P L D 1958'Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)

MUHAMMAD MUNIR, C. J.‑This is an appeal from the order of a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan at Lahore made in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 170 of the Constitution, which has come to be commonly called as the writ jurisdiction of High Courts. The appeal raises some fundamental issues as to the limits of that jurisdiction. By the order under appeal the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority, Lahore, held on the 27th, 28th and 29th of May, 1957, in which four stage carriage permits for Sargodha -Bhera and one stage carriage permit for Lahore‑Rawalpindi granted to the Tariq Transport Company (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) and the Diamond Transport Company, Lahore, respectively were quashed and all the applications for permits decided in the meeting held on those days were ordered to be re‑heard in accordance with law. As we have been influenced in our judgment chiefly by the precise scope of the allegations made in the petitions for writs and the issues raised between the Diamond Transport Company and the Provincial Transport Authority in one case, and the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service (hereinafter referred to as the respondent with the pronoun "he") and the appellant on the other, it is necessary to set out the grounds of those petitions and the relief asked therein. Since 1948 the respondent has held a monopoly for .the Sargodha‑Bhera route for stage carriage permits. Oil 5th September, 1956, the appellant applied to the Regional Transport Authority, Lahore, for 13 route permits for stage carriages including the Rabwah-Bhera and Sargodha‑Bhera routes. This application was duly published except that the Sargodha‑Bhera and another route were omitted from the publication and the date for the consideration of the application was not announced. Another application by the Tariq Transport Company with a different address from that of the appellant for the Sargodha- Bhera route was received in the office of the Regional Transport Authority, which was published in a transport newspaper "The Driver" in its issue of 22nd May, 1957. This Transport Company appears to be a pseudonymous concern, and it is common ground that the four stage carriage permits were not issued to this Company "but to the appellant. A general notice that all pending applications for motor vehicle permits will be considered by the Regional Transport Authority on 27th May and subsequent days was published and the applications were considered by that Authority at a public hearing held on 27th, 28th and 29th May, 1957. The decisions were taken on the third day and were published in sonic of the newspapers. They were all in accordance with those formally recorded by the Authority subsequently. Since a part of the route for which a permits had been granted to the Diamond Transport Company lay within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority of Rawalpindi, the Provincial Transport Controller considered the grant of that permit by the Regional Transport Authority, Lahore, as ultra vires and wrote accordingly to the Regional Transport Authorities of Lahore and Rawalpindi. The, result was that the issue of the permit which had been granted to the Diamond Transport Company, subject to the condition that the company would not operate on the route lying within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Rawalpindi, till it obtained the counter‑signature of that Authority, was withheld. On the 18th of July, 1957, the respondent moved the High Court of Lahore under Article 170 of the Constitution praying that "the proceedings of the 27th to the 29th of May, 1957, of the Regional Transport Authority, Lahore, so far as these relate to the item dealing with the Sargodha‑Bhera route" be called and quashed and that the Authority be directed "not to issue any permits for the Sargodha‑Bhera route to the Tariq Transport Company Lahore and to cancel the permits if already issued". The respondents to that petition were the present appellant and the Regional Transport Authority Lahore. Subsequently, with permission of the Court, further particulars of the petition were put in and the amended read with the original petition alleged:‑ (1) that as the appellant's application for the Sargodha- Bhera route was published on 22nd May, 1957, it could not be considered before the 21st June, 1957, and that therefore the permits issued to the appellant in the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority held on 27th to 29th May, 1957, were invalid ; (2) that because at the aforesaid meeting the appellant and the respondent were not heard in the presence of each other, there was no proper hearing, and the permits to the appellant having been granted without such hearing were invalid ; (3) that the grounds on which the appellant's application for permits was granted and the respondent's objections to the grant turned down were not disclosed to the respondent ; (4) that the direction issued by the Provincial Transport Authority to the Regional Transport Authorities under section 44 to conduct a survey of the relevant route before granting fresh permits for it was disobeyed. Another petition was presented by the Diamond Transport Company in which the only point raised was that the Provincial Transport Authority, of which the Provincial Transport Controller was the Chairman, had no jurisdiction to issue a direction to the Regional Transport Authority Lahore not to issue a permit to the petitioner for the Lahore‑Rawalpindi route and the relief asked was that appropriate writs be issued against both those Authorities. When the respondent's petition came up for hearing before the Bench on 17th September, 1957, the Assistant Advocate‑General, Mr. M. Anwar, who was representing the Provincial Transport Authority one of the respondents to the Diamond Transport Company's petition, appeared and made a request that both the petitions be heard on the next day. Agreeing to this course, the learned‑ Judges recorded the following order:‑ "Mr. Anwar A. A. G. appears and requests that this petition be‑heard along with a connected petition (Writ Petition 923/57) tomorrow. He represents the Provincial Transport Authority who were a party in the connected petition, but not in this petition. Mr. Anwar states that according to his instructions there were serious irregularities committed by the Regional Transport Authority on the relevant dates Ind there is even a suggestion of the forgery of the records for these dates. It seems desirable that P. T. A. be also impleaded as a party in this petition and we order accordingly. Let both connected petitions be heard together". In an otherwise simple case, this order caused considerable confusion by obscuring the issues inter. partes, introducing many a disputed question of fact and virtually converting the hearing of a petition for a writ into the trial of an original action. As a newly added respondent the Provincial Transport Authority put in a reply making different allegations against the Regional Transport Authority, which were completely irrelevant to the issues arising between the appellant and the respondent in one case and the Diamond Transport Company and the Provincial Transport Authority in the other. The reply, which in no sense was a return, more than supported the petition of the respondent and in its essential characteristics was itself a petition for the issuance of a writ ending with the prayer "that this Honourable Court may be pleased to quash the entire proceedings of the 27th to the 29th May 1957 meeting of the Regional Transport Authority and the award of costs as against the Regional Transport Authority". The learned Judges themselves state that "the two petitions proceed on different grounds and seek different reliefs", but it does not appear to have been realized that while the issue in the Diamond Transport Company's case was a simple issue of law, the facts which gave rise to that issue not being in dispute, the issues in the other petition were funda mentally different and had 'no bearing on the question raised in the former. The respondent's petition had asked for no relief against the Provincial Transport Authority and was expressly limited to the prayer to quash the proceedings so far as they related to the item dealing with the Sargodha‑Bhera route. The reply of the Provincial Transport Authority, however, asked for the quashing of the entire proceedings of the 27th to the 29th May 1957. One unfortunate result of this procedure has been that the High Court has quashed all the proceedings that took place from 27th to 29th May and, in so doing, it has deprived a large number of persons, without hearing them and without there being‑even a petition against them, of the permits which had been granted to them and to which no one except the Provincial Transport Authority had objected. Thereafter the hearing of the petitions assumed the form of the trial of a regular suit in which the respondent examined only one witness, besides its General Manager Mr. Muhammad lqbal Piracha. The appellant also contented himself with one witness. The Provincial Transport Authority, however, was permitted to summon seven witnesses and the learned Judges themselves examined five persons as Court witnesses. The Regional Trans port Authority produced only three witnesses. After hearing all this evidence and the arguments of counsel the learned Judges came to the following findings:‑ (1) that neither the application of 22nd May by the pseudonymous Tariq Transport Company, nor the appellant's application of 25th September, 1956, for the Sargodba‑Bhera route could be heard by the Regional Transport Authority in its meeting of 27th, 28th and 29th May, the former because 30 days had not expired after its publication, and the latter because the Sargodha‑Bhera route had not been mentioned in the publication of 24th October‑1956 ; (2) that the applicants for permits were not heard in the presence of the objectors; (3) that the Regional, Transport Authority is a quasi judicial body and since for its action in granting 64 out of 700 applications no reasons were recorded, the decisions taken were bad in law ; (4) that because the appellant was not present when his application for Sargodha‑Bhera route was considered, the application should either have been rejected or adjourned ; (5) that having taken no part in the proceedings of 27th and 28th and part of 29th May, Major Allah Dad, the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority, could not take any part in the decisions to be arrived at by that Authority and the final decisions taken being the result of his influence are invalid ; (6) that under rule 4.8 (2) of the Punjab Motor Rules permits for the Sargodha‑Bhera route could not be granted to the appellants by modification of the prayer for Rabwah‑Sargodha route, without such modifications having been put to the res pondent under subsection (3) of section 57, and independently of that subsection under section 47 (1). In the view the learned Judges took the entire proceedings of the meeting of 27th to 29th May were quashed and the order thus made has given rise not only to an appeal by the Tariq Trans port Company, but also by the Iqbal Transport Service Lyallpur, the Chaudhury Bus Service, Jhang, the Bandial Bus Service Quaidabad, the Yasin Transport Company Lahore, the Raja Bus Service Ltd., the Bhatti Bus Service, the Faruq Bus Service, Lahore, The Husani Transport Service, the Shorkot Transport Service and the Lyallpur Transport Company whose sole grievance in the appeal is that the proceedings of the meeting in which permits were granted to them have, in the absence of any petition for a writ against them, been quashed without their being made parties to the proceedings and without their being heard against the mak ing of such order. The first point raised in the appeal is that the respondent not having exhausted the remedies available to him under the law, his prayer for a writ should not have been entertained by the High Court. It is admitted by Mr. Muhammad Iqbal, learned counsel for the respondent, that under section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, read with rule 4.37 of the Punjab Motor Rules an appeal from the order of the Regional Transport Authority lay to the Board of Revenue, which has replaced the Financial Com missioner, the original Appellate Authority under the rule. That rule not only constitutes an Appellate Authority but also details the manner in which an appeal may be made and the documents that may be relied on and provides that the appellant, either in person or through an agent or representative, shall be heard in support of the appeal. The respondent did not avail himself of this statutory right and preferred to invoke the very extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court by alleging that no remedy "equally speedy, effective and efficacious other than through the writ juris diction of 'this Honourable Court is available to the petitioners against the illegal and wrongful action of respondent No. 1". That this averment was wholly unfounded I have no doubt what ever. The respondent could have adopted precisely the same procedure as he did before the High Court, and I am quite sure that if he had alleged that a copy of the order against which he was preferring the appeal was not being given to him, the Appel late Authority would have sent for the record exactly as the High Court did and would have given a full consideration to the points raised in the appeal.. In the reply to the petition, it was alleged by the appellant that the respondent could not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court because another remedy, namely, an appeal, was available to him, and this legal. position was present to the mind of the learned Judges who heard the petitions because they state that "Orders granting or refusing all kinds of permits by the Authority are appealable". In their judgment, however, the contention that the respondent should appeal before asking for a writ from the High Court has received no considera tion, and I consider it to be wrong on principle for the High Court to entertain petitions for writs, except in very exceptional circumstances, when the law provides a remedy by appeal to another Tribunal fully competent to award the requisite relief. Any indulgence to the contrary by the High Court is calculated to create distrust in statutory tribunals of competent jurisdiction and to cast an undeserved reflection on their honesty and com petency and thus to defeat the legislative intent. And in a case of the present kind where the right, which the petitioner for a writ claims to vest in him is entirely the creation of a statute, it is all the more imperative on him to exhaust the remedies provid ed by the statute before he comes to the High Court. He cannot be permitted to say that while he will have one or all the benefits of the statute, he will comply with none of its remedial processes. In the English cases cited at the Bar none is to be found where the High Court, without stating the reasons for its interference before the aggrieved party had availed himself of the right to appeal, ever issued a writ. In the United States of America, prematurity of the action is a well‑recognised barrier to judicial review of administrative orders see Columbia System v. U: S. (316 U S 407). That position is thus stated by Ferris in para. 158 at page 179, of his "Extraordinary Legal Remedies":‑ "The purpose of the common law writ is not to take the place of a writ of error or appeal, but to cause the entire record of the inferior Court to be brought up by certified copy for ins pection, in order that the reviewing Court may determine from the face of the record whether the inferior Court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not proceeded according to the essential requirements of the law, in cases where no direct appellate pro ceedings are provided by law * * * When used in the nature of a writ of error, it was granted only in those instances in which the inferior Court had acted without jurisdiction or in disregard of statutory provisions. The writ ran to those bodies whose orders, though erroneous, had the force of final and conclusive judgments, and there being no right of appeal or other method of review, the extraordinary writ of ‑certiorari was resorted to from necessity". And in paragraph 163 at page 185, the learned author has the following on the same subject: "The common law rule is that certiorari will not lie when there is another adequate remedy by appeal, writ of error or otherwise, where the inferior Court has jurisdiction. If this were not true, then the writ might be used to withdraw any case at any intermediate stage from the consideration of the trial Court and submit it to the final determination of the superior Court issuing the writ. This would in effect render the writ a substitute for an appeal or writ of error". In the case of mandamus, it has been uniformly held in England that the Court will, as a general rule, and in the exercise of its discretion, refuse an order of mandamus, where there is an alter native specific remedy at law which is not less convenient, beneficial and effective, arid such remedy includes an appeal to an appellate tribunal (Halsbury, 3rd Edidition, Volume 11, p. 107, paragraph 200 and Note (b) at p. 108). A similar position obtains in U. S. A. where a statutory remedy by way of appeal or writ of error ordinarily bars the right to mandamus on the principle that the writ may not be substituted as a means of review to take the place of express remedial process as created by statute for such purposes, whatever may be the Court's conviction as to the clear error of the lower Court, Ex parte Riddle (255 U S 450); Matter of Tiffany (254, U‑S 32); Ex parte Park Square Automobile Station (244 U S 412) and Ex parte Roe (4). Mr. Muhammad 1qbal relies on the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan in Muhammad Hussain Khan v. The Federation of Pakistan (P L D 1956 Kar. 538) where Kaikaus, J. relying on King v. North (6) seems to have held that if the proceedings are illegal or in excess of jurisdiction, the mere fact that the person has a right of appeal' against the order cannot bar an application for certiorari. Cases of absence or excess of jurisdiction, however, stand on a different footing and are an exception to the general rule just stated. An appeal, while adequate to correct mere errors in the exercise of jurisdiction, is often inadequate to redress or prevent a wrong done in the absence or excess of jurisdiction. If a tribunal has no jurisdiction either in respect of the subject‑matter of litigation or the parties before it or the territory to which the dispute relates or because of its own defective constitution or the illegality of the order, the proceedings are void abinitio, and an appeal in such a case is an unnecessary step and mere prolongation of the proceed ings which eventually the Court must hold to be void for lack of jurisdiction. In such cases certiorari acts as would a Court of Equity. Thus there have been several cases in England where certiorari was granted ‑ if the Tribunal had acted without jurisdic tion, though a right of appeal existed, R. v. North ((1927) 1 K B 491) White v. Steel (12 C B (N S) 383), Martin v. Mackonochie (4 Q B D 697, 732), Ex parte Smyth (3 Ad. & E. 719). But where appeal does lie, in order to quash a proceeding by certiorari, it is necessary that the lack of jurisdiction should appear on the face of the record. Another case where a petition for certiorari may be entertained without waiting for the result of the appeal is where an appeal being competent a party is deprived of that right without any fault or negligence on his part or where the appellate tribunal refuses to or does not determine the appeal. Having given careful consideration to this aspect of the matter, I am of the view that the present case was governed by the general rule that where a statute creates a right and also provides a machinery for the enforcement of that right, the party complaining of a breach of the statute must first avail himself of the remedy pro vided by the statute for such breach before he applies for a writ or an order in the nature of a writ. Since in the present case the statute under which the respondent had a grievance provides art appeal in which that grievance can be set right, no writ of certiorari or mandamus or any other discretionary order of that nature should have been issued by the High Court. Though, what I have said above is sufficient for the reversal of the High Court judgment, there are some other questions in this case, on which a considered opinion is called for. The main ground stated by the High Court for quashing the proceedings is that the provisions of section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act were not complied with because Sargodha‑Bhera route was omitted from the publication of the appellant's application in October 1956 and the appellant was not heard in the presence of the res pondent in respect of the former's application for that route. With a view 'to determining whether these irregularities were a valid ground for quashing the entire proceedings, it is necessary to state a few more facts. The appellant's application was taken up with the other applications from the Lahore District on 27th May when Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Piracha, the Manager of the respon dent, was also present. He, however, alleges, and this may be assumed to " be true, that he was not permitted to take part in the proceedings relating to the applications from Lahore because he himself was an applicant from the Sargodha District as well as an objector to 18 other applications made by other parties for the Sargodha‑Bhera route. The applicants from all districts were heard on the 27th and 28th May, and it was after hearing them that the objectors were heard on the 29th of May. Mr. Iqbal Piracha had not put in any objection either to the appellant's application for Rabwah‑Bhera route or for the Sargodha‑Bhera route which had been omitted from the publication of October 1956, but to the other 18 applications for the Sargodha‑Bhera route he had strongly objected and in the proceedings there is a detailed note about this objection and its rejection on the ground that fresh permits for Sargodha‑Bhera were necessary. Thus the respondent was fully heard on the general issue whether the appellant's monopoly for that route should in the public interest be disturbed and additional permits granted. In the arguments before us it has not even been hinted that the respondent intended to make any special objection to the grant of permits to the appel lant for the Sargodha‑Bhera route in case the respondent's objec tion to the grant of further permits was rejected and it was decided to issue more permits for that route. The omission of this route from the publication of the appellant's application of 25th Septem ber 1956, was therefore, an irregularity which did not at all prejudice the respondent. In the same manner, the absence of the appellant, assuming he was absent as alleged by the respondent, from the proceedings when his application for the Sargodha‑Bhera route was considered and the absence of the respondent from those proceedings has not the slightest bearing on the case because the respondent was heard at length in support of his general objection that no further permit for the Sargodha‑Bhera route should be issued. The learned Judge seem to have acted on the assumption that the provisions of S. 57 being mandatory any departure from them, however immaterial in the circumstances of a case, is suffi cient to vitiate the entire proceedings. This, to, my mind, is not the law because the violation of a procedural rule regulating the hearing, if it results in an error so minor as not to amount to the denial of a fair hearing, cannot be a ground for quashing the, proceedings, if, in fact, by the irregularity no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner for a writ. This is how S. 57 has been construed by the administrative appellate authority and, in my opinion, it is a sound rule, recognised by almost all general codes of procedural law and absolutely essential for the preservation of all duly considered verdicts, that an omission or, error in procedure, unless it has occasioned a failure of justice or prejudiced a party in the presentation of his case, is not a sufficient ground for reversing the decision. In the present case, the appellant was fully, heard in support of his objection to the further grant of permits for the Sargodha‑Bhera route and that general objection, if accepted, would have affected the appellant as well as the other applicants for the same route, and it not being the respondent's case that he had any particular objection to urge against the appellant personally, the irregularity in procedure which did not influence the decision, which would have been the same even if the respondent had objected to the appellant's application, did not vitiate the proceedings. This aspect of the matter has not at all been referred to by the High Court and it has been assumed that a violation simpliciter of any provision of S. 57 is a sufficient ground for quashing the proceedings. The Act does not say that the applicant and the objector must be heard in the presence of each other all that it says is that they both must be heard if they wish to be heard. The hearing of the objector in the absence of the applicant or subsequently to the date on which the applicant is heard or his application considered does not in all cases amount to a denial of fair hearing so as to make the proceedings void or illegal, and in the present case it is impossible to contend that the respondent was not heard against the grant of permits for the Sargodha‑Bhera route. Mr. Muhammad Iqbal relied on the‑ direction issued by the Provincial Transport Authority under S. 44 of the Act to the effect that while considering the grant of permits the Regional Transport Authority should bear in mind the condition of the roads as disclosed by a survey. The Regional Transport Authority's case in regard to this direction was that it was issued by the Provincial Transport Controller who had no jurisdiction to issue it. The High Court has said nothing about the matter and the direction alleged to have been issued is not to be found on the record. The question of its validity cannot therefore be examined in this appeal. It is stated by, the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority that in granting or refusing the permits the traffic conditions on the roads were considered, and I do not know what else a survey could disclose. To sum up, the respondents' whole case before the Regional Transport Authority and in the High Court was that his monopoly of the Sargodha‑Bhera route, which he has been enjoying since 1948 should have been preserved and no permit for that route should have been granted to anyone. He had produced before that Authority a note by the Chairman of the Punjab Road Transport Board stating that he had found by experience that route to be financially ruinous. The Acting Chairman of the Authority, how ever, had alleged, an allegation which is to be found in the minutes, that this note had been purposely and improperly obtained by the respondent from the Manager of the Board and when the parties were permitted by the High Court to produce all relevant evidence, the respondent did not call the Manager either to prove that note or to offer him for cross‑examination. The respondent himself admits that of the several routes held by his concern, Sargodha- Bhera is the only productive route, and it has not been disputed that when after the grant of permits the appellant began to operate on the route, the respondent found it possible to reduce the fare from Rs. 1‑8‑0 to 0‑8‑0 per passenger, which after the cancellation of the appellant's permits he again raised to Rs. 1‑8‑

0. In these circumstances, even if the High Court were to examine the justness or reasonableness of the Authority's decision it could not have come to any conclusion other than the one at which the Authority had arrived. On merits therefore the respondent had no case for the consideration of the High Court either in law or in equity. The points dealt with above were the only ones raised by the respondent in his petition and if that petition had been heard as between the appellant and the respondent and no third party‑had been inducted into the case, the appeal would have concluded here, and it would not have been necessary to say anything more. But, as mentioned above, at the request of the counsel for the Provincial Transport Authority for a joint hearing of the two petitions, the High Court took the unusual step of consolidating the petitions and impleading the Provincial Transport Authority as a respondent to the petition to which he was not a party. The, Provincial Transport Authority had no locus standi to be heard in the petition to which it was not a party because it could not have applied for a writ, nor could it be a co‑respondent in that case because the present respondent had asked for no relief against it. What is more, not only was the Provincial Transport Authority impleaded, it was also directed to put in a written state ment. A perusal of the statement that it put in would show that it was essentially a fresh petition by the Provincial Transport Authority for a writ against the appellant and the Regional Trans port Authority, ending with a prayer‑clause which can only be found in a petition for a writ and containing allegations which in the opinion of that Authority were grounds for the issuance of a writ. In a petition for a writ the first question that the Court has to consider is whether the petitioner has the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court, and I consider it to be a basic principle that a person seeking judicial review of administrative or quasi judicial action must show that he has a direct personal interest in the act which he challenges before his prayer for review is entertained. .A petitioner", says Mr. Justice Frankfurt in his concurrent opinion in Giant Anti‑Fascist Refugee, Committee v. McGrath (341, U. S. 123, 151) " does not have standing to sue unless he is interested in and affected adversely by the decision of which he seeks review. His interest must be of a personal and not of an official nature". An application for an order of certiorari can only be made by an aggrieved party and not merely by one of the public, R. v. Nicholson, ((1899) 2 Q B 455) and in the case of an application for an order of mandamus it is an established rule that the applicant must show that there resides in himself a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought, R. v. Lewisham Union ((1897) I Q B 498 at p. 500). It cannot be contended that the Provincial Transport Authority had any such interest in the' matter to entitle it substantially to assume the role of a petitioner. Certiorari cannot issue at the instance of one not named as a party to the proceeding in which the judgment or order sought to be reviewed was entered. Where one not a party seeks to use certiorari, he must show that the decision sought to be reviewed is directed against him or his property in the sense that the enforcement of the decision would involve special, immediate and in its effect a direct injury to his interest. Ferris, Para 174, p.

199. Nor could the Provincial Transport Authority be properly made a co‑respondent to the respondents' petition because the essential party to a petition for a writ of certiorari is the tribunal or Authority whose action is to be reviewed and who is interested therein and affected thereby and in whose possession the record of such action remains. But in order that the Court may do ample and complete justice and render a judgment, which will be binding on all persons concerned, all persons who are parties to the record should be made parties. It is one of the paradoxes of this case that a person who was not at all interested in the proceedings was made a party, perhaps the principal party, but the large number of Transport Companies and concerns which have actually been affected by the judgment were never required to be in Court to be heard against the issuance of writ or direction. If the High Court had the authority to issue a writ suo mote its action in impleading an unnecessary party, but who could nevertheless assist the Court in the determination of the issues raised, would have been'‑open to no objection. But in law there is no warrant for the implicit assumption underlying the procedure adopted by the High Court that it has a sort of general revisional or supervisory jurisdiction over all tribunals performing quasi judicial functions or exercising statutory administrative powers, which in some manner affect a citizen. It has been held by the High Court that a decision by a Regional Transport Authority to refuse or grant a permit affects the fundamental right granted to every citizen of Pakistan by Article 12 of the Constitution to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation or to conduct any lawful trade or business, subject to regulation by a licensing system and that therefore a decision in this matter is of a quasi-judicial nature. And from this it appears to have been further assumed that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of all breaches of such rights inheres in the High Court by reason of Article 170 of the Constitu tion. If the premises be correct, the conclusion about the Regional Transport Authority being a quasi‑judicial body may perhaps be right, but Article 12 is not at all in point in the present case, and the learned Judges appear in this respect to have been under an obvious misapprehension because a business unless it amounts to a trade or profession is not within the Proviso to Article

12. Here it is doubtful whether the carriage of passengers by power‑propelled buses is a trade, and a profession it certainly is not. The respon dent was not the applicant for the grant of a permit; he was objecting to somebody else carrying on transport business under a licence. It is therefore difficult to agree with the High Court that a fundamental right was involved in this case unless it be held that to enjoy a monopoly of transport service on a public road is a fundamental right of every citizen of Pakistan. A more obviously untenable position could not have been adopted by the respondent. The public roads of this country vest in and are under the management of the State, which also looks after their maintenance and is responsible for the traffic on those roads. They do not belong to or vest in an applicant for a route permit and they are not in his possession. His claim therefore not only to ply buses on such roads for profit but also to enjoy a monopoly of public traffic on them is not relatable to any fundamental right, a breach of which would make an administrative body responsible for public traffic a quasi judicial body. I shall presently deal with the issue raised and fully argued whether a Regional Transport Authority is a quasi judicial body but assuming that it is, it 'does not follow that under the Constitution the High Court can exercise a general revisional or supervisory jurisdiction over such bodies because, as already pointed out, a petitioner for a writ or a direction or order under Article 170 of the Constitution has first to show his standing. A High Court, therefore, is not competent merely on information or of its own knowledge to commence certiorari proceedings or other proceedings of a similar nature under that constitutional provision. And if that be correct, as I hold it is, the High Court could neither suo motu nor at the instance of the Provincial Transport Authority, which was not in the slightest degree concerned with the matter, go into the various issues raised by that Authority. The matters which were raised by the Provincial Transport Authority alone and found no place in the respondent's petition were (1) that since the Regional Transport Authority had given no reasons for selecting 64 out of 700 persons for the grant of permits, the proceedings were invalid in law ; and (2) that because the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority who had not taken any part in the proceedings of 27th and 28th May took part in the deliberations of the, Authority on the 29th and actually influenced the decisions of the Authority, the case was similar to that where a judicial or quasi‑judicial officer who has himself not heard the evidence decides the matter. For the purpose of determining whether the High Court's decision on these two points was correct, it is unavoidable to enter into the general issue as to what a quasi‑judicial tribunal is and whether the Regional Transport Authority functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is such a body. The question whether an act is judicial, quasi‑judicial or administrative is clouded by a confusion which it is extremely difficult to resolve and no clear‑cut distinction between these three functions can be discovered from the lame number of reported cases and the divergent opinions expressed therein, In modern States where expertise is the dominating feature of Government more than one function is combined in administrative tribunals, and more often than not an administrative agency discharges not only legislative and administrative but also judicial functions. The true question in the case of such tribunals always is whether the act which is complained of is a judicial act and not whether the procedure adopted by the tribunal is judicial or quasi judicial or whether the dominant or general aspect of the tribunal is that of a judicial, quasi‑judicial or administrative body. A tribunal is not always furnished with the trappings of a Court, nor will such trappings make its action judicial. The character of the action taken in a given case and the nature of the right on which it operates must determine whether that action is judicial, ministerial or legislative or whether it is simply the act of a public agent. A tribunal acts judicially in the full sense of the term if (1) it has to determine a dispute ; (2) the dispute relates to a right or liability which, whatever its immediate aspect, is ultimately referable to some right or liability, recognised by the Constitution or statute or by custom or equity which by the domestic law is declared to be the rule of decision ; (3) since every right or liability depends upon facts, the tribunal is under an obligation to discover the relevant facts ; (4) the ascertainment of the facts is in the presence of the parties either of whom is entitled to produce evidence in support of its respective case and to question the truth of the evidence produced by his opponent ; and (5) after an investigation of the facts and hearing legal arguments the tribunal renders a judgment which so far as the tribunal is concerned terminates the dispute. In the case of an administrative tribunal, however, the emphasis is on policy, expediency and discretion to enable it to achieve the object with which it was set up. In the case of such a tribunal the, approach in determining the relevant facts is there fore often subjective and not objective, there being generally no lis before it in which the parties are arrayed against each other for the enforcement of a private right or liability and who for that purpose are entitled to produce evidence and adduce legal argument. The word `quasi' as prefixed to the word `judicial' may either indicate that the tribunal is not acting purely administratively or that it is acting in a manner in which a judicial tribunal is expected to act. In his recent book "Fundamental Law of Pakistan", Mr. Brohi has a critical comment on this subject at pp. 475 to 484 and after discussing and analyzing leading cases thus states his general conclusion at p. 481: "In other words, if the law permits a subjective approach to the determination of the conditions limiting the exercise of power, and constitutes the officer exercising the power as a sole judge as to their existence, writ of certiorari will not lie but if, on the other hand, those conditions have themselves to be determined objectively then they become `conditions‑precedent' to the exercise of the power and their existence cannot be said to be conclusively demonstrated merely because the officer exercising the power says that such conditions exist. In the latter case the Court can go behind the declaration that such conditions have been found to exist". And at p. 482 he quotes from an article of Mr. Gordon contributed to 49 L Q R in the course of which at p. 107 the writer says:‑ "Judicial Tribunals must treat legal rights and liabilities as pre‑existing, because such tribunals declare themselves bound by a fixed objective standard, they profess not to confer rights or impose liabilities themselves but only to do what is dictated by law. But administrative tribunals which act upon policy and expediency, themselves dictate what is policy and expedient; they are not concerned with pre‑existing rights and liabilities but themselves create rights and liabilities that they enforce". In certiorari the initial question is whether the official whose action is called in question was acting under a law. If he was not, the act was that of a mere public agent and action at law and not certiorari is the remedy. If, however, public functionary has acted in exercise of a statutory authority, then the question to be determined is whether he was the sole judge of facts and of the necessity, expediency, advisability, or reasonableness of the action to be taken. If the reply be in the affirmative, he was not acting judicially and his discretion is not liable to judicial review. But if he was under an obligation to find the facts in a judicial or specially prescribed manner, a material departure from the pro cedure which has adversely affected the rights of a party would render his action liable to judicial review, even if, on the facts to be so found, the action to be taken depended on his discretion. These cases are distinguishable from those where, whatever be the nature of the Tribunal, the order made is illegal in the sense that the Tribunal was not competent to make it or when on the facts found, whether subjectively or objectively, the order in question could not have been made or an order should have been but has not been made or where the Tribunal suffers from lack of jurisdic tion for the reasons stated earlier in this judgment. In all such cases, the order is liable to review by a superior Court in writ proceedings provided it has affected any right of the petitioner for a writ. What has to be seen in all such cases is the provision of the statute under which the action was taken and it is on a true construction of that Provision in the context of the statute that the answer to the question under discussion will primarily depend In making these observations, however, I must not be understood as laying down a precise definition of judicial or of administrative action; all that is meant is that the factors mentioned are important considerations for a correct determination of the, question. In the light of the principle stated above, we can now approach the question whether a Regional Transport Authority when granting route permits under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 acts in a quasi‑judicial (it not being contended that it acts judicially) or purely administrative capacity. The procedure prescribed by the Act for the making and consideration of applications for permits is that:‑ (1) anyone may make an application for a permit ; (2) a public notice of the particulars of the application and of the date of its consideration has to be given ; (3) anyone may make a representation in support of or against the grant of such application ; (4) the application has to be disposed of at a public hearing at which the applicant and the person making the representation shall have an opportunity of being heard either in person or by a duly authorized representative ; and (5) when an application for a permit is refused, the Authority is bound to give to the applicant in writing its reasons for. the refusal. What considerations the Authority must bear in mind when it has to decide, an application is the subject matter of section 47 which is as follows:‑ "47.‑(1) A Regional Transport Authority shall, in deciding whether to grant or refuse a stage carriage .permit, have regard to the following matters, namely :‑‑ (a) the interest of the public generally ; . (b) the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken ; (c) the adequacy of existing road passenger transport services between the places to be served, the fares charged by those services and the effect upon those services of the service proposed ; (d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the service ; (e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services and in particular of unremunerative services in conjunction with remunerative services ; and (f) the condition of the roads included in the proposed route or routes ; and shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route or routes or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or routes lies or by any association interested in the provision of road transport facilities". The first thing to notice about this provision is that there is nothing therein to prevent a Regional Transport Authority in deciding upon a policy to grant or refuse permits provided that policy has been formulated after considering the matters mentioned therein. The next point to be noticed is that the provision lays stress on the interest of the public, the advantages to the public, and the benefit to any particular locality and has no reference what soever to any private right. Clause (c), which refers to the adequacy of existing road passenger transport does not recognize any right in those who are providing such transport. Thus if a transport company is the only company plying on a particular road and charging monopoly, fares, the Regional Transport Authority may, in the public interest, grant fresh permits for that route to destroy the existing monopoly. And if the fares be reasonable and the transport services adequate, the Authority may refuse to issue any further permit for that route, but any such decision again will have reference to the public interest and not to any individual right because the avoidance of cut‑throat competition between two transport agencies is as much in the public interest as the destruction of a monopoly held by either of them. The only provision in this section, which refers to private interests, is clause (e) but it does not enjoin the Authority not to grant any further permit if an unremunerative service for a particular route already exists. Thus this clause creates no right whatsoever in any person for a claim to a permit; it merely mentions one of the considerations by which the Regional Transport Authority should be guided in taking a decision to grant or refuse any permit, There is, therefore, no lis between two or more persons before a Regional Transport Authority or between anyone of them and that Authority; and there is no private right involved in the decision of the Authority. As pointed out by Lord Herschell in Boulter v. Kent Justices ((180.7) A C 556) the grant of a licence is the conferment of a privilege and the con sideration that influences the grant is the public interest. There is therefore no lis before the licensing authority. "A decision", His Lordship observed, "that license should not be granted is a decision that it would not be for the public benefit to grant it. It is not a decision that the objector has a right to have it refused. It is properly speaking a determination in his favour. It is, I think, a fallacy to treat the refusal as necessarily induced by a particular objector. Every member of the local community might object. Would they all then become the other party? There in truth no lis, no controversy inter partes and no decision in favour of one of them and against the other, unless, indeed, the entire public are regarded as the other party for if a licence be refused on the ground that it was not needed to supply the legitimate wants of the public at large, the decision is really in favour of public at large". And in Lord Mayor of Leeds v. Ryder and others, ((1907) A C 420) Lord Loreburn said: "The justices acting under section 1 subsection (2) of the Act of 1904 act administratively for they are exercising a discretion which may depend upon considerations of policy and practical good sense‑and they must, of course, act honestly. That is the total of their duty". Similarly, a Regional Transport Authority is empowered by S. 48 to issue a direction or an order, but in taking any action under that provision it has again to consider the factors mentioned in subsection (1) of S. 47 which, as already pointed out, all relate to the public interest and refer to no private right. The applicant for a permit and the person who makes a representation have to be heard, if they wish to be heard, at a public meeting, but it has never been held that a hearing alone is sufficient to convert the tribunal, which is under an obligation to grant a hearing, into a quasi judicial tribunal. In fact, notice and' hearing which both find place in S. 57, and as was the case in Franklin v. Minister of Town and County Planning, ((1948) A C 87), consideration of objections are in modern times a normal feature of purely administrative tribunals where the order of the Tribunal may affect any right to property or economic activity. Nor can the mere fact that a person whose application for a permit has been refused is entitled to a copy, in order to be able to appeal to the Appellate Authority, convert the Regional Transport Authority into a quasi judicial tribunal because the requirement of stating reasons for the action taken is common to many an administrative agency, Subsection (7) does not say that the Authority refusing an applica tion must record reasons for the refusal; the reasons may be recorded later while supplying the copy. And in so far as the refusal of a representation is concerned, the Authority is under no obligation either to record reasons thereof or to give them in writing. The Authority has no power to record evidence on oath or to issue process and counsel as such is not entitled to appear before it. The decisions taken by the Authority are "institutional" decisions, and on the questions before it every member may inform himself in any way he likes. It is never confronted with an issue of public interest versus private right, not in the case of a renewal even. The position is lucidly put by Mr. Gordon whom Mr. Brohi at page 482 of his book cites as saying "- - - - -Any Tribunal is administrative if its duty is to make decisions according to policy and practical good sense; but a tribunal is judicial if its duty is to render decision according to legal rights. If an individual can come before a Tribunal and say: the facts are so‑and‑so, which gives me a legal rights to so‑and‑so, then the Tribunal must be a judicial tribunal. But if a Tribunal's functions are such that a suppliant must, in effect, say: `the facts are so‑and‑so which makes it policy and practical good sense for you ` to grant me certain privileges', then that tribunal is merely an administrative Tribunal. Into which class do licencing tribunals fall? Obviously for the most part their functions are administrative, for by statute justices grant licence to such persons, as they, in the exercise of their discretion, deem fit and proper. There is no question of legal right; an applicant for a new licence has no right." "After he gets the licence he has a legal right because the Tribunal has created it. But a judicial tribunal does not create legal rights, it hears a claim that a legal right exists, it investigates a claim, and pronounces whether the claim is true or not. It confers nothing, it merely gives effect to the pre‑existing rights of the parties‑creation is not a judicial function". It appears to me therefore that, despite several cases in the High Courts to the contrary, it is impossible to hold that a Regional Transport Authority acts judicially when it grants or refuses a permit or accepts or rejects a representation. This being so, the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority could not be revised by certiorari and the fact that the Chairman of the Authority, who had not taken part in the deliberations of 27th and 28th May, discussed the question of grant of permits in the meeting of the Authority on 29th May, has no bearing on the case, the question not being one of excess of jurisdiction.' There is no provision in the Punjab Motor Rules that a member of an Authority who has not taken part in the earlier stages of a meeting cannot take part in the adjourned meeting held to consider the same agenda, and there is no evidence that the four permits in question were granted under the influence of the Chairman. In the same manner, there is no obligation on the Regional Transport Authority to record reasons for the grant of permit or for the rejection of a representation, non‑perform ance of which may raise the irregularity to the status of excess of jurisdiction. And in the absence of any allegation of excess or absence of jurisdiction the High Court had no power to issue an order of certiorari or mandamus or any order or direction to the Authority. We may now examine the question that the powers of a High Court in Pakistan are wider than the writ jurisdiction of the High Court in England because Article 170 is not limited in its application to writs but also empowers a High Court to issue orders and directions to all authorities including the Government even if they act administratively. In England prerogative writs were a means by which the King's Bench Division of the High Court, acting‑ in the name of the Sovereign, restrained all Courts of inferior jurisdiction from exceeding their powers. By a series of legal fictions and doctrines which in their application to particular cases are not easily reconcileable, this prerogative jurisdiction was gradually extended, first to judicial tribunals which were not named Courts, then to what were described as quasi‑judicial tribunals and eventually to administrative tribunals provided at any stage of the proceedings they were required to act judicially. At first a lis between at least two parties before the inferior tribunal was considered to be an essential condition of the jurisdiction for certiorari, but later it was held not to be necessary in all cases and at present the rule appears to be that the proceedings before an inferior tribunal, whatever be its general character, are liable to be controlled by the High Court if the law by which it is governed makes it an essential condition of its jurisdiction to find the facts which require or empower it to make an order, and the order actually made adversely affects the rights of a party. In this last category, fall the licencing cases in R. v. Woodhouse ((1907) A C 420) (reversed in Lord Mayor of Leeds v. Rydor ((1906) 2 K B 501) on the ground that the licences were not in excess of the powers of the licensing authority); Rex v. The County Council, Ex parte the Entertainments Protection Association, Limited ((1931) 2 K B 215) and the cases in Manchester Legal Aid Committee, Ex parte R. A. Brand and Company Limited ((1928) 2 Q B 413); R. v. Postmaster‑General, Ex parte Carmichael ((1928) 1 K B 291); R. v. Boycott, Ex parte Keasley ((1939) 2 K B 651) and Board of Education v. Rice (1911 A C 179, 182.): In the last of these cases Lord Loroburn L. C. said "Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not originated, the practice of imposing upon Departments or officers of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. In the present instance, as in many, others what comes for determination is sometimes a matter to be settled by discretion, involving no law. It will, I suppose usually be of an administrative kind; but sometimes it wilt involve matter 'of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon' matter of law alone. ' In such cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts". This tendency of the Judges to extend their jurisdiction, in a country where everyone considers, himself to be subject to the rule of law and where droit administrative is hardly known, is easily understandable though not the process by which the result has been arrived at. In the United States, orders in the names of English writs are issued, by superior Courts in exercise of the powers derived from the Sovereign people. Substantially similar and equally effective orders, but with less imposing names, may be made by other Courts to control the numerous administrative agencies whose actions are liable to judicial review by virtue of S. 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946. The distinction between judi cial and quasi-judicial bodies on the one hand and administrative, agencies or tribunals on the other, however, is as fully preserved, in, the States as in England because, absent congressional intention to the contrary; Courts in the United States will not interfere with, administrative action where a Judge in England will 'decline interference. In both jurisdictions‑the scope of judicial interference where the order impugned is' made by a judicial, or quasi‑judicial body is comparatively larger than where it is made by an administrative department whose action can be reviewed only on the ground of absence or excess of jurisdiction or the omission to exercise a jurisdiction or of some irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction, which has prejudicially affected a party. The position under, our Constitution is substantially the same Article 170 empowers a "High Court to issue to any person or, authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of, habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part II and for any other purpose", As the framers of the Constitution must be deemed to have known the conditions of the jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division to issue the prerogative writs, the Article must be construed as implicitly enacting those conditions. From the language of the Article, however, it seems to me to be perfectly clear that the power of the High Court to issue directions, orders and writs is not limited to writs in the English form but extends to the making of orders restraining or directing any authority or Government, which may be discharging executive functions under a statute. But this cannot be taken to mean that purely executive action can be controlled by the High Court. The Article is to to be read in the' context of the whole Constitution, the basic feature of which is a distribution of powers between the Legislature, tire Executive and the Judiciary. Any encroachment by the High Court in the field reserved for the executive would therefore amount to judicial invasion and would be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. In the exercise of its writ jurisdiction the High Court can never substitute itself for, or assume the responsibility of the executive, for the simple reason that it does not have the requisite information, experience and training to discharge executive functions. That Court cannot, therefore, itself make any executive order, its function being confined to the issuing of directions on matters of law. The', conclusion to be deduced from this discussion is that where an' administrative or executive officer acts under a law, the High Court will control the action by an appropriate order if he :‑ (a) Goes out of the law i.e. exercises a jurisdiction not vested in him by law; (b) Wrongly denies or omits to exercise a jurisdiction ; and (c) Where the law under which he acts prescribes the manner in which he is to act, materially departs from that law. But the over‑riding requirement in all the three cases is that the excess or denial of jurisdiction or the irregularity in the prescribed procedure should have injuriously affected some justiciable right of a party. In the present case there is no allegation of any excess or denial .of jurisdiction and as I have already shown the irre gularity, if any, has not caused the respondent any prejudice or affected any of his legal rights. The High Court had, therefore, no legal grounds to set aside the licenses granted in the meeting of 29th May including those granted to the several appellants before us. As regards the Diamond Transport Company, the issue was only between the petitioner in that case and the Provincial Transport Authority which was the respondent to that petition; and in view of the finding of the High Court that as Provincial Transport Controller' the Chairman of that Authority had no jurisdiction to issue a direction to the Regional Transport Authority, the petition of that company should have been allowed. The position in which that company found itself was governed by express provisions of the Act and not by the direction that the Provincial Transport Controller chose fit to issue. And with regard to the other transport services and companies who are the appellants before us, there could be no question of the High Court's issuing any directions adversely affecting them. There are certain other points referred to in the judgment of the High Court and decided against the appellant, which require to be noticed. The High Court holds that if an applicant for a permit is not present at the public hearing his application must be rejected or adjourned. There is no provision in the Act to this effect and the Rules make it clear that it is optional with him to appear unless he is required by the Regional Transport Authority to be present. As regards the representation mentioned in section 47 and that in section 57, the High Court seems to take the view that these are two independent representations to be made at different stages. This is not correct. Section 47 deals only with what matters the Regional Transport Authority should bear in mind while considering the question of grant or refusal of a permit, while section 57 prescribes the procedure for the making of a representation. A representation under section 47 must, therefore, be made in the manner detailed in section 57 and no separate representation is contemplated by section 47, though the condition as to the time within which a representation may be submitted under section 57 or the prohibition in subsection (4) of that section against the consideration. of a, representation unless it be in writing and a copy thereof be given to the applicant, do not apply to a representation under section 4,7, which the authority must in any case consider. In considering the question whether a permit for Sargodha- Bhera could be validly granted to the appellant the High Court has expressed the opinion that while rule 4.8 (2) entitles the Authority to modify a route, it does not override the provisions of section 57 (3) of the Act. If by this is meant that when an Authority proposes to modify an application under rule 4.8 (2), the modified application must be published afresh to provided a further occasion for objections the view is clearly erroneous because the rule itself contemplates the' modification at a stage subsequent to the publication of the original application and refers to the time when the decision to grant or refuse a permit is to be taken. For the reasons stated in detail above, I would accept this appeal, reverse the order of the High Court and dismiss the respondent's petition for a writ. The appellant will have his full costs half of which will be recovered from the respondent and half from the Provincial Transport Authority, while the appellants in the other appeals and the petitioners for special leave to appeal whose petitions have been converted into appeals will bear their own costs. SHAHABUDDIN, J.‑I agree with the order 'proposed by my Lord ‑the Chief Justice and my brother Cornelius and should like to state how I view the crutial points arising in the case. The petition before the High Court was presented by the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service and the respondents thereto were only the R. T, A., Lahore, and the Tariq Transport Company. It is clear from that petition and the submissions made by Mr. Muhammad Iqbal who appeared before us for the Sargodha -Bhera Bus Service that the grievance of the latter was only against the 'grant of permits to the Tariq Transport Company for the Sargodha‑Bhera route. The prayer in the `petition that the proceedings of the meeting of the R. T. A. held on the 27th, 28th and 29th May 1957, should be quashed has therefore to be taken as relating only to the grant of above‑mentioned permits; but the learned Judges of the High Court quashed the entire proceedings, though at 'the above‑mentioned meeting permits had been granted to several transport operators, some of whom are appellants before us by special leave in the appeals other than that of the Tariq Transport Company and notice of the petition had not been given to them. Mr. Muhammad Iqbal while making it clear that his clients had no grievance against the Other grantees of the permits, however, argued that under Article 170 High Courts have powers to issue any suitable directions or orders or writs untrammelled by any conditions or restrictions that apply to the issuance of the writs specified therein, and that there is nothing in its language indicating that action could not be taken suo‑motu. But the petition before the High Court was one for the issuance of writs of certiorari and prohibition and that the learned Judges treated it as such Is indicated by the fact that they dealt with the matter before them from the point of view of the R. T. A. being a quasi‑judicial body dealing with fundamental rights and there is nothing in the judgment to show that they acted outside the writ jurisdiction. What was granted by the High Court was, therefore, a writ of certiorari and we have not been shown any authority that certiorari proceedings could be started by Courts suo motu. On the other hand, it is clear from the following passage in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, (paragraph 108 of Vol. 11) that the Court should be moved by an Application 108: Many statutes contain provisions substituting for the orders of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari a different procedure for bringing before the Court matters or questions arising under the statute. A, common form is a provision that, if any person aggrieved by an order made under the Act desires to question the validity thereof on the ground that it is not within the powers of the Act or that any requirement of the Act hag not been complied with, he may make an application to the Court, and the Court may, if satisfied that the order is not within the powers of the Act or that the interests of the applicant have been substantially prejudiced by any requirement of the Act not having been complied with, quash the order ; but that save as aforesaid the order shall not be questioned by prohibition or certiorari or in any legal pro ceedings whatsoever". And on this point, I think, it is of advantage to reproduce some pertinent observations from a valuable monograph on the subject of writs, as in operation in the Superior Courts of the United States by a writer named Ferris under the title `Extra ordinary Legal Remedies' to which I shall have occasion to refer again in the course of this judgment. In paragraphs 170 and 171 of his book the learned author, observes as follows : "The petition is either' entitled in the name of the State, on relation, or in the name of the party to the original pro ceeding sought to be reviewed; depending upon the practice prevailing in the jurisdiction where brought. * * * * * * * * * * * The office of the petition is only to procure the issuance of the writ‑to enable the Court to determine whether it would be granted‑and after it has served that purpose it is, no longer of importance, except perhaps, that reference may be had to it to ascertain the errors assigned;. * * * * * Even if the contention that" Article 170 confers on the High Court a jurisdiction" 'wider`' than the writ jurisdiction is `for argument's sake assumed to‑ be correct, without' deciding the point, it does hot follow' that power to move suo motu is given under the said Article. The normal procedure is to' move a Court by a petition, or a complaint or a plaint and in cases where power to act suo motu is given it ‑is specifically conferred as in S. 115, Civil Procedure Code, and S. 435, Criminal Pro cedure Code. I can see .no ground for thinking that the Intention of the Constitution was to empower, 'the High Courts to send for the records of any of the proceedings before any executive or quasi‑judicial authority and satisfy themselves that every depart ment of the Government is functioning satisfactorily. As regards the, petition, having been heard by the High Court without even issuing a 'notice to the other grantees of permits, Mr. Muhammad Iqbal had nothing to say in justification of this procedure. It is true that the proceedings that "were quashed were those of the R. T. A., but, it cannot be denies that other transport companies to whom permits had been granted were interested' in maintaining the impugned order. To issue a writ, `which affects parties interested in, the impugned order being maintained, without giving them an opportunity of being heard is to act against the principle of natural, justice that no one should be condemned unheard. Even administrative bodies not performing judicial acts are "enjoined to observe this principle, and as a matter of fact one of the main grounds on which the proceedings of the R. T. A: were quashed in this case was that ‑ though the objectors were heard, they could not effectively reply as they were not present' when the applications were heard, but it was overlooked that the proceedings were being quashed without giving the grantees of the other permits who would be affected thereby even an opportunity of appearing before the Court in the petition. On this ground `alone, it seem to me, that the other appeals must succeed. Coming to the merits .of the appeal filed by the Tariq Transport Company, the first thing that calls for comment is t that Sargodha‑Bhera: Bus Service having under S. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act a right of appeal against the order of the R. T. A did not avail itself of that remedy and no satisfactory explanation therefor was given. As held by this Court in Muhammad Hanif and others v. The Provincial Transport Authority Karachi and others (Civil Appeal No, 16 of 1958) the Motor Vehicles Act is a self‑contained Code, and in respect of the rights and liabilities created by it the manner of enforcement must be sought within that Statute itself. Article 170 does not provide an additional or alternative remedy when another equally effective remedy is available. It cannot be doubted that the jurisdiction conferred under it is an extraordinary jurisdiction and it could not have been the intention of the Constitution that the High Court should be empowered to ordinarily interfere with the routine machinery provided for under the law, for obtaining relief. A person may find it more con venient to apply to the High Court for a writ instead of availing himself of the remedies afforded by the law on the subject, but that by itself can hardly be a ground for granting him this extraordinary relief. Ferris in his book Extraordinary Legal Remedies in Paragraph 163 observes: "The common law rule is, that certiorari will not lie when there is another adequate remedy, by appeal, writ or error, or otherwise, where the inferior Court has jurisdiction. If this were not true, then the writ might; be used to withdraw any case, at an intermediate stage, from the consideration of the trial Court and submit it to the final determination of the, superior Court issuing the writ. This would in effect render the writ a substitute for an appeal or writ of error. But where the law gives an appeal, and the party is deprived of it without any fault or negligence on his part, certiorari will lie in lieu of or as a substitute for an appeal, if there is shown to be, in addition to such cause, a meritorious case. To be a bar, the other remedy must be adequate. It is the inadequacy, the danger of a failure of justice, and not the mere absence, of another remedy that determines the right to certiorari. An adequate remedy is one, which is equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient, not merely one, which at some time in the future, will bring about relief. ' Where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal or error may not prove adequate either in point of promptness or completeness, so that a partial or total failure of justice may result, then certiorari may issue" It is thus clear that though the High Court under Article 170 has jurisdiction to give relief even in a case where the petitioner before it has not availed himself of the right of appeal provided under the relevant statute under which the impugned order was passed, yet it has to apply its mind to the circumstances of the case and satisfy itself that there was sufficient reason for the petitioner not availing himself of the other remedy or that the other remedy was not equally efficacious or expeditious. But in the present case the learned Judges have not applied their mind to this aspect of the matter at all, although in its written state ment the appellant, Tariq Transport Company, definitely raised the point that as there was an apposite remedy available to the petitioner which was not availed of', this was not a fit case for the issue of a writ. The only explanation that can be inferred from the petition is that the petitioner applied to the R. T. A. for a copy of the proceedings, but that it was not supplied, and that is also the explanation given by Mr. Muhammad Iqbal before us. But it was not explained in the petition or before us as to why the appeal was not presented to the prescribed authority with the representation that the appellant had applied for a copy of the proceedings, but it had not been granted. It is stated in the affidavit accompanying the petition that the deponent, a partner in the petitioner company had with him an unauthenticated copy of the proceedings, which was sent to him anonymously. This could have filed before the appellate authority. In paragraph 12 of the petition it is said that there was no remedy as speedy, effective and efficacious as that of a writ, but it was not explained how the appeal to the prescribed authority was not equally effective, speedy and efficacious. Having regard to the nature of the proceedings an appeal would have been a speedier remedy. As a matter of fact in this case it took the High Court about six months to issue the writ. However, this was a matter for the learned Judges of the High Court to consider, but as already indicated, there is nothing in the judgment to show that this matter received their attention although the fact that an appeal lay was present to their minds. One of the conditions precedent to the issue of a writ of certiorari when the inferior' tribunal has acted within its jurisdic tion is an error apparent on the face of the record. Ferris in paragraph 172 at page 197 of his book on' Extraordinary Legal Remedies observes as follows on this point "The errors complained of should be plainly and distinctly set forth in the petition and the reasons relied upon should be specifically pointed out, * * * * I Assignments of errors not embraced in the petition cannot be considered". But in the present case the enquiry by the High Court went far beyond the allegations made in the petition where only three errors in procedure were alleged. They are:‑ (1) that the application on which the Tariq Transport Company was granted four permits for Sargodha‑Bhera route was considered before the period of 15 days, allowed for preferring objections, had expired ; (2) that the ground on which an application is granted and the objection to it is :turned down should be communicated to the persons concerned, but the petitioner was not informed of the merits of the application of the Tariq Transport Company or the grounds on which permits were granted to them ; and (3) that the direction of the. R. T. A. under S. 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act to conduct a survey of the routes concerned before taking a decision regarding the grant of fresh permits was wholly ignored, because the R. T. A. knew that compliance with it would force its hands to reject the application of the Tariq Transport Company. It is significant that the main grounds on which the entire proceedings were set aside, namely, that the applicants and the objectors were not heard in the presence of each other, and that the ultimate decision was influenced by the permanent Chairman of the R. T. A., although he was not present when the applica tions and representations were heard were not alleged in this petition. But Mr. Muhammad Iqbal relied on the further particulars furnished by the petitioner a week later wherein it was alleged that the applicants were heard for two days and then objectors were heard and that at the time the applicants presented their case, the objectors were not allowed to be present and that no one appeared for the Tariq Transport Company when its application came up for consideration. He also relied on the allegation in paragraph 3 (c) of the statement, that the record of proceedings was confirmed not by the Acting Chairman who presided at the meeting in question but by the permanent Chair man who had no knowledge as to what had transpired at that meeting, as covering one of the main grounds on which proce edings were quashed viz., that the ultimate decision was influenced by the permanent Chairman, although he had not heard the applicants and objectors. But confirmation of proceedings which must have taken place on a subsequent date does not amount to participation in taking the decision, and it is clear from the record that the last mentioned allegation was not alleged by the petitioner but was made curing the enquiry which, as stated above, went beyond what was alleged in the petition., As regards the additional particulars mentioned by the petitioner ' on the 25th July, 1957, it is true that in the petition itself it had been submitted .that the 'petitioner had riot perused‑ the' record of findings as it was not available' and would, therefore, reserve its right to furnish further particulars and obviously permission was granted to furnish the additional particulars. But it is significant that in paragraph 10 of the petition it was stated that the petitioners understood that as a result of the representa tions' and press' comments referred to in paragraph 9, an investiga tion by some official agency was held into this matter and that it would certainly be helpful if the Court was pleased to send for and peruse the proceedings of the investigation and the finding' given as a result thereof. It is seen from the statement of the P. T. A. which was impleaded in this case, that in connection with these proceedings some complaints were received by its Chairman and that he had an enquiry made into those allegations. Obviously the reference in the petition is to that enquiry. It, therefore, appears to me that the petitioner did not come to Court fully prepared with its allegations, but, that having noticed certain features which it considered irregular and having a suspicion that all was not above board, it moved the High Court to start an inquisition into the affairs of the R. T. A. which the learned Judges had no jurisdiction to do. 'But they complied with the request and embarked on such an enquiry‑ after impleading the P. T. A. although it had not asked for being brought on record but had merely prayed that another application for a writ against the R. T. A. wherein it was a respondent should be heard together with the petition for writ which gave rise to the appeal under consideration. That other application also related to the proceedings in question, but there the point for determination was entirely different from that arising in the petition of Sargodha- Bhera Bus Service. The Assistant Advocate‑General, while requesting on behalf of the P. T. A. that the two petitions be heard together stated to the Court that according to his instructions there were serious irregularities committed by the R. T. A. on the relevant dates and there was even a suggestion of the forgery of the record of those dates. The learned Judges thereupon considered it desirable to implead the P. T. A. as 'a respondent. The result of this was an enquiry covering grounds not urged in the main petition, and it was during this enquiry that it transpired that the final decision taken by the members of the R. T. A. who had heard the applications and the objections thereto was influenced by the permanent Chairman who was not present at the time when those applications were heard. But even this enquiry did not serve any useful purpose‑ in respect of the serious charge of forgery made against the R. T. A. f6r the learned Judges observed in the last paragraph of their judgment that it could not be said that a full and proper enquiry was held into that allegation and that they therefore left it to Government to decide what action it should take in the matter. Had this decision to leave the matter to the Government been taken at the outset when the Assistant Advocate‑General made suggestions of forgery, the enquiry would have been confined to the allegations in the petition, which was the proper course to adopt. As it a is it cannot be said that the High Court quashed the proceedings, in question because of the errors; apparent on the face of the record. As for the allegations in the petition to which the enquiry should have been confined, the learned Judges considered only two of them‑and their findings on them were to the effect (1) that the application of the Tariq Transport Company for permits, on the Sargodha‑Bhera route could not be legally taken up for con sideration at the meeting of 27th to 29th May 1957 as it had not been published as required under the Act and (2) that as reasons were not given, for granting permits to 64 out of nearly 700 applicants the grant of permits was arbitrary and capricious. No finding was recorded on the 3rd alleged error viz., the non‑com pliance with the directions of the P. T. A. that a survey of Ac routes concerned should be taken up befog taking a decision about the granting of permits. I am unable to agree with the above findings of the High Court and I find no force in the third allegation in the petition, which the High Court did not consider. It cannot be denied that the application on which permits were granted to the Tariq Transport Company was not published as required under the Motor Vehicles Act. The contention of Sh. Bashir Ahmad that the permits were granted on the applica tion for the longer Rabwah‑Bhera route has no force and was rightly rejected by the learned Judges, but it was not considered whether non‑compliance with the requirement of publication bay itself rendered the grant invalid even though no prejudice was caused. The fact that Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service had in respect of as many as eighteen applications for permits on the Sargodha -Bhera route which had been duly published raised the objection that no further permits should .be granted for that route, and the permits were granted after considering that objection and that therefore no prejudice was caused to the Bhera BUS Service by the non‑publication of the applications of Tariq Transport Company, was not taken into consideration. Mr. Muhammad Iqbal, however, argued that the non‑compliance with subsection (3) of S. 57 of the Motor Vehicles. Act which is mandatory was fatal; but‑non‑compliance, with every mandatory provision is not sufficient to render the proceedings void even which no prejudice is caused. For instance, under S. 53 (3) the R. T. A. should make applications for permits available for inspection at the office and if a ‑person operating on a route for which further permits are applied for comes on such inspection to know of those applica tions and objects to them at the hearing and permits are still; granted after his objections are heard, it would be pendantic to say that those permits are void merely because the applications were .not published as required under S. 53 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. That section is, in my opinion, on the same footing as S. 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code which is to the effect that a deposition of ' each witness shall be read over to him in the presence of the accused or his pleader. In Abdul Rahman v The King Emperor (54 I A 96) where this provision had not been compiled with, it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that though it was regrettable' that such an irregularity had crept in, that would not by itself be a ground sufficient for quashing the conviction. They' observed "if, indeed, it were shown that the omission did lead 'or even with probability might have led to some material error in the depositions not being checked, the case would be otherwise". Similarly, if in the present case the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service had not been able to make their representation against the issue of fresh permits for Sargodha- Bhera route the non‑publication of the applications of the Tariq Transport Company would have been fatal. But, as stated above, Sargodha‑Bhera Bus' Service had raised the objection when other applications for the same route were heard. The second finding that the reasons should have been given for granting 64 permits was based on the ground that an appeal had been provided for, and therefore is was necessary to give the reasons. But under subsection (7) of S. 57 of the Act which was also noticed by the learned Judges it is only for refusing to grant a permit that reasons should be given. We hove not been shown any provision in the Act or in the rules requiring the transport authority to 'give reasons for granting a permit, or turning down an objection raised against the grant of a permit: As regards the third allegation in the petition, namely, that the directive of the P. T: A. for taking a proper survey of the route concerned was not complied with, the communication containing that direction is not on the record and therefore no finding can be recorded on this point. However, what was stated at the hearing in this connection was that the letter issued by the Provincial Transport Controller drew the attention of the R. T. A. to the observations made in an appellate judgment about making a survey of the routes, Such a communication can hardly be regarded as a directive which the R. T. A. was bound to comply with under S. 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The other grounds on which the proceedings have been quashed may be stated as follows: (1) That permits were granted to the Tariq Transport Company although at the time the application was considered the applicant was not present either in person or through a representative; (2) that subsection (5) of S. 57, Motor Vehicles Act means that the objectors should be present when the applicants place their case before the authority in order to give an effective reply, but such an opportunity was not given to those who had representation to make; and (3) that though the decision in the matter was of a quasi judicial nature to be arrived at not on subjective personal or private opinion but in conformity with an objective standard and criterion laid down in the Apt, the ultimate decision was influenced by the permanent Chairman who was not present at the time of the hearing. The first and the second of these findings can no doubt, be related to the allegations found in 'the statement of further particulars furnished by the petitioner a week; after the petition was filed, although having regard to the fact that as stated above the petitioner on the strength of the enquiry made under the direction of the P. T. C. moved the Court for an, investigation into the affairs of the R. T. A. and not only for an enquiry regarding errors specified in the petition for the writ, it is, possible to take the view that these allegations should not have been considered by the High Court. But the third objection was undoubtedly beyond the scope of the enquiry, which could properly be started on the petition and the statement of further particulars as: this was not an error "apparent on the face of the record. In paragraph 23 of the judgment the contention with regard to the absence of the Tariq Transport Company or its agent at the time his application was heard was stated thus "Lastly it was objected on behalf of the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service, that when the application of Tariq Transport Company for grant of stage carriage permits on Rabwah Bhera and Sargodha‑Bhera route came up for hearing, neither the applicant nor their representative was present." The application of Tariq Transport Company should, in that case, have been adjourned for hearing or rejected:' the" grant of stage carriage permits to the 'Tariq Transport Company in their absence was, therefore, in contravention of subsection (5) of section 57 of the Act." Though it is not stated in so many words; that the learned Judges found this contention to be correct yet the effect of the discussion in the paragraph which is immediately followed by the finding that in the light of the facts and the circumstances stated: above they had no doubt that the grant was unwarranted try law and void, indicates that the said contention was' accepted. The discussion in the rest of the paragraph 23 related to the question whether the manager' of the Tariq Transport Company was present. There were two other applications made by the Company in respect of which the presence of the Company's representatives was noted in the record, but as regards the application for the Sargodha‑Bhera route no such note was made and the contention of Sh.‑Bashir Ahmad was that as Tariq Transport Company was mentioned when the two earlier appli cations were taken up the authority did not consider it necessary to again mention its presence when the remaining two applica tions were taken up in the presence of the manager. This, the learned Judges did pot, accept, observing that if this suggestion was, correct the presence of the manager would have been rioted only against the first application and not against the second also. From this, it is plain that the learned Judges proceeded, in this part of their judgment on the basis that the, presence of 'the applicant was necessary. But an examina tion of the provisions .of the Act and the' rules shows that an applicant need not be present at the `time of the public hearing. We have not been shown any section under the Act requiring his presence and it was conceded before us that none of the rules requires that the applicant should be present when the application is heard. Rule 4.7 which deals with the hearing of the applications or objections is to the effect that when an application for any permit is considered and the applicant desires to be heard in support of his application or has been summoned to appear under the provisions of sub‑rule 6 of r. 4.4 the applicant may either appear and conduct his case in person or may be represented by any person authorised on his behalf. Rule 4.4 which deals with the conduct of business of transport authorities states in subsection (6) as under "The Provincial or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, may summon any applicant for a permit to appear before it and may decline to grant the permit until the applicant has so appeared either in person or by an agent authorised by him in writing and until the appli cant has furnished such information as may, reasonably be required by the Authority in connection with the appli cation". It is clear from these rules that it is not necessary for an applicant to be present unless he has been summoned, and it was not alleged that the Tariq Transport Company was summoned to appear before the R. T. A. That being so, the R. T. A. was under no obligation to adjourn the hearing or reject the applica tion of the Tariq Transport Company merely because none appeared on its behalf. There is nothing in S. 57 to support the finding of the learned Judges that disposal at a public hearing means that all the parties should be heard "at one' and the same time in the presence of each other". This finding seems to be based on the erroneous impression that an applicant should be present E when his application is taken up for consideration. But as seen already there is no rule requiring the applicant to be present and the rules referred to in this connection are to the effect that his presence is required only when he is summoned. That being so, what is to happen if the applicant is not present? Can it then be said that the objector did not have an oppor tunity of being heard because he did not hear the applicant state his case. It is quite possible that the applicant may, be present and yet may not choose to say anything in support of his application. As pointed out in another connection sub section (3) of S. 57 affords the persons interested in making representations an opportunity to inspect applications for permits received by the authority. Persons interested in opposing appli cations for permits can therefore acquaint themselves with the contents of such applications and formulate their objections. However, there being no rule on the subject the R. T. A. was at liberty, to have its own procedure, and what it has done cannot be said to be opposed to the principles of natural justice. It has not been shown that any prejudice was caused to the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service by the procedure adopted by the R. T. A. Its main objection was that no fresh permits should be granted for the route in question and the minutes of the proceed ings show that that objection was considered. As regards the last ground, namely, that the ultimate decision in the grant of permits was influenced by the permanent Chairman, who was not present when the applicants and objectors were heard, it was observed by the learned Judges that according to rule 4.4 (8) neither a Chairman nor a member of the authority who had not attended the hearing could participate in the deliberations. But this rule does not in terms say so. However, it does not seem to me necessary to decide this point as we have not been shown that the grant; of four permits to the Tariq Transport. Company was influenced by the permanent Chairman and, as stated above, this point was not an error on the face of the record. It now remains to consider whether the R. T. 14 is quasi-judicial body. The learned Judges have held it to be so, but I find myself unable to agree with them. It has been laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne (1951 A C 66 at p. 75: P L D 1950 P C 102 at p. 170) that the only relevant criterion as to whether an act is a judicial act "is not the general status of the person or body of persons by whom the impugned decision is made but the nature of the process by which he or they are empowered to arrive at their decision. When it is a; judicial process or a process analogous to the judicial, certiorari can be granted". In The Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works Ltd. (A I R 1949 P C 129 at p. 133) their Lordships of the Privy Council observed "It is a truism that the conception of the Judicial function is inseparably bound up with the idea of a suit between parties, whether between Crown and subject or between subject and subject, and that it is the duty of the Court to decide the issue between those parties, with whom alone it rests to initiate or defend or compromise the proceedings". But Mr. Muhammad Iqbal contended that the process by which the transport authority decides as to whether it should grant a permit or not is judicial and that there is a short of lis between the applicants and the objectors. As regards the first conten tion he relied on the fact that the decision does not rest on what the R. T. A. personally considers it proper, but on its acting according to the standard set out in S. 47 which states the points the authority has to keep in view in granting a permit. As regards his second point he relied on the fact that representations made to the R. T. A. have to be considered. There is no force in these contentions. Merely because the authority has to arrive at an objective decision as to facts before taking action, it does not necessarily and ipso facto become a quasi judicial authority. Section 47 no doubt states the points to be considered in granting stage carriage permits but it does not require the authority to form an opinion on those points judicially. It has to consider any representation made to it in this connection either by persons already providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route or routes or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or routes lie, but if there be no such representations there is nothing in the Act requiring the authority to call for them. That being so, if no representations are forth coming the decision on the points mentioned in S. 47 has to rest only on the personal knowledge and information of the members of the R. T. A. Therefore the mere fact that a standard has been set up in S. 47 does not make either the process by which a decision is taken a judicial process or the authority a quasi‑judicial body. In Province' of Bombay v. Khushaldas (A I R 1950 P C 222) the Government of Bombay bad appealed against a writ of certiorari granted by the High Court quashing an order requisitioning certain premises. The Ordinance "under which the action was taken had given the Provincial Government power to requisition for any public purpose if in its opinion it was necessary or expedient to do so. One of the points for decision before the Supreme Court of India was whether having regard to the provisions of the Ordinance the order or requisition was judicial or administrative and the argument of the respondent was that the Provincial Government had to act judicially in determining the public purpose. In rejecting this contention the learned Chief Justice observed at page 225 as follows "The word `quasi judicial' itself necessarily implies the existence of the judicial element in the process leading to the decision. Indeed, in the judgment of the lower Court, while it is stated at one place that if the act done by the inferior body is a judicial act, as distinguished from a ministerial act, certiorari will lie, a little later the idea has got mixed up where it is broadly stated that when the fact has to be determined by an objective test and when that decision affects rights of someone,' the decision or act is quasi‑judicial. This last statement overlooks the aspect that every decision of the executive generally is a decision of fact and in most cases affects the rights of someone or the other. Because an executive authority has to determine certain objective facts as a preliminary step to the discharge of an executive function, it does not follow that it must determine those facts judicially. When the executive authority has to form an opinion about an objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereon are alike matters of an administrative character and are not amen able to the writ of certiorari." I with respect, agree with this statement of law. As regards the fact that under the Act' representations can be made, that by itself does not amount to creating a Hs because representations can be made not only by those who are already operating transport, but also by the police or a local authority, and it cannot be said that if these authorities make the representa tions there would be a [is between them and the applicants. On a study of the scheme and the provisions of the Act it is very clear that the representations were intended only for helping the authority to make up its mind in the matter. The very fact that there is no obligation cast on the authority to ask for representations when there are none indicates that it is not called upon to determine any controversy. It is no doubt true, that in S. 57 (7) reasons should be given for rejecting an appli cation for a permit but it is significant that no reasons need be given for granting a permit. It has already been pointed out that the opposite view taken by the learned Judges was not correct. Similarly, there is nothing in the Act or the rules to show that reasons for overruling an objection have to be given. This again is another indication that the representation is only to enable the authority to make up its mind as to whether an applicant should be granted a permit or not. In the New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd. v. The New Suwarna Co. Ltd. (A I R 1957 S C 232: P L D 1957 S C (Ind.) 227) which was relied on by Sh. Bashir Ahmad on behalf of Tariq Transport Company, an application for a permit was rejected on the ground that the police report was against in and thereupon the applicant appealed, challenging the correctness of the police report, when a second report was placed before the appellate authority which had withdrawn some of the adverse comments against the appellant. The appellate authority read out this police report to the parties, who did not raise any objection to the use of that document. But when the appeal was allowed the persons to whom‑.permit had been granted by the transport authority moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Consti tution of India on the ground that the order passed by the appellate authority contravened the principles of natural justice, as the revised police report had not been shown to him and he had therefore no real opportunity to deal with it or to meet any relevant allegation made therein. A writ was granted, but the Supreme Court of India allowed the appeal against the grant of that writ and in doing so made the following, observations at pages 236 and 241: "Thus the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed there under with particular reference to the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Authority do not contemplate anything like a regular hearing in a Court of justice. No, elaborate procedure has been prescribed as to how the parties/ interested have to be heard in connection with the question, who is to be granted a stage carriage permit * * * * * * * * * * The police report is more for the information of the autho rities concerned with the granting of, permits than for the use of the several applicants for such permits. In our opinion, therefore, the fact that the Appellate Authority had read out the contents of the police report was enough compliance with the rules of natural justice"., I, with respect, agree with this view and it is clear that a representation by a private party or by a local authority stands on the same footing as a representation by the police. In this decision reference was also made to the fact that S. 64 of the Act which provides for a right of appeal against specified kinds of orders passed by the P. T. A. or the R. T. A. while requiring that an opportunity of being heard should be given to the appellant does not in terms speak of a like opportunity being given to the persons who would be affected if the impugned order is set aside. But the Province from which the appeal before the learned Judges had come had made provision in the rules for a notice being given to any other person interested in the appeal. It is significant that there is no such provision in the rules applicable to the present case. This indicates that there is no lis and that did not require the appellate authority in hearing an appeal to act judicially. The decisions cited by Mr. Muhammad Iqbal in support of his contention that the R. T. A. is a quasi‑judicial body have no doubt proceeded on that basis, but it does not appear that the question was dealt with in those cases with reference to the aspects considered above. In Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras and another (AIR 1956 S C 463) cited by Sh. Bashir Ahmad where the question was whether the State of Madras in interfering with the decision of the appellate authority acted in excess of its powers conferred under S: 64‑A introduced into the Act by the Madras Amendment, the following observation occur at page 467. "In proceedings under Ss. 47, 64 and 64‑A of the Act there is no determination of any individual's rights and from that point of view, the functions of these authorities may be regarded as executive or administrative. On the other hand, it may be said that a person has the fundamental right to carry on his business of plying buses and therefore has the right to have statutory functions of these authorities properly exercised in which case they would be quasi-judicial functions. Assuming this to be so, it has yet to be seen whether the State Government acted in excess of its legal authority." Here the learned Judges assumed that the R. T. A. is a. quasi judicial body but their earlier observation is significant. In the present case the learned Judges of the High Court also were of the view that the decisions of the R. T. A. regarding the grant or refusal of permits are of quasi judicial nature as they affect fundamental rights; but the right under Article 12 of the Constitution is subject to a licencing system, and there is nothing in the article to indicate that the licensing system should t be quasi‑judicial in its nature. It is for the competent legislature c to decide whether for a particular trade the licencing system should be quasi‑judicial or administrative. The Motor Vehicles Act is the licencing system in this case and sufficient has been said above to show that its provisions are not quasi‑judicial. CORNELIUS, J.‑‑The main question for decision arises out of an appeal preferred by the Tariq Transport Company (C. A. No. 46 of 1958). By the grounds raised in this appeal the Tariq Transport Company challenges all the findings upon which the High Court founded its writ (or direction or order) quashing all the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority, Lahore, held on the 27th, 28th and 29th May 1957. The remaining matters before the Court have been presented by about 36 other transport companies, to whom permits to operate public transport services by means of stage carriages had been granted by the R. T. A. at its meeting on the aforementioned dates. These latter transport companies were not parties to the petition before the High Court at any stage, but as a result of the order of the High Court, the permits which had been granted to them have been affected and consequently, in the event of the main appeal by the Tariq Transport Company succeeding, they will derive a resultant benefit. Three of these matters were still at the petition stage when arguments in the appeal were opened but in the course of the hearing leave to appeal was granted to these transport companies as well. Accordingly, besides the main appeal of the Tariq Transport Company, there are for decision, in these proceedings, ten other civil appeals, one having been admitted as a writ petition on the 12th March 1958, which has since been permitted to be converted into an appeal. The proceedings in the High Court were commenced by the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service, for a writ in relation to certain permits granted by the Regional Transport Authority to the Tariq Transport Company who operate buses on the route Sargodha Bhera. It appeared, in the course of arguments that from 1948 onwards,. the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service have been the sole operators on this route. It was stated in the course of the arguments that the maximum rate per passenger on this route has been fixed by Government, at Rs. 1‑8‑0, and it was added that during the short period for which the Tariq Transport Compan3 was able to utilize its permits, the competition which resulted led to the rate falling to Rs. 0‑8‑0 per passenger. The petition quoted at the out‑set a letter from the Genera Manager, Punjab Road Transport Board, reporting to the Provincial Transport Controller on the 25th September 1956, that the Road Transport Board, which is a Government concern had found that the Sargodha‑Bhera route was unremunerative, of account of lack 6f traffic on the section Bhalwal‑Bhera, which was included in it this was stated presumably as a ground for not issuing further permits for the same route to new operators. Challenge to the issue of permits to the Tariq Transport Company was preferred on three grounds, on the basis of which it was averred that the procedure adopted at the relevant meetings was " Wholly illegal and in utter disregard of the relevant provisions of law ". These grounds were as follows:‑ (1) That the meeting which commenced on the 27th May 1957, was held less than 30 days after the publication of fresh applications for tire Sargodha‑Bhera route, which were stated to have been made on the 22nd May 1957. (2) That the R. T. A is bound to state the grounds upon which any fresh application is granted and objections thereto are rejected and that the petitioners had never been informed of the reasons for the grant of fresh permits to the Tariq Transport Company or for the rejection of their objections to such grant. (3) That the Provincial Transport Authority had instructed the R. T. A. to conduct a proper survey of the route in question before granting and fresh permits; this directive has been "wholly ignored" by the R. T. A. for a particular purpose, namely in order to be able to grant permits to the Tariq Transport' Company. The petition went on to say that the grant of these permits was "wholly illegal, ultra vires and oppressive" and that it offended "against the rules of natural justice" and therefore could not be allowed to stand. It was added that permits had not yet been issued to the Tariq Transport Company, but were about to be issued, and accordingly the reliefs claimed were:‑ " (i) to call for the record of the proceedings of Respondent No.1 held from the 27th to 29th May 1957, and to quash the same ; (ii) to issue a mandamus to the said Respondent not to issue any permit to Respondent No. 2 for the Sargodha‑Bhera route and in the alternative to cancel such permits", if already issued. The prayer for a mandamus was clearly misconceived. In a formal sense, the correct prayer should have been for a writ of prohibition, which may issue in such cases upon an allegation of absence or excess of jurisdiction, where the order in question still remains to be implemented. In a proper case, such an order may be made even after implementation, but it is clear that the matter did not lie within the scope of a mandamus. As for the other relief, its wording clearly shows that it was, and was intended to be, a prayer for a writ of certiorari. Calling for the records of the proceedings of an inferior Court or tribunal, and upon proper grounds, quashing the same are precisely the kind of orders, which are normally embodied in a writ of certiorari. In the petition certain allegations of injurious, although general nature were made. It was alleged that the R. T. A. had been deliberately delaying the supply of a copy of their proceedings to the petitioners, because they had taken their decisions "in a most arbitrary and haphazard manner" and they were "gaining time to find some arguments to support its decision and to incorporate the same in the proceedings". For this reason, the prayer was made that the record of these proceedings should be immediately taken into possession by the Court. A further allegation was made that, owing to public criticism, an investiga tion into the proceedings in question had been held "by some official agency", and it was suggested that the Court might with advantage send for the proceedings of this investigation. It does not seem that any action was taken on the latter request, but the High Court took immediate steps to send for the records of the proceedings and these were duly received within a few days. The petition was instituted on the 18th July 1957, and on the 25th July an application was made to add further particulars. In this petition some fresh legal grounds were raised against the validity of the proceedings of the R. T. A. The first ground related to the hearing of the applicants and the objectors. It was alleged that the R. T. A. heard the individual applicants first and thereafter they heard all the objectors. Further, the objectors were not allowed to be present when the applicants presented their case. Alleging that an objector cannot know the case of the applicant fully unless he hears it being presented, a contention was raised that the requirement of section 57 that the applicant and the objector should be heard at a public hearing, had not been satisfied. The second ground of a legal nature was that the Tariq Transport Company did not appear before the Regional Transport Authority in support of its application for the route in question. A third illegality was alleged in relation to the confirmation of the record of proceedings in question; it was said that this should have been by the acting Chairman who presided and not by the perri4anent Chairman. An allegation was added that the list of permits granted at the meeting in question which had been produced before the Court on the 23rd July 1957, was different from the one which had been prepared and published in the first instance. The further allegations made in this petition related mainly to the "fairness" of granting fresh permits on a route which was already fully served by a company which had no other remunerative route permits whereas the newly introduced company had other highly remunerative routes. The prayer for writs in the form already mentioned was supported by the allegation "that, no remedy equally speedy, effective and efficacious, other than through the writ jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court is available". The Tariq Transport Company replied in detail to the allega tions contained in the petition. It is unnecessary to consider the averments relating to the "fairness" of the action of the R. T. A. or other matters, which are of general nature. As regards the allegation that there had been violation of section 57, Motor Vehicles Act, in holding the meeting for consideration of applications for permits which had been published less than 30 days prior to the holding of the meeting, the Tariq Transport Company repudiated the notice published on the 22nd May 1957 purporting to notify an application made on their behalf, and relied instead on an earlier publication of the 24th October 1956, Perhaps with reference to the fact that the notice published on the 24th October 1956, did not specify the Sargodha‑Bhera route, it was added that the grant to them of permits on the Sargodha Bhera route could be related to their application, duly published on the 24th October 1956, for permits on the Rabwa‑Bhera route, which includes the route Sargodha‑Bhera. It was averred that such a grant is "perfectly legal under the Act and the rules". In the course of the arguments it appeared that the rule referred to is rule 4.8 (2) of the relevant Motor Vehicles Rules, which enables the R. T. A: in granting permits, "to modify the permits of the applicant in a reasonable degree" and provides that in such a case the application shall be deemed to have been modified with retrospective effect. With reference to the allegation that no reasons were stated to the petitioners for the rejection of their objections and the grant of permits to the Tariq Transport Company, it was appointed out that there is no provision in section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act for the grant of a copy of such reasons to the objector, but only to an applicant whose application may have been rejected. On the point of the disobedience of the directive of the Provincial Transport Authority it was stated firstly that no survey was necessary since the petitioner‑company having held a monopoly for so long was alone in a position to give a fair estimate of the extent of traffic, and secondly that the Tariq Transport Company had no knowledge of, the said directive. As regards the additional grounds preferred by the petitioner‑company on the 25th July 1957, the following replies were made. It was said "that no objection was raised before the Regional Transport Authority regarding the procedure which they were following at the hearing and in fact, both the objector as well as the applicant were present throughout". No reply was made to the allegation regarding the confirmation of the minutes of the meeting by the permanent Chairman, as this was a matter within the particular knowledge of the R. T. A. but it was denied that there was any difference between the list produced in the Court and that which was prepared and published in the first instance. It was also denied that no other remedy was available to, the petitioner other than recourse to the writ jurisdiction of he High Court and specific reference was made to section 64 of Motor Vehicles Act which gives a,‑right of appeal to "a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof " and it was added that appeals under this section are disposed of much more quickly than writ petitions before the High Court. The Regional Transport Authority also took the plea that there was an appeal available to the petitioner‑company, which he should have availed himself of. With reference to the allegation that the meeting of May 1'957, was prematurely held, it was said that, the application of the Tariq Transport Company was made on the 25th September 1956, and was published in October 1956. In granting permits for the Sargodha‑Bhera route to this company, the Regional Transport Authority acted upon this application, and not upon any application received or published in May 1957. It was added that "somehow" the route Sargodha‑Bhera was omitted from the list when the application of September 1956 was published in October 1956, but the R. T. A. had committed no irregularity in granting‑a permit for the Sargodha‑Bhera route since this was included in the Rabwa‑Bhera route for which application had been made and published. It was denied that the law required the R. T. A. to state 'reasons for the grant of permits, or for the rejection of objections to such grant, and as regards the allegation of disobedience to a directive for a survey from the Provincial Transport Authority, it was said that such an instruction had been received from the Provincial Transport Controller, and not from the Provincial Transport Authority, and moreover, it did not have the force of law. In granting the fresh permits, the R. T. A. had taken into account traffic conditions prevailing on the route in question. It was denied that there had been deliberate delay in the supply of the copies of the proceedings to the petitioner‑company, or that any investigation into the proceedings of May 1957 had ever been held. With reference to the additional grounds, it was said that no one was excluded from the hearing which took place in public, that the confirmation of the minutes by the permanent Chairman had been 'made after consultation with the acting Chairman, that it was false that there had been any variation in the list of permits granted at that meeting, and finally that the Regional Transport Authority acted on the basis of the opinion that "it was in the public interest to grant permits to another carrier on this route and the Tariq Transport Company seemed suitable for it." A number of the grounds taken by the petitioner‑company may be briefly disposed of. Thus, the second ground taken in the original petition is obviously of no force. It is not required by the law that a Regional Transport Authority shall give its grounds for granting any application or rejecting any representation made to it under sections 0 & 57 of the Act. On the other hand, it is expressly required by subsection (7) of section 57I that when a Regional Transport Authority "refuses an application for a permit of any kited, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal. Under the well known rule of interpretation of statutes, expressed by the maxim " expressio unius est exclusio alterius " the special mention of the requirement of express reasons in regard to one of the possible actions of a Regional Transport Authority under section 67 is to be read as implying that the R. T. A. is not under any obligation to state reasons in writing for any, other order which it might make in pursuance of the provisions of section

57. The learned Judges of the High Court have expressed the view on this point that because orders granting or refusing permits of all kinds are appealable, "necessity for giving reasons is therefore obvious but none has been given in this case". I am unable to regard the clear provision in subsection (7) of section 57, which has been reproduced above, as being made purely for greater caution, but on the other hand consider that the expressio unius rule is directly applicable for the interpretation of this and other provisions under section 57, and have therefore no hesitation in concluding that there is no legal obligation upon the authority to give its reasons when it grants a permit, or rejects a representa tion by a person opposing the grant of a permit. As for the provision that an appeal is competent against orders of this kind, I do not find it necessary to infer from this provision that every order by a Regional Transport Authority should be a "speaking order" which should set out at length the reasons upon which it is based. It is always possible for an appellate authority, dealing with an appeal by a person who had opposed the grant of a permit, in case the record does not itself afford sufficient reasons upon which the appeal can be decided, to obtain from the R. T. A. a statement of . the grounds upon which its action was based. As regards the alleged directive of the Provincial Transport Authority, it was made clear at the hearing of these appeals that this was contained in a letter issued by the Provincial Transport Controller to remind all Regional Transport Authorities of their duty, as enunciated in a recent appellate judgment passed under section 64 of the Act, in proper circumstances to conduct surveys of routes on which additional permits were to be allowed. This letter is in no sense a directive, which the R. T. A. was bound to obey, and the allegation that by failing to conduct a survey of the route Sargodha‑Bhera before granting fresh permits on this route the R. T. A. had acted illegally is therefore completely baseless. Then, as to the public hearing before the R. T. A. the ground that objectors were not allowed to be present when the applicants presented their case proves to be quite unfounded. It has not been mentioned in the judgment of the High Court, at all, but on the other hand some evidence which was recorded during the proceedings and which is mentioned in the judgment clearly indicates that the plea of exclusion was without basis in fact. The High Court have, however, found that the method adopted by the R. T. A. in hearing the applicants and objectors was such that "neither the applicants who had applied for the same route or routes nor the objectors were heard at the same time" and have inferred from this that none of them had an opportunity to hear the case of the opposite party. They construed the provision in subsection (5) of section 57, to the effect that applications for permits should be disposed of at a public hearing at which the applicant and the person making the representation shall‑have an opportunity of being t heard, as meaning that "all the parties are to be heard at one and the same time in presence of each other". Finding that this was not the case at the impugned meeting, they concluded that there had been violation of subsection (5) of section

57. In my opinion, in the absence of any prescribed procedure in that behalf, a Regional Transport Authority is perfectly competent to deal with applications and representations or objections in such order as to it may seem most convenient for the disposal of the business before it. The right given to persons making representations or objections is a right to be heard at a public hearing. It is true that to an officer or a body which prefers to work in that way, it may seem most convenient to hear an objector immediately after hearing the applicant in respect of whom he has objected, but that method need not appeal to every such person or body. Where for instance as in the present case, there were at least 18 applications for the grant of fresh permits on the Sargodha Bhera route, the requirement laid down by the High Court would oblige the R. T. A: to hear each of these applications separately, and immediately after to hear the objector in relation to such applications. Clearly, this would not result in more expeditious disposal of the business before the R. T. A. It would involve a great deal of needless repetition, and the R. T. A. might well consider that it would be better seized of all the relevant factors bearing upon the question for decision, by hearing all the applicants for fresh permits in sequence first, and then having got in their minds fairly clearly, the arguments in favour of granting fresh permits, to hear the objector or objectors and gather the arguments on the other side. It is unnecessary to elaborate this matter further in view of the fact that there was nothing in the nature of exclusion of any applicant or objector throughout the hearing, which lasted more than two days. It seems tome perfectly clear that in holding that the method adopted in dealing with the applications, and objections, at the meeting in question, was in violation of any provision of section 57, the High Court have come to a conclusion which is plainly erroneous. It is also clear on the facts that the statement that the Tariq Transport Company was not represented at any relevant stage of the proceedings in question is without foundation. Even the record upon which this particular allegation in the petition is found shows that a representative of this Company was present when two other items were taken up for consideration. In any case no prejudice could possibly be thought to have been caused to the petitioner‑company by such absence, and in my opinion, if the High Court intended to say on this point, that on account of such absence, (assuming that there was such absence) the applica tion of the Tariq Transport Company should have been adjourned for hearing or rejected, I should find it necessary to hold that this also was an erroneous conclusion. No finding was given, and indeed none was necessary, upon the allegation that the minutes of the meeting in question over which, at the end, the acting Chairman was presiding, could not be validly confirmed by the permanent Chairman. The point is a technical one relating to the validity of the minutes and nothing in the case appears to turn on it. Indeed, so far as the petition of the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service goes, the main fact which it was nec6gsary to establish from these proceedings was that the permits in question were granted to the Tariq Transport Company at the meeting 'in question. 'It appears clearly on the record that this fact was known to all parties on the 29th May 1957, and that it appeared in print in a public newspaper on the following day. Therefore, no weight need be given to the allegation that the list of permits granted was changed after the announcement. In actual fact, no change was shown to have taken place. There thus remained for consideration only the first ground stated in the original petition namely that the meeting was invalid because it was held less than 30 days after the publication of notices as required by section 57 (3), Motor Vehicles Act. On this point, there was an elaborate reply out of which a number of issues arose for consideration. It may be, mentioned here that it was stated before us by Sardar Muhammad Iqbal, who appeared for the Sargodha Bhera Bus Service that his clients had no interest in avoiding the entire proceedings of the R. T. A. on the 27th to 29th May 1957, but they were concerned only to secure cancellation of the permits granted to the Tariq Transport Company upon the Sargodha‑Bhera route. A specific plea was taken by the petitioner‑company that the application of that Company for this route was only published five days before the meeting, and to this a specific reply was made, namely that the publication of the 22nd May 1957 was made without the knowledge of the Tariq Transport company by some persons using their name without authority, and they have rested their case upon the fact that their application had been published on the 24th October 1956. As has been seen, that application as published made no mention of the route Sargodha‑Bhera, but on this point, the R. T. A. supported the Tariq Transport Company by the assertion that this route was mentioned in their application of the 25th September 1956, but had been in some inexplicable manner omitted in the notice published in the newspaper. The original documents were produced in the High Court as well as at the hearing of the appeal, and the list attached to the application of the 25th September 1956 clear15 contains the route Sargodha‑Bhera. It was suggested, however that the whole sheet upon which this list was based had been substituted for that originally attached to the application in which not thirteen but only eleven routes were mentioned. A point raised before us was that the publication of the 24th October 1956 was not in due compliance with section 57 (3) as the date etc., of the meeting at which it was to be considered was not published at the same time. To the argument that without publication of the precise route in question, there could be no notice to the existing operator, namely the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service, which would thereby be deprived of its right to represent against the grant of the permit applied for, the reply was given that the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service had an ample opportunity of representing all possible grounds affecting its position on the route, in relation to some 18 other applications seeking new permit on this Sargodha‑Bhera route. For the petitioner‑company, however, it was urged before us that it was not sufficient that they should have had an opportunity generally to object to the introduction of a new operator on this route. It was necessary also that they should be made aware of the person or persons who were seeking new permits, as they might have had special grounds to object to that person or persons. They also denied the existence of power to grant a permit for a portion of a route,' on the basis of an application for the whole route, derivable from rule 48 (2) of the relevant Motor Vehicles Rules. A number of these matters have been dealt with by the High Court in their order. As I am clearly of the opinion that that order is without jurisdiction, and that the proper remedy for the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service was by an appeal under section 64 (1), Motor Vehicles Act, I do not think that it is appropriate that I should make any observations upon the questions, whether of fact or of law, arising out of this point on which the parties were at issue. The only valid order that can be made in revision of the order of the R. T. A. is in my opinion an appellate order of the prescribed authority under the section mentioned above. My reason for thinking that the High Court had no authority to deal with the question raised in the petition of the Sargodha -Bhera Bus Service is that in my opinion, the functions of a M Regional Transport Authority under sections 47 and 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act are not in any sense either judicial or quasi judicial functions. I base this opinion upon a critical examina tion of sections 47 and 57, read together, and from a consideration of the composition of a Regional Transport Authority, and the manner of its working. A Regional Transport Authority is composed of a number of officials and non‑officials selected by the Government. The Chairman of the Authority in the present case was the Commissioner ‑of the Division and one member was a Deputy Inspector‑General of Police who had previously acted as Provincial Transport Controller. It may be presumed that in selecting Officers to serve on a Regional Transport Authority, care is taken to choose such officers as have experience of the conditions under which public transport vehicles operate in the area in question and of all facts relevant to such operation. No particular qualification is prescribed by the law (section 44) which must be possessed by a non‑official person in order to qualify fore appointment to a Regional Transport Authority, but there is one disqualification namely that he should not have any financial interest of any kind in any transport undertaking. Here also, I think it may be safely presumed that the persons selected for appointment as non‑official members are such as have personal knowledge of the operation of public transport and are capable by themselves of exercising a judgment with regard to the matters which they must bear in mind in granting or refusing a stage carriage permit. These matters are enumerated in section 47 of the Act and are briefly as follows:‑ (a) the interest of the public generally ; (b) the advantages to the public of the proposed service, e.g. saving of time and convenience through not having to change from one service to another ; (c) the adequacy of the existing services, and the fares which these services charge, as well as the effect upon these services of any fresh services that are proposed; (d) the benefit which the local service is likely to receive ; (e) whether the applicant operates other services, and in particular whether some of these services are unremunera tive ; and (f ) the condition of the roads i.e. whether they will carry the services proposed. On some of these matters the members of a Regional Transport Authority, probably require assistance as to the facts, and it seems that this assistance is derived by them from their own resources i.e. by means of investigation conducted through their own staff, or from the written applications and objections, and at a public hearing from the representations made both by the applicants as well as by other persons, including those who oppose the applications, and by local or Police authorities. The R. T. A. is not required to follow any particular procedure in examining any application or objection, nor do the words of section 47 place any limitation upon their power to inform themselves, so that it would be difficult to argue that any proceedings of a Regional Transport Authority can be invalidated on the basis that the Authority, or any of its members, had received‑. Information from any source other than those indicated above. Indeed, on a great many points, members of such an Authority will pro bably be found to rely, and indeed might be expected to rely, upon their own knowledge and information, and this circums tance cannot be urged as having a prejudicial effect upon their decision, as it certainly would if the Authority were a judicial or even quasi judicial body. A further requirement of subsection (1) of section 47 needs to be mentioned. It is that the Regional Transport Authority " shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing transport facilities along or near the proposed route or routes or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or routes lies or by any association interested in the pro vision of road transport facilities". As has been seen, considera tion (c) of the six considerations enumerated above expressly requires a Regional Transport Authority to take into account the effect upon existing services of the introduction of a new operator, and this must necessarily be accepted in the widest sense, to include both profit as well as loss. It may be that the existing passenger service is operating under great strain, owing to the traffic being heavy. In such a case the introduction of a fresh service would make things easier for the existing service, by' introducing another operator to carry the burden. On the other hand, where the traffic is barely sufficient to sustain the existing service, in an economic sense, to introduce a fresh service might entail loss to the existing operator as well as to the new, unless it be that the traffic needs to be developed by better business methods or greater efficiency than has been displayed by the existing service. The question may be consi dered from very many different aspects, but this is not necessary for my present purpose, which is to say that in the enumerated subjects for consideration, one specified subject is to safeguard the interests of existing operators. Bearing that in mind, it becomes possible to view the require ment which I have quoted above in a fuller and wider light, namely as not merely providing an opportunity for existing operators to ventilate their grievance against the introduction of competitors but as making available the information and experi ence of such an operator along with the information possessed by the local and police authorities and associations interested in road transport, for the purpose of providing the fullest possible information to the Regional Transport Authority, to enable it to discharge its functions under section

47. In other words, the opportunity which the law requires shall be given to the existing operator's (for which see also subsection (3) of section 57) need not be construed as being merely an opportunity to present a direct resistance to the application, and thus to create, as it were, a case to which the applicant and the previous operator are opposing parties. If that were so, I feel no doubt that the law would also provide that both ‑the applicant as well as the objector should have opportunities to present evidence in support of their respective claims, and requirement might also have been that the R. T. A. should consider the evidence in the light of the competing claims and thereafter to come to a decision whether the applicant or the objector should succeed, either partially or wholly. In these circumstances, it would be undeniable that the function of the R. T. A. in relation to the case would be judicial in its nature. The matter raised by the objecting operator would then have to be regarded in the light of a lis to which the applicant for a new permit would be the opposing party. But the law does not require anything of the kind. It merely lays down in section 57 that every application for a stage carriage permit shall be duly published and at the same time a date should be announced before which representations in connection with it might be submitted to the Authority, and again that such representations shall be disposed of at a public hearing where the applicant and the person making the representation shall have an opportunity of being heard. The right therefore, even of a person who, in the words of section 47, is "already providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route or routes" is not to make a case out of it against the applicant and to produce evidence and require adjudication. Along with local and police authorities and associations interested in road transport, and perhaps any person acting pro bona public, who may have made representations, the representation of such a person is also to be heard. In deciding whether or not to grant the permit applied for, the R. T. A. shall take all such representations into consideration, along with the six other matters, which it is to bear in mind in arriving at its decision. With the exception of one matter already mentioned namely, the effect upon existing road passenger services of the new service proposed, and the matter mentioned in consideration (c), namely that the applicant himself operates other road services, all the other matters enumerated as requiring consideration by the Regional Transport Authority appear to be clearly matters of interest to the public generally, and bear no relation to private profit or loss, such as that which is the foundation of the petition before the High Court. Indeed, reading these points of consideration as set out in section 47 (1) together, it seems to me to be abundantly clear that the overriding consideration is the interest of the public in a general sense. Even the effect upon individual operations can be regarded in the light of the public interest as having a direct bearing upon the efficiency of the service to be provided. I feel no doubt that the section, being worded as it is, cannot be construed so as to make the private profit or loss of the applicant or any existing operator the governing Consideration of the matter, it is perhaps for that reason that the section has been designedly so worded as to avoid creating by word or implication anything in the nature of a lis between an existing operator and a new applicant. If it were otherwise, the statute might be employed as a handle for converting the proceedings of a Regional Transport Authority into a battle ground for the competing economic interests of rival operators and aspirants in the field of public transport, and in such a case it would be the interests of the public which would be the first to suffer. It is therefore in my view of the greatest importance that sections 47 and 57 should not be con strued as if they were principally designed to secure determination of the rival claims of existing operators and new applicants, from the angle of profit or loss. The proper implementation of these sections requires that they should be construed as em powering the R. T. A. to regulate the system of road passenger transport by imposing thereon a licensing system whose primary objective shall be the public interest generally. It is not necessary for coming to this conclusion to deny that the Regional Transport Authority must observe, in the exercise of its selective functions, the principles of justice, equity‑ and good conscience, but this is not to say that, through observance of these salutary principles upon which orderly human life is based, the R. T. A. is converted into anything resembling a Court of justice. These are principles, which are appli cable to the functioning of every authority, which is re quired to regulate the actions of persons and bodies under any law. The mere facts that they must act with due care and attention, and must exercise a sound discretion, or in other words must act judiciously, are not sufficient to constitute a licensing body like the R. T. A. into a judicial or quasi‑judicial body. As was said by the Privy Council in the case of Nakkuda Ali (19 51 A C 66: P L D 1950 P C 102) the relevant criterion in determining whether such an authority is subject to the writ of certiorari by virtue of being a body ex ercising quasi‑judicial functions is the nature of the process by which it is empowered to arrive at a decision. When the process is a judicial process, or one analogous thereto, the writ of certiorari can be granted to control it. The relevant law imposes but one duty upon the Regional Trans port Authority, in a case where the application is opposed on the basis of self‑interest, and that is to receive a written objection from the opponent, and to hear it along with all representations made under section 57 (3), most of which have nothing to do with self interest, and are solely addressed to the public benefit. All these representations are intended to be treated equally, and there need therefore, not be the slightest hesitation in holding that the Pur pose underlying the invitation, which the statute enjoins, and in compliance with which all such representations are‑ received, is to procure fuller information upon which the R. T. A. can decide what, in a particular case, the public interest requires. It is true that the views of an existing operator are directly relevant to one matter which the R. T. A. has to bear in mind, viz., the effect upon existing road services of the grant of a fresh permit. But it is also clear that this factor can be assessed without making anything in the nature of a lis between the new applicant and the old operator. The Regional Transport Authority is not required to arrive at any separate conclusion upon this particular matter. It is clear that the law does not require anything in the nature of an adjudication upon the matter. The requirements of the section are fully met if the representation has been heard, and the R. T. A. is thus in possession of the facts necessary for assessing "the effect upon existing road services", which in itself is but a minor element in the catalogue of major consideration, viz., those bound up with the public interest, which it is incumbent upon the R. T. A. to bear in mind. Therefore, it seems to me, on careful examination of the detailed provisions of sections 47 and 57 of the Act, that these sections do not provide for a Regional Transport Authority to perform any act of a judicial or quasi‑judicial nature. I can not find that this administrative body entrusted with the application of a licensing system in relation to road passenger transport is under any duty to act judicially in ascertaining the facts upon which it may base a decision, or as to any part of the process of arriving at such decision. The mere duty to hear an objector does not per se constitute a sufficient ground for the conclusion that the function exercised is a judicial one. On that point, I find myself in agreement with the view expressed by Lord Thankerton in the House of Lords, in the case of Frenklin v. The Minister of Town and County Planning (1948 A C 87). There, a Minister was empowered to direct that a specified area of land should be developed as a new town, if he was satisfied after consulting the local authorities concerned that this was expedient in the public interest. As part of the process by which such satisfaction was to be achieved, he was required to make a preliminary order announcing his intention, and if any objections were made to direct a local enquiry and to consider the report of such enquiry. It was held by the House of Lord that no judicial or quasi‑judicial duty was imposed by the law upon the Minister. His function remained purely administrative. The purpose of inviting objections and of the provision for enquiry was merely that the mind of the Minister should be further informed in order to the final consideration of the soundness of the scheme. It has been brought to our notice that in certain earlier cases e.g., the case of Errington ((1935) 1 K. B 249), where a Minister was similarly em powered, it was held by the Court of Appeal in England, that his action in ordering the clearance of buildings from a slum area was rendered subject to the writ of certiorari because he had not followed the rules of natural justice in having taken into con sideration a good deal of evidence and information which came to him otherwise than‑from the objections raised to the proposed order, and the report of the public statutory enquiry which he followed. It is doubtful whether this judgment can stand as an authority after the decision in the Frenklin case cited above, but that circumstance need not affect the validity of any argument employed by the Court of Appeal, as guidance for this Court. In the present case, however, there is no question of the R. T. A. having taken into account any evidence, which it was not entitled to use for the purpose of reaching its decision. On the point whether a Minister acting as in the Errington case was performing a quasi‑judicial duty, the view which I am inclined to take is that notwithstanding that the order which he was making was one which affected the rights of the subject, as house property of value was ordered to be demolished, the Minister was performing a purely administrative act. Among other cases cited before us, mention should be made of the following English cases viz.: Rex v. Post Master‑General (ex parte Carmichael (1928, 1 K B 291); R. v. London County Council (Entertainments Protection Association Limited (1931, 2 K B 21 5) ) and The Manchester Legal Aid case (1952, 2 Q B p. 41). In the first mentioned case, the question was whether a tele graphist was entitled to receive compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by reason of having been incapacitated for work through telegraphist's cramp. Under the law a certificate from a "certifying surgeon" was sufficient authority for such payment. When it was established to the satisfaction of the Court of Appeal that the certificate on the basis of which compensation had been refused, was not issued by a person who was a "certifying surgeon" within the meaning of the Act, the Court held that the grant of such a certificate was a judicial act subject to the writ of certiorari. It is clear that in this case there was something in the nature of a lis namely the claim by the disabled worker, which it was in the interest of the State from whose funds the claim was to be met, to resist, and this fell to be decided by the certificate of an expert which was necessarily based on the evidence before him regarding the physical condition of the worker. Therefore, it could be said that the act of the "certifying surgeon" though clearly not judicial in the strict sense, was quasi‑judicial, and the grant of the writ of certiorari might therefore be justified. It is, however, possible to consider that a more appropriate form of relief may have been by way of a mandamus requiring that a certifying surgeon's certificate should be made available to the worker in question. In the second case, the question arose in relation to a certain licence granted by London County Council under the Cinemato graph Act, 1909. The law was to the effect that a County Council might grant licences to such persons as they thought fit to use specified premises for the exhibition of pictures etc. on conditions specified in the licences. No procedure of any kind appears to have been laid down, enjoining any enquiry upon the Council in the discharge of this function nor does it appear that there was any provision for inviting objections or that any other circum stances existed giving rise to anything in the nature of a lis. The Court of Appeal, however, held that the case was precisely analogous to that of licensing justices granting or refusing licences for public houses. Scrutton L. J. said that he was unable to see "any distinction between the application for a cinema licence, and the application which is made to Magistrates for a public house licence". The judgment of Greer L. J. proceeded on the same basis. Slessor L. J. while accepting the principle, also examined the question in the light of the dictum that to attract the writ of certiorari, it is enough that there should be a person or body having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of the subjects and having a duty to act judicially. The learned Lord Justice resolved the question whether any right was involved on the following basis viz. that the question whether the County Council would or would not grant a licence affects the right of the subjects and that the granting of a licence, on the ground of public safety and morality was one "which affects the public and the rights of the subjects". With the great respect, I should have thought that the condition as to rights relates, and only relates, to the particular right, which falls to be determined in each case. The point that a person applying for a licence had no right to get one which the law can recognize, does not appear to have received any consideration, and moreover, as to the apparent analogy with the power of licensing justices in relation to beer‑houses, it is of importance to note that licensing justices are Magistrates, subject to the control of the Supreme Court in England. This is indeed apparent from a sentence in the judgment of Scrutton L. J. in this very case, where the learned Lord Justice clearly says that "every proceeding of Magistrates in granting new or renewing old licences is in the nature of a Court, excess of jurisdiction in which can be dealt with by the writ of certiorari". On this topic I may usefully refer to a passage in the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Nakkuda Ali, which has been mentioned above, where it was observed that it was probably true that the writ of certiorari was more readily issued to established bodies whose function is primarily judicial, even in respect of acts which are purely administrative, than to Ministers or officials whose function is primarily administrative, even in respect of acts having analogy to the judicial. A similar view appears from the following sentence, which I extract from paragraph 113 in the Monogragh on Crown Proceedings in volume XI of Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition :‑ " . . . the writ of certiorari was largely used to control the justices of the peace in the exercise of their criminal and administrative functions under numerous statutes . . . ." In the Manchester Legal Aid case, there seems to have been clearly a lis between the person seeking the legal aid, and the administrators of the fund out of which it was to be paid, which was to be determined by a decision of the authority concerned, on the basis of factual evidence. To such a proceeding, the writ of certiorari clearly applies. The case is very similar to the plea of pauperism, which may be raised by a litigant under the Civil Procedure Code in Pakistan. Such a plea is subject to contest and a decision given thereon is a judicial decision subject to appeal. The learned Judges of the High Court have based their opinion that the proceedings before the R. T. A. were of a quasi judicial nature, on the following grounds:‑ (1) That orders granting or refusing all kinds of permits by the Authority are appealable, therefore, the R. T. A. was bound to give reasons for its decisions, and because in the present case no reasons were given for granting stage carriage permits to 64 out of 700 applications, therefore these decisions were arbi trary and capricious; (2) that the grant or refusal of permits by the R. T. A. affects a fundamental right granted to every citizen of Pakistan under Article 12 of the Constitution to enter upon and conduct any lawful trade or business, subject to regulation by a licensing system, and decisions on such matters are therefore of quasi judicial nature and should conform to objective standard or criterion laid down or recognised by law so as to be "capable of being tested by the same external standard". It was further observed that the operation of governmental controls and the licensing of trades and occupations in modern welfare States "invariably interferes with the fundamental rights of the citizens" and that the time has come when executive authorities should "disabuse their minds of the impression that the application of controls and the grant of permits or licences lies within their personal bounty or gift". With respect, I find it impossible to accept these reasons as sufficient for coming to the conclusion that the findings of a Regional Transport Authority in granting or refusing permits are of quasi-judicial nature. The declaration that all orders by which such an authority grants or refuses permits should give reasons is, as has already been seen, not borne out by the relevant statute which, on the contrary, by expression and implication, relieves the Authority of the duty of stating its reasons when it grants a permit or rejects a representation under sections 47 and

57. The constitutional objection rests upon the supposition that a licensing system under Article 12 of the Constitution by which any trade or business is regulated must be quasi judicial in its nature. The further supposition is made that unless the operation of the licensing system can be made to "conform to objective standard or criterion" it will degenerate in the hands of the executive autho rities into mere arbitrary distribution of bounties. I am unable to see anything in the wording of Article 12, which would justify these conclusions reached by the learned Judges. Licensing systems may be of many different kinds. Their detailed provisions must necessarily vary and their nature can only be judged by examina tion of the precise provisions, as to whether they are purely administrative, or possess either A holly or in part some judicial quality. It is for the legislature and for the executive authorities to decide what should be the underlying principles and the precise provisions of the licensing system, which they propose to apply to any particular trade or business. I cannot conceive that there is any power in the Courts to lay down that any particular provision or mode of application should be included, or be deemed to be included in every licensing system applicable to any trade or profession. That would be a clear invasion of the functions, which are exclusively entrusted to the legislature and the executive. It is for the Courts to interpret legislative instruments including such as may be devised by the executive under the rule‑making power, upon their terms. It is not open to Courts to proceed upon any preconceived idea as to what provision such systems should contain. I have already, in the foregoing portion of this judgment included an examination of the provisions of sections 47 and 57, and I am clearly of the opinion that they do not provide for anything analogous to the judicial process to be followed in the grant or refusal of permits or for the disposal of representations. On this subject, I should like to refer once again to the case of Nakkuda Ali, where a question arose whether the action of a Controller in withdrawing a licence, which had been issued to Nakkuda Ali to act as a dealer was amenable to the writ of certiorari. The law was to the effect that when a Controller "has reasonable grounds to believe" that a certain person is unfit to be allowed to continue as dealer, he may cancel the licence. The Privy Council held that when in the case before the Court, the Controller cancelled Nakkuda Ali's licence, he was not determining a question i.e., he was not adjudicating upon a right, but that his action was executive action to withdraw a privilege because he had reasonable grounds to believe that the holder was unfit to enjoy it. The contention that by the mention of "reasonable grounds" something in the nature of a judicial act was intended, was answer ed by saying that the mere fact that a man is enjoined to act on reasonable grounds is not sufficient for concluding that he could only arrive at the necessary belief by the judicial process. In the present case too, the grant of a permit is not made in recognition of any right, but must be considered as a conferment, under the licensing system, of a franchise to a person to operate public passenger vehicles upon a prescribed route, according to a pres cribed time schedule, at controlled rates of fares, by means of vehicles which are subject at all times to inspection by the authorities for fitness. Even the drivers of such vehicles are required to be licensed specially. It is surely a difficult process to spell out of an activity commenced and continued under such 0 circumstances, anything in the nature of the exercise of a fundamental right. It is clearly an activity commenced under a licensing system, and continued under restrictions imposed in the public interest. I may mention at this stage that a number of judgments were cited from the Indian jurisdiction, in support of the general proposition that Regional Transport Authorities functioning as in the present case act quasi judicially. Without disrespect to the learned Judges whose reasoning were commended to us by the learned counsel for the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service, I find it difficult to agree with their conclusion. In none of these cases does it appear that the conclusion has been reached after an examina tion of the legal provisions under which the R. T. A. exercises its functions in the manner, which is in my view essential for the pur pose. In a number of the cases cited, the question appears to have been decided on assumptions. As these decisions are not binding upon the Courts in Pakistan, I do not consider it necessary to deal with them in detail. On the view that the proceedings under examination in this case were not of quasi‑judicial nature, and did not have the effect of withdrawing any right from the petitioner‑company, the con clusion cannot be avoided that neither a writ of certiorari nor a writ of prohibition could be claimed in this case, and it would be seen then that tile entire proceedings 'before the High Court were incompetent. The petitioner‑company would of course not be left without re‑source in that case, and as has been pointed out already, the law provides for an appeal to a prescribed authority, which was, at one time, the Financial Commissioner. In the course of the proceedings reference was made to a published decision of the Financial Commissioner in a case, which bears many points of resemblance to that of Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service before the High Court. This decision was given in the case of the Waheed Bus v. Malsi Transport Company and is published as P L D (Revenue) 1956, West Pakistan, page

57. The petitioner‑company need not have had any doubt in its mind that any of the questions, which it was able to raise against the grant of permits to the Tariq Transport Company could not have been examined and adjudicated upon competently and validly by the prescribed appellate authority. The statement made in the petition that there was no other equally speedy, or efficacious remedy would therefore appear to be groundless. This was a circumstance, which had been placed before the High Court from the outset of the proceedings, and it deserved greater attention than it has received. There is no mention of this matter in the judgment of the High Court. It was a point, which had, at any rate, considerable relevancy in regard to the question whether the learned Judges ought to, in the exercise of their discretion, issue any writ in the case. It is not necessary for me to consider the latter question in view of the opinion, which I have expressed above that the proceedings were not of a character to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court in certiorari or prohibition. Nor am I impressed with the argument that the precise limits laid by the English Courts upon' the issue of these writs are not applicable to High Courts in! Pakistan exercising their powers under Article 170 of the' Constitution. The power thereby given to the High Courts to exercise control over executive actions must be construed within the context of the Constitution, and within the general conception of the functions allocated to the judiciary by the Constitution. I can see no ground for thinking that the intention of the Constitution was to making all or any executive authorities generally answerable to the High Court for their actions. Where anything in the nature of a judicial process is involved in the exercise of action which is covered by the law entrusted to the executive, there to the extent of such involvement the High Court is undoubtedly in a position to exercise a salutary con trol, by reason of its acquaintance with all aspects and requirements applicable to the judicial process. It is in that sense that the Courts of the country from which originate, not only the writs here in question, but also the whole conception of separation of the legislative, judicial and executive functions, have confined their interference with executive actions by the writs in question to matters involving processes which are either expressly, judicial, or analogous to the judicial process. The division of functions between the three great limbs of State in Pakistan is by no means less clear than it is in England. To observe and to respect this division is implicit under the duty of loyalty to the Constitution, which rests upon all citizens but in particular upon those who are entrusted with the duty of interpreting and imple menting the Constitution. Therefore, I would strongly deprecate and I hope I do so with due respect to all authorities concerned, any tendency on the part of the Courts to regard all executive acts as being amenable to their jurisdiction under Article 170 of the Constitution, merely because that that Article enables the High Court to issue "directions and orders" as well as writs of specified kinds. So far as concerns the kind of orders which the High Court was requested in the petition to make in the present case, I am clearly of the opinion that the principles laid down by the English Courts are directly applicable, and that the power of interference by certiorari or prohibition with the executive acts is confined to such portion of those acts as is expressly judicial, in its nature, or can reasonably be held to be of a quasi‑judicial nature. It remains to consider the effect upon the proceedings of the introduction into the case by order of the High Court of the Provincial Transport Authority, as a party. It seems that with respect to one of the permits issued by the R. T. A. at the meeting in question, namely that issued to the Diamond Transport Company, the Provincial Transport Controller had issued a direction to the R. T. A to the effect that it was not empowered to issue an inter‑regional route permit. (The learned Judges found no difficulty in holding that this order of the Provincial Transport Controller was erroneous because the Act itself pro vided for the issue of such licences subject to confirmation by the other R. T. A concerned). However, on the strength of being a party to the writ petition, which had been instituted by the Diamond Transport Company Against this erroneous order, an Assistant Advocate‑General appearing on behalf of the Provincial Transport Authority sought leave to have that petition heard along with the petition of the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service. He stated that the meeting of the R. T. A, on the dates in question was attended by serious irregularities and that it had even suggest ed that the record had been forged. On these allegations, the High Court felt that it was "desirable" to implead the Provincial Transport Authority as a party and accordingly a direction was made to this effect. The Provincial Transport Authority there upon filed a written statement containing a large number of serious allegations. These were not introduced only in reply to the averments in petition, with which the Provincial Transport Authority was in agreement. Additional and more serious allegations were made e.g., that there had been forgery in the list attached to the Tariq Transport Company's original application of the 25th September, 1956, that the list of permit holders was "manipulated, added to and subtracted from" in a high handed manner, that changes had been made in the, original list of permits granted, and, more generally, that members of the R. T. A had been taking undue advantage of their official position to oblige certain companies and officials, that there were instances where even the names of companies not on the agenda had appeared in the list of grant9es of permits, that the decisions of the Regional Transport Authority had been reviewed by the Chairman and the Secretary, that no reasons had been given why one applicant had been preferred to another, nor had any surveys of routes been made and that for these and other reasons which were set out in a separate annexure, the entire proceedings of the 27th to 29th May were null and void. By allowing fresh allegations of this kind to be made by the Pro vincial Transport Authority, the High Court greatly extended the scope of the enquiry, in a manner of which I find myself, speaking with great respect, entirely unable to approve. A specific mischief had been complained of in the original petition namely the introduction of a new operator for the first time on the Sargodha‑Bhera route, and although the prayer made was for quashing the entire proceedings on the ground of their being premature for lack of sufficient notice, yet it was plain at that time, and has been stated before us in clear terms by Sardar Muhammad Iqbal appearing for the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service, that his clients would have been satisfied with an order having the effect of cancelling the permits awarded to the Tariq Trans port Company. In the event, the High Court did not rely to any great extent on the grounds set out in the original petition. The learned Judges appear to have done so mainly upon the more general and injurious grounds raised for the first time by the Provincial Transport Authority. It seems necessary to observe that if within a certain Depart ment, one authority has reasons to be displeased or dissatisfied with the working of another authority, it is surely unnecessary, and is completely inconsistent with the maintenance of autonomy within that Department, to present those disputes for resolution by a Court. It is not an elevating spectacle to find, as we saw in the present case, the Secretary of the R. T. A. asking the Court to settle what powers the Provincial Transport Authority could exercise over the R. T. A. Surely there are sufficient wise heads and sober minds within the branch of the adminis tration which deals with the control of public transport to be able to devise, consistently with the statutory instruments, a modus vivendi whereby these two authorities may be enabled to function together harmoniously, and with the degree of, efficiency necessary to ensure the public good. If on the one hand it is necessary to advise the judiciary not to exceed their proper bounds in dealing with matters lying in the executive sphere, it seems necessary also to advise officials who are required to discharge executive functions to avoid regarding each other in the light of potential litigants before a Court, even it be the High Court. It was stated before us that the origin of the whole disagreement between these two Transport Authorities is something in the nature of a private quarrel between their respective Chairmen, who are both officials. The matter was not pursued further in this Court, and one may express the hope that the supposition has no element of truth in it. For, it would indeed be a sad day when owing to private grudges public officials are permitted to think of utilising a very special jurisdiction vested in the High Court, to carry on their private conflicts with the aid of such forms of law as they find applicable to their respective function. (I should add, in fairness, that the attitude of the R. T. A. in the face of the attack upon it was scrupulously correct throughout the proceedings in the case). I deem it necessary also to make some observations regard ing this special jurisdiction, which is vested in the High Court. The power to issue a writ is indeed a very special power. It is a peremptory power, intended to be exercised in a short‑handed manner, to correct errors of the relevant kind, which are paten and demand that they should be righted. They must, of course be errors of a type with which the Courts are specially competent to deal. It is not necessary to detail or categorise the errors, which may be dealt with in this way. Enough has been said in this judgment, which will indicate what the errors are that may be corrected by the writs of certiorari and prohibition. To gain the speedy, not to say immediate, relief available under these writs, it is necessary that the person complaining of the error should make his allegations in as specific a manner as possible, for in dealing with such petitions, the Court will not ordinarily enter into the examination of complicated questions of fact or law, such as are more suitable for resolution in a suit or other proceedings of more normal kind, in which an opportunity for full investigation and presentation of all relevant matters is available to both sides. Particularly with reference to writs of certiorari and prohibition, the error should generally appear on the very face of the proceedings, and the relief granted should be addressed specifically to the correction of such error. If, then, no error of the relevant kind is made to appear in the petition itself, it is clearly the duty of the Court to reject the petition. To allow the petitioner to make out fresh grounds is not permissible, otherwise than in the most exceptional circumstances. In the present case, with the introduction into the case of the Provincial Transport Authority a new face was put on the proceedings. By reasons of the allegations of general misadministration and even dishonesty which were thus brought into the case, a contest arose between the Provincial Transport Authority on the one side and the R. T. A. on the other, and it is painful to observe that in the event, with some support from the volu minous evidence which the High Court allowed to be led in the case, these allegations determined the fate of the petition of the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service. It is probably impossible to find a similar case in' the whole recorded history of the writ jurisdiction, where a petition has succeeded on a side‑wind raised T by a party who or which was introduced into the case by the Court on (I say so with due respect) no good ground. In this case, the party concerned, namely the Provincial Transport Authority, immediately took advantage of the opportunity to make a direct attack on the R. T. A. preferring allegation of a nature which, having regard to the position of the two Authorities in the same Department of Government were surely, more appropriate for presentation to the head of that Depart ment for enquiry and necessary action, or even to the Provincial Government itself. That such an attempt should be made to draw the High Court into an unseemly dispute between two executive authorities operating is the same sphere which were either unwilling or unable to perform their plain duty of working together in the public interest is extraordinary enough. If the High Court had advised the Provincial Transport Authority‑to settle its quarrel with the R. T. A. either directly or with the aid of the superior officers of the Government under which they both served, it would have acted with perfect propriety. But the matter did not end in any such way. Moved by the allegations of the Provincial Transport Authority, the High Court was drawn further into making what seems to me barely distinguishable from an inquisition into the conduct of the affairs of the R. T. A. in respect of the particular meeting in question. However widely the words of Article 170 of the Constitution may be interpreted, I cannot conceive that that Article can ever be thought to include a general power in the High Court to conduct searching enquiries into the internal working of such an institution as the R. T. A. I am clearly of the opinion that the introduction of the Provincial Transport Authority as a party into the proceedings became obnoxious .to the writ jurisdiction from the moment when by its written statement, it made plain its intention to attack the proceedings of the R .T. A. on general ground which were hardly relevant to the petition by the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service and clearly appeared to have been put forward in pursuit of previously existing disagreements on the executive side. All actions taken and all conclusions reached in consequence of the new grounds put forward by the Provincial Transport Authority appear to me to be clearly extraneous to the matter before the Court, and in my opinion, they should be totally disregarded in arriving at a conclusion in the present case. The irrelevancy of these proceedings would have appeared at once if, upon receiving the written statement submitted by the Provincial Transport Authority, the learned Judges had asked themselves whether in case the Provincial Transport Authority had moved them for a writ against the R. T. A. on the grounds appearing in their written statement, the Court would have had jurisdiction to deal, with such a petition, and whether, if there were jurisdiction, they ought to exercise it in these remarkable circumstances. For these reasons, I consider that all those grounds, which the High Court has advanced in granting relief to the petitioner company, which were raised and pursued only by the Provincial Transport Authority, should be excluded altogether in consider ing whether or not the order of the High Court should be main tained. I have already considered m detail the validity of those of the grounds underlying the order, which are related directly to the allegations made by the petitioner‑company, and have expressed my opinion thereon. I have come to the con clusion that the matter raised by the petitioner‑company was not within the jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Article 170 of the Constitution, but that all questions which properly arose there out were exclusively within the appellate jurisdiction created by section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. I have no reason to think that that jurisdiction is not available for the grant of speedy and effective relief in a case like the present. That is a sufficient ground for allowing the appeal of the Tariq Transport Company and setting aside the order made by the High Court, with costs throughout which, in my opinion should be paid as to one‑half by the Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service and as to the other half by the Provincial Transport Authority. It follows as a consequence that all the other appeals before us, must also succeed. These have been brought by parties who had no intimation of the proceedings before the High Court, and therefore had no opportunity to present their views which would have been in favour of the validity of the proceedings of the R. T. A. at which fresh permits had been granted to them. In consequence of the High Court order, they have been gravely prejudiced, and that injury is not wholly repaired by mere reversal of the High Court order, since these parties have been unable to employ their permits for a period of over a year. However, since the injury to them appears not to have been intended, I would leave these other parties to bear their own costs. A. H: Appeals allowed.