be no objection to a Judge's taking part in the proceedings against the contemner even if he himself was the subject of a vile attack; and Fourth, that proceedings are not to take the form of a trial and punishment may be meted out brevi manu, i.e., summarily.

6. Under Article 206 of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1972, a Court, in the present case the High Court, has power to punish any person who "does anything which tends to bring the Court or a Judge of the Court into hatred, ridicule or contempt" or "does any other thing which, by law, constitutes contempt of the Court". I have been a Judge of this Court for over ten years and was at the time of the publication the senior‑most puisne Judge. If, truth is rot a justification and the intention of the person committing contempt is immaterial, it is obvious that the publication of the allegations under the heading "TOHINAY ADALAT" that I am not by reason of my character and conduct fit to occupy the position of a Judge and my continuance in office is itself a contempt of the Court and that I am unfit for appointment as Chief Justice, brings the persons giving publicity to these allegations fully within the purview of Article 206 of the Interim Constitution, and renders all the three respondents liable to punishment. Keeping public interests in view, I do not: consider it expedient or advisable to pronounce the sentence immediately and to conclude the case. It is my obvious duty, since I have been grossly maligned, to say something more.

7. A deliberate attempt has been made to damage my reputation and to create a wholly incorrect impression about my conduct as a Judge, It would, therefore, be contrary to public interest to leave the; matter here. I cannot be a plaintiff in a suit for libel in a subordinate Court or in my own Court, and I cannot enter, as suggested in the article, into a public controversy in the Press like a politician or any other ordinary citizen. A refutation of the false and malicious campaign against me being necessary, I can explain my position only from the Bench. It is for this reason that several authorities have laid down that not only the defamed Judge should take notice of his own contempt ; but in a case like this it is his obvious duty to take part in the proceedings in order to maintain the confidence of the public in the Court which the respondents have attempted to Impair.

8. I now proceed briefly to explain the allegations in the article and to show that they are false. MY APPOINTMENT AS A JUDGE

9. How I was appointed a Judge is not, beyond the incident that I am about to mention, known to me. Papers or proceedings relating to the appointment of a Judge are highly confidential and at one stage I was about to suggest to my brothers on the Bench that we should send for the relevant file from the Ministry of Law. Apart from the question whether the Government would place at our disposal this highly confidential file, there was the considera tion that we could not use information derived from such records for the purposes of a judgment, and even if the Government bad complied with our request, it mould have been our duty to allow the respondents to inspect that file. On fuller consideration, I thought that this court was undesirable, perhaps, illegal, and did not, therefore, send for the file to see how despite, as alleged, the opposition of the then Chief Justice of Pakistan, the Govern ment decided to appoint me. All that I know about my appoint ment is that my name was recommended for appointment by the late Mr. Justice M. R. Kayani and later on the then Governor, the late Malik Amir Muhammad Khan, called me to Nathiagali and persuaded me to accept the office of the High Court Judge. I may mention here that before my appointment my gross income was assessed as follows 1959 (ending on 31‑3‑1959) Rs. 74,000.00 1960 (ending on 30‑6‑1960) Rs. 87,119.00 (raised by the Department to Rs. 1,07,119.00) 1961 (ending on 30‑6‑1961) Rs. 80,000.00 1962 (ending on 30‑6‑1962, i.e., before I became a Judge on 1st of October 1962). Rs. 1,08,826.37 These figures are borne out by the record of the Income‑tax Department, and the information given for this period in the article is incorrect. Under the Income‑tax Law only net income is assessed, but in order to determine the earning capacity of an individual the relevant income is the gross income out of which professional expenses have to be deducted. But since the Governor made a personal appeal and asked me to accept the office in the public interest I agreed. I am quite sure that if the file relating to my appointment is checked by the Government, the facts that I have mentioned will be borne out to the last letter because they are absolutely correct. INCOME‑TAX AND ASSETS Income‑tax:

10. I have already mentioned the figures of my Income from 1959 to the date of my appointment as a Judge in 1962, showing that I had no attraction to accept the office of a Judge at a salary which would reduce my income to less than one‑half. The allega tion that my income for the assessment years 1959‑60, 1960.61 and 1961‑62 was intentionally inflated and was assessed at one and the same time is absolutely incorrect as the dates of these assessments are 4th March 1951, 29th November 1961 and 21st September 1962. The return for the assessment year 1961‑62 was filed and the assessment made after my appointment was notified on 17th August 1962. The figures given by Shami of my income for the assessment years 1950‑51 to 1562‑63 do not include my income from 1st April 1959 to 30th June 1959 nor my income from 1st July 1962 to 30th September 1962. I might mention that it was during this period that I sold my That land for Rs. 57,266.00 by registered sale deeds dated the 2nd of October 1961. Assets

11. Shami states in the article that my total ostensible income up to the date I was raised to the Bench in 1962 was Rs. 3,88,192.00 and my total assets were of the value of Rs. 14,47,000.00. This statement is wholly devoid of truth whatso ever. On being questioned, Shami has stated that in the impugned article he did not mention any of my acquisitions as a Judge but that he had dealt with my income and assets as a lawyer. Therefore, I have only to confine myself to my income before I became a Judge and the assets that I held immediately before my appoint ment. If from the list given by the respondent the items of pro perty which did not belong to me when I became a Judge are excluded, the value of the remaining assets shown by him in the article will be as follows : Rs. (a) A plot of land in Gulberg V, Lahore 24,000.00 (b) Shares of Lahore Commercial Bank Ltd. 12,500.00 (c) Shares of Rustam Cycle Company Ltd. 32,000.00 (d) Shares of Kohinoor Rayons Ltd. 54,000.00 (e) Library etc. 11,000.00 Total 1,33, 500.00

12. It may be mentioned here that under Article 3(1) of the Judges (Declaration of Assets) Order. 1969 (President's Order 4 of 1969) all Judge; of the High Courts and the Supreme Court were required to submit to the Supreme Judicial Council, which consisted of (a) the Chief Justice of Pakistan ; (b) the two next most senior Judges of the Supreme Court; and (c) the two Chief Justices of High Courts of West and East Pakistan, a statement of the properties and assets, both movable and immovable whether within or outside Pakistan, owned by them (a) on the 7th of October 1958 or on the date they first assumed office as Judges, whichever be later, and (b) on the 23rd of April 1969. These declarations were also to set out the properties and assets which had been (i) transferred by them by sale, gift or otherwise between the dates referred to at (a) and (b) above, with the particulars of the person in whose favour they had been so transferred ; and (ii) acquired by them within the period referred to in (a) and (b) above, by purchase, gift or otherwise with the particulars of the person from whom they had been so acquired, the consideration money, if any, paid therefor and the source of such money. We questioned Shami if he was aware of President's Order No. 4 of 1969 to which he replied in the affirmative. In response to the President's Order aforementioned, I had submitted my declaration of assets and had shown all my properties and assets, both movable and immovable owned by me on the 1st of October 1962 when I was raised to the Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan, and those I held on the 23rd of April 1969 which was the limiting date. I had also shown the properties and assets owned by my mother, wife, children and other relatives who fell within the ambit of the said Order. The consideration money for the acquisitions and sales having mainly passed through cheques, I had indicated in my declaration the numbers and dates of the cheques and the account numbers on which the same were drawn or deposited in, along with, of course, the names of the banks, to facilitate the Supreme Judicial Council to verify the correctness of the contents of my declaration. These declarations were strictly scrutinised by the Council and as a result proceedings were started against two of the Judges showing, that holding of an inquiry against a Judge being a very serious matter, the declarations must have received the strictest scrutiny by the Council. AGRICULTURAL LAND MEASURING 151 SQUARES IN CHAK No. 107/GB, TEHSIL JARANWALA, DISTRICT LYALLPUR

13. One of the assets, mentioned in the article, is 151 squares of agricultural land in Chak No. 107/GB, Tehsil Jaranwala, District Lyallpur. The acquisition of this asset has a long and complicated history and it is unnecessary for me to state all the details. Suffice it to say that this land was purchased by my wife for Rs. 2,50,000.00 in the year 1963 after I had been appointed a Judge, in pursuance of an agreement of sale by the vendor, dated January 1962, with my wife's brother. Therefore, the allegation that I acquired this land‑and before I became a Judge is totally false. My wife comes on her mother's as well as her father's side from good and opulent families. Her father, Mr. K. A. Hameed, Bar‑at‑Law, was the only son of Sh. Ali Bakhsh who was the leading lawyer of Sialkot and owned considerable property in Sialkot and Amritsar. Her mother's father was Sh. Ali Muhammad who was a District and Sessions Judge. She has her own banking account and holds shares in certain companies one of which is K. S. B. Pumps Company Ltd., of which she has been a Director for a long time. She has income of thousands of rupees as rent of her property and as dividends from companies, In addition to the income from her agricultural land. She was assessed to income‑tax before I was, and she has all along been giving details of her assets where required bylaw. The land belonged to a Parsee and was being managed by one Fazal‑ur‑Rahman Khan under a power of attorney. This power of attorney was cancelled by the Parsi owner who executed a fresh power of attorney on the 5th of June 1956 in favour of an other Parsee, P. S. Kavasji, who executed the agreement of sale of this land in favour of my wife's brother. The execution of this power of attorney, which deprived Fazal‑ur‑Rehman Khan of the management of the land and rendered the tenants liable to ejectment, provided a grievance to Fazal‑ur‑Rehman Khan and the tenants who embarked on a long course of litigation about the land. The real question in this litigation was whether the pro perty was evacuee or not. The matter went even up to the Central Government and was dealt with by several Custodians until on 7th of April 1960, the Custodian, Mr. Justice Masud Ahmad, passed the following order :‑ "The authority given by the petitioner to his agent Kavasji having been recognised by me, the petitioner's property in Pakistan would cease to be evacuee property." This should have settled the matter but a series of review petitions, and writ petitions to the High Court started, and one Yusuf Ali Khan, Bar‑at‑Law and other persons of the locality Including some of the ejected tenants became intensely interested in the matter until Mr. M. A. Haq, C. S. P., Custodian of Evacuee Property, West Pakistan, disposed of the matter by a detailed order dated the 30th of June 1971 which gives the entire history. of the acquisition of the land and the entire litigation concerning it. He held that the land had been non‑evacuee property since 7th April 1960. A certified copy of this order is appended to this judgment as Annex 'A'. HOUSE IN CHAK No. 107/GB, TEHSIL JARANWALA, DISTRICT LAYALLPUR

14. As regards the house, which is in fact a cottage, built on this land, the position is perfectly clear. The house was construct ed by my wife in 1965 after I had become a Judge and has always been being shown as hers in all official papers: In my declaration of assets filed under President's Order No. 4 of 1969, it was shown as belonging to my wife and the Supreme Judicial Council accepted the declaration. HOUSE (12‑WHITE HOUSE LANE, LAHORE)

15. The house (12‑White 'House Lane, Lahore) does not belong to me and is the property of my wife who acquired it under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 and she adjusted her claim as a refugee claimant, and Paid the balance of the amount by purchasing claims for Rs 78,854.00. This house has all along been shown in her Income‑tax Returns and Wealth Statements as her property, and in my declaration of assets to the Supreme Judicial Council I showed it as her property. SHARES

16. Before my elevation to the Ben‑h, which is the relevant period, I held shares in the following concerns :‑ Rs. (1) Lahore Commercial Bank Ltd. 12,500 (2) Kohinoor Rayons Ltd. 54,000 (3) Rustom Cycle Company Ltd. 32,000 Sometime in 1964 the Kohinoor Rayons Ltd., offered right shares, one to one, and I purchased further shares on payment of Re. 54,000.00 by a cheque dated the 15th of July 1964 drawn on my account with the United Bank Ltd., Lahore. As regards shares in the Commerce Bank Ltd., and the Gandhara Industries Ltd., it is sufficient to state that these con cerns were not in existence before my appointment as a Judge In 1962 and both were incorporated in 1963 when I acquired shares of the value of Rs. 2,000.00 in the Commerce Bank Ltd., while 2300 shares in the Gandhara Industries Ltd.; were acquired by me for Rs. 45,901.00 in March 1969 out of the sale proceeds of 5100 shares of Kohinoor Rayons Ltd. These are not, therefore, to be considered because, as pointed out, Shami has expressly stated that in the article he has dealt with my assets not as a Judge but as a lawyer. PLOT AND HOUSE IN GULBERG V, LAHORE

17. In his article Shami states the house (9‑Gulberg V, Lahore) as one of the assets which I held when I was elevated to the Bench but fn the same article be admits that it was construct ed In 1965‑66, almost three years after my appointment to that office. It is borne out by the plan which was duly sanctioned by the local authorities that its built‑up area is 6492 sq. feet. I had correctly shown the value of this house as Rs. 2,25,000.00 in my declaration of assets submitted to the Supreme Judicial Council which was duly accepted by them. The plot was purchased by me before my appointment as a Judge and the price that I paid for it to the Town Improvement Trust was Rs. 21,000.00. FOUR SQUARES OF LAND IN THAL

18. Four squares of agricultural land in that were purchased by me in 1955 from Mian Bashir Ahmad of AL‑MANZAR, Lawrence Road, Lahore, for Rs. 20,000

00. They were sold by me for Rs. 57,266.00 before my appointment as a Judge. LIBRARY

19. It is extremely difficult for any one to judge the value of a library until a complete list of the books purchased is kept. No lawyer ever maintains such a list, nor did I. I roughly estimated the value of the books in my Library as Rs. 11,009.00 and I showed it in my declaration filed before the Supreme Judicial Council CARS AND THE ALLEGATION RE: CONTRAVENTION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATIONS ACT

20. It is stated in the article that from 1950 till the date of the article in twenty‑two years I purchased twelve years. The figures are incorrect inasmuch as during the period in question cars at serial Nos. 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11 were not purchased or owned by me. I purchased only seven cars and my means Permitted me to purchase them with the proceeds of the re‑sale of old cars and some extra money. There has never been any contravention of Foreign Exchange Regulations Act by me or by my wife. I Imported an air‑conditioned Chevrolet Impala (KAA‑3) in 1965 Fn I he following manner :‑ For some professional work Messrs Pfaff Ltd., of Germany paid me my fee in foreign exchange equivalent to 17000 D'marks. I declared this foreign exchange to the State Bank of Pakistan, and the Central Government allowed me to utilise only 12500 D'marks for importing the car. I imported this car in 1965 on Permit No. 0056288 issued by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, and paid on account of freight, customs duty and sales tax Rs. 27,673.88 by cheque on 10th of May 1965. Thus the statement in the article that this car was imported in contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act is absolutely false. As regards Mercedes Benz 220S, No. 8 in the list, it is alleged in the article that it belonged to a foreigner and I got it transferred by having it mortgaged in violation of the Import and Export Control Regulations. This statement also is false because the car was acquired by my wife and she paid for it Rs. 22,u00.00 by a cheque dated the 22nd of June 1967. The car was 1962 Model, and its transfer was effected in the following circumstances :‑ The car was imported by Mr. O. J. Seiler, Honorary Consul, Federal Republic of Germany, and Managing Director of K. S. B. Pumps Company Ltd., under Import Permit No. 049512 and was cleared from the Customs on the 5th of February 1963 under Customs Cash Receipt No. 16 of the same date. Full customs duty as leviable at that time, including the sales tax amounting to Rs. 11,862.00 was paid by Mr. O. J. Seiler. In order to purchase another car, he approached the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad, for permission to sell this Mercedes Benz. He was granted permission in the following terms :‑ " ..the Government of Pakistan have no objection to the sale of your Mercedes Benz 2205 car Model 1962, bearing Registration No. LEE 3, Chassis No. 180941‑20‑06456;3 to any one in Pakistan subject to the condition that you shall not claim repatriation of sale proceeds from Pakistan in say manner. The car was then sold to my wife who had been the Director of K. S. B. Pumps Company Ltd., since 1959." These facts were placed before the Supreme Judicial Council in my declaration of assets to that Body. It is also incorrect that at the present moment I own three cars. I own only one car, namely, Mazda, whereas my wife owns Mercedes Benz 2205. There is no other car owned by me, my wife or my children. JOURNEYS ABROAD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE

21. It is alleged in the article that after 1960 I have been abroad with members of my family thrice and the expenditure on these trips is estimated at Rs. 1,00,000.00. This again is an unfounded allegation, because the facts are as follows :‑ In 1960 I went abroad with my wife and we were allowed foreign exchange of K0 by the Government of Pakistan. We again went out in 1965 and were given foreign exchange of

599. The war broke out in that year while we were abroad. We stayed in London with a cousin of my wife whose husband was then the Head of the Military Mission in the Pakistan High Commission. I did not utilise the entire foreign exchange allotted to me and returned to the Government 137, of which there is an endorsement on my Passport. In 1969 1 went alone to Bangkok to represent Pakistan in the World Association of Judges and the expenses of this journey were borne by the Government. In the following year, I attended the Conference of the World Association of Judges in Venice and the fare and expenses of the journey were borne by the Association itself. As I overstayed by a month to perform Umra I took leave for which I received my salary in foreign exchange from the Government. It should be clear from the facts stated above that the allegation is wholly unfounded and false. STANDARD OF LIVING

22. Objection has also been taken to my standard of living and it is alleged that it, is out of proportion to my declared income and that I am living in a grand style. The allegation is too vague to admit of a precise reply, and all that I have to mention is that I do not drink, smoke or play cards. Though I am a member of a club I have not visited it for years and have never paid anything more than the monthly subscription. My income is not restricted only to my monthly salary of Rs. 4,000.00. I have income also from the land. My wife has income of thousands of rupees as rent of her property and also she has her own, dividend income in addition to the income from the agricultural and she has been. regularly assessed to income tax from 1951 and has been submitting income tax returns and wealth statements. She became an assessee even before I was assessed to income‑tax. ALLEGATION RE: EVASION OF TAXES

23. It is alleged in the article that my wife made gifts of land to favour of her four children and myself and that no return of the gift tax was filed by me. Under the law; the gift tax is to be paid by the donor and not by the donee, and it is the donor who has to file a proper return. My wife, in fact, submitted a return for the gift tax and was taxed by the Gift Tax Officer, but on appeal to the Income‑tax (Gift Tax) Tribunal the appeal was accepted on the 5th of November 1971 by an order, the relevant part of which runs as follows We would accordingly direct that for the first gift a 5 years average for the years 1961 to 1965 of sales may be taken whereas for the second gilt the same average for the years 1964 to 1968 may be taken. The valuation may be revised accordingly. The Income‑tax Department has submitted a Reference to the High Court on the question involved in the case which is still pending and I cannot say anything further en the subject as the matter is sub judice. As regards the omission to pay wealth tax, the allegation is based on the assumption that I own property worth Rs. .14,47,000.00. As has been pointed out above, the value of my assets as given in the article is incorrect. Even according to the assets which I own today, I am not liable to pay any wealth tax and, therefore, not bound to submit a return. Under the law, the residential house of whatever value, the household effects and the agricultural land of the value of less than Rs. 1,00,000.00 are exempt from wealth tax. According to the rules, the price of the land is to be determined at the rate of Rs. 10.00 per produce index unit and if it is so determined its value comes to Rs. 78,365.00. If these items are excluded, as permitted by law, in determining wealth tax, my assets do not exceed the taxable limit, which in the article itself is stated to be four lacs. SARDAR SHAH BOKHARI S CASE

24. As regards the forgery case against Sardar Shah Bokhari and Mr. Justice Cornelius's letter to the President of Pakistan requesting that notification of my appointment as a Judge of the High Court may be delayed till such time as the forgery case against Bokhari, one of my juniors and an Attorney, was decided because I was not mentioned in good terms in a complaint relating to a decision of the High Court from which an appeal had to be filed in the Supreme Court, I have already said that I know nothing of what Mr. Justice Cornelius wrote about my appointment ; but it is a matter of record that under the orders of Mr. Justice Cornelius himself, the Deputy Registrar of the Supreme Court addressed a letter, copy of which is being attached with this judgment as Annex `B' stating that‑‑ "the complaint of the Court is not directed against any person other than Mr. Sardar Shah Bokhari, Attorney and the references to other lawyers whether by name or otherwise are incidental to the narrative, and are not to be understood as imputing any connection with any of the offences alleged." The complaint of the Supreme Court against Syed Sardar Shah Bokhari, as amended, would read as at Annex 'C'. I was not, in any way, concerned with Bokhari's case as would be apparent from Chief Justice Cornelius's own action. I was neither a party nor a witness in the case and my name did not appear either in the judgment of the trial Court or in that of the Additional Sessions Judge. Bokhari was convicted by the trial Magistrate, but his appeal was accepted by the Additional Sessions Judge on technical grounds against which appeals and revisions are pending. One of the cases was listed before Muhammad Afzal Cheema, J., for hearing on the 13th May 1969, but since the other connected appeals and revisions had not been fixed, it was ordered that all connected matters be "fixed for an actual hearing . . . . for the 28th of May 1969, as No. 1". Subsequently, the cases were fixed before a Division Bench consisting of Ataullah Sajjad and Shameem Hussain Kadri, JJ., but were again adjourned and are still pending. The roster and the cause lists are subjects exclusively within the domain of the Chief Justice, and at the time the article was contributed by Shami and published in the Weekly "Azan‑e‑Haq" I being not the Chief Justice, had no concern whatsoever regarding the fixation of Bokhari's case. Moreover, since 1y70 the live most senior Judges had been incharge of different Divisions, and the Constitution Division having been placed under my control I could not pass any order or give direction regarding any case outside my own Division. Bokhari's case was indubitably the subject‑matter of Criminal Division of which another learned Judge was incharge.

25. That the respondents are in contempt there can be no doubt about. The case is somewhat similar to, though worse than, the Allahabad case, In re: An Advocate of Allahabad where on the appointment of a Judge a comment was published in a news paper that a comparatively undeserving lawyer had been raised to the Bench, and the comment was held to amount to contempt.

26. It was observed by Lord Atkin in Andra Paul v. Attorney‑General (A I R 1936 P C 141) that justice is not a cloistered virtue and that she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken comments of ordinary men, provided they J abstain from imputing improper motives, do not act in malice or) attempt to impair the administration of justice. But though not cloistered virtue justice is not a hand‑maid of journalists either. Nor is a human being, installed in the temple of justice, a deity or infallibility incarnate, totally immune from criticism for public acts performed from the seat of justice. But where the criticism takes, as in this case, not the form of a comment on a public act of the Judge but that of a tirade of calumny and in the guise of expression of professed respect for the superior Judiciary, the continuance in office of a Judge who has been in office for more than ten years and his proposed or actual appointment as Chief Justice are held out to the public as contempt of the Court of which he is a Judge or is going to be the Chief Justice, there can be no question of the application of any of the provisos mentioned by Lord Atkin. The act is malicious and downright contempt and cannot be permitted to go unpunished as it is a direct attempt to impair the administration of justice. I take the present occasion as an opportunity to point out that the responsibility for the appointment of Judges of Superior Courts in this country rests with the President and his Governor concerned, the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justice of the relevant High Court, h and the Press and the public must not arrogate to themselves the right of commenting that a particular person is not suitable for appointment, and splash their views in the manner that the respondents have chosen to do.

27. That a gross contempt has been committed by the respondents admits of no doubt whatsoever. On their own showing when the Government was considering my case for appointment as Chief Justice they published a scandalous article alleging, leaving aside the reasons for it which are not relevant in a contempt matter, that I was not tit not only for appointment as Chief Justice but also to occupy the office of a senior Judge that I was occupying. In this way they not only scandalised me but also must be held to have alleged that the interests of justice were b not safe in my hands. This amounts to contempt by every definition of "contempt" given in general law, and comes expressly within the terms of Article 206 of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

28. The question now is what is the appropriate punishment in the circumstances. Khan Zaman, respondent No. 2, has, in the written reply, tendered unqualified apology. He has also explained that he had no knowledge whatsoever of the publication of the impugned article as it was printed at Lahore and he resided at Sargodha/Mianwali. His conduit during the proceedings was one of a feeling of remorse. He is guilty of contempt but, in the circumstances, I do not want to record a finding of guilty against him. I have no doubt that respondents Mujibur Rahman Shami and Ejaz Hassan Qureshi could not have derived the information which they have misrepresented and published otherwise than from a source which they have stubbornly refused to disclose, and there is not one word of remorse, contrition or apology to be found in their written statements except a hypocritical profession of respect for the Judiciary and a compliment to my legal learning. The respondents have relied upon some rule of journalistic ethics and it is clear from the authorities j that a journalist has in such a matter no more privilege than an ordinary citizen. The contempt committed is one of the worst form, since the effect of the publication undoubtedly tended to shake the confidence of the public in the Institution of which I was about to be, and now am the Head. Their conduct during the hearing has also been most contumacious. Mujibur Rahman Shami is the author of the article. I convict and sentence him to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 2,000.00 (Two Thousand Rupees), default of payment of which will entail simple imprisonment for six weeks. Ejaz Hassan Qureshi has indeed accepted the responsibility of the article, but since he is not the author, I award him a lesser sentence of simple imprisonment for four months and a fine of Rs. 1,500 00 (One Thousand and Five Hundred Rupees), or four weeks' simple imprisonment in default of payment of fine.

29. Before parting with the case I may observe that I have read the judgments of my learned brothers Ataullah Sajjad and Muhammad Afzal Zullah, JJ., and entirely agree with all their findings and observations. A bold and a N courageous Bar is doubtless an asset, but it is well established that no lawyer should align himself wholly and completely with the contemner and become oblivious of his obligations towards the Court of which he is an officer. I may also add that respondents 1 and 3 attempted during the hearing to bring in irrelevant matters and filed a scandalous application with photostats of secret documents from the file of the then Chief Justice which had not the remotest connection with the subject‑matter of contempt before us. The learned Advocate‑General sought our permission to move the machinery of law against them for being in possession of secret documents. There is no need of any such permission from us for an action which he thinks is competent against these respondents under law. ATAULLAH SAJJAD, J.‑‑I have "gone through the judgments of my Lord the Chief Justice and Muhammad Afzal Zullah, J., and I entirely agree with them. I would, however, like to record my own views in respect of some of the matters which arose out of this case.

2. The notice to the respondents was issued as a result of the publication of an article entitled "Tauheen‑i‑Adalat" published in the weekly 'Azan‑i‑Haq', Mianwali. Mujibur Rehman Shami respondent No. l is the Editor, Khan Zaman respondent No. 2 is the Publisher and Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi respondent No. 3 is the Printer. The article after eulogizing the judiciary indulges in a calumnious attack against the present Chief Justice to sit on the Bench of this Court but it categorically states that he lacks in 'parhaizgari' i.e. piety. Certain figures have been quoted to show that his Lordship has acquired property in much larger proportion than his income as a lawyer. It was suggested in the end of the article that the presence of Sardar Muhammad Iqbal as a Judge was not in accordance with the high traditions of the High Court and an appeal was made to his Lordship to resign immediately as it was in his own interest and was also good for this defeated nation which was suffering from lack of confidence.

3. When questioned by the Court, Mujibur Rehman Shami; under whose signatures this article appeared, stated that he had confined his criticism to the actions of Sardar Muhammad Iqbal to the period before his Lordship was elevated to the Bench. This, however, does not appear to be factually correct. 1t is alleged that in 1961‑66 his Lordship constructed a bungalow at 4 cost of rupees seven lacs. It is further alleged that in 1964 his Lordship purchased Cheverolet Impala Car in violation of the Rules of Foreign Exchange and that in 1966 he obtained a Mercedes Benz Car which belonged to a foreigner 4n violation of the Import and Export Control Regulation. It was further suggested that his Lordship's standard of life had no proportion with the known sources of income and that he lives in a grand style. A reference has also been made to the circumstances under which his Lordship was appointed as a Judge and it is alleged that the then Chief Justice, A. R. Cornelius, had refused to recommend Sardar Muhammad Iqbal for appointment as a Judge as he lacked the strength of character essential for a Judge of the High Court. It is also said that his Lordship had some connection with the case of forgery in which his junior had been convicted and that case was pending in the High Court since a number of years and the reason for that delay may be best known to Sardar Sahib.

4. Khan Zaman, the Publisher of the 'Azan‑i‑Haq' expressed his regrets and offered unconditional apology.

5. Respondents 1 and 3, i.e., Mujibur Rehman Shami and Ijaz Hassan Qureshi filed written statements saying that the article had been published in the public interest, that Sardar Muhammad Iqbal being the aggrieved Judge should not sit on the Bench and that the truth of the allegations made in the article had to be determined. It was further said that if these allegations ultimately proved to be untrue, they would apologise. In the written statement filed by Mujibur Rehman Shami, it was also alleged that his Lordship Sardar Muhammad Iqbal had tried to influence the course of another contempt case namely, Cr. Original No. 9 of 1972 (State v. Taj Din and others) and on 20th of October 1972, photostat copies of some 'Top Secret' documents which were in the shape of letters addressed by three Judges of this Court to the Chief Justice, were produced to substantiate this allegation. Later, on the basis of these very documents, a petition for contempt was moved by respondents 1 and 3 through their counsel Messrs M. Anwar and M. A. Rehman against Sardar Muhammad Iqbal, which has been dismissed by the Bench of seven Judges.

6. We examined Mujibur Rehman Shami in some details and also recorded the statement of Ijaz Hasan Qureshi. Mujibur Rehman insisted that the article was innocuous and that, in any case, he should be told as to which of the portions of the article fell within the mischief of the law of contempt. He further refused to disclose the name of the person who had provided him with the secret documents, although he admitted that he had looked at the originals. He said that he had paid money to the photographer but later on clarified this statement by saying that he had not paid directly to the photographer. He refused to disclose the name of the person who had brought the secret record to him or handed him over the photostat copies. He was told that it was an offence to refuse to answer questions put by the Court, but he took shelter behind the Code of Ethics of the Journalists and said that he would rather take a risk and follow the Code of Ethics. When, questioned as to wherefrom he had gleaned the information contained in the article. he said that it had been sent to him by an annonymous writer who had appended a typed memo randum with it. He said that he might have destroyed the letter but had kept the typed material with him. He was given time to produce this typed information but he returned after some time and told the Court that he had not been able to lay hands on this information.

7. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi when examined, said that he knew about this article only after its publication but after questioning the Editor he was satisfied that the Editor had taken the right course.

8. The learned counsel for respondents 1 and 3 addressed lengthy arguments in this case. They insisted that the culpable portions of the article should be specified so that they may be able to examine the truth or otherwise thereof. They also said that since the contempt related to Sardar Muhammad Iqbal, his Lordship was incapacitated to sit on the Bench. They further said that whatever the law may have been before 1967, but after the coming into force of the Code of Conduct. of Judges, a Judge who has personal interest in the matter cannot himself hear the case.

9. I may observe that it is the overall effect of an article on the public mind which is to be seen. In this case the writer of the article started with an eulogistic note about the judiciary and then proceeded to make a scurrilous attack on the integrity of the Senior Puisne Judge of this Court by making imputations that he was living beyond his means, had violated the law regarding Foreign Exchange and Import Export Control Regulations and was responsible for delaying the hearing of the case pending against his junior in the High Court and suggesting that it will be a good riddance for the High Court if his Lordship resigns. This Court, therefore, rightly told the respondents and their counsel at the very start that the whole article was streaked with the gravest possible contempt and' there was no need to specify any culpable portions. In K. L. Gauba's case (A I R 1942 Lah. 105) the Chief Justice and another Judge of the Lahore High Court had been scandalised by publishing a pamphlet seemingly in the form of a petition to the King. I have seen the original file of that case and I find that a brief show‑cause notice was issued to the contemner. He filed an application praying, inter alia, that the culpable portions of the pamphlet be specified but the Court did not choose: to do so and dealt with the pamphlet as a whole.

10. One of the reasons advanced by respondents 1 and 3 and their counsel for specification of the culpable portions of the article was that they could then be in a position to prove the truth of their allegations. I may say that the law is settled that it is not open to a contemner to plead justification of the contemptuous matter. See In re : Ram Mohan Lal Agarwal (155 I C 33), State v. K. L. Gauba and Sir Edward Snelson v, Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore (P L D 1961 F C 237).

11. A State exists on the basis of a free Legislature, an effective and efficient Executive and an independent Judiciary. The penal provisions regarding sedition are meant to protect the structure of the Executive while the law of contempt is meant to stifle and punish any interference with the course of justice. It is a grave offence against the State if people's minds are contaminated against the administration of justice by suggesting that a Judge of the superior Court is living beyond his means and his activities, past and present, disentitle him to hold the high judicial office that he does. Contempt partakes of the offence of sedition. The ultimate effect of a contemptuous utterance against a Court or an individual Judge is to shake the confidence in the ad ministration of justice by the State. Contempt of Court is an offence against the State (See Ex parte In re: The Application of Philips Grossman (69 Law Ed. 527). It is, therefore, on this principle that justification of the seditious or con temptuous matter is not allowed under the law because this is done, the mischief shall be multiplied and the witnesses who appear in defence of an accused in a sedition case or a contempt matter shall repeat the same seditious and contemptuous matter in the witness‑box with the result that the mischief, which the law intends to suppress, shall spread all the more wider and public confidence will be further under mined in the Organs of the State. In Israr Husain v. Crown (P L D 1954 F C 313) an affidavit had been filed scandalizing a particular Judge who was cognizant of the matter against the contemner, Israr Hussain. It was argued before the Federal Court that the appellant had not been given an opportunity to substantiate the truth of his allegations. The Federal Court observed that no authority or opinion had been quoted before them to show that truth could be successfully set up as a defence. It was observed by Muhammad Munir, Chief Justice, as follows :‑ The whole principle of the Law of Contempt is against any such defence, and if the law where as contended for, the whole administration of justice would be brought into disrepute because in that case the honour of the Judges would be at the mercy of disgruntled litigants who might with impunity attack the Judges and when proceedings in contempt were taken against them, bring them into further contempt by pleading truth and offering to prove it. Judges would thus be constantly engaged in defending their own personal honour against the onslaughts of persons who are parties to causes pending in their own Courts. And where a Judge has thus been dragged into a forensic arena, public confidence in the administration of justice by him would be completely gone and a few such instances would be sufficient to expose the whole system of public ridicule. In State v. Ataullah Khan Mangal (PLD1967SC78) which was a case of sedition, the question of justification was raised before the Supreme Court. The then Chief Justice A. R. Cornelius observed as follows :‑ The view that has been consistently held is that evidence as to the truth of the measures which formed the basis of criticism offered in the offending statement cannot be admitted in cases where the libels are alleged to be seditious. The principle upon which this rule Is based is simple and salutary. It is that It can never be in the public interest that enquiry into the truth of such statements should be allowed in cases where the essential and. indeed the only question for the Court to decide is whether the effect of the language used is such that it is calculated to create in the minds of those who see or hear it a feeling of revulsion towards the Government by law established, so strong as to amount to hatred or contempt, or in a still worse case, where the hatred or contempt is so strong as to have the effect of seriously taking away from the Government the allegiance of the public or a sedition thereof, in other words, producing `disaffection'. The above observations would equally apply to a case of contempt.

12. Mr. M. Anwar conceded that in an ex facie contempt the same Judge could punish the contemner but he asserted that where a Judge was scandalised in any other manner, he being the wronged person should not sit on the Bench. He quoted from Marshall's Book on Natural Justice. He and Mr. M. A. Rehman referred to some authorities that generally deal with the principles of natural justice. In my opinion, these authorities are not relevant to the decision of the plea taken before us. I personally see no difference in a case where contempt is committed in the face of a Judge or where he is scandalised by published matter. The plea that a Judge cannot sit in its own cause was raised in the case of K. L. Gauba and was repelled. The object in allowing a Judge to sit in his own cause and punish the contemner seemingly is to remove the obstruction to the stream of justice as early as possible and in the shortest period, so that the public confidence in the State and its system of administration of justice is restored. A Judge who stops brevi manu any attempt to interfere with the course of justice actually performs his constitutional and public duty. The power of a Judge sitting to punish his own contempt is, therefore, meant to prevent any damage to the public .confidence in the Organs of the State. It is a mode of vindicating majesty of law in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage. The power thus entrusted to a Judge is wholly unrelated to his personal sensibility be they tender or rugged.

13. I am not unaware of the two judgments which strike a slightly different note and where it was considered desirable that as a general principle a Judge who has been personally attacked should not hear a contempt matter. One of these judgments is Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh, C.J. (A I R 1954 S C 186). It was actually an application for transfer of the contempt matter from the Pepsu High Court to some other Court. The opinion referred to above, therefore, would appear to be obiter dictum, but the further observations made in this respect make it clear that their Lordships were not laying it down as a rule of law and it was conceded that cases may arise where it is more convenient and proper for the Judge to deal with the matter himself. They said that they were leaving the matter to the good sense of the Judges themselves and repeated the oft‑quoted maxim that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done by all concerned. It would appear that the Indian Supreme Court did not lay down any principle of law. Nor did it say anything in derogation of the legal position as established in this sub‑continent that a Judge whose contempt is committed can hear a case himself. The second case is from the American jurisdiction reported as Dorsey K. Ofutt v. United States of America (99 Law Ed. 11). According to rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure a Judge is authorised to punish the contempt committed in his face. In this case there had been a running controversy between the Judge and the defence counsel involving bitter personal attacks and continuous wrangling. The Judge immediately after the termi nation of the trial proceeded to punish the lawyer. The Court of appeal sustained the conviction but the Supreme Court by majority reversed the commitment and remanded the case for hearing before another Judge. The factual distinction between this case from the American jurisdiction and the case before us is quite clear. In the precedent case, the Judge himself had contributed to the acrimonious wrangling between the Bench and the counsel which was marked by personal attacks and innuendos of increasing bitterness. But in the case before us, there is nothing on the record to show that his Lordship, the present Chief Justice, had in any way given any cause of offence to the respondents except perhaps that in the legal discharge of his duty he dismissed the two writ petitions filed by Ijaz Hasan Qureshi.

14. The law in this country is, however, settled that a Judge whose contempt is committed can himself sit on the Bench. The Philosophy underlying this practice was explained by Cornelius, C. J. in his Judgment in Sir Edward Snelson v. Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore (P L D 1961 S C 237). His Lordship said:‑ It is thus that, while in the ordinary functioning of the Courts it is a principle of absolute application that no person shall be a Judge in his own case, yet when the attack is laid at the very foundation upon which the structure of justice rests, there the superior Courts have in certain cases been allowed, not by statute, but by assumption of jurisdiction which has been acquiesced in by all individuals and institutions in the civilised countries of the world, the right to be themselves the injured party, themselves the prosecutors and themselves the Judges. That extraordinary development is explained, and can only be explained by the necessity of arming the Courts with powers to defend themselves against every attack upon the position which they occupy in the administration of justice. Confidence in their capacity as such can be allowed to be affected only at the risk of dissolution of the entire system of Courts, and it is therefore that the Common Law has provided not only that the Courts shall be Judges in their own cause, that they shall also act in a peremptory and summary manner to check at once all attempts to interfere with the administra tion of justice by themselves.

15. The latest case on this subject is the case of Ashfaq Ahmad Sheikh v. State (P L D 1972 S C 39). At page 49 of the report, we find the following observations:‑ The next point urged by the learned counsel is that the learned Judge himself should not have heard the contempt matter on the principle that the same person should not be both the Prosecutor and the Judge. It is well‑settled that the same persons should not be the Prosecutor and the Judge in any action. It is also well‑settled that a Judge should not hear any matter in which he has personal interest in the decision on it. A proceeding for contempt of Court is, however, an exception to this general rule. The case of Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh, referred to above, was brought to the notice of the Supreme Court during the hearing of the precedent case and it was observed that it was not held in the cited case that a Judge involved in the contempt must not as a rule hear the contempt matter and decide it. In the celebrated opinion of Judge Wilmot in Rex v. Almon (1765 Wilmot 243) the contemner had attacked Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice, as acting `officiously, arbitrarily and illegally, and thereby delaying the issue of a writ of habeas corpus'. The objection to the Judges sitting on the Bench examining their own cause was overruled. Judge Wilmot observed that the arraignment of the justice of the Judges calls out for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatsoever, not for the sake of the Judges as private individuals but because of the safety of channels by which justice is conveyed to the people.

16. I may also say that one of the peculiar features of the law of contempt is that where a party is in contempt, a counsel cannot claim right of audience on his behalf. See Hadkinson v. Hadkinson ((11952) 2 AllE R 567). There is no gainsaying that a bold and fearless bar is one of the essentials of the fair administration of justice but a lawyer who completely aligns himself with the contemner treads on very delicate ground and may himself fall within the mischief of the law of contempt, because in that case he forgets his first duty to the Court as its officer and aligns himself with an accused who has tried to undermine the prestige of the Judiciary. It was held in the matter of contempt of Court against Mr. Sham Lal, Advocate. High Court, Lahore (138 1 C 878) that a counsel's privilege does not extend to state his instructions when these instructions involve an attack on the dignity of the Court.

17. Mujibur Rehman Shami invoked some provisions of the Code of Journalists to justify his refusal to answer some of the questions put by the Bench. When questioned as to whether there was any rule of Journalistic Ethics which permitted him to obtain and use documents in violation of the law of the country, he said that according to Fiqah he could break the law for the benefit of the country. He is welcome to nurture his own notions about the welfare of his country but I may say that gentlemen who take to the profession of Journalism do so with a sense of dedication and are expected to possess a greater sense of respon sibility than an ordinary illiterate and gullible citizen. Mujibur Rehman Shami admitted that he knew that all the Judges of the superior Courts in the country had submitted the statements of their assets to the Supreme Judicial Council in 1969, but he said that he did not know as to what particular period those statements related. He also said that he knew that under the Constitution the misconduct of a Judge was triable by the Supreme Judicial Council, but said that only the President can make reference to the Supreme Judicial Council and not an ordinary citizen. The‑provisions of Article 211(5) of the Interim Constitution are quite clear and the President can ask the Supreme Judicial Council to enquire into the conduct of a Judge on information received from the Council or any other source".

18. There is no Code of Ethics which enjoins on a journa list to publish articles scandalizing the Judges of the superior Courts of the country or take hold of official documents in violation of the Official Secrets Act. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi, when questioned said that he knew of the publication of the article after it had appeared in the magazine but he did not stop its further circulation as he was satisfied that the article had been .published after due verification by the Editor. I am constrained to say that both these journalists have not evinced that standard of sense of responsibility which was expected of them, and in coming to this conclusion, I cannot lose sight of the fact that his .Lordship Mr. Justice Sardar Muhammad Iqbal had only a few days before the publication of the impugned article dismissed two writ petitions filed by Ijaz Hasan Qureshi. One of these writ petitions related to the revival of the declaration of weekly ''Zindgi' of which Mujibur Rehman Shami was the Editor.

19. We Judges do not claim infallibility. The press is free to offer criticism on the functioning of the Court or of a Judge or his judicial pronouncements as the very idea of the open Court rule, which we have adopted from the British system, is to make it appear to the world at large as to how the Courts of the country are functioning. But I do not think that the press has a licence to make insinuations and innuendos which tarnish the character of a Judge of a superior Court and call upon him to resign because he lacks piety.

20. The International Committee of Jurists which wasp formed under the Chairmanship of Lord Shaw Cross considered the law of contempt as it prevailed in Britain, and gave the opinion that the press was not free to allege partiality or corrup tion on the part of a Judge. It further said:‑ Clearly if some one wishes in good faith to make a charge of partiality or corruption against a Judge he ought to have the opportunity of making it; but we do not consider the press to be the appropriate organ for this purpose. We consider that he should be able to do so by letter to the Lord Chancellor or to his Member of Parliament without fear of punishment and would deplore the use of the law of contempt to prevent him from doing so. The charges could then be considered either administratively or in the House of Commons or in the House of Lords. The liberty possessed by a journalist is not at a higher level than that of an ordinary citizen. It consists in printing, without any previous restraint but subject to consequences of law. When a journalist publishes an article questioning the piety and upright ness of a Judge, he commits the grossest' form of contempt. Continuing with this aspect of the case, I am tempted to quote the following observations of the Privy Council in Arnold v. King Emperor (A I R 1914 P C 116):‑ Their Lordships regret to find that there appeared on one side in this case the time‑worn fallacy that some kind of privilege attaches to the profession of the press as distinguished from the members of the public. The freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject and to what ever length the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, but apart from the statute law his privilege is no, other and no higher. The privilege of the press cannot be independent of the duties that attaches to its exercise. The power of the press to dissemi nate printed matter calls for great care and caution in the selec tion of the material that it publishes. The public mind is greatly affected by press propaganda and the gentlemen of the press" before publishing a particular material have to consider that their writings may not contaminate men's mind in respect of loyalty to the State and integrity of persons performing judicial functions or affects public morals, decency and order.

21. As a result of the above discussion, I find that both: Mujibur Rehman Shami and Ijaz Hussain Qureshi have com mitted gross contempt of Court. They showed no contrition during the hearing of this case and Shami maintained that the article was published in the interest of the country. He also during the course of his statement refused to divulge information asked by the Bench and he was told that his contumacious beha viour amounted to further contempt but he did not relent. While I am not dispose to issue fresh notice to him in respect of his refusal to divulge information to the Bench, I feet that it can be taken notice of while imposing the sentence. He deserves no leniency. I award him a sentence of six months' simple imprisonment and also impose a fine of Rs. 2,000, in default of payment of which he shall undergo six weeks' simple Imprisonment. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi did not show less zeal during the hearing of the case but since he is not the author of the article, I direct that he shall undergo simple imprisonment for four months and pay a fine of Rs. 1,

500. In default of payment of fine he shall undergo four weeks' simple imprisonment.

22. So far as Khan Zaman respondent No. 2 is concerned, he is legally guilty but as he has offered unqualified apology, I agree that no finding of guilty should be recorded against him.

23. I also agree that the Advocate‑General may take action according to law in respect of the 'Top Secret' documents remov ed from this Court and utilised by respondents 1 and

3. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑

I have gone through the judgments of my Lords the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Ataullah Sajjad. I entirely agree with them. However, I would like to add observations of my own.

2. Mujibur Rahman Shami and Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi, the editor and printer respectively of the Urdu Weekly Azan‑e -Haq, published under former's signatures an article titled tauheen‑e‑adalat (Contempt of Court) wherein they attacked the appointment and continuance as Judge and advisability of eleva tion as Chief Justice of this Court, of one of us (now the Chief Justice of this Court, hereinafter referred to as `the Judge'). Some public spirited members from the profession of law, a calling of decorum and dignity, sent the following telegram to the then learned Chief Justice :‑ `Azan‑e‑Haq' Weekly, Mianwali contains defamatory, scandalous matter regarding this Court at page 4 in 13th September issue. Demanded by many lawyers at meeting held under Chairmanship of Malik Muhammad Ashiq, Advocate for contempt proceedings also request to get immediate confiscation of all copies. Telegram sent to Governor also. By order dated. 12‑9‑1972, the Chief Justice noted that prima facie the article amounted to Contempt of High Court as it brings into disrepute and scandalizes the Judge named in the article as well as the Court. His Lordship issued notice to the editor, printer and publisher‑the three respondents, to show cause why they should not be punished. He constituted a Full Bench of three Judges including `the Judge'.

3. Khan Zaman respondent has submitted a written unquali fied apology with the averment that he no doubt is the publisher of the Weekly, but being a resident of Sargodha/Mianwali (The Weekly is shown to have been printed at Lahore) his responsi bility is only technical, and further that the article was published without his knowledge and consent and that he was sorry for the subject‑matter published therein.

4. Mujibur Rahman Shami and Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi, instead of showing cause against the notice of punishment for contempt, objected to the constitution of this Bench ; in that 'the Judge' being the affected and, according to them, an inter ested person should not hear this case. It was also contended that the `Judicial Code of Conduct' is a complete bar. They also alleged that 'the Judge' showed keen interest and anxiety in an earlier case of Contempt reported as State v. Taj Din (P L D 1972 Lah. 434) therefore he should not hear this case. Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi in his written application in this behalf went to the extreme and gave a suggestive threat that 'the Judge' would be guilty of misconduct if he heard this case. Some other points were also raised the nature of which is illustrated in the following prayer in another written application :‑ " . . . . . steps may be taken by this Court to indicate (a) with precision the passages in the articles objected to ; (b) which of the assertions are correct and which are incorrect ; and (c) three copies of the Azan‑e‑Haq' of the 131h September 1972, may be ordered to be furnished to the respondent or his counsel so as to enable him to prepare his written statement." The learned Advocate‑General submitted an application for the proceedings to be held in camera as they were of "sensitive nature involving the prestige and dignity" of this Court and that public hearing of the matter was bound to result in further undermining the dignity of the Court. This application was vehemently opposed by the contesting respondents (hereinafter referred to as 'respondents'). The main reason for this opposition given by Mujibur Rahman Shami (his counsel had told him to make the statement himself) was that the hearing should not be in camera, because only few persons (Khas Loag) might have read Azan‑e‑Haq and that public at large should know about these allegations." In a subsequent written objection to the application of the Advocate‑General, the respondents stuck to the same position. The pith and substance of the seven‑page objection is that "the cloud allegedly cast in respect of the antece dents of one of its (High Court's) members should be publicly removed by giving the fullest possible facilities to the respondents to prove their allegations, with the same opportunity to the person affected to disprove the truth of those, and unless this process takes place within the full public view, no judgment delivered by this Court in proceedings held behind closed doors will inspire confidence in the manner in which cases heard in .open Courts do". An attempt was also made to show that 'the Judge' (in particular) had on the first hearing directed that the publication of the proceedings in the press will be of only the material released by the Officer on Special Duty of this Court. It was complained that the press note which appeared "under the order of the High Court" did not reflect the proceedings "accurately". This was given as an example of the dangers of holding proceedings in camera "in a case which has already attracted great public interest and attention, and is indeed likely to make legal history on account of the extraordinary and novel propositions of law and fact of great and grave public interest .arising in the case". Although the entry in the Court on the first day of the proceedings was controlled, we, in our discretion, did not consider it necessary to hold this trial in camera. It may, however, be mentioned here that at one stage we felt that a deliberate attempt was being made to misrepresent and give a twist to the proceedings in this Court in the form of written replies and objections ; therefore, the learned counsel were pointedly told and warned about it. To cite one example, it was wrongly suggested by Mr. M. Anwar that 'the Judge' alone had directed the publication in the press in accordance with the press release of the Court. It was fully known to the parties that all three of us had taken this decision and that it was in pursuance thereof that the senior Judge on the Bench gave the direction, and I am sure that the learned Advocates representing the parties who were present are senior enough to know this practice. To give it a different colour in a written application, to say the least, is unfortunate. Timely warning against any further harm to this institution had a salutary effect because a visible change was observed during the subsequent proceedings, except that Mr. M. A. Rehman, learned counsel representing Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi when referring to 'the Judge' had, at moments, sting in the manner of putting forward his and/or his client's point of view. For example, at one stage he suggested without even an iota of justification, that 'the Judge' was "insisting" on sitting on this Bench. About this, he was warned in open Court. We confined ourselves to verbal counsel of restraint to both the learned lawyers which was at times a difficult task, and did not take any further regular action during or after these proceedings. Had we done so, some more notices of Contempt might have been issued to the counsel and their clients. Their conduct was such that it could be made the subject of such proceedings but the object of these proceedings being only the protection of the 'Court', any further action in the matter might have given a wrong impression that it was for the protection of 'a Judge'; against whom the two respondents through the same learned counsel had filed a complaint in this Court during the pendency of these proceedings. Lest it might be understood that in law this case has become a precedent for the lawyers to conduct and act as 'the two' have done in this case, it needs to be emphasized that it is not so. We do not approve of their conduct neither as a pure proposition of law nor on the bar of propriety and/or otherwise. While making these remarks we have not been oblivious of the need for diligent and courageous defence by all lawyers, of liberty and dignity of the citizens and the Courts. It .is not difficult for those gentlemen of learning to keep the balance wherever in their true judgment it is necessary to do so.

5. On merits, the case is not very complicated. The position adopted by the learned Advocate‑General is that Mujibur Kahman Shami and Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi have, by writing and publishing the impugned article, not only committed the Contempt of a Judge of this Court, but also of the entire Court. He went to the extent of levelling a charge that the conduct of these respondents is malicious and also "is a part of a big conspiracy to harm the institution itself". Thus according to him, it is the grossest form of Contempt and must be punished severely. A bare reading of the article, on the face of it, shows that apart from its culpability on the basis of general law of Contempt as envisaged in sub‑Article (2)(d) of Article 2u6 of the Interim Con stitution of 1972, it has in fact 'scandalized' and brought into 'hatred', 'ridicule' and 'contempt', 'a Judge' of this Court as also 'the Court' (tendency to do so apart). Such acts are punishable under sub‑Article (2)(b). The responsibility for authorship, printing and publication of the article not having been denied, both the learned counsel, quite understandably, tried to bank on procedural aspects of the matter. All the arguments of the learned counsel can be divided into four categories :‑‑ (i) that the constitution of this Bench is illegal ; (ii) that the culpable portions of the impugned article have not, in particular, been put to the respondents ; (iii) that they have not been permitted to lead defence evidence to prove the truth of the contents of the article ; and (iv) that as the public capacity of the Judge has not been attacked therefore, the offence of Contempt has not been committed ; and in any case as, according to the learned counsel, there was no ulterior motive underlying the publica tion of the article, therefore the respondents should not be punished for Contempt.

6. The precise argument on the question of constitution of the Bench is that the contents of the article are such that 'the Judge' must have felt hurt. That being so, he having become an interested party should have refused to sit on this Bench. When told that the precedent law on this question is against the pro position propounded by him, Mr. M. Anwar raised three contentions : firstly, that the Code of Conduct of Judges framed under and by virtue of the Constitution prohibits the hearing of such a matter by 'the Judge' concerned ; secondly, that according to the principles of Islamic law, a person who has any interest fn a subject‑matter of a case should not hear it. In this con nection, learned counsel compared certain instances in Muslim history with the principle of natural justice in the Western Jurisprudence, namely no one can be a Judge in his own cause and thirdly, that the latest trend in law of Contempt (reliance was placed on American precedent law) is that the Judge, whose Contempt is committed, does not sit on the Bench hearing the case.

7. When it was pointed out to the learned counsel that even after the promulgation of the 'Judicial Code of Conduct', our Supreme Court has not departed from the earlier practice ; Mr. M. Anwar replied that the argument being advanced by him before this Court has not been noticed by the Supreme Court in any of the earlier case, therefore, we are not bound by the earlier rulings. It is not correct proposition of law that this Court is competent not to follow the law declared by the Supreme Court, on the mere assumption that aground being urged before it was not raised before the Supreme Court. However, the question does not arise in this case; because the precise argument being raised before us has been considered and repelled in a recent ruling of the Supreme Court. In the case of Yusuf Ali Khan v. The State (P L D 1971 S C 508) after having noticed similar arguments based on the 'Judicial Code of Conduct', it was observed that in a case for committal for Contempt when a Judge issues notice he does not seek to vindicate any personal interest but the general administra tion of justice, which is a public concern.‑ The purpose of a proceeding in Contempt is to preserve the confidence of the public t, in the Court and not the protection of individual Judges. No personal interest is, therefore, involved. In the case of Ashfaque, Ahmad Sheikh v. The State (P L D 1972 S C 39) after noticing the relevant decisions on the law of Contempt, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the same person being both the Prosecutor and the Judge is not wholly unknown in our legal system. The same argument, which has been raised before us, was repelled in that case. In re : Karmatullah Khan (P L D 1972 S C 14) the following observation at page 24 of the report is very significant :‑ Mr. Justice . . . . and Mr. Justice . . . and Mr. Justice . . are the members of the Bench. To their knowledge it is utterly false that any one of them granted any interview to Mr. Abdul Khaliq or a third person on his behalf before or after his appeal was heard at Peshawar. The allegation made by the respondent was not only false, but mischievous in nature. In an earlier case against the same accused, reported as In re : Karamatullah Khan (P L D 1970 S C 400) it was observed at page 402 with reference to a learned Judge who was presiding over the Bench, that he had "denied the statement of the respondent that he saw Abdul Khaliq before his appeal was heard." These rulings show that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court, some of whom might be authors of the 'Judicial Code of Conduct', not only sat on the Benches concerned but also that their own statements were noticed in the judgments as complete answer to certain assertions made by the respondents therein. In Attorney‑General for Pakistan v. Yusuf Ali Khan (PLD 1972 SC 115), it was mentioned in the letter quoted in the judgment that it was incumbent on the learned Judge concerned therein "to decline to deal with the matter, after a complaint had been lodged against him, in the interest of justice and fair play." Their Lordships noted that in the letter, the integrity and impartiality of the concerned learned Judge and those of the other learned Judges who dismissed the respondent's petitions were directly attacked. All the learned Judges of the Supreme Court excepting one but including 'the concerned Judge' sat on the Bench which decided this case and convicted and sentenced the respondent with the following warning :‑ "I would also severely warn him not to indulge in future in any contemptuous acts which might scandalize Judges of the superior or subordinate Courts or undermine the judiciary." It is not out of place here to note that the respondent in the case before the Supreme Court had, like the contesting respondents is this case, claimed to have had an objection to the elevation of 'the Judge' concerned in this case, as Chief Justice of this Court.‑ May be that when the learned Advocate‑General emphasized before us that the impugned article was the result of a conspiracy, he was not for wrong. Many other precedent cases can be cited. As the argument based on the provisions of the 'Judicial Code of Conduct' has directly been dealt with and repelled by a ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Yusuf Ali Khan therefore, this being law declared, I do not want to make any further comment in this behalf. On general principles and/or the trends in American law also, the objection cannot be upheld. The law of Contempt is an exception to the principle of natural justice that 'no one shall be a Judge in his own cause', and the American law is not in any way different in this behalf. Soma comment in this behalf can be found in Syed Akhlaque Hussain v. Pakistan (PLD 1969 SC 201). In other respects, the difference between the American and Pakistan law on Contempt arises out of basic approach to reasonable restraints on freedom of expression including press in the interest of "the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to Contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence" (Article 16, Chapter I‑Fundamental Rights, Interim Constitu tion of 1972). While our Constitution has laid down these restrictions, in America this question is not settled by written word of Constitution. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the law declared by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, as noticed above, is a complete answer to the argument of the learned counsel In so far as the matter pending before us is concerned. Similarly in the ruling in the case of Ashfaque Ahmad Sheikh, the Supreme Court has dealt with and repelled the argument that the Islamic teachings run counter to the law of Contempt in Pakistan. I may add that there is nothing in the injunctions of the holy Qur'an and Sunnah that in a case like the present one 'the Judge' concerned cannot himself decide the matter. The examples cited at the bar lack in detail of context and are also irrelevant. On the contrary, there are clear injunctions to the Judges to do justice in all circumstances regardless of their interest in, or against, a person, on account of relationship, clan or creed. Instances of punishment meted out to the kith and kin of the highest in the real and dearest to the Judge, are not lacking. In the light of the above discussion and keeping in view all the aspects of the matter, it is held that the objection against the constitution of this Bench is misconceived and is repelled as such.

8. The other objections that precise specific portions in the article have not been put to the respondents has also no force. Firstly, the entire article constitutes Contempt. Even the part thereof, which have some silver lining, have tendency in innuendo to ridicule 'the Judge' and `this Court'. Therefore, there was no need for the Court to particularise any parts of the article. The statements made by the two respondents in Court do not at all indicate that they had any misunderstanding about the accusation and/or the charge against them. Even on the very first day of the proceedings, they were told that the entire contents of the article formed the charge against them and they might defend themselves against it. Secondly, the Supreme Court in a similar matter did not split the material contained in a detailed letter like the present article, and observed that it, "read as a whole" showed that the respondent "was out to wreak vengeance by directly attacking the integrity and impartiality of the Judges concerned" (See Yusuf Ali's case). Thus reading of such an article 'as a whole', regardless of an attempt by the author thereof to say a word or two to praise of 'the Judge' and the judiciary, would not be in any way against any established rule of procedure or practice. Thirdly, it has been held in so many cases that the strict observance of the rules of procedure contained in the Criminal Procedure Code is not necessary in Contempt proceed ings; subject of course, to the condition that the relevant principles of natural justice were observed. The provisions relating to the charge, etc. contained in the Criminal Procedure Code are not attracted. Had it been so, section 537 thereof would have been a complete answer. Moreover, even the argument based on the requirement of framing of the rules of procedure under Article 123 of 1962‑Constitution (Article 206 of the Interim Constitution) was repelled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashfaq Ahmad Sheikh. Fourthly, keeping in view the precedent law on the question of procedure, it has to be noted on factual side that the respondents have not made any serious attempt to show that the article read 'as a whole' (subject to their argument that it does not relate to the public capacity of the Judge), does not constitute Contempt as defined in sub‑Article (2) (b) of Article

206. And lastly, the respondents were not only represented by two experienced lawyers, but also it appears from the conduct and the trend of their drafting of some miscellaneous applications that they have conducted this case with considerable zeal, industry and sentiment. I have no doubt that the respondents have not at all been misled in their defence by any act or omission on the part of the Bench.

9. Truth has never been treated as a good defence against charge of Contempt. In S. Israr Hussain v. The Crown (PLD 1954 FC 313) and Sir Edward Snelson v. Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore (PLD 1961 SC 237) this question has been dealt with. There is no need for me to elaborate the same. It needs, however, to be noticed that the defence list produced by the respondents is not only vague but also vexatious in character. 1t appears from the state ment made by mujibur Rahman Shami in Court that he was ready, rather wanted, to take any amount of risk. If we would have allowed him to produce the defence evidence he wanted to lead, I am sure he would have made further attempt to scandalize the judiciary. The purpose was not at all bona fide. Apart from other considerations, there is one major question which remains unanswered. Had the purposes and motive of the respondents been honest, before publishing the article, there was no impedi ment to their having approached `the Judge' to seek first hand information and/or clarification. I have considered the request for production of defence evidence also in the context of sentence, but there is nothing peculiar in this case qua sentence so as to allow the respondents to lead evidence. There is another aspect of the matter. Mr. M. Anwar, while arguing the objection to the constitution of the Bench, conceded that if certain allegations against `the Judge' are to be replied by him, in case he is not sitting on the Bench, then he could send a note or his comments on disputed facts to the Judges hearing the case. I have already cited some cases decided by the Supreme Court, wherein the statements made by the concerned Judges were considered sufficient reply to allegations made by respondents therein. That being so, I would presume that the respondents had, before taking the risk of publishing the article and defending the same in Court, also deliberately taken the risk that the statements made in the article might be incorrect and might be denied by `the Judge' and that would be the end of the matter qua their defence on facts. In such circumstances, there was absolutely no justification for allowing them to lead evidence of so‑called truth in defence.

10. I have already indicated that the only defence on merits taken by the learned counsel for the respondents‑and they could not do better‑in this case is that the article in question has not injuriously affected the image of 'the Judge', as a Judge of this Court in his public capacity. Therefore, according to them, the respondents have not committed Contempt. They have heavily relied on a ruling of this Court in the case of State v. Taj Din (P L D 1972 Lah. 434). My reading and analysis of the said ruling shows that the law laid down therein instead of helping the respondents, goes against them. The learned counsel tried to misinterpret and misapply the ruling. They relied on the findings in Para. 66 of the judgment, wherein it was held that "neither the photograph nor the caption gives any impression that it has even a remote relation with the public capacity of the learned Judge or that it could, by any stretch of imagination, shake the confidence of the people in him or bring him or the Court to which he belongs into hatred or contempt". This observation, the learned counsel tried to detach from the other observations, but the approach by them betrays unfairness to the ruling. In the same judgment in Para. 42, in answer to question No. 4 posed by their Lordships, it was held that "in the face of the categorical statement made by Mr. Yusuf Ali Khan that the placards did display the inscription referred to above and that they had all along intended to refer to Mr. Justice . . . . and further the statement of the contemners themselves that they had taken out the procession to protest against Mr. Justice . . . ., there is no doubt left that by doing the aforementioned acts they scandalized the Judge as such as well as the Court and brought them into hatred and contempt." These two findings in the two cases, which their Lordships were disposing of by a single judgment, cannot be read in isolation. All my above remarks find support from the following proposition of law laid down by their Lordships in Para. 60 of the judgment :‑ "Even in this case cited by the learned Advocate‑General, the learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has particularly referred to the aspersion being "one, on his conduct in his capacity as a Judge", and it would not be incorrect therefore to infer that criticism of the conduct of a Judge in his personal capacity would ordinarily constitute Contempt only if it happens to cast aspersions upon such a fact of his personality as cannot be segregated from his public capacity. For example if a Judge were dubbed as dishonest in his private life or in his personal dealings can anybody say that such an aspersion would not shake the confidence of a public in his official and public capacity also for who would like to have justice dispensed to him by a Judge who is shown to be dishonest in his private or personal dealings. The honesty of a person can hardly be bifurcated into public and private capacities. If a person is dishonest in his private dealings, it would be difficult to convince a litigant or the public at large that he has another water‑tight compartment in his character which concerns only with his public dealings and that he continues to be honest in that particular facet. Such examples could be multiplied and, therefore, it would not be a good defence for an alleged contemner in every case to say that he was referring only to the private capacity of the Judge if it can be shown that the reference in that capacity was to such an aspect of his personality in his private capacity as could not be differentiated from his personality in the public capacity." I do not want to make any further comment as the law laid down and quoted above is too clear to need any further exposition. In this case, it has not at all been urged nor can it be urged that the impugned article, if weighed at the bar of the weighty observations quoted above, would not constitute Contempt. In connection with the merits, a passing reference was also made to the motives of the respondents. I do not want to enter into any discussion on the question of relevancy of motive in such like matter but on facts, as they appear from the manner in which the article has been written, the conduct of the respondents and the statements (written or otherwise recorded) made by them in Court. I am not at all convinced that they had any good motive in publishing the article.

11. Considering all the circumstances of the case, there is no doubt at all that Mujibur Rahman Shami and Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi have committed grossest Contempt of Court and I find both of them guilty of the same. Khan Zaman has tendered unqualified apologies. He was not concerned in the printing of the article. If at all he has committed technical Contempt ; in view of his apology, I do not feel the necessity of recording a finding of guilty against him.

12. On the question of sentence, it needs to be noticed that Mujibur Rahman Shami and Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi did not show any remorse, Mujibur Rahman Shami is the author of the article and there is no extenuating circumstance in his favour. I sentence him to six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000 in default of payment of which he shall suffer simple imprisonment for six weeks. Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi is not the author of the article. Agreeing with my learned brothers on the question of sentence qua him, I award him sentence of four months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,500 in default of payment of which he shall suffer simple imprisonment for four weeks. K.B.A./S.A.H. Contemners sentenced to imprisonment.